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La théorie des origines du langage de Trần Đức Thảo  
 
 
Résumé 
 
Depuis des siècles, plusieurs penseurs et scientifiques ont abordé la relation entre la 
coopération, le langage et la cognition sociale. Parmi eux, Trần Đức Thảo (1917-1993) 
mérite une mention spéciale. Le but de la recherche qui suit est de présenter au lecteur la 
réflexion philosophique de Thảo sur le langage humain et son évolution. Nous essaierons 
de tracer les grandes lignes de la théorie de Thảo sur les origines du langage dans ses 
Recherches sur l'origine du langage et de la conscience (1973) dans lesquelles il a essayé 
de truver une synthèse entre philosophie, linguistique, psychologie et anthropologie 
physique. La découverte du marxisme-léninisme a conduit Thảo à proposer une approche 
matérialiste et dialectique au problème de la relation entre corps esprit. De cette façon, 
Thảo a proposé une sorte de tournant matérialiste et historique de la philosophie de la 
conscience de Husserl qui était au cœur de ses premiers intérêts philosophiques. La théorie 
de Thảo met en relief la nature sociale du langage et de la cognition, de sorte que 
l’évolution du langage est inextricablement liée aux relations sociales. Une telle conclusion 
reposait sur l’hypothèse que le travail est une caractéristique exclusivement humaine qui 
distingue les humains des animaux. Pour lui, la genèse du langage est dans le travail 
humain et donc le langage se développe parmi nos ancêtres pré-humains ainsi que chez les 
humains en réponse aux problèmes posés par la vie matérielle. En gardant à l’esprit que le 
langage découle des exigences sociales et des besoins du monde matériel, selon Thảo le 
langage se transforme lui-même au fur et à mesure que la société humaine change. Et 
compte tenu des racines sociales de la pensée et du langage, la conscience évolue 
continuellement avec le temps. Dans ce cadre, Thảo a voulu déterminer la nature du 
langage et son rôle dans les sociétés préhistoriques et son évolution à travers les relations 
sociales. 
  
Mots clés : Tran-Duc-Thao, Evolution du langage, Cognition sociale, 
Marxisme-léninisme, Phénoménologie, Conscience 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Trần Đức Thảo’s Theory of Language Origins 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Several thinkers and scientists throughout the philosophical and scientific tradition took up 
the relationship between cooperation, language, and social cognition. Among them, Trần 
Đức Thảoʼs (1917–1993) deserves a special mention. The purpose of the following 
research is to introduce the reader to Thảoʼs philosophical reflection on human language 
and its evolution. We shall attempt to map out the main lines of Thảoʼs theory of language 
origins set out in his Recherches sur l’origine du langage et de la conscience (1973) that 
combines philosophy, linguistics, psychology, and anthropology. The discovery of 
Marxism-Leninism led Thảo to suggest a materialistic and dialectic approach to the mind-
body problem. In this way, Thảo tried to suggest a materialist and historical turn of 
Husserl’s philosophy of consciousness which was at the very heart of his own first 
philosophical interests. Thảo’s account threw into sharp relief the social nature of both 
language and cognition, so that language evolution is linked inextricably to social relations. 
Such a view depended upon the assumption that labour is an exclusively human 
characteristic which sets humans apart from animals. And the genesis of language is in 
human labour. In this way of thinking, language develops among both our pre-human 
ancestors and present humans in response to problems posed by the material life. Bearing 
in mind that language arises from the social demands and needs of the material world, 
language is transformed itself as human society changes. And given the social roots of 
thought and language, consciousness evolves continuously over time. Within this 
framework, Thảo wanted to determine the nature of language and its role in pre-historical 
societies and its making through social relations. 
 
Key Words: Tran-Duc-Thao, Language Evolution, Social Cognition, Marxism-
Leninism, Phenomenology, Consciousness 
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Ja; mach nur einen Plan 
sei nur ein großes Licht! 
Und mach dann noch´nen zweiten Plan 
gehn tun sie beide nicht. 
Denn für dieses Leben 
ist der Mensch nicht schlecht genug: 
doch sein höch´res Streben 
ist ein schöner Zug. 
(Bertolt Brecht) 
 
and in the eyes of the people there is the failure; 
and in the eyes of the hungry there is a growing wrath. 
In the souls of the people the grapes of wrath are filling 
and growing heavy, growing heavy for the vintage. 
(John Steinbeck)
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Preface 
 
 
Le philosophe travaille sur l’histoire, 
comme le savant opère dans son laboratoire. 
(Léon Brunschvicg) 
Le problème de l’origine concerne évidemment autre chose 
que l’origine du langage: son essence, son rapport à la pensée et  
à la société, l’organisation de la pensée humaine  
(empirisme vs rationalisme), sa différence à la pensée animale  
et plus généralement la position de l’humanité  
dans l’ensemble du règne animal. 
(Sylvain Auroux) 
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1. Introducing Thảo’s Theory of Language 
 
The following research provides the first systematic survey of Trần Đức Thảoʼs 
(Từ Sơn, Bắc Ninh, 26 September 1917 – Paris, 24 April 1993) philosophical 
reflection on language. One of the main features of Thảoʼs approach to language is 
the emphasis on the formation of language. By this, we shall attempt to map out 
the main lines of Thảoʼs conception of language, along with an original analysis of 
his hypothesis on language origins that combines philosophy, linguistics, 
psychology, and anthropology. The scope of the present study compels us to 
provide a historical perspective on how Thảo addressed the problems of language. 
Added to this, it is essential to broaden and complete historical research with a 
closer epistemological examination of Thảoʼs theory. 
Thảoʼs Recherches sur l’origine du langage et de la conscience (Investigations into the 
origins of language and consciousness, 1973; henceforth ILC) deserves a special 
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mention in this regard and most of our efforts will be devoted to a detailed analysis 
of that book. As a matter of fact, the ILC marks the most relevant moment in Thảoʼs 
career in so far as it is the first book he entirely devoted to language. Since the 
1940s, Thảo had wanted to offer a dialectic materialist treatment of the formation 
of consciousness. The problem of the genesis that emerged in Husserl’s last 
writings joined in Thảo’s work the great collective scientific project of dialectical 
materialism. This choice brought Thảo closer to the great currents of Soviet 
anthropology and sociology-based psychology. After having dealt with the 
formation of consciousness for a long time, in the 1960s, Thảo became more and 
more aware of the significance of the role of language to describe the nature of 
consciousness. In this way, Thảo freed himself more and more from the Husserlian 
legacy and was increasingly interested in semiology, psychology, linguistics, and 
empirical sciences. This leads us to wonder how the question of language origins 
arose in Thảo’s philosophical career. 
The ILC deserves a special mention also from an historical point of view. In the 
ILC, the problem of the nature of language is faced by Thảo in an original way 
compared to the great currents of linguistics and semiology in the 1960s – except 
for Sebeok and a few others. Here it is important to bear in mind that Thảo set out 
his theory of language origins in a period when official linguistics avoid discussing 
the issue. When semiology was being established as academic discipline and 
semioticians were trying to define the nature of that research field, Thảo tried to 
propose a general semiology in dialogue with the Saussurian heritage which at the 
time was the battle field of several different theoretical projects. But Thảo was also 
particularly sensitive to the most recent trends in ethology, animal psychology, 
and palaeoarchaeology. Thus, he was aware of the need to put in place a systematic 
survey of language origins which would link findings coming from several different 
research fields. And he tried to do this under the sign of the dialectical materialism 
during the hardest moment in the Cold War. When Hanoi was being bombed by US 
Army, Thảo dealt with Soviet anthropology, Western palaeoarchaeology, 
linguistics, semiotics, Husserlian phenomenology, and tried to suggest a general 
insight of natural history and human nature. This leads us to wonder what dealing 
with language origins from the standpoint of dialectical materialism in a so trubled 
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period from a political and cultural point of view exactly meant. 
From a more theoretical point of view, the value of the ILC is also indisputable. 
In his ILC, Thảo clearly highlighted to what extent the question of the origin of 
consciousness must be understood in chronological terms. Thus, in the ILC he took 
into due consideration the need to explain the human-specific form of thinking 
from an evolutionary point of view which cannot dismiss the slow evolution of 
symbolic abilities among our ancestors. At first glance, there are clear advantages 
to be gained from the perspective of phylogeny: viewed from the perspective of 
glottogenesis, consciousness can be analysed in a simpler way. To him, only 
describing the slow development of language light can be shed on the first forms of 
consciousness. By this, Thảo completely reformulated the Hegelian 
phenomenology of consciousness in that he described the slow formation of 
consciousness through stages among our pre-human ancestors during their 
practical life. Added to that, the discovery of Homo habilis in 1964 and the 
increasingly frequent publications dedicated to social and communication behavior 
in animals attracted Thảo’s attention. This leads us to ask what kind of rationality 
is at work in the formulation of a theory of language origins that at the same time 
deals with general philosophical questions and the empirical sciences. 
Historians of philosophical ideas have rarely paid attention to Thảo’s linguistic 
thought. Unfortunately, it still lacks a systematic enquiry of Thảo’s philosophy of 
language; and nobody has even taken his hypothesis on language origins into 
account in great detail. Historic relevance of Thảo’s philosophy is, nonetheless, 
unquestionable. Note, for example, that by the 1940s and the 1950s, Thảo was 
considered one of the most relevant French scholars in phenomenology. Over the 
years, he never stopped working on Husserlian phenomenology and tried to 
completely reformulate it. It is remarkable that some assumptions of dialectical 
materialism lead Thảo to argue that both the practical life and language are 
prerequisite conditions for having consciousness. Consciousness is not an original 
datum, but the result of the dialectical interplay of social, working, semiotic, 
embodied and preexisting practices. For Thảo the phenomenological method 
cannot fully account the constitutive process of consciousness. It will be worth 
investigating further how the objectivity of semiotic and social practices which are 
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the foundation of subjectivity outlines the horizon of Thảoʼs research. For the time 
being, we shall focus on the fact that Thảoʼs philosophy of language could be 
regarded as a relevant chapter in the history of phenomenology which must still be 
written. And for this reason, the following study adds fresh research in the history 
of philosophy.  
Needless to say, a revaluation of Thảo’s account might be also useful in the field 
of the history of linguistic ideas. It shall be our concern to substantiate this thesis 
in the following chapters. The only point we need to note for now is that a central 
claim of Thảoʼs theory, for example, is his criticism towards Saussureʼs semiological 
model. In the light of the recent interest in the theoretical affinities between 
linguistic structuralism and the Husserlian phenomenology (Stawarska 2014; De 
Palo 2016; Aurora 2017), the way in which Thảo conciliated his criticisms towards 
both the Saussurian semiology and the Husserlian philosophy is undoubtedly an 
interesting chapter in the history of interactions between linguistics and 
phenomenology. Added to this, given the transdisciplinary nature of investigations 
into the origins of language, a research concerning Thảo’s anthropological, 
philosophical, linguistic, and psychological sources could at last cast (new) light on 
the distinctive dissemination of certain linguistic ideas during the 20th century. 
Thảo’s materialist turn of Husserlian philosophy led to pursue a monistic 
approach to the puzzle surrounding consciousness. Thảoʼs conception of language 
could still be appreciated in the context of current philosophical and scientific 
debates on the so-called “mind-body problem”. Our study reflects some of the 
fundamental questions in the understanding of consciousness that have taken 
place over the last years and, as such, it will be of great interest to professionals 
and scholars who are interested in the subject. But questions about consciousness 
have proved to be notoriously difficult. Lots of question will be left open because, 
in this study, we shall limit ourselves to a general analysis of the basic features 
characterizing the question of language origins and language faculty. 
We firmly believe that Thảoʼs theory could help us to better understand some 
aspects of the current debate on language origins. This point is particularly 
relevant because, in recent years, a new way of dealing with the old question of the 
origin of language is emerging. In this regard, scholars are talking about 
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“evolutionary linguistics”. The question of the origin of language is not something 
new that has appeared in the past decades. Nor the debate on the scientific status 
of a research of this kind is something new. However, there is no doubt that, in 
recent years, there has been a proliferation of works, conferences, research 
centres, journals, etc., devoted to the subject. In this regard, we can wonder if what 
we are witnessing is the formation of an unprecedented sociological, scientific and 
academic entity. Among the several topics we can choose to analyse, we could 
address the question whether there are taken-for-granted knowledge and 
procedures underlying current debates on language origins. In this regard, one of 
the most sensitive aspects of the debate is the explanatory power of thought 
experiments. Do they rely on existing data and concepts? Can they do something 
else than integrating existing data? Can they be particularly effective at providing 
the shift in perspective? To what extent can they solve problems? What is 
supposed to be the universal features of the human condition? What is the role 
played by our biological substrate? And what is the role played by sets of social 
relations? Do scholars argue for biological determinism or historical 
contingencies? What is the role of women in thoughts experiments? How does 
language naturally evolve? What are the properties of naturally evolved language? 
Is language cut free of the social world? Is language regarded as an autonomous 
system? In determining the nature of language and its role in society, is language 
essentially social or just contingently? In this case, too, we have to deal with 
problems of great complexity. A detailed survey of them, along with a discussion of 
the current debate on language origins, would have necessitated enlarging the 
following work considerably. However, the following study does not preclude any 
possibility of engaging the most fundamental and crucial features of the current 
debate on language origins. 
Lastly, we can go so far as to say that a research concerning Thảoʼs theory of 
language origins indicates some of the ways in which other relevant issues of great 
interest can be approached. The present study will provide the basis for a more 
general reflection on some topics that are just as topical as ever: the relation 
between humankind and other animal species than the human one, the logic of 
nature and history, the origins of humankind, the emergence of human cognition, 
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the function of society, the role of institutions, and so on. In short, the following 
work will provide a detailed analysis of Thảoʼs theory without neglecting wide-
ranging and fascinating issues of general interest. Now that we have outlined the 
main strong points of the present study, we are going to describe the scientific 
starting point of our research. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Exploring available literature on this subject will also enable us to examine the 
extent to which Thảoʼs reflection on language has been debated up to now. As a 
means of evaluating the excellent reputation enjoyed by Thảo among his 
contemporaries, we will begin by citing some records. Here is how the French 
philosopher Jean Cavaillès described Thảo’s dissertation in 1942: 
 
Mr. Thảo has read all of Husserl’s published works, some unpublished, most of the 
commentaries. His work is itself one of the best French studies on Husserl and well above 
the level of ordinary degree. It reveals many skills and a penetrating philosophical 
reflection [M. Thảo a lu toute l’œuvre publiée de Husserl, quelques inédits, 
l’essentiel des commentaires. Son travail constitue lui-même une des meilleures études 
françaises sur Husserl et dépasse nettement le niveau du diplôme ordinaire. Il révèle 
des connaissances nombreuses et une réflexion philosophique pénétrante.] (from 
Israël 2005: 57; see fig. 1). 
 
Louis Althusser ([1992] 1995: 176) wrote: “I also got to know a little about 
Husserl, whom we discovered thanks to the phenomenological Marxists Desanti 
and Tran Duc Thảo, whose thesis I found brilliant.” Along the same line, it could be 
also interesting to mention the testimony of Jean-François Revel (1924–2006). Since 
the first years after his graduate thesis, Thảo had appeared to his comrades as a 
“demi-god of thought” (Revel 1997: 101-102). 
After the publication of Phénoménologie et matérialisme dialectique 
(Phenomenology and Dialectical Materialism, 1951; henceforth PDM), Thảo 
reputation became enormous. In this regard, we should also mention Roland 
Barthesʼ quite favourable review of Thảo’s PDM. Jean-François Lyotard ([1954] 1991: 
51, fn. 2) explicitly set out his admiration for Thảo and affirmed: “I must 
recommend this remarkable little book too strongly to the reader” (also cf. id., p. 
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125, 128-129). But Lyotard continued to discuss Thảo’s text in following pages1. 
Jacques Derrida ([1962] 1989: 65) invoked Thảo in his famous Edmund Husserl’s Origin 
of Geometry. An introduction. A few years later, Derrida ([1990] 2004: 117) still 
remembered Thảo’s philosophical project. In opposition to the dominant approach 
to phenomenology of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, according to Derrida, Thảo’s PDM 
pointed to the scholars of 1950s the philosophical task of dealing with the history 
of ideal objects and of truth. Paul Ricœur (2004: 168) dedicated to “Trần Đức Thảo’s 
remarkable book [PDM]” a chapter in his À l’école de la phenomenology (see also Le 
travail et la parole in Ricœur [1955] 1965)2. Other examples could be added. At least, 
many eminent French scholars considered Thảo as one of the main philosophers of 
the last century. Nevertheless, Thảo’s choice to live in Vietnam from 1952 to 1991 
might probably be a previous answer to explain the reason why his work is “no 
longer discussed today” (Derrida [1990] 2004: 117; see also Herrick 2005).  
If one asks to what extent Thảo’s philosophical project and his theory of 
language origins have been effectively discussed in the past fifty years, at least 
three points must be kept in mind. Firstly, it is clear, from the very start, that the 
problem of Thảoʼs Vietnamese period (1952–1991) is essential to determine the 
meaning of his works and especially of those he wrote between the 1960s and 1980s 
(see for instance Melançon 2016a). In the following paragraph, we will largely use 
the results of some recent studies devoted to Thảoʼs Vietnamese period. For the 
moment, we shall take note of the fact that an important part of the recent 
literature on Thảo is eminently biographical and historical (see for instance Thảo 
1993, 2004 and 2013; Hémery 2013; Papin 2013 and Feron 2014). 
Secondly, over the course of the period in question, most of the interest in 
Thảoʼs works has been extensively devoted to his writings on Husserlian 
                                                 
1  Montag (2013: 47) writes: “Precisely because both Thảo and Lyotard explicitly sought 
not to uncover and present the meaning of Husserl’s texts, assuming, within each 
period of Husserl’s thought at least, a coherence, but rather to describe the coexistence 
of contradictory meanings in a textual disarray that was never definitely overcome, 
their reading appeared superior to earlier efforts to criticize (but sympathetically) 
Husserl, such as Sartre’s Transcendence of the Ego (1937).” 
2 Ricœur carefully read the copy of PDM Thảo gave him and wrote down meticulous 
notes of Thảo’s PDM in a notebook (for the notebook see Fond Paul Ricœur, Dossier 
dʼarchive 99, 13893–13911; for the copy of PDM see the library of the Fond Paul Ricœur, 
document J142.7). Fond Paul Ricœur: Institut Protestant de Théologie, 83 boulevard 
Arago 75014, Paris. 
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phenomenology. In connection with this, according to some scholars, it is essential 
to determine the role played by Thảo among French students in phenomenology 
(see Brouillet 1970, Invitto 1985, Jarczyk & Labarrière 1990, van Breda 1962, de 
Warren 2009, Moati 2013, Feron 2017). As we have already noticed, Thảoʼs writings 
have been largely appreciated by French contemporary scholars who were 
interested in phenomenology (Derrida, Ricœur, Barthes, Althusser, etc.). The 
extent to which those scholars invoked Thảoʼs works more or less polemically 
exceeds the scope of our present paragraph. For the time being, we shall leave that 
question open. The only point we need to note for now is that we can observe a 
wider interest in Thảoʼs writings on phenomenology starting from the 1960s (Neri 
1966; Rovatti 1970; see also Tomassiniʼs Italian translation of PDM in 1970; Picone 
1972, Tomassini 1972, Brouillet 1975, Nardi 1994, Herman 1997, Benoist 2013, Feron 
2013, Giovannangeli 2013, Melegari 2014, Melançon 2016b). Symptomatically, this 
literature is eminently introductive rather being addressed to those working on 
Thảoʼs philosophy almost exclusively. 
It seems quite relevant that several works are devoted to Thảoʼs reflection on 
politics and especially on Marxism and colonialism (see Federici 1970, McHale 2002, 
Majkut 2003, Espagne 2013, Melançon 2013, Simon-Nahum 2013). This is the third 
point we must keep in mind. Now that we have outlined the main trends of 
secondary literature devoted to Thảoʼs life and works, let us mention a book of 
collected papers edited by Benoist and Espagne in 2013 which summarises the 
three main trends of secondary literature on Thảo. It must be regarded as the first 
attempt to offer a comprehensive survey on Thảoʼs intellectual activity. 
What emerges from all that has been said is the role assigned to Thảoʼs 
philosophy of language. Needless to say, most papers devoted to Thảoʼs philosophy 
of language took the shape of reviews and brief articles (Drévillon 1973, Caveing 
1974, François 1974, Haudricourt 1974, Trognon 1975, Schmitz 1978, Baribeau 1986, 
Tochahi 2013). The fact is not surprising because the study of Thảoʼs writings is far 
from being highly selective and is still focused on some general issues. What is 
necessary to examine Thảoʼs philosophy of language in depth is a wide research 
which takes Thảoʼs writings on language dating from the 1950s to the 1970s into 
account. Only after having done so will we be able to develop a detailed analysis of 
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Thảoʼs theory of language. We have already mentioned in the previous paragraph 
the advantages of a research of this kind. And the scope of the present study is 
exactly to provide the first systematic survey of Thảoʼs philosophical reflection on 
language. 
 
3. Thảo’s Life and Works 
 
It is extremely difficult to establish when Thảo took a sudden interest in issues 
relating to language. Our working hypothesis will consist of considering that 
Thảoʼs interest in linguistic topics was the result of his personal reflection on the 
Husserlian phenomenology. To Thảo, the phenomenological reduction to 
consciousness had not been radical enough and, for this reason, Husserl failed to 
understand natural origins of consciousness. Given what he considered the main 
conundrum of phenomenological method, Thảo was forced to elaborate a new 
approach to studying consciousness. Faced with this problem, Thảo claimed that 
human language must be understood to be the key to have access to a better 
understanding of the formation of consciousness. 
To begin to gain a clearer sense of what was and what was not distinctive about 
Thảoʼs conception of language, one needs a previous systematic and 
comprehensive overview of Thảoʼs life and works. This overview could be also of 
interest for all those who do not know Thảoʼs biography in great detail. 
However, Thảo’s biography is not always clear or renowned at all. The mystery 
that surrounded his life made Thảo’s philosophy fascinating, exciting, and 
intriguing for a very long time. Even the most important information on his life, 
such as his date of birth, was unknown until a few years ago (see for instance 
Tomassini 1970). That seems to be a sufficient reason to devote an introductory 
paragraph to Thảo’s biography. Added to this, Thảo’s Vietnamese period shrouds in 
mystery nowadays too. It is particularly important because Thảo’s theory of 
language was exactly drawn up during that period of time. This is another reason 
why an introductory paragraph to Thảo’s life and works seems to us essential to 
our aims.  
It is not possible in a limited space to analyse every detail of Thảoʼs biography in 
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depth. The present paragraph shall attempt only to map out the main lines of 
Thảoʼs biography and intellectual activity. Fortunately, in recent years, all the 
problems mentioned above have led to the proliferation of studies devoted to 
Thảoʼs life (see the previous paragraph for more elaborate treatment). Most of the 
information used here are based on those sources3. 
Thảo was born in the little village of Phong-Tháp (part of Châu-Khê City) in the 
province of Bac Nihn on 26 September 1917. He was the son of a postal employee. It 
could be useful to remember that, at the time, Vietnam was a French colony. Thảo 
studied at the French Lycée Albert Sarraut in the Vietnamese capital Hanoi. 
Polyglottism was entirely part of his education. In the coming years, he would 
learn classical languages, German, English and Russian and he would continue to 
publish in Vietnamese and French. He received a French baccalaureate degree in 
1935. One year later, he won a scholarship of the general government of Indochina 
in order to study in France. After having studied at the Lycée Louis-le-Grand and at 
the Lycée Henri IV in Paris, eventually, he became a student of the École Normale 
Supérieure’s (henceforth ENS) in rue d’Ulm (Paris) in 1939. The same year began 
the Second World War (WW2). After French defeat (the so-called Débâcle) and the 
surrender of Paris June 14, 1940, Thảo left Paris and went to the South of France. In 
Clermont-Ferrand, during winter 1940–41, he met the French philosopher and 
partisan Jean Cavaillès (1903–1944). Under the auspices of Cavaillès, Thảo began to 
be interested in phenomenology. 
In 1941, Thảo was again in Paris. Here, he personally knew Maurice Merleau-
Ponty (1908–1961) who was working as a temporary researcher (agrégé préparateur) 
at the ENS. Merleau-Ponty read with Thảo some pages of his dissertation 
Phénomenologie de la perception (Phenomenology of Perception). So many years later, 
Thảo would still remember the way in which Merleau-Ponty highlighted the 
                                                 
3 For Thảo’s biographical information see Feron 2014, Giao 1988, Hémery 2013, Israël 
2005, Papin 2013, Melançon 2016a, Revel 1997; cf. also Thảo 1991: 1-11; id., 1993a; see 
also Thao 2004 and 2013. See also the letters to Van Breda maintained by the Archives 
of the University of Leuven. For the period at the ENS see the following documents 
maintened by the National Archives of France (Saint-Denis): 61AJ/174, 175, 176, 191. See 
also de Warren 2009 for a brief but meticulous introduction. For the earliest Thảo’s 
Vietnamese period of see the testimony of Tô Hoài (1992: chap. 2) who represents him 
as enthusiast and naïf. For Thảo’s political engagement at the end of 1950s, cf. Kux and 
Dall’Ongaro 1967: 117-125. 
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relevance of Husserl’s last writings such as Erfahrung und Urteil (Experience and 
Judgment) and the first two sections of Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften 
(The Crisis of European Sciences). Genetic phenomenology and the problem of the 
epistemological status of phenomenology marked Thảo’s first encounter with 
Husserlian phenomenology. In 1942 Thảo defended a thesis (mémoire; DES, Diplôme 
dʼétudes supérieures) about the phenomenological method. One year later he 
passed as second ex-aequo the agrégation in philosophy (Spring 1943). Interestingly, 
he was the first Vietnamese who passed the agrégation in philosophy. But he was 
non classé: he won but he cannot become a professor in France because was not a 
French citizen but a protégé français. 
After the agrégation, Thảo started working again on phenomenology (September 
1943). From January to April 1944 he spent some time at the Husserl-Archive in 
Louvain (Belgium) where he read some Husserl’s unpublished works4. He 
transferred several unpublished Husserlʼs documents in Paris. He kept some of 
them by him until 1946 and some of them until 1948. In June 1944, Thảo began to 
rework his dissertation on phenomenology under the supervision of the French 
philosopher Emile Bréhier (1876–1952). The text largely circulated among his 
colleagues at the ENS. Thảoʼs dissertation could be regarded as one of the first 
academic works on phenomenology and it probably seemed interesting in 
particular in the light of the role assigned to last Husserlian writings. 
Unfortunately, the text is lost. Anyhow, according to Thảo’s published works, this 
in-depth study of phenomenology leads Thảo to assume a more and more critical 
attitude towards Husserl’s work. 
To fully understand Thảo’s philosophical career, we cannot underestimate his 
political interests. Slowly, political engagement leads him to deal with certain 
philosophical questions, and especially that of the relationship between history 
and consciousness. In the early 1940s, Thảo played a part in the political activities 
of the Trotskyist Groupe bolchévik-léniniste indochinois (GBL). He had the opportunity 
of meeting the communist militant Daniel Guérin (1904–1988) and the writer Pierre 
Naville (1904–1993). And, in 1944, Thảo engaged himself in the safeguard of 
Vietnamese workers who had been deported in France and employed to contribute 
                                                 
4 For the list of Husserl’s texts he read see Tomassini 1970. 
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to production of weapons needed cause of the war against Germany. 
Simultaneously, Thảo became a member of both the General Committee and the 
Central Committee of Indochinese during the Congress of Indochinese (Congrès des 
Indochinois) which took place in Avignon (December 1944).  
At the end of WW2, Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969) declared the Independence of 
Vietnam (2 September 1945). Then Thảo gave a press conference to defend the 
independence of Vietnam. But, during the conference, he inflexibility answered to 
a question: journalists asked him to express his opinion concerning the way in 
which the French troops will be received in Vietnam and Thảo answered: “à coup 
de fusil!” (With guns!). After a few days the political group of which he was the 
political leader is dissolved by order of the Ministry of the Interior. Thảo was 
arrested on 6 October and incarcerated in the Santé Prison (Paris) from 9 October 
to 16 December 1945 (see fig. 3). During the imprisonment, he wrote two articles: 
Sur l’Indochine (On Indochina, 1946) and Marxisme et Phénoménologie (Marxism and 
Phenomenology, 1946). Both revealed the immediate results of Thảo’s earliest 
intellectual and political experiences. 
Thảo (1946a) discussed the Husserlian notion of Lebenswelt (monde de la vie, 
lifeworld) viewed as the key to produce a synthesis of phenomenology and 
Marxism. Thảo was disappointed by those Marxists who had merely postulated 
that the general structure of world-experience (structure générale de l’expérience du 
monde) strictly depends upon economic base. He, therefore, tried to investigate the 
relationship between material conditions of life (economic base) and the 
intellectual or spiritual dimension (culture, philosophy, art, etc.). It is quite clear 
that Thảo’s main aim was to elucidate the relative autonomy of superstructures. 
Thus, he set out that some economic elementary conditions furnish l’allure générale 
in which several ideological interpretations of the world could be conceivable. But 
economic base does not determine superstructures. Thảo had placed the subjective 
experience of the lifeworld between the two dimensions. It shall be our concern to 
substantiate this thesis in Chapter 1. Let us move on to the article entirely devoted 
to Indochina. The Husserlian notion of lifeworld was regarded by Thảo (1946b) as 
the starting point for all his subsequent remarks: French and Vietnamese have two 
different lifeworlds and, for this reason, they differently interpret the same events. 
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Consequently, a possible solution of the Vietnamese crisis could only be the 
abolition of the colonial structure which had produced two different lifeworlds. In 
the 1945 articles, the problem of the origin of idealities emerges clearly and for the 
first time. 
After the WW2, Thảo became one of the most relevant scholars in 
phenomenology. In 1946, Thảo is invited to give lectures about phenomenology at 
the ENS5. From 1946 to 1949, he published several articles devoted to 
phenomenology. From a philosophical point of view, after a brief period in which 
Thảo was close to existentialist trend (see Thảo 1946a), he began to disapprove of 
Sartre’s existentialism even more (see for instance Thảo 1949a). At the end of the 
1940s, Thảo’s philosophical project involved a radical criticism towards 
existentialism from a materialist and anti-dualistic point of view. In Thảo’s work, 
the question of animal consciousness and the transition to human consciousness 
became increasingly relevant. Over the following decades, this interest would 
slowly lead him to focus on the question of the origin of language. 
In the meantime, Thảo became even more sympathetic with Marxism and his 
political engagement became radical (see Thảo 1946a; 1946b; 1947a, 1947b). He 
supported the political view of Ho Chi Minh who probably Thảo personally met 
during the Conference of Fontainebleau (Summer 1946). And in 1951 Thảo’s 
political engagements for the independence of Vietnam led him taking the decision 
to return to Vietnam.  
Before the departure, Thảo summarised and published some results of his 
research into phenomenology (see Thảo [1951] 1986). To some extent, Thảo 
disagreed with Husserl’s approach exactly because Husserl neglected the empirical 
origins of knowledge. After adopting a materialist perspective, Thảo tried to 
reevaluate certain ideas involved in Husserl’s theory of consciousness and 
integrated them into a description of animal cognition. Consciousness is nothing 
other than the result of a given inhibited behaviour. In this context, Thảo gave up 
Husserl’s way of thinking and assumed dialectical materialism as the theoretical 
horizon in which phenomenology could be successfully integrated. To Thảo, 
                                                 
5 One can consult the content of Thảo’s lessons by way of the notes of his student 
Althusser (see ALT2. A56-09 maintained by the IMEC in Caen, France). I would like to 
thank Alexandre Feron for this information. 
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phenomenology may be useful to describe animal intelligence, but a coherent 
description of human cognitive skills requires an overview concerning the 
practical and historical dimension in which they arose. Thảo, therefore, explained 
the way in which human social institutions – language, politics, philosophy, 
religion, and so forth – arose from practical and collective working life6. For 
instance, before being a tool of communication, language was a working tool that 
rhythmically coordinated collective goal-oriented actions. Slowly, language turned 
into a personal mode of expression and, consequently, involved human-specific 
reasoning and other cognitive skills (see Chapter 2 for more details). The origin of 
language is, therefore, analysed in a key moment of the book, that is, the transition 
from animal consciousness to human one. Nonetheless, the space Thao dedicated 
to this point is extremely small. Furthermore, the phylogenetic perspective is only 
sketched out. He rather prefer to compare species living today so as to highlight 
their characteristics. 
In 1952, Thảo arrived in the region of Viêt-Bac that was the military base of 
Viêt-Mihn Army. During the first year, he wrote two reports on the economic and 
educative politics that had to be realized in Vietnam. The two reports are lost. 
Then he worked in the Department of Literature, History and Geography of the 
province of Thái-Nguyên. One year later, he translated some writings of the Maoist 
General Secretary of Indochinese Communist Party Truong Chinh into French. 
Thereafter he took part in the organisation of ideological re-educational activities 
in the province of Phú-Tho during the period of the Agrarian Reform. It could be 
necessary to remember that from 1952 to 1954, the Agrarian Reform was 
characterized by terrible cruelties, destruction of local traditions and the 
imposition of the Central Committeeʼs political doctrine. 
At the end of the First Indochina War (1954), Thảo had been appointed as 
Director of Department of History at the University of Hanoi. From then on, he 
began to teach and write in Vietnamese. During the same period, Thảo published 
                                                 
6 In those pages, as pointed out by Feron (private correspondence), Thảo followed the 
historiographic paradigm of Émile Durkheim’s Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse 
(The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, 1912) and Engels’ Der Ursprung der Familie, des 
Privateigenthums und des Staats (The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, 
1884). 
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some historical articles devoted to the history of Vietnam and to Vietnamese 
literature (see Aubert-Nguyen 2013). Since 1955, he has taught History of 
Philosophy at the University of Hanoi and at the Institute of Pedagogy. A 
Vietnamese transcription of Thảo’s lectures has been published in 1995 (The History 
of Thought before Marx)7. He began his lectures with Homer, finished with the 
analysis of Hegelian philosophy and included references to Western literature and 
Chinese traditional philosophy. In the meantime, he returned to questions 
concerning the origin of consciousness with two articles devoted to The Origins of 
Consciousness in the Evolution of Nervous System (1955). The evolutionary perspective 
begins to emerge in Thảo’s work. 
Thảo taught at the University of Hanoi until 1957 (cf. Papin 2013: 64). 
Meanwhile, Thảo supported democratic reform in two articles of the same year. As 
a result, the Vietnamese Communist Party –deeply hostile to every kind of 
revisionism – decided to arrest, try and imprison Thảo until 1961 (id., p. 79). After 
being forbidden to publish articles or books in Vietnamese, Thảo restarted getting 
involved in French intellectual life. Thus, he wrote some articles in French and sent 
them to some French reviews (see Thảo [1965] 1956, 1966, 1969a, 1969b, 1970). This 
was a particularly difficult moment from the biographical point of view. 
Meanwhile the American involvement in the Vietnam War (1955–1975) increased. 
Nonetheless, from an intellectual point of view, this is an extremely fruitful period 
for Thao. In the 1960s he was engaged in a vast research project on the origins of 
consciousness and language, as evidenced by a series of articles collected in his ILC 
in 19738. This project can be summarized as an attempt to formulate a monistic and 
materialistic theory of consciousness. Dissatisfied with the results of 
phenomenology, Thảo also sought to explain human cognition through the 
practical and collective life of our ancestors, following some indications he found 
                                                 
7 The version of Thảo’s lectures corrected by Thảo is lost. Thảo 1995 is the synthesis of 
the notes of his students (cf. Papin 2013: 69; Thao 2013: 96-102). 
8 See Thảo 1966, 1969a, 1969b, 1970. The first article corresponds to the first chapter of 
the ILC. In detail, Thảo 1966 corresponds to Thảo 1973: 11-57. There are small 
differences of editorial nature that concern examples. On the other hand, the two 
articles of 1969 correspond perfectly to Chapters 2 and 3 of the ILC. In detail, Thảo 
1969a corresponds to Thảo 1973: 59-146 and Thảo 1969b corresponds to Thảo 1973: 146-
219. In the same way, the last article (Thảo 1970) corresponds to the last chapter of the 
second part of the ILC (Thảo 1973: 220-244). 
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in the classics of Marxism (see Federici 1970, Caveing 1974, Haudricourt 1974, 
Frédéric 1974). The conversion of genetic phenomenology into a phylogenetic 
investigation into the origins of consciousness was definitively concluded. 
In PDM, language played a role, but not a very relevant one, because it was 
simply the mental reflex of social praxis. Thảo’s perspective changed in his ILC: the 
language is no longer a reflex of social life but rather an essential element of social 
practices. ILC is composed of three parts: the first one envisages the movement of 
the indication as the original form of consciousness, the second one is devoted to 
the evolution of propositional syntax and semantics, and the third one focuses on 
the relation between the Marxism and psychoanalysis, and more precisely the 
phylogenetic origin of the Oedipus complex9. In short, Thảo dealt with the three 
main stages of the evolution of the human language – pointing, syncretic language, 
and fully-developed sentences. There are no clear-cut distinctions between these 
three stages but proximate overlaps, slow transitions and coexistence. To explain 
the evolution of language, Thảo also described the interactions of some elements: 
physiology and anatomy, communication, tool-making, cognition, social relations, 
and environment.  
In 1951, Thảo explained the origins of human language without taking the 
evolution of the human lineage into account. To him, linguistic skills arose among 
our fully-developed human ancestors. In contrast with that, as he set out in his ILC, 
prehominds (the Australanthropus) already developed a sophisticated form of 
language (see Chapter 7 for more details). Additionally, the evolution of the human 
lineage reveals a gradual development of anatomy (hands, brain, and sense 
organs), social life (labour, communication), and cognitive skills (abstract thinking 
and consciousness). But, similarly to what he had already made in PDM, Thảo kept 
linking the stages of human evolution with the corresponding phases of child 
development. 
                                                 
9 For the Oedipus complex see Freud’s letter to Fliess (15 October 1897) in Freud 1954. See 
also Simon & Blass 1991; Ellenberger [1970] 1994 and 446; Perron 2002. For the debate 
on the Oedipus complex and the corresponding political implications (the so-called 
“Freudo-Marxism”) see Bernfeld 1926 and 1928; Reich 1927 and [1929] 1934; Sandkühler 
1970; Kätzel 1987; Reiche 1968; Marcuse 1955; Foucault [1972] 2006; Deleuze & Guattari 
[1972] 2004; Gente 1972; Wolfenstein 1993. For the universal validity of Oedipus 
complex in anthropological debates see Malinowski ([1921] 1927) and Lévi-Strauss 
([1949] 1970). 
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Thảo tried to suggest a dialectic-materialist theory of language origins. It is 
clear, as we will worth investigate further in Chapter 3, that the main target of 
Thảo’s theory was the French structuralism and Saussureʼs linguistics (see Thảo 
1974 and 1975). Thảo’s theory started from three hypotheses: i) consciousness 
emerges in and through the language considered in its materiality and in its 
practical and operational function; ii) language is not an object, but it is mediation 
between humans and reality, between the individual and the others, between the 
individual and the own self; iii) language cannot be studied as an autonomous 
reality, but it must be observed in the social and practical life. Then, he supposed 
the existence of certain fundamental natural signs in which the relationship 
between the signifier and the signified is not arbitrary (gestures, vocalizations, 
pointing, physiognomic expressions, etc.). These signs have a strong bodily 
character and are part of the practical and collective life. 
In the 1980s, the international political context changed. Thảo restarted writing 
articles in Vietnamese once again (see Melançon 2016a). In 1979 Vietnam won the 
war against the Cambodian Democratic Kampuchea governed by Pol Pot’s Khmer 
Rouge (KR). In the meantime, Vietnamese public opinion discovered the atrocities 
of Cambodian genocide carried out by the KR between 1975 and 1979 (an estimated 
one and a half to three million people died). In could be remarkable the fact that, in 
this period, the diplomatic relations between Vietnam and China were not easy at 
all. And it is no coincidence that Thảo wrote a polemic paper against Maoism and 
the supporter of the so-called Cultural Revolution. In the same period, Thảo tackled 
Hegel’s and Marx’s dialectics. He wrote the article La dialectique logique dans la genèse 
du “Capital” (The Dialectic in the Genesis of “Capital”; see Thảo 1984) and a book 
devoted to the Philosophy of Stalin (see Thảo 1988a). This research allowed Thảo to 
reconfirm the criticism of structuralism and in particular his disapproval for 
Althusser’s insight (see Thảo 1988b). 
Archival documents refute the view that Thảo was alone and isolated in 
Vietnam. Let us mention just three examples. At the Department of Applied 
Philosophy, Sociology, Pedagogy and Psychology of the University of Padua (Italy), 
there is the Rossi-Landi Fund. In this found it is possible to consult the exchange of 
letters taking place from 1971 until 1973 between the Italian semiologist Ferruccio 
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Rossi-Landi (1921–1985) and Thảo (see the following documents: (1) faldone muto. 
Titolo provvisorio: Thảo; (2) V4, cartella “Editions Sociales”; (3) 15o, “Trân Duc 
Thao”). The subject of the letters is the editorial project of a volume titled LʼOrigine 
del linguaggio e della coscienza (The Origin of Language and Consciousness) that 
would collect the Italian translation of some of Thảoʼs articles that appeared in the 
previous decade in the French review La Pensée (see fig. 2). A wider correspondence 
concerning theoretical as well as practical topics existed between Thảo and the 
French philosopher Lucien Sève (born in 1926) and which took place between 1971 
and 1986 at least (see figures 4-6). In the case of Rossi-Landi and in that of Sève, 
several books and reviews were sent to Thảo (see fig. 7). Moreover, from 8 March to 
27 May 1982, Thảo was in East Berlin as visiting scholar at the German Academy of 
Sciences (Akademie der Wissenschaften) under the supervision of Vincent von 
Wroblewsky (see fig. 8). The three examples we have mentioned show very well 
that Thảo was not alone and isolated but rather he was up-to-date on most recent 
research (as it is clear in so far as one takes the chronology of Thảo’s references in 
his ILC into account: see figure 20). The reason for this interest in empirical 
sciences is that dialectical materialism was considered by Thao as a synthetic 
approach to the sciences against abstract philosophical speculation. 
Let us now to move on to a letter of Thảo to the French philosopher Guy Besse 
(1919–2004) dating 1 February 1987 (see fig. 9; Thảo 1987a). Thảo talked about a 
collection of essays and he called them Recherches anthropologiques (Anthropological 
Investigations; see fig. 10). Thảo also said that he had already proposed such a 
collection to the French Communist editor Messidor/Editions sociales. The book was 
supposed to composed of three essays: L’origine du premier homme (The Origins of 
First Human Being), Le concept de l’homme (The Concept of Human Being), and La 
formation de l’homme (The Formation of Human Being). With regard to these essays, 
two of them remained unpublished: L’origine du premier homme (The Born of First 
Human Being; Thảo probably referred to a manuscript entitled La naissance du 
premier homme and dated November 1985: see Thảo 1985; in 1986, he published an 
article with the same title) and Le concept de l’homme (August 1986; see Thảo 1986b). 
The question of the origin of consciousness, of humanity, and of language had 
already slowly emerged during the 1940s and 1950s, starting from a review of 
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genetic phenomenology and under the aegis of dialectical materialism as a method 
to put in relations several different research field. The issue is now firmly 
established as the main interest of Thảo’s philosophical reflection. 
La formation de l’homme was published by Thảo himself in 1991 (see Thảo 1991). 
This book was composed of La formation de l’homme (September 1986) with a Preface, 
an Introduction devoted to an analysis of some recent findings in genetics, an 
Appendix to the Introduction dedicated to the communication system of chimpanzees 
(June 1983). In the same period, Thảo also published two articles concerning 
language origins. Those two articles are entitled Mouvement de l’indication et 
certitude sensible (The Movement of Indication and the Sensible Certitude, see Thảo 
1981 and 1983). Unfortunately, a deep analysis of the Anthropological Investigations 
cannot be fulfilled by the present study because of the additional philological work 
which is necessarily required to offer the content of Thảo’s manuscripts and almost 
unpublished writings in an accessible form. 
Interestingly, during the 1990s, Thảo’s renewed interests in logic implied a 
relevant rehabilitation of Husserl’s phenomenology and, specifically, his notion of 
Living Present. In a letter to the French philosopher Vincent von Wroblewsky (born 
in 1939) written 8 March 1993, Thảo described his last efforts and said: “As you can 
see at the beginning, my philosophical assumptions changed completely” (see Kail 
1993: 141-142). Thảo probably alluded to his re-evaluation of Husserl’s philosophy 
that allowed him to rediscover some of his own philosophical assumptions of the 
1940s and 1950s. Unfortunately, the achieving of such a philosophical, ideological 
and scientific project would be suddenly interrupted by his death in Paris. He 
returned to Paris in 1991 sick, elderly and worn out by years of financial and 
existential difficulties (see Marchaisse 2013). For instance, in 1992, Jean-Toussaint 
Desanti sent a letter to the President of the Association of the ENS Former Students 
to ask whether the association could help Thảo (see Archieve Desanti, Pièce n. 
239/2_1/46_1 p. 5 et 6). Thảo passed away 24 April 1993. His body has been buried 
in Văn Điển Cemetery (Hanoi, Vietnam). 
After having briefly summarised Thảoʼs intellectual itinerary and made essential 
information available to the reader, all the necessary elements are there, and we 
can devote the following paragraph to the main contents of the present study. 
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4. Contents of the Present Work 
 
Chapter 1 will focus on the development of an interest in language origins in 
Thảo’s early writings. Among them, PDM deserves a special mention. PDM came up 
against a backdrop of growing interest in Husserlian philosophy and, along with 
other works, marked the innovative reception of phenomenology in France.  
In this respect, our thesis is that Thảo became to be interested in language 
origins as soon as he tried to explain the transition from animal consciousness to 
the human one. But Thảo slowly came to consider this problem. Firstly, he focused 
on the problem of consciousness in genetic terms under the influence of 
phenomenology: How does consciousness arise? Thảo suggested that the 
development of Husserlʼs phenomenology must be regarded as a series of efforts to 
solve a conundrum that Husserl failed to solve. He reasoned that the consciousness 
described by phenomenology must be reckoned to be the result of both the 
biological evolution and the social history. Then, Thảo claimed that there is a need 
to assume dialectical materialism as the only coherent solution to save and 
integrate the positive achievements of phenomenology into a richer account. Thus, 
Thảo tried to explain the origin of consciousness from the movement of matter and 
then he was forced to consider the animal consciousness. Furthermore, as we will 
see, according to Thảo, phenomenology is able to describe the animal 
consciousness, but in order to explain human consciousness, the contribution of 
sociology is needed. At the point of transition from phenomenology to historical 
materialism, from animal psychology to sociology, Thảo introduced the question of 
the origins of language. In regard to living beings, Thảo set out that we could 
observe a primordial form of consciousness already in simpler organisms. More 
specifically, he argued that consciousness is nothing but the result of the inhibition 
of a given behaviour through a more sophisticated one. In short, consciousness is 
the inner experience of an inhibited act. In this way, Thảo introduced the 
“symbolic function” and declared that symbolic function could be reckoned to be 
an important juncture in the evolution of animal consciousness. The inner lived 
experience of the organism is no longer experienced in the inner flow of 
consciousness, but it is rather communicated to others through the behaviour. 
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Nevertheless, the way in which Thảo posed the problem of language origins did not 
yet depend upon an evolutionary insight. 
Before coming to other considerations, it must be said that it is not the task of 
Chapter 1 to explore Thảo’s treatment of Husserl’s philosophy in great detail. As a 
matter of fact, this issue is discussed enough in secondary literature and everybody 
could find sufficiently thorough analyses of it (see Rovatti 1970, Tomassini 1970, 
Invitto 1985, Lyotard 1991, Ricœur 2004, Warren 2009, Benoist & Espagne 2013). 
The main point of Chapter 2 is the analysis of Thảo’s hypothesis on origins of 
human language set out in his PDM, along with a detailed study its semiological 
assumptions. Our thesis will be that Thảo’s first theory of language origins entails 
some difficulties. In detail, Thảo does not seem to be able to describe the mediation 
between practical life and linguistic consciousness once the fully developed 
language emerges. The problem facing Thảo at this juncture is how i) to conciliate 
the linguistic ego and the real subject of practical life, and ii) to justify the link 
among language, reality, and consciousness. After having published PDM, Thảo was 
obligated to set out a new theory of the origins of language and consciousness in 
order to solve the difficulties that we have just mentioned. 
As we have already seen, the results of Thảo’s research dating from the 1960s to 
1970s took the shape of a book devoted to the origins of language and 
consciousness. PDM had taken the origins of human language into account but did 
not highlight very well the relevance of language for human cognitive 
development. By contrast, ILC underlined the role played by language in the 
evolution of human cognition. In the following chapters, we will focus on the RLC. 
We will study the book from 9 different perspectives which correspond to 9 
different way to approach its main contents (see Chapters 3-11). 
Between 1974 and 1975, Thảo published a long article that may be seen as a 
biographical and theoretical introduction to some themes that he had already 
discussed in ILC. In Chapters 3 and 4, that article will be analysed together with ILC 
in order to show the way in which Thảo described and justified the general outlines 
of a semiotics that allowed him to talk about the signs employed by our ancestors 
before they spoke languages similar to ours in every way. In those articles, Thảo 
called into question Saussure’s semiotic model explicitly and gave an interesting 
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treatment of Saussure’s semiology. Chapter 3 will describe the main outlines of 
Thảo’s treatment of Saussure’s semiotics. In this way, it will be possible to raise the 
question of the theoretical conditions for having a theory of language origins. Our 
thesis will be that Thảo was forced to broaden the narrow limits of Saussure’s 
semiology in order to study the origins of language. Emphasis will be put on Thảo’s 
semiological project, i.e., the “semiology of the real life”. This semiology dealt with 
what he called “the language of real life”, i.e., the pre-conscious and social system 
of motivated signs which entail some fundamental significations. In Chapter 3, a 
deep analysis of the notion of the language of real life will be conducted on the 
base of Thảoʼs philosophical sources (MEW III: 26-31), along with the analysis of 
some examples of understanding of that notion within the Marxist tradition and 
the examination of Thảoʼs manuscripts.  
In Chapter 4, we will deal with Thảo’s criticism towards phenomenology and we 
will show that his theory of language origins seriously depended upon that 
criticism. In this way, the old longstanding philosophical issue of realism. 
Specifically, we will describe the way Thảo tried to link consciousness and material 
reality. Simultaneously, the meaning of Thảo’s criticism of Husserlian 
phenomenology will become clearer. Since phenomenology merely described the 
lived experience of the subject and neglected the real relation between the subject 
and the material external reality, the Husserlian philosophy is a kind of subjective 
idealism and cannot represent a touchstone to investigate the origins of language 
and consciousness. Thảo anchored consciousness and intentionality in collective 
activities and especially in the semiotic act of gestural indication which involves 
the most fundamental relationship between humans and physical environment. 
And for this reason, Thảo stated that pointing must be reckoned to be the semiotic 
base of conventional systems of arbitrary signs, as it allows their reference. 
In Chapter 5, we will see that, according to Thảo, consciousness arises from the 
language of the real life. Consciousness is the peculiar way human thinking 
represents reality and becomes aware of the contents of experience. And this is 
nothing other than the effect of the internalisation of language of real life. After 
that, a brief analysis of the Soviet debate on consciousness taking place in the 1950s 
and 1960s will be conducted in order better to understand the background against 
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which Thảoʼs theory needs to be read and to what extent his theory answered some 
questions that are at the very heart of contemporary debates. Some brief remarks 
concerning the debate on mind/body problem taking place in English speaking 
world in the same period will show how, during the 1950s and 1960s, on both sides 
of the Iron Curtain, scholars largely dealt with the question of consciousness. In 
this way, some philosophical questions will be introduced: How consciousness can 
simultaneously be the product of the nervous system and something spiritual? To 
what extent physiological mechanisms can produce something that seems to 
transcend matter? Or should we reduce consciousness to physiological 
mechanisms? What implications does the definition of consciousness as a social 
product have for the study of consciousness? To what extent social relations are 
involved in the formation of consciousness? Is nurturism the only insight Marxism 
had to support? Is there something more than experience and learning in the 
formation of consciousness? And then, did language reorganize the prelinguistic 
experience? To what extent does language have an influence over thought? What 
kind of conscious contents does language convey? In the conclusions of Chapter 5, 
we will assume those questions as guidelines to describe the peculiar way Thảo’s 
addressed the puzzle of consciousness.  
Chapter 6 will examine the extent to which the language of real life must be 
reckoned to be the mediation between social practice and consciousness. Before we 
address this question, however, we must begin by sketching a particular 
comparison between Thảoʼs conception of consciousness and Vološinov-Baxtinʼs 
one. Exploring some of the similarities and differences between those two socio-
semiotic approaches to the description of consciousness may allow us highlighting 
the main assumptions of Thảoʼs theory of sociogenesis of consciousness. The main 
element in the approach Thảo suggested to the puzzle of consciousness is the 
internalisation of the language of real life. The language of real life seems to be the 
key to explaining the way conscious contents arise. Thảo’s discussion underscores 
implications of understanding the origin of concepts and abstract notions. By this, 
he described how tendential meaning conveyed by the language of real life can be 
internalised by a sophisticated mechanism of self-dialogue and proprioceptive 
attitude. 
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Chapter 7 is intended as a detailed exploration of Thảoʼs hypothesis on the 
development of practical skills such as the use and production of instruments and 
tools. We have already said that Thảoʼs hypothesis on language origins largely 
depended upon Engelsʼ theory of the part played by labour in the development of 
linguistic skills. But the main property which belongs to Thảoʼs theory that is of the 
highest order of importance can be at best summarised in his efforts to 
substantiate Engelsʼ suggestions with the most recent findings in several fields of 
research such as biology, archaeology, palaeoanthropology, and so forth. The main 
thesis of Chapter 7 is that Thảo knew and took a position on contemporary studies 
devoted to the origins of humankind. Meanwhile, we cannot forget that Thảo 
seems also to be seriously influenced by contemporary scholars whose thinking 
betrayed some elements of anthropocentrism and teleology.  
Chapter 8 will place Thảoʼs theory within contemporary debates on the role 
played by gestures, hunting, ape communication systems, phylogenetic 
development of cognition, and so forth, and the role of the evolution of language. 
The framework we will map out will enable us to appreciate the Thảoʼs theory of 
language origins within the broader context of Soviet anthropology (Spirkin, 
Bunak) and linguistics (Abaeb) as well as of debates on language origins taking 
place in Western countries in the mid-20th century. Given this scenario, Thảo’s 
insight seems to be one of the most radical in so far as he assigned to gestures and 
multi-modality a key role to explain the formation of language and thought. 
Chapter 9 will focus on some aspects of Thảo’s approach to several different 
topics. Though various issues will be tackled, Chapter 9 revolves around the 
epistemological evaluation of Thảo’s theory. In the first group of paragraphs, we 
will focus on the heuristic methodology used by Thảo. Archaeology and psychology 
offered Thảo findings that he assumed as the empirical starting point to suggest his 
own hypothesis. In the second group of paragraphs, Thảoʼs approach to nativism 
will be analysed in great detail. We will illustrate how the analogy between the 
development of language in the child and the symbolic skills of our ancestors is 
based, according to Thảo, upon the innateness of some of modern human symbolic 
abilities. After having described some examples of the results Thảoʼs approach, we 
will introduce some questions concerning the deductive method which seems to be 
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at work in Thảoʼs reasoning. In effect, he established a finite set of formulas (six) 
that can generate all the infinite occurrences of signs which arise during the 
phylogeny as well as the ontogeny. The third group of paragraphs will deal with 
the language of the child in greater detail and will try to analyse Thảoʼs theory 
against the background of debates among psycholinguists during the 1960s. Then, 
we will evaluate whether Thảo’s hypothesis lacked a solid basis of experimental 
data or whether his elaboration of experimental data was really inappropriate. 
After that, some remarks concerning Thảo’s alleged scientism and his relation to 
the phenomenological method will be required. Lastly, we will illustrate Thảo’s 
representation of human language.  
To Thảo, retracing phylogeny of language amounts to a description of a sort of 
phenomenology of consciousness in Hegelian terms. Chapter 10 will deal with the 
way Thảo described the most ancient forms of language – circular-arc gestures and 
straight-line gestures – and analysed the development of corresponding conscious 
cognitive skills. He claimed that language of real life and the corresponding forms 
of consciousness slowly appeared through dialectical shifts. To Thảo, the 
emergence of new signs depends upon the intrinsic contradictions of available 
signs which are no longer appropriate to new material activities. As a matter of 
fact, the language of real life evolved in order better to represent mind-
independent things. Every sign reveals some inadequacies, and, for this reason, it 
could be transcended by a more sophisticated one. For instance, to Thảo, the 
qualitative leap that marks the emergence of the sign of representation from the 
simple indication depends upon the ability to transcend the limits of present 
perception. Furthermore, in this Chapter, the semantic formulas of signs of 
representation will be analysed in great detail. 
Chapter 11 will substantiate the thesis that Thảo suggested a conception of the 
iconic nature of syntax. To him, the function of real sentences is to express the 
connections of things by means of the connection of words. To begin to gain a 
clearer sense of what was and what was not distinctive about Thảoʼs theory of 
iconic syntax, we need a systemic overview of his theory of the formation of the 
functional sentence. According to Thảo, the functional sentence marks the 
dialectical transition from the use of isolated syncretic words to the first real 
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sentence. 
Chapter 12 will introduce the reader to what we consider the profound meaning 
of Thảo’s philosophical project. We believe that Thảo wanted to suggest a 
philosophical anthropology which served him to identify the roots of alienation in 
modern societies. The main element in the approach Thảo suggested to the 
problem of human nature is the question of the origins of consciousness. To him, 
that question can be solved if we assume the standpoint of the evolution and 
development of human language. In order to understand Thảo’s conception of 
language, it is necessary first to see some of the assumptions on which it was based 
and then proceed to its details. For this reason, Chapter 14 will start with a wide 
overview of the main trends in the history of the question of language origins. In 
that history, the link between language and labour emerged as one of the main 
concerns of what we will call “Noiré tradition” preceded by the name of the 
German philosopher who has long been considered a reference point of that 
tradition. In Chapter 12, we will also be able to discuss a central claim of Thảo’s 
anthropology. He refused to reduce consciousness to corporeal activity. Rather, he 
preferred to see consciousness as an emergent ability of the human body in so far 
as it is embedded in social relations and labour. We know beforehand that the 
language of real life plays the role of mediation between consciousness and 
practical life.  It follows naturally that consciousness evolves continuously over 
time because the transformation of language parallels the development of human 
society itself. There is an essential bond that links the individual and society, the 
individual and the creative power accumulated during human history. The roots of 
alienation in modern societies could be seen in the negation of that human 
essence. 
Thảo’s anthropology seems thus to be the exact opposite of Gehlen’s one. Even if 
there are some similarities between Thảo’s anthropology and Gehlen’s such as the 
role played by labour in the evolution of humans and the active role played by 
language to shape the relationship between individuals and material world under 
the pressure of social demand and needs, there is a deep difference between the 
two anthropologies they suggested. Central to Gehlen is the idea that humans do 
not have, unlike other animals, a relationship with his environment set once and 
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for all on the instinctual level, genetically codified. Humans are thus historical 
animals. But if the human being is an animal open to the world, since human 
behaviour is not inscribed in a circle of predetermined activity on an instinctual 
plane, human passions should be disciplined. This is the main condition for having 
human societies. But Thảo’s emphasis on the universal human nature does not 
allow us to underestimate the formative role and the open-ended nature of both 
language and labour. Thus, the last paragraph of this chapter will be devoted to 
Thảo’s theory of material and intellectual culture as the human-specific 
environment in which humans live. 
 
5. Expected Results and Further Perspectives 
 
The main purpose of the present study will be to suggest a systematic survey of 
Thảoʼs philosophical reflection on human language. We will attempt to map out the 
main lines of Thảoʼs conception of language, along with an original analysis of his 
hypothesis on language origins that combined philosophy, linguistics, psychology 
and anthropology. Our efforts will tend to place Thảo’s theory in its historical 
context and to study its inner development over the period in question (see the 
Conclusions for more details). 
As has already been said, Thảoʼs ILC deserves a special mention in the formation 
of Thảoʼs theory of language origins. Our efforts, which have been devoted to a 
detailed analysis of that book to provide a historical perspective on how Thảo 
addressed the problems of language, could take the shape of a commented edition 
of the book. After his publication forty-five years ago, a revised edition of ILC can 
now be successfully edited. Scholars will have at their disposal a text enhanced by 
Thảoʼs first-hand errata corrige (see figure 15). A historical analysis devoted to the 
development of Thảoʼs theory and essentially based on the results of the present 
study – which largely depend upon unpublished manuscripts – will also enable 
scholars better to appreciate the philosophical value of ILC. This will be the most 
immediate and concrete further perspective of the present study. 
Given that the present study will allow us better to understand the relation 
between the two theories of language origins set out by Thảo in his PDM and ILC, 
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one can explore to what extent his theory changed during the 1980s. Thảoʼs 
partially unpublished and totally neglected Recherches anthropologiques 
(Anthropological Investigations; see fig. 10), to be sure, represented Thảoʼs 
perspective on language origins during the 1980s. Thảoʼs Anthropological 
Investigations show several fascinating, unexpected and suggestive hypotheses 
which seem to deeply and essentially differ from what he had suggested in his 
previous writings. As we have already said, unfortunately, a deep analysis of the 
Anthropological Investigations cannot be still fulfilled by the present study because of 
the additional philological work which is necessarily required to offer the content 
of Thảo’s manuscripts and almost unpublished writings in an accessible form. But 
the present research will offer the fundamental elements to carry out research into 
Thảo’s last writings in the next years. 
Once the purpose of describing Thảo’s theory of language origins set out in the 
1980s will have been fulfilled, as a result, a comprehensive overview of the course 
of Thảo’s research will be finally at a disposal of researchers. Over the course of the 
period in question, Thảo suggested several different solutions to the question of 
the origins of consciousness. Only analysing the inner evolution of Thảo’s thought 
throughout his career, light can be shed on the forms of his philosophical insight. 
In this way, it will be possible to gain a clearer sense of what was and what was not 
distinctive about Thảo’s theories of language. This is the most important field 
scholars should investigate in the coming years. 
Every theory of language origins – like any other theory – depends upon the 
historical context in which it is set out, and, specifically, on available technological, 
linguistic, historical, scientific knowledge as well as the given political and cultural 
background. We have strictly followed this assumption in the present work. 
However, further research could examine Thảoʼs theory from an epistemological 
standpoint in order to test his approach and highlight some difficulties (see the 
next paragraph for more elaborate treatment). Thảo’s theory is an attempt to 
philosophically answer some questions concerning language and language origins. 
In his efforts, we see the same problems that affect today’s research. The aim of 
questioning of this kind is to individuate new methods, new research fields, new 
problems, new terminologies, etc., which allow us to deal with still unknown 
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subjects or to analyse the logic which guides every investigation into language 
origins. What has to be also stressed is that Thảo’s thought might be still useful to 
evaluate and appreciate certain hypotheses on the origins of human language 
which have been set out in the past few decades. His perspective can serve as a 
touchstone by which the current proposals may be judged. Nevertheless, we may 
also be reproached for making the error of anachronism and for this reason some 
remarks concerning our idea of what anachronism are necessary (for more details 
see the next paragraph). 
 
6. Some Methodological Remarks 
 
We should note that Thảo’s theory of language could be legitimately seen as a 
consequence of his more general philosophical account. In this regard, Thảo’s 
theory of language origins is neither a strictly linguistic theory nor a strictly 
scientific and experimental theory. Of course, everything depends upon how we 
define linguistic and science. For the time being, we shall leave that question open. 
To avoid misunderstanding, we shall now only anticipate that Thảo regarded his 
own theory as a scientific one, but, as we will also note in the following study, he 
used a particular idea of science. To him, every scientific theory must be based on 
dialectical materialism (see below Chapter 1). Whatever Thảo defined what was or 
was not “science”, “linguistic” or “dialectical materialism”, it does not preclude us 
to say that his theory is neither scientific in current term nor it was based on 
experiments. 
To the extent we will deal with Thảo’s philosophical approach to language, some 
brief remarks concerning what we mean by “philosophy” are needed. In our mind, 
“philosophy” means an investigation into the external world and our relationship 
with it (cf. Cellucci 2008: 19 ff.; cf. also Russell 1997: 170). Philosophy is not limited 
to sectoral issues but tends to provide a clear and general vision of the world (cf. 
also Plato, Republic VII 537 c7). Philosophy aims at developing knowledge and, thus, 
questions such as those of the conditions and nature of knowledge and methods of 
discovery are essential for philosophy. One of the main values of philosophy is to 
suggest new methods, new problems, new terminologies, etc., which allow us to 
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deal with new and still unknown fields of research. The history of sciences 
demonstrates this point very well. How many sciences arose from philosophy? 
This gives rise to two consequences at least. Both results of other disciplines in a 
wide sense and existing knowledge are thus essential to philosophy. Secondly, the 
goals of philosophy cannot essentially differ from those of sciences – whatever it is 
the scientific standards a period accepts. Both science and philosophy are intended 
to develop our knowledge of the world and ourselves. In this vein, there is a kind of 
continuity between philosophy and sciences as a domain of acquired and 
established knowledge. But philosophy cannot blindly accept findings of other 
disciplines. Sciences deal with a very limited scope by very sectoral approach. 
Instead, philosophy cannot be understood to be a professional activity in the same 
way as sciences. Philosophy lacks objects, methods, practices and categories that 
are shared and established once and for all. For this reason, philosophy constantly 
seeks new ways to improve methods, research areas and existing approaches. And, 
in this vein, philosophy is aware that there is no guarantee that current methods, 
approaches, fields of research, etc., could allow us to discuss and solve new 
problems. 
The very quick and operational description we have just given of the nature of 
“philosophy” serves first as a keystone for readers so that they can orient 
themselves throughout the following work. We can now say that our interpretation 
of the task of philosophy corresponds very well to that envisaged by Thảo in his 
writings. As we will see, a central aspect of Thảo’s theory is the fact that his 
philosophical research naturally takes as its point of departure both the scientific 
discoveries and the philosophical theories of the past. His aim was to propose a 
general theory of the world and of our epistemic relationships to this world. 
Questions such as our epistemic relation to the world and the nature of our 
thought are not specifically scientific questions, but general epistemological, i.e. 
philosophical questions. Thảo was aware that philosophy absolutely needs 
scientific findings to achieve its goals. In the following chapters, we will describe 
examples of how Thảo proposed a philosophical synthesis of the results of sciences. 
At this moment, what interests us is the role Thảo assigned to language in the 
formation of consciousness and his efforts to explain its origins. At this point, we 
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see at once the role of dialectical materialism as a philosophy that provides the 
theoretical tools for articulating and ordering the results of empirical sciences to 
answer philosophical questions concerning the nature of consciousness. In doing 
so, dialectical materialism would expand our knowledge of the origins of language, 
offering researchers some useful working hypotheses. 
But why does a philosopher treat the origin of language to explain the nature of 
consciousness? It is remarkable that, according to Thảo, consciousness is the result 
of the biological history of our species and language the condition of its 
development. Assuming that, we understand why he developed a theory of the 
origin of language. But there is more. There are singular affinities between 
philosophical discourses and discourses concerning the origin of language. It could 
be useful to remember that theories of language origins have a special place among 
scientific discourses. Specifically, the question of language origins cannot be 
reduced to the tasks of one scientific discipline. Since Darwin’s theory of origins of 
species, it has become clearer and clearer that hypotheses on language origins 
must be based on findings of several different sciences (anthropology, psychology, 
linguistics, biology, genetics, archaeology, etc.). Crucially, over and above the 
scientific value of each science whose findings collaborate to the understanding of 
language origins, one of the main issues related to language origins regards the 
way different sciences can contribute to suggesting a plausible theory of language 
origins. By this, the question of language origins meets an epistemological concern 
that has just been seen to be at work also in philosophical discourse. But if it is so, 
the question of language origins is a particularly interesting area for philosophers. 
It is essential to note that often a theory of the origins of language is reduced to 
a form of the literary genre usually called narrative. A theory of the origins of 
language aims to illustrate a pre-historical one-time hypothetical scene by 
connecting events, real and imaginary. The test of the plausibility of such 
fictionalization of unattainable events depends upon indirect elements. But a 
theory of language origins cannot be reduced to fiction merely because scientific 
findings of several different scientific fields of research give theories of language 
origins some starting points. A theory of language origins must, therefore, be in 
accordance with available knowledge. The extent Thảoʼs theory was in accordance 
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with the available knowledge of the period will be discussed in depth in Chapter 7. 
Starting from the results of the empirical sciences, in the sense indicated, does 
not mean that a theory of language origins obliges us to leave aside questions of 
more general interest. There is no doubt that topics related to language origins 
have been and perhaps they are still philosophical subjects. Language and reality, 
language and thought, language and society, the evolution of humankind, the 
relation between humans and animals, etc., are just some of the topics that the 
origins of language must deal with. That is the case with Thảo: philosophers such 
as Thảo tend to a theoretical goal which goes beyond a theory of language origins. 
But the question of language origins cannot be reduced to the work of philosophers 
alone. There are at least three different ways to approach the issue. First, as we 
have just seen, there is no doubt that research that aims at hypothetically 
reconstructing the origins of language has historically been and may still be a 
philosophical research. That kind of research attempts to provide a general 
overview collecting available results to suggest a plausible development of events. 
There is also the sectoral approach to the issue. This is the case of researchers who 
focuse on the origins of language against the background of their particular 
scientific field. Third, research on the origins of language sometimes seems to 
attempt to legitimize and test methods, theories, and ideas of language that arose 
elsewhere (eg Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch 2002). 
After having briefly analysed the relationship between the theories of language 
and the (scientific) available knowledge, we must address the other question we 
posed at the beginning of this paragraph, namely the question of the relationship 
between the origins language and linguistics. In part, the previous lines have 
already answered this question. Linguistics, like any other science, provides the 
necessary elements for the development of a hypothesis on the origins of language. 
Furthermore, we must admit that the topics concerned with the question of 
language origins are parts of the history of the discipline. And that is true assuming 
whether the standpoint of historiography of linguistics (Koerner & Asher 2014) or 
that of historiography of philosophy of language (Coseriu 2015). If we ignore that 
point, we cannot understand, for example, why the question was sometimes 
neglected or banned by linguists (see for example Auroux 1989). And we cannot 
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forget that nowadays too, though in a partial way, some linguistic disciplines such 
as sociolinguistic, psycholinguistic, biolinguistics, etc., actively contribute to 
hypotheses on language origins. 
Regardless of the definition of what linguistics is – whether it is a recent 
scientific discipline (Oesterreicher 1986) or a more ancient inquiry into language 
and languages (Koerner & Asher 2014), Thảo’s theory is certainly a paragraph in 
the history of linguistic ideas. Suffice here to remeind the reader that Thảo 
suggested a theory of the faculty of language and its relation to the real life of 
humans. But we can draw at the same conclusion if we analyse Thảo’s efforts to 
tackle Saussure’s semiology. And the following work will enable us to see at work 
the transfer, the transmission and the reception of Saussure’s theory which was 
born in the field of linguistics and Thảo employed in a different context.  
In this respect, it is important to think carefully about the meaning of the words 
“idea”, “theory” and “knowledge”. At first glance, we must observe that the 
present study is not interested to distinguish the history of linguistic ideas from the 
history of linguistic theories (cf. Colombat, Fournier & Puech 2015: 11). In fact, we 
will deal with the theory of a single author and our aim wonʼt be the long history of 
ideas suggested in different historical periods. In a similar way, we do not deal with 
a scientific theory in the current sense, i.e. the body of knowledge of a professional 
domain, as defined by relevant learned societies or professional associations. In 
effect, we do not deal with the history of science(s) in a strict sense because we do 
not tackle the issue of the emergence of a discipline, shared methods, standards, 
institutional goals, etc., within a scientific community. With the term “theory”, we 
mean a coherent set of concepts, procedures, methods, and statements. This use of 
the term “theory” will allow us to compare ideas, notions, concepts, etc., of 
different authors who worked in different periods. In this vein, the distinction 
between “science” and “non-science” does not concern us because Thảo’s research 
tried, on the contrary, to find a synthesis between domains and categories that are 
based on scientific criteria that do not always coincide. Thus, we will sometimes 
use the terms “idea”, “theory” and “knowledge” naively and interchangeably. 
What does it mean to focus on the history of a theory about language? In July 
2018 took place the 20th Intentional Congress of Linguists. A workshop has been 
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devoted to the history of linguistics and the call for papers explicitly emphasized 
the goal of the workshop: “contributors are invited to show how older, lesser-
known or forgotten linguistic theories may support modern research.” 
Contributions focusing on the importance of the history of linguistics for current 
linguistic research are welcome! And what does it happen to linguistic theories 
which cannot support a modern research? Should we really exclude them from our 
field of research? When can this choice take place? What kind of modern linguistic 
research should be regarded as “current”? Should the history of linguistic ideas 
demonstrate its own importance? And should it do it in this way? Should linguistic 
historiography merely offer a rhetorical support for current research? If not, why 
can’t history of linguistic ideas open new fields of research? 
The call for papers was not basically wrong but some functional distinctions 
need to be introduced for our purposes. We previously noted that our following 
remarks do not presuppose a distinction between linguistics as a science and non-
scientific linguistic ideas since that distinction is not useful to our aims. Thus, we 
will mean by “linguistics” every linguistic theory which deals with the faculty of 
language, languages and language practice. It is precisely for this reason that we 
call the history of linguistics the historiographical discipline that i) studies the 
production, transmission and circulation of past theories, concepts and statements, 
which arose to describe languages, language and language practices; and ii) relates 
them to their social, economic, institutional and cultural context. Like all historical 
research, the historiography of linguistics can not be reduced to a tool serving to 
establish the authority of the present nor to disqualify current research. In fact, 
history of linguistics can also be interested in long-dead concepts that are not still 
active today. Historiography must provide reliable descriptions and explanations 
of the transformations that have taken place in the past by finding evidence and 
asking questions about that evidence. 
The point of view of the historiography of linguistics is not the only point of 
view that one can adopt to study the past of the discipline. Moreover, linguistic 
ideas have developed over at least the last 3,000 years and several different 
approaches have been used over the period in question (philosophical, philological, 
erudite, quantitative, qualitative, empirical, theoretical, etc.). This raises a number 
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of questions. What could the historical conditions of the emergence of new 
concepts, reasoning styles, experimental systems, technical objects, etc., be like? 
Answering this question is one of the tasks of the historiography of linguistics. How 
did linguists, philosophers, grammarians, etc., articulate their statements, 
descriptions and observations starting from the practices, technologies, knowledge 
and methods available in their time? We call the approach that tries to answer such 
questions “historical epistemology of linguistics”. It is interested neither in 
deducing norms from past theories nor evaluating their validity in relation to 
present research. How did linguists, philosophers, grammarians, etc., try to solve 
the same problems as linguists today? In this case, we try to answer the problems 
of today’s linguists through the theories of the past. We call this approach the past 
of the discipline “epistemology of linguistics”. The evaluation of past 
methodologies and their comparison with current linguistic research is the task of 
the epistemology of linguistics. By “epistemology”, we mean the study of the 
foundations, methods, and implications of scientific knowledge. It could be useful 
to remember that the French word “épistémologie” corresponds to the English 
“philosophy of science” more than “epistemology” which is concerned with the 
theory of knowledge. 
What the call for papers requires are contributions in the field of the 
epistemology of linguistics. Obviously, the epistemology of linguistics supposes two 
assumptions at least: i) the scope of linguistics is a set of ahistorical, general, and 
universal problems; ii) linguistic theories of the past are evaluated in the light of 
the same set of problems which troubles linguists today. The goal of the 
epistemology of linguistics is to deduce norms from the description of past 
assuming the point the standpoint of current linguistic theories. Evidently, one 
must dismiss the historiographical standpoint. Nevertheless, we can reliably 
distinguish relevant theories from irrelevant ones only after having carried out 
historical research. The description must precede every evaluation; history of 
linguistics must precede epistemology of linguistics. Another important point is 
also to understand that historical epistemology remains closer to historiographic 
research, while the epistemology of linguistics enjoys a greater freedom compared 
to the context of production and transmission of certain ideas. 
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The three approaches could be intimately related and interact each other. And 
we use all the approaches in the following work. But attention must be paid to 
distinguish them because each one satisfies different needs. We firmly believe that 
the historical approach must be the starting point of both the historical 
epistemology of linguistics and the epistemology of linguistics. It is difficult to 
introduce rigorous observations concerning the emergence of concepts and 
problems as well as useful evaluations for today’s research without the support of 
historical enquiry. In the first case, we previously need some historical coordinates 
to illustrate the conditions of emergence a field of knowledge at a given time and 
place. In the other case, the evaluation of the solution of a given problem cannot be 
detached from the contingent packages, methods, proofs, contingent conditions of 
methods, evidence, procedures, etc., which were at a disposal in a given period. 
Only after having conducted the historical research, we can introduce the 
standpoint of the epistemology, whetever it could be more or less historically-
oriented. In this vein, even if we will use the three approaches, historical research 
must be regarded as the infrastructure of the following work. Given that we will 
describe the historical, theoretical, social, etc., conditions of emergence of the 
question of language origins in Thảo’s thought (see especially Chapter 1). After 
that, we will analyse his theory of language origins from a historical point of view 
and we will try to avoid every kind of anachronism. In the conclusions of this work 
we will propose possible lines of research that would take into account the extent 
to which Thảo’s theory answers the problems of current research. 
For the time being, we must describe in detail the historiographical and 
epistemological-historical approach that will be at work in the following study. 
While epistemology of linguistics is not basically interested in concepts which are 
not active today, history of linguistics, as a historical discipline, can also take into 
account phenomena without follow-up, without any continuity with the present 
day (Riot-Sarcey 1998). Interestingly, this allows the historian to reactivate 
possibilities of the past (Ricœur 2003). This point, as we will have seen in the 
previous paragraph could be important for the development of current research. 
Now, we do not believe that history can be guaranteed to be free from any 
influence of the present moment and especially from the expectations of the 
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researcher (see Koselleck 1979). One should also be aware that, as Aron (1938) 
noted, the teleological perspective plays a leading role in historical research. To 
make sense of evidence from the past, historians cannot ignore what happened 
after it (Farge 1994). Additionally, historical descriptions cannot be totally free 
from available knowledge. It depends upon the fact that history as every form of 
knowledge is an effort to solve problems – and in our case to explain how, where, 
why, when, etc., a certain historical fact took place – starting from available data. 
What is furthermore an absolutely fundamental fact is the political and 
ideological role played by the link between the rhetoric of historical events and 
historical discourse – as is well known, at least, from Cicero (see De Oratore, 46 BC). 
The question of writing and narration of history is not an incidental aspect of 
historiogrpahy. Certainly, history must tell. But history cannot be reckoned to be a 
mere fiction (see for instance Veyne 1971). Nevertheless, historiography is a 
discipline which must test its own findings (De Certreau 1975; Ricœur 1983-1985). 
Against the narrativism (see the works of Danto, Gallie, Mink, White, etc.), we 
believe that language of history does not create historical reality, but it rather 
interacts with evidence and available knowledge. The main difference between 
fiction and history is the same that exists between conjecture and verifiable 
hypotheses (thanks to the documentary, statistical, indirect evidence, testimonies, 
etc.). After that, it is necessary to add that historiography cannot be reduced to the 
recording of facts. First, the historical fact is not an absolute starting point. It is 
rather the result of the dialectic between problems, sources, and representations of 
facts or hypotheses. With the term hypothesis, we mean a proposed representation 
of a fact. Without hypotheses, all sources (or data) are at the same level. Once a 
hypothesis is made or adopted, the hypothesis organizes sources by representing 
the corresponding facts, creating connections, introducing causal connection, 
evaluating facts (not every fact seems worthy of our concern). At the same time, 
data give our hypotheses shape because we generate hypotheses from collected 
facts and compare our hypotheses with known facts, available knowledge, available 
sources, etc. In sum, there is a circle of facts and hypotheses. 
Assuming that, we must add that once there are hypotheses, there is the effort 
to explain. Historical research cannot be reduced to a description of facts. We 
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believe that historiography can explain but we must immediately add that it 
depends upon what kind of questions we pose to historiography. As historians, we 
face with Thảo’s writings. They will be considered as historical events and, as every 
historical event, we will try to explain why they appear at a certain moment and in 
a certain place given the fact that some historical conditions were at work. We call 
this kind of explanation external explanation. External factors cannot be dismissed 
to determine the meaning of a theory. We cannot ignore who Thảo was, where he 
came from, where he was educated, why he returned to Vietnam and his exclusion 
from academic and political life in Vietnam, the fact that his theory of language 
origins largely depended upon the necessity to write in French and addressed his 
writings to the French public, the difficulties to find scientific books and articles, 
etc. 
Another objection that can be made concerns the fact that our research, like all 
historical research, necessarily needs general concepts to resume and designate 
theoretical trends (idealism, Marxism, materialism, physicalism, etc.). 
Generalizations of this kind are not unnecessary in so far as they are regarded as 
hypotheses. As such, they can be constructed from observations and may be 
verified at any time. Certainly, we must be aware of the historicity of our 
representations and concepts, especially when they do not appear in sources. And 
the researcher should clearly define concepts at work in her own descriptions. But 
we cannot say that representations are disconnected from sources, evidence and 
available knowledge (see Marrou 1954). In other words, neither sources form 
representations immediately nor representations create facts. Instead, 
representations, sources, evidence are dialectically interwoven. 
In the following work, we will illustrate the conditions of emergence of certain 
questions in the writings of Thảo from a historical point of view. But we are firmly 
convinced that historical conditions are necessary but not sufficient to describe the 
emergence of a theory. As a result, we defend the idea that the agency of historical 
actors must remain intact in our work. We cannot give up to historize the theory 
against the background of the biography of the author. And for this reason, the 
biographical method could be very useful (cf. Schlieben-Lange 1989: 18). In this way, 
we are dealing with the development of a theory during the author’s life. We want 
 41 
to figure out how, why, when certain questions have arisen. And to achieve this 
aim, it is necessary to adopt a philological approach and try to find new sources 
such as letters, manuscripts, etc. Together with a biography of the author, the 
theory must also be regarded against the more general historical and cultural 
background of the epoch. In this way, a theory must be seen as an action which is 
simultaneously historical and ideological. We cannot forget what kind of public 
Thảo addressed to: although the orthodox political terminology of Marxism-
Leninism was widely used by Thảo, he wanted to pursue a dialogue with empirical 
sciences. He translated and reformulated political concepts into philosophical ones 
in order to offer working hypotheses to empirical sciences: 
 
You know that I have exposed in Phenomenology and Dialectical Materialism how I have 
been led to Marxism by the theoretical contradictions of phenomenology and 
idealism in general, apart from all political considerations. Since then, experience 
has confirmed that my research is only useful if it remains purely theoretical and 
scientific [Vous savez que j’ai exposé dans Phénoménologie et Matérialisme dialectique 
comment j’ai été amené au marxisme par les contradictions théoriques de la 
phénoménologie et de l’idéalisme en général, – en dehors de toute considération 
politique. Depuis, l’expérience m’a confirmé que mes recherches ne sont utiles qu’en 
restant sur ce plan purement théorique et scientifique.]. (Letter to Rossi-Landi, 
Hanoi, 8 September 1971; see fig. 11)  
 
At the same time, it means that our author and his theory cannot be reckoned to 
be one-dimensionally determined by the historical conditions (see for instance 
Febvre 1942). We cannot give priority to the collective dimension, the impersonal, 
and the automatism over actions of individuals. A theory must be rather regarded 
as an intentional act. The opposition between individuals and society must not be 
neglected but it should rather be reckoned to be dialectic interactions. In this way, 
we will analyse the theory of our author against the background of the theoretical 
context of reference. Another way of saying this is that we will see how Thảo acts 
upon a theoretical context composed of philosophical, psychological, political, and 
biological discourses. So, we will analyse the margin of autonomy of Thảo’s theory, 
i.e., his work of adaptation, reformulation, translation (in a strict sense), and 
negotiation of more or less established discursive norms. Thus, the notions of 
agency (Thompson 1963) and situated bounded rationality (Barth 1966, 1967) will 
allow us better to determine the field of research of Thảo. It will be so possible to 
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compare his theory with other ones in order to appreciate novelty/conventionality 
or authenticity/unoriginality of arguments and conclusions as well as to mark 
their limits. Thus, during the course of our research, we need to introduce what we 
have called the historical epistemological approach. 
Pedagogical needs forced us to adjust the logic of research to the logic of clear 
descriptions of Thảo’s theory. Thus, in the following pages, our historical-
epistemological method does not always emerge in the clearer way. For this 
reason, few words are needed in this regard. Thảo’s theory will be compared with 
other theories. Those theories are about some particular topics or more general 
ones which seemed us to be relevant to explain the peculiarities of Thảo’s theory. 
They are theories that he knew or theory of the epoch which shared some 
assumptions, topics, methods, arguments, etc, with Thảo’s one (see for instance 
Chapter 8). The comparison will permit us to focus on affinities and differences 
between them. Then we will try to explain those affinities and differences by 
theoretical or contingent factors. Our aim will be not to find precursors of Thảo’s 
theory and ideas, but rather to understand why there were affinities and 
differences between Thảo’s theory and the other ones. The comparison will also 
allow us better to describe some concepts and assumptions of Thảo’s theory which 
are briefly sketched-out in the primary sources (for instance the concept of 
inhibition: see Chapter 2). 
Certainly, the question arises of how to best reconstruct what an author knew. It 
is not always clear in texts and, for this reason, it could be useful to collect as many 
documents as possible (as we have already noted above about biographical 
method). But this method cannot provide us with the guarantee that we are not 
overestimating the role played by other sources. In these cases, we are often 
dealing with what it is not said, the implicit. This a conundrum which arises in 
every field of historical research. In fact, historiography cannot be reduced to 
record of events becaus it has also to reconstruct what lacks in the sources 
(Schlieben-Lange 1989: 12). 
We will take the historical awareness implicit in Thảo’s theory into account: the 
relation of Thảo’s theory with its past, future, and present. Scholars call such an 
inner perspective on time régime d’historicité (François Hartog), the field of 
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experience and horizon d’attente (Koselleck 1979 applied these notions to the 
historical research), horizon de rétrospection (Auroux 1987). As we will see, Thảo’s 
theory can be well seen as an attempt to transform available knowledge and bring 
together several different fields of research (psychology, archaeology, physiology, 
etc.) under the aegis of dialectical materialism. In effect, we must focus on the 
scientific model Thảo’s theory was based on and which is very strange to us: to 
him, dialectical materialism is the scientific framework which gives empirical 
sciences their true meaning. In other words, to him, dialectical materialism is 
nothing but the philosophical framework (the metaphysics) of empirical sciences. 
According to Auroux (1980: 8), we need to distinguish this explicative-
descriptive epistemological approach from methodological and evaluative one. 
According to the perspective chosen in our research, we must, however, add some 
remarks. The historical and philological point of view is the precondition for 
having both the descriptive-explanatory epistemological approach and the 
methodological and evaluative one. According to the point of view of historical 
epistemology, what Auroux called “descriptive-explanatory epistemology,” we will 
analyse the internal conditions of Thảo’s theory. By this, we will also try to 
evaluate its methodology keeping in mind its historical and cultural context but 
without considering it as the only source of validity of a theory. A genuine 
treatment of a theory must not simply neglect the inner logic which specifies the 
peculiarity of a theoretical account. A theory joins a chain of implications and, 
thus, we must consider their value and function in the argument independently of 
the external context. What must be emphasized is the coherence or inconsistency 
of a given theory. In this way, we will test both cognitive mechanisms (the 
opérations cognitives: see Simone 1975) and processes of systematisation which were 
at work in Thảo’s theory. 
As we have already had occasion to mention in the previous paragraph, there 
are clear advantages to be gained from the point of view of the epistemology of 
linguistics. First, the epistemological evaluation of Thảo’s theory furnishes the 
todayʼs researches an informed awareness of some concepts they are using and 
their limitations. Second, the comparison of Thảo’s theory with current research 
could be a means of evaluating new hypotheses, novel or opposing theories. In the 
 44 
conclusions of the present study, we will suggest a possible development of this 
approach. For the purposes of this study, however, we shall not delve into the 
details of this point. And, for this reason, we encourage a further research to be 
devoted to this kind of investigations. 
Certainly, we are aware that an epistemological research adopts an 
anachronistic point of view in so far as we suggest comparing Thảo’s theory with 
research conducted elsewhere and many years after his death. But that does not 
mean that we are looking for precursors, prophecies, current issues in the past, etc. 
(see Febvre 1942). We would simply encourage to compare Thảo’s theory with 
current research withouth assuming that a scientific paradigm (methods, topics, 
standards, etc.; see Kuhn 1982) is better than everyone else. The only profound 
legitimacy that can be conceived in the theoretical support of anachronism is 
therefore the fact that the question of the origins of language is a field of research 
in which several different approaches are still in competition. In effect, it lacks a 
shared conception of language, animal cognitive skills, etc. Thus, today’s debate on 
language origins needs the support of older theories whose study – as Koerner 
(1978: 67) wrote about historiography of linguistics in general – promotes “skill in 
the judgement of novel or opposing theories, and thus at the same time safeguards 
us against uncritically accepting excessive claims in support of one particular […] 
theory.” 
Generally, a comparison between older theories and most recent ones could 
allow individuating what can be considered as “newer” in current debates. An 
essential condition for carrying out such a comparison is to study different 
approaches representative of a certain historical moment. Nonetheless, this is not 
our case. We deal indeed with a theory which cannot be reckoned to be the model 
of a largely shared approach to the issue in a given moment of the past. Since this 
kind of comparison cannot be taken into account, we must abdicate this still 
“historical” approach. We also believe that the “pseudo-historical” approach 
cannot help us to our epistemological aim. As Swiggers (1984) already argued, we 
believe that a comparison between a theory of the past and more recent theories is 
essentially wrong, in so far as they do not share the same theoretical assumptions 
and they do not start from the same empirical findings. Since one adopt such a 
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pseudo-historical approach, there is the risk to carry out a research whose goal is 
to distinguish science and non-science by assuming the current research as a norm 
to evaluate the past. We must, therefore, look for another solution to make the 
comparison between Thảo’s theory and the current debate on language origins. 
We defend the heuristic value of the anachronism (see Hartog 1980; Loraux 
1993). Anachronism does not simply mean to discover a current issue in the past or 
a past issue in the current debate. In the first case, one justifies and reinforces 
current methods, hypotheses, assumptions, etc., through an ideologically oriented 
historical or pseudo-historical inquiry. Attempts of this kind are justified only to 
the extent that there is not unanimity among scholars but rather divergent 
theoretical views. But this effort does not contribute to enriching knowledge (see 
Auroux 2006). The second case, too, does not contribute to developing the 
knowledge of phenomena because it is based on the idea that current ideas are the 
result of a history that they conserve and convey nowadays too. However, even 
under that assumption, Thảo’s theory do not have any historical connection with 
today’s research. 
What is the positive value of the anachronism? Before answering this question, 
it must be kept in mind that anachronism engages the substantial contribution of 
the researcher. We must indeed choose, correct, and ignore several different 
aspects of Thảo’s theory in order to suggest a general model which can allow us to 
introduce the comparison with most recent theories. It involves the fact that we 
abstract Thảo’s theory from his cultural, philosophical and scientific background. 
Without forgetting the nature of the practice of anachronism, we have just 
expleined, we can now clarify the aims of this approach. Firstly, we can describe 
Thảo’s theory in order to illustrate some cognitive operations underlying every 
investigation into language origins. Specifically, we can analyse relations between 
the following factors: metaphysical assumptions, conceptions of language, 
empirical data, arguments, hypothesis generation, methods of justification, etc. 
Then we can compare Thảo’s theory with the cognitive operations at work in most 
recent research. In this way, we do not assume current cognitive operations as a 
norm to evaluate the past. And since a theory of language origin seems to be an 
interesting case of hypothetical discourse, we can highlight some general cognitive 
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mechanisms underlying hypothetical reasoning, imagination and mental 
experiment. 
Secondly, we can read current debate against the background of Thảo’s 
“revisited” theory. Thảo’s theory and current research share the same field of 
interest in some way. Simply put, they try to describe and suggest a plausible 
mental experiment concerning language development. But Thảo’s theory obviously 
needs to be adapted to current research so that it can be compared to the most 
recent theories. We have to “translate” Thảo’s theory in current terms. We can do 
that because we know the source-context in which Thảo’s theory has been 
suggested. As will be seen in the following paragraph, historiography must be 
considered as the essential starting point also in the case of anachronism. But in 
the case of the anchronism point of view, the work is target-oriented rather than 
source-oriented. We must highlight only some elements of Thảo’s theory which 
can be relevant to current debate. At the same time, we would try to produce the 
same effects Thảo’s theory aiming at in the 1960s. We can do it by generalizing 
some Thảo’s statements – which still convey the same goal of original ones – and 
applying them to both current terminology and new available data. This approach 
can be justified only whether it injects new clarity and efficiency, new vision and 
energy, new dynamism into the current debate on language origins. Otherwise, we 
cannot demonstrate more than Thảo’s theory is irreparably a past theory. And it is 
something that we already know. Instead, if Thảo’s theory can help us to 
understand our troubles and solving our difficulties, the anachronistic approach 
can show its real heuristic value. 
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Chapter One 
The Materialistic Dialectic Genesis of Consciousness in Thảo’s Early 
Works 
 
 
 
der Kultus des abstrakten Menschen, 
der den Kern der Feuerbachschen neuen Religion bildete, 
mußte ersetzt werden durch die Wissenschaft 
von den wirklichen Menschen 
und ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung. 
(F. Engels) 
 
 
 
1. Thảo and Husserl’s Phenomenology in France. - 2. The Phenomenological 
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1. Thảo and Husserl’s Phenomenology  
in France  
 
The question of the origin of language does not immediately emerge in Thảo’s 
work. We can observe a first treatment of the issue in 1951 but until the 1960s we 
cannot find a richer discussion of the subject. Nonetheless, we can understand how 
Thảo’s interest in the question of the “origin” - and a fortiori in language origins – 
arose against the background of a particular moment in French philosophy. In the 
1940s, the interest in Husserl’s philosophy was becoming stronger among French 
philosophers. What was discussed at the time was the epistemological status of the 
Husserlian phenomenology and the way in which Husserl had explained the 
genesis of idealities, meaning, and significations from both the perception and the 
lifeworld. At the same time, this interest joined two other debates. The first one 
tackled the legacy of Hegelian phenomenology, while the second dealt with the 
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scientific-philosophical project that went under the name of dialectical 
materialism, that is, the project of a synthesis of the sciences according to a 
dialectical logic and a strict materialist ontology. 
Our hypothesis is that Thảo was primarily interested in these debates before 
developing an explicit interest in language and its origin. Therefore, the present 
chapter will try to show the extent to which Thảo began to reflect on the question 
of the “origin” starting from a study of Husserl’s phenomenology and its 
epistemological consequences. This interest would follow by an attempt to save 
phenomenology within a broader approach, that of dialectical materialism, in 
which the problem of genesis and origin seems to be inevitable. If the essence of a 
phenomenon coincides with the process of its genesis, as the supporters of 
dialectical materialism contend, then the study of human consciousness and 
thought cannot escape a comparison with the empirical and human sciences whose 
results need organizing in a unified description of the development of 
consciousness from animal world to human dimension. 
Scholars has been discussing about the introduction of the phenomenology in 
France for a few years. According to Dupont (2014: 21), “Husserlian 
phenomenology became well known in France during the late 1920s, and by the 
mid-1930s original French appropriations of phenomenology had began to emerge” 
(for the phenomenological movement see Spiegelberg [19823] 1994; for the reception of 
so-called phenomenology in France see Waldenfels 1983 and Monseu 2005). Dupont 
(2014: 154-155) individuates four stages in French philosophical reception of 
phenomenology between 1910 and 1939: i) Husserl and his criticism of the so-called 
psychologism; ii) the polemic over the Ideas and the Logos-Essay; iii) the 
popularization of phenomenology; iv) French original appropriation of 
phenomenology. According to Dupont, the French productive phase of the 
reception of Husserl’s philosophy started with Emmanuel Lévinas’ (1906–1995) 
writings: from Sur les ‘Ideen’ de M. E. Husserl (On Husserl’s Ideas, 1929) and La théorie 
de l’intuition dans la phénoménologie de Husserl (The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s 
Phenomenology, 1930) to Quelques réflexions sur la philosophie de l’hitlérisme (Some 
refelections on the philosophy of Hitlerism, 1934). Against that, to Spiegelberg 
([19823] 1994: 426-427), the productive phase began in 1936 when Sartre published 
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La transcendence de l’ego (The Transcendence of the Ego). 
Against this background, Thảo’s treatment of phenomenology needs reckoning 
to be the expression of the French creative appropriation of phenomenology. One 
should add that the Husserl’s death in 1938 and the transfer of his Nachlass to 
Leuven (Belgium) encouraged some French scholars to go there and read Husserl’s 
unpublished writings (c.f. Dupont 2014: 146). As Merleau-Ponty before him (see van 
Breda 1962), Thảo spent some time at the Husserl-Archive in Leuven from January 
1944 until April 1944 (c.f. Tomassini 1970: 278-279). Thảo probably heard something 
about Husserl for the first time during the winter 1940–41, when he met the French 
philosopher and partisan Jean Cavaillès in Clermont-Ferrand. Then, in 1941, Thảo 
met Maurice Merleau-Ponty who worked on phenomenology and was writing 
Phenomenology of Perception (for Merleau-Ponty’s earlier phenomenological account 
see Geraets 1971). Merleau-Ponty’s reading of phenomenology was centred on the 
genetic method and oriented to problems such as the philosophy of history and the 
epistemological value of phenomenological method. Maybe Merleau-Ponty 
inspired Thảo’s dissertation devoted to this topic and defended in 1942. In summer 
1942, he probably read the Sixth Meditation of Eugen Fink (1905–1975) by Gaston 
Berger (1896–1960) in Marseille (see the letter to Van Breda, July 1942; see fig. 12). 
And we cannot rule out the possibility that Fink’s project of a “phenomenology of 
phenomenology” influenced Thảo (see the letter to Van Breda, 27 September 1943; 
see fig. 13). Thảo kept on studying phenomenology during the second half of the 
1940s and wrote some articles (cf. Thảo 1946a, 1949a, 1949b). 
It is significant that the main contents of phenomenology were well known by 
Thảo. At this stage of reception of Husserlian works in France, phenomenology was 
analysed by some scholars to check its compatibility with Marxism. As an 
illustration, some of them could be mentioned here: Demarchi, Naville, Desanti, 
Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Lefebvre, Lyotard, Althusser (see Bandyopadhyay 1972; 
Poster 1975; Waldenfels 1983; Spiegelberg [19823] 1994: 428-444; Dupont 2014). It is 
significant to emphasize that Thảo wrote PDM under the influence of this debate. 
Meanwhile, a great political debate took place in France immediately after the 
Liberation in France (see Schoch 1980; Kelly 1982; Burkhard 1999; Lewis 2005; Judt 
2011: 115-238). What emerged in this debate was a certain amount of political 
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questions related to anti-colonialism (Ageron 1973), Stalinism and its relation to 
Trotskyism (Kemp 1984), the choice between historical and dialectical materialism 
(Jordan 1967; Thomas 2008), etc. This point has to be mentioned because that 
debate had some consequences for Thảo’s political and philosophical thought. 
Thảo’s interests in political activities began during the WW2, specifically, when he 
joined the Trotskyist Groupe bolchévik-lèniniste indochinois (GBL). More 
fundamentally, he engaged himself in the fight against French Colonialism and 
supported the independence of Indochina (see McHale 2013, Melançon 2013, 
Simon-Nahum 2013, Renault 2015). Under the influence of Ho Chi Minh, Thảo 
seemed lean towards a kind of moderate nationalism (see Thảo 1946b, 1947a, 
1947b). In the same period began to be deeply impressed by Marxism from a 
philosophical standpoint.  In France of the 1940s, he was not the only one to follow 
this way (see Caute 1965; Gouarné 2013). 
To explain the way Thảo tried to conciliate phenomenology, Marxism (even if a 
deep knowledge of Marx’s writings still lacked in Thảo’s approach), and anti-
colonialism it could be useful to mention two of his articles of the 1940s. Thảo 
(1946a) discussed the Husserlian notion of Lebenswelt (monde de la vie, lifeworld, 
i.e., the pre-given perceived concrete pre-scientific historical world) viewed as the 
melting point between phenomenology and Marxism10. Thảo argued that lived 
experience of the lifeworld is embedded in collective activities which are based on 
a given economic and technical infrastructure (Feron 2013: 166 calls this lived 
experience “existential infrastructure”). On the one side, Thảo was disappointed by 
those Marxists who had merely postulated that the general structure of world-
experience (structure générale de l’expérience du monde) strictly depends upon 
economic base11. On the other side, Thảo (1946b) explained the reason why French 
and Vietnamese cannot understand each other: a possible solution to the 
Vietnamese crisis could only be the abolition of the colonial structure in so far as 
the colonial structure involves two different lifeworlds (the world of colonizers and 
                                                 
10 For the notion of Lebenswelt in Husserl’s late writings see Hua VI (The Crisis of European 
Sciences), XXIX, XXXIX; see also Perreau 2010, Claesges 1972, Kerchenhoven 1985 and 
Waldenfels 1971. 
11 For Marxist dichotomy see MEW XIII: 1-11 (Preface to A contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economy, 1859); and cf. Bottomore 1991: 45-48; see also Harman 1986 and 
Tomberg 1969. 
 52 
the world of conquered). 
After that, Thảo started to become more and more unsatisfied with two 
assumptions of Husserlian phenomenology: i) the fact that lived experience is the 
abstract moment of concrete and practical life; ii) the transcendental ego is the 
product of natural evolution and human history. Thảo’s criticism towards Husserl 
and Existentialism shows the question facing him at this juncture: how to 
conciliate a philosophy of consciousness with the real and material life (see Thảo 
1949a). In so doing, he tried to suggest a sort of naturalization of phenomenology 
(Benoist 2013). Furthermore, Thảo believed that dialectical materialism could solve 
the main conundrum of phenomenology, i.e., the risk of becoming a kind of 
idealism as far as i) phenomenology tends to separate the lived dimension of 
consciousness from real acts and ii) conceives of reality as related to consciousness. 
For this reason, in PDM, Thảo’s aim was finding fault with the assumption of the 
ontological dualism between material reality and humankind (cf. Thảo [1951] 1986: 
133 ff.).  
Thảo’s reading of Marxism was characterized by an improvement of the field of 
interests: not only did his research concern human history; it also tackled natural 
evolution from unicellular organism to humans. Indeed, the first paragraphs of the 
second part of PDM describe the growth of consciousness in both the natural world 
and child development. For this reason, nobody can overlook the role played by 
Engel’s Dialectics of Nature (MEW XX: 305-570), though not exclusively of course. 
One of Thảo’s most peculiar strategies in PDM consisted of mentioning the recent 
literature in the field of psychology. In developing the notion of consciousness, Thảo 
was increasingly concerned with the international debate on methods and results 
of experimental psychology and took the issue quite seriously. Though Thảo 
explicitly mentioned only a few authors – such as Piéron, Sgonina, Köhler, Pavlov, 
and Piaget –, he had probably examined in depth the core of the several 
psychological frameworks of his epoch (cf. Shiraev 2015: 102-418; see also Bloch 
2006) – an occupation that lasted throughout his life. 
The way in which Thảo’s reinterpreted his psychological sources to point out a 
theory of the evolution of consciousness seems to owe more to Merleau-Ponty’s 
reading of Husserl than to other phenomenological scholars. Indeed, Merleau-
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Ponty (1942, 1945), too, drew out the implications of phenomenology regarding 
Marxism and some psychological accounts. And for both of them, Thảo and 
Merleau-Ponty, consciousness arises as perceptive and embodied consciousness. In 
this way, for all intents and purposes, Thảo arrived at a position similar to Merleau-
Ponty’s or basically continued along Merleau-Pontyʼs line. But there were some 
substantial differences between them. To Merleau-Ponty, the behaviour is a 
sophisticated, undetermined, and multimodal reaction to a situation. Against that, 
Thảo argued that the behaviour is the result of some physiological mechanisms (cf. 
Thảo [1951] 1986: 137-138). And Thảo does not agree with Merleau-Ponty’s employ 
of Husserlian analysis of the lived experience (Erlebnis) to describe the consciousness 
of humans. To Thảo, indeed, phenomenology must be seen as a tool to explain 
animal cognition and nothing more (cf. id., xxiii-xiv). 
In sum, Thảo took up studying phenomenology in a particular context in which 
different philosophical-scientific traditions (Existentialism, Hegelism, Marxism), 
research fields (psychology, ethology, natural sciences), and political interests led 
him to investigate the formation of conscious contents and therefore the status of 
phenomenology in the system of knowledge. 
 
2. The Phenomenological Method and its Content 
 
Thảo’s PDM was almost exclusively concerned with “the essential features of 
phenomenology from a purely historical point of view and in the perspective of 
Husserl’s own thought” (Thảo [1951] 1986: xxi). To draw a picture, when one 
browses through PDM to gain an impression of its contents, it is immediately clear 
the fact that the book is divided into two parts. The first one is devoted to Husserl’s 
phenomenology (id., p. 3-132) and the second one to dialectical materialism (id., p. 
133-220). What immediately stands out is the quantitative asymmetry between the 
two parts. The explanation for that should be sought in external and biographical 
reasons, of course: “The work that we present to the public consists of research 
belonging to different times and inspirations” (Thảo [1951] 1986: xxi). But there are 
scholars who suggest that this asymmetry depends upon an substantial error of 
Thảo’s philosophy (cf. Ricœur 1953: 827-836; Neri 1966: 149-163; Rovatti 1970: vii; 
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Picone 1972): it is incomplete because the author does not fully develop the 
potentialities of the phenomenology as support of Marxism. And Thảo himself 
acknowledged that, in PDM, there was a conundrum. But it is the opposite of what 
some scholars propose: the phenomenological analysis of lived experience keeps 
him away from developing his own philosophical account (for instance see Thảo 
1974 and 1975). There are scholars who, however, argued for the deep theoretical 
unity of PDM in so far as the criticism towards Husserl led Thảo to describe the 
natural and social origin of consciousness (see Benoist 2013; Feron 2017). We will 
try to substantiate this insight in the present paragraph. We believe that the 
contradictions of phenomenology led Thảo to put in place a broader approach to 
the problem of consciousness, which included the results of ethology, animal 
psychology, anthropology and sociology. 
In the Preface of PDM, Thảo said that the first part of his PDM had been written 
between 1942 and 1950. More narrowly, in 1942 he wrote his dissertation (Diplôme 
d’Etudes supérieures) whose first chapter, he argued, was published in PDM. But it 
is not clear what he meant: does the first chapter of his dissertation correspond to 
the first part of PDM? Or does it coincide with the first chapter of PDM? As long as 
the dissertation will not be recovered no answers to these questions can be given. 
But we can affirm that the paragraphs devoted to Husserl’s unpublished writings 
were written after Thảo’s stay in Louvain in 1944. In fact, Thảo “study of Husserl”, 
as Thảo ([1951] 1986: xxi) called it, continued during the 1940s. According to Thảo 
(1993a), the reading of Husserl’s writings which were stored in Leuven confirmed 
the main conclusions of his dissertation: against the “most popular opinions” on 
phenomenology which regarded Husserl’s philosophy as a doctrine of eternal 
essences which Husserl set out in his Logical Investigations (1900 –1901), Thảo 
discerned that Husserl’s effective analysis implied a “philosophy of time, of 
historical man and of universal history” (Thảo [1951] 1986: 145). 
To track the impact of Husserl’s unpublished works on PDM, it could be relevant 
to underline what Thảo argued for in the Preface of PDM12. To Thảo, there are deep 
differences between Husserl’s published writings and his unpublished manuscripts. 
                                                 
12 For the list of Husserl’s text that he read in Leuven (for the most part, they are the so-
called Group C: see HuaM VIII) cf. Tomassini 1970: 278-279. 
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Specifically, Husserl’s divergent intentions concerned methods and results. So 
Thảo introduced several terminological couples to describe Husserl’s 
phenomenology. For instance, he opposed Husserl’s “philosophical horizon” and 
his “descriptive method” (Thảo [1951] 1986: xxi) or the “concept of 
phenomenology” and “its actual achievement” (id., p. xxii) or, to mention one 
other example, “phenomenological idealism” and the “method of lived analysis.” 
To Thảo, Husserlian philosophy fluctuates between two poles: the realism of some 
assumptions and the transcendentalism of its theoretical results, the 
transcendentalism of some assumptions and the materialism of its descriptive 
methods. But Husserl did not solve this conundrum and failed to understand that 
the lived experience he described is nothing other than the abstract moment of the 
real embodied life. This fact could be seen if we analysed the contents of Husserlian 
writings all over Husserl’s career: i) from the objective idealism of Logical 
Investigations (PDM: ch. 1) and ii) the transcendental idealism of Ideas (PDM: ch. 2), 
towards iii) the genetic phenomenology of the late 1930s (PDM: ch. 3). 
Thảo described Husserl’s philosophical goal by tracking a constant concern all 
over Husserlian writings – although Husserl did not adequately develop it. 
Specifically, Thảo described the inner development of the Husserlian philosophy as 
a sequence of efforts to grasp the origin of the lived experience. In this respect, i) 
the Logical Investigations led the author to admit a pre-predicative perception; ii) the 
Ideas began to regard the sensible dimension as “the original resting place [couche 
originaire] on which are constituted values and ends”; iii) The Crisis of European 
Sciences and the last writings addressed the lifeworld (Lebenswelt). Specifically, 
Thảo highlighted that the lifeworld could be regarded as the “domain of human 
history” and “the origin and foundation for every intelligible signification” (Thảo 
[1951] 1986: xii). Consequently, Thảo reasoned that Husserl had slowly understood 
the role of concrete life (perception and human history) with regard to the origins 
of the intellectual world. 
Thảo’s major premise was the thesis that the ideal significations investigated by 
Husserl from his Logical Investigations were the results of the perceptive interaction 
with the objects of the world. But the minor premise was that the pre-predicative 
dimension corresponds to the life of the body. As a consequence, universal values 
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constitute themselves over time and at the level of the sensible world. But Thảo 
went much further and stated that the origins of pre-predicative experience of the 
world (the so-called Weltkonstitution, world-constitution) “correspond to the 
experience of animal life.” But Thảo did not refuse the transcendental account of 
the Husserlian philosophy. He rather refused to assume the lived experience of 
consciousness as something that is essentially independent of material reality. 
Specifically, phenomenology dealt with the idealised and abstract image of the life 
of consciousness and did not take into account the fact that the contents of 
consciousness depend upon a more fundamental relationship between the 
organism and the environment. 
For Thảo, one must go beyond the way phenomenology conceptualised the lived 
experience. We should place the study of the lived experience within a 
materialistic horizon and seek its foundation and its authentic meaning in the 
material dialectics of the behaviour of living organisms and at the level of sensible 
life. In other words, the pre-predicative experience of the world is the common 
ground of humans and animals. It also means that the consciousness of animals and 
humans cannot be reckoned to be the starting point of what phenomenology called 
subjective constitution of the world. By contrast, consciousness is, in turn, the result of 
natural evolution and physiological mechanisms. Thảo, however, did not merely 
reduce the sophisticated life of consciousness to the physiological mechanism. To 
him, consciousness is the subjective aspect of the life of organisms. Or, to put it 
another way, consciousness is the life of matter becoming aware of itself. From this 
point of view, phenomenological descriptions of consciousness ideally reproduce 
the dialectics of nature itself. 
That is to say that, as Thảo ([1951] 1986: xxiii) put it, “the transcendental subject 
thematized by phenomenology must [...] be identified, strictly speaking, with the 
man of flesh and blood who is evolving in the real world.” Since Thảo dealt with 
human psychical life, he acknowledged the role of history and the dialectics of 
production forces. Besides, the human lifeworld is the result of relations among the 
members of a given society. For Thảo, these kinds of relations firstly depend on the 
concrete satisfaction of needs. History coincides with the development of the 
forms of production. As a result, human psychic dimension arises in such a context. 
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The practical life precedes the inner life of consciousness (id., p. 49). Conscious 
contents are the idealized inner experience of the real contents of practical life. 
The fact cannot be ignored that Thảo questioned the validity of Husserl’s 
transcendental assumption and then dealt with the dimension of real life. In 
support of his position, Thảo rehabilitated the role of both animal behaviour as 
well as human societies in order to situate the development of consciousness 
against the background of its material origin. The inner analysis of phenomenology 
led Thảo to argue that contradictions of the Husserlian philosophy could be solved 
only by way of dialectical materialism in so far as this one could explain the natural 
and social origins of consciousness. But a further problem is that Thảo had to 
justify a philosophical perspective which links nature and humankind, human 
history and human psychic life, consciousness and concrete experience. 
The questions of the link between animal and the human world could be 
reckoned to be the core of the second part of Thảo’s PDM (see Brouillet 1975). 
Specifically, Thảo divided the second part of his book into two chapters: i) an 
explanation of animal behaviour ([1951] 1986: 133-178); ii) a reconstruction of 
human history (id., p. 179-218). To Thảo, dialectical materialism seemed to be the 
best solution to link animal and human world. More fundamentally, he esteemed 
dialectical materialism the only solution of Husserlian contradictions in so far as 
dialectical materialism shows the mechanisms underlying phenomenological 
consciousness and lived experience. To conclude, Thảo’s description of Husserlian 
philosophy largely depends upon his understanding of Hegelian phenomenology. 
Not only did the inner development of Husserlian phenomenology seem to 
reproduce the way consciousness discovers its real nature, but it also represents an 
introductory way to a most fundamental account: the dialectical materialism. 
 
3.1. Dialectical Materialism: Origins 
 
Dialectical materialism represents a philosophical framework which may offer 
at the same time a naturalistic view of humankind without failing to appreciate its 
peculiar features depending on human social life. Thus, in Thảo’s view, the most 
significant phenomenological thesis regarding the natural and historical 
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development of consciousness could be safeguarded only in the horizon of 
dialectical materialism. 
Thảo did not offer a definition of dialectical materialism. For this reason, it 
could be useful to offer some historical remarks concerning this notion. In essence, 
dialectical materialism may be defined as a realist philosophy of science. Simply 
put, dialectical materialism argues that the world exists outside us and is in 
principle knowable. This is so because all the phenomena including human being 
are material. There is an ontological homogeneity between humankind and reality. 
All the phenomena in the universe consist of matter in motion. Assuming the 
ontological unity of reality and the omnipresence of motion, dialectical 
materialism suggests that all things are interdependent and interconnected. More 
fundamentally, the self-motion of matter involves some differences among natural 
entities. In this way, dialectical materialism differs from the materialism of the 
18th century. For philosophers and naturalists just like Julien Offray de La Mettrie 
(1709–1751), Pierre-Simon de Laplace (1749–1827) and Pierre Jean George Cabanis 
(1757–1808) the interconnection of matter implies a causal chain of life-forms 
which might be characterized in terms of a simple uni-directional development 
without any qualitative change. 
In contrast with that, dialectical materialism defends the idea of the emergence 
of new qualities in the natural being corresponding to new stages of evolution. In 
other words, it suggests that a new order of being has its irreducible laws even if it 
shares the same ontological status with previous stages. This conception of natural 
evolution and causation depends upon Hegel’s philosophy. For this reason, before 
analysing the concept of dialectical materialism more precisely, it could be useful 
to devote some words to the notion of “dialectics” which represents the most 
relevant philosophical point to begin with. 
Marxists usually recall Hegel’s notion of dialectics. Before Marx employed the 
notion, Hegel had regarded dialectics as the most relevant feature of rational 
thinking. At the same time, he regarded thinking as co-extensive with the 
development of reality. It is well known his aphorism: “The real is rational, and the 
rational is real” (Hegel [1821] 1970: 24). The most relevant feature of Hegel’s 
dialectics was the concept of opposition or negation (Aufhebung, sublation or 
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overcoming). Each stage of the dialectical process is the product of contradictions 
inherent or implicit in the preceding stage. For this reason, just to mention an 
example, Hegel wrote in his Wissenschaft der Logik (Science of Logic, 1812–1816) that 
“it is in this dialectics as it is here understood, that is, in the grasping of 
oppositions in their unity, or of the positive in the negative, that speculative 
thinking consists. It is the most significant aspect of dialectics” (Hegel [1812–1816] 
1969: §§ 69, 56). From this point of view, the last stage of the dialectical method 
could be called negation of negation exactly because it denies the previous negation 
and so transcends it. 
Marx recovered Hegel’s dialectics by essentially changing its application. Firstly, 
he wrote in the Afterword of the Second German Edition of Capital that “my dialectic 
method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite” (Marx 
1887: 14). According to Marx, the main conundrum of Hegel’s philosophy did not 
concern the “rational kernel” of his dialectic – i.e., the logic of negation – but 
rather Hegel’s more general philosophical assumptions. To Marx, Hegel regarded 
the process of thinking as a real substance that transcends human historical 
dimension. So Marx stated, “for Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e. the 
process of thinking, which, under the name of ‘the Idea’, he even transforms into 
an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is 
only the external, phenomenal form of ‘the Idea’” (ibid.). Marx suggested bringing 
thinking back to its material origins: “It must be turned right side up again.” Marx 
would study both the dynamic of the real world and the human thinking. And he 
took into account the concrete history of humankind and not the abstract plane of 
logical ideas. Another way of saying this is that he wanted to describe the material 
and real development of human societies through the concepts of opposition and 
negation. 
 
3.2. Dialectical Materialism: Earliest Definitions 
 
After having provided an overview concerning the notion of “dialectics,” some 
remarks on Marx’s materialist turn of Hegel’s dialectics are needed. Firstly, Marx 
never employed the expression “dialectic materialism” but only “dialectic 
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method.” The term of “dialectic materialism” had been coined by Dietzigen in his 
Streifzüge eines Sozialisten in das Gebiet der Erkenntnißtheorie (Excursions of a Socialist 
into the Domain of Epistemology, 1887). Before Dietzigen, Engels used materialist 
dialectics, but he never employed the expression dialectical materialism. 
In his Dialectics of Nature – that represents one of the main sources of Thảo’s PDM 
– Engels pleaded for dialectical laws as they had been set out by Hegel and Marx: “It 
is, therefore, from the history of nature and human society that the laws of 
dialectics are abstracted. For they are nothing but the most general laws of these 
two aspects of historical development, as well as of thought itself” (Engels 1987: 
356). Dialectic laws are the most general laws that govern both the natural 
development and human history. Engels reproached Hegel for having dismissed 
the empirical origins of the laws of dialectic. The laws of dialectic are nothing other 
than the result of thousands of years of observations. So Engels stated that “the 
mistake [of Idealism] lies in the fact that these laws are foisted on nature and 
history as laws of thought, and not deduced from them.” The laws of dialectics are 
the general laws of natural development and they could be regarded as laws of 
thinking deduced from observation of natural phenomena. If dialectic laws are the 
general laws of natural development, then they “therefore are valid also for 
theoretical natural science.” It means that in contrast to Marx, dialectics cannot be 
solely applied to the field of human history but also to the field of natural sciences. 
The scientific value of dialectics embraces the range of reality as a whole. 
Significantly, some scholars doubt that Engels’ account could be regarded as a 
licit extension of Marx’s approach to social processes (see Jordan 1967; Schmidt 
1971). But Engels’ insight was really influential in the history of Marxism. For this 
reason, could be useful to mention the following passage of Engels’ Ludwig 
Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy (1886) which represent one of the 
most relevant sources of the successive debate on dialectical materialism: 
 
According to Hegel, therefore, the dialectical development apparent in nature and 
history — that is, the causal interconnection of the progressive movement from the 
lower to the higher, which asserts itself through all zigzag movements and 
temporary retrogression — is only a copy [Abklatsch] of the self-movement of the 
concept going on from eternity, no one knows where, but at all events 
independently of any thinking human brain. This ideological perversion had to be 
done away with. We again took a materialistic view of the thoughts in our heads, 
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regarding them as images [Abbilder] of real things instead of regarding real things as 
images of this or that stage of the absolute concept. Thus dialectics reduced itself to 
the science of the general laws of motion, both of the external world and of human 
thought — two sets of laws which are identical in substance, but differ in their 
expression in so far as the human mind can apply them consciously, while in nature 
and also up to now for the most part in human history, these laws assert themselves 
unconsciously, in the form of external necessity, in the midst of an endless series of 
seeming accidents. Thereby the dialectic of concepts itself became merely the 
conscious reflex of the dialectical motion of the real world and thus the dialectic of 
Hegel was turned over; or rather, turned off its head, on which it was standing, and 
placed upon its feet. And this materialist dialectic, which for years has been our best 
working tool and our sharpest weapon, was, remarkably enough, discovered not 
only by us but also, independently of us and even of Hegel, by a German worker, 
Joseph Dietzigen. (MEW XXI: 293; trans. from Engels 1946: part iv) 
 
Engels regarded Hegel’s dialectical laws as the logical structure which may be 
seen at work in the natural world as well as in human history. Engels employed the 
expression “materialist dialectic” for depicting his own account and identified 
Hegel’s dialectics with a description of the inner development of reality. To Engels, 
the reality is movement, interconnections and qualitative development from the 
lower stages to the higher ones. Dialectical materialism cannot be characterized in 
terms of a reductionist physicalism, i.e. the view that reduces human thinking to 
lowest interactions of matter. Among others, Engels argued for the ontological 
unity of reality. But he also acknowledged the functional differentiation of bodily 
activities. To him, for instance, the thinking cannot be reduced to chemical 
interactions in the brain. So Engels established a correspondence between material 
reality (natural, physical, and social) and forms of thinking. The reasoning is not 
independent of contingent reality. But it must be analysed according to the specific 
properties of mental dimension. 
Similarly, to Engels but independently of him, Dietzigen stated that “to us, 
dialectical or Social-Democratic materialists, the mental faculty of thinking is a 
developed product of material Nature” ([1887] 1906: 294). Like Marx, Dietzigen 
wanted to show the material origins of human thinking. But Dietzigen argued for a 
non-reductionist version of materialism. Against traditional materialism 
(physicalism) which stated that “the faculty of reasoning or of knowledge 
predicated of the brain was not a substantive object of study” (Dietzigen [1987] 
1906: 307), dialectical materialism set out that, even if the mind is a property of the 
brain, it can be dialectically regarded as a relatively autonomous object of study. 
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For Dietzigen, “tangible matter, does not possess the slightest preferential right to 
be more substantial, i.e., more immediate, more distinct and more certain than any 
other phenomenon of Nature.” 
In the same period, Kautsky, too, used the expression “dialectical materialism”. 
He employed the notion to describe Marx’s and Engels’ account (Kautsky 
[1887/1899] 1889). After the writings of Engels, Kautsky and Dietzigen, dialectical 
materialism was interpreted in two different ways. On the one hand, some scholars 
regarded it as a synonym of historical materialism. The historical materialism is the 
study of human history and human societies from a dialectic point of view. On the 
other hand, there were scholars who continued to interpret dialectical materialism 
as a more general method to analyse both nature and human world. 
 
3.3. Dialectical Materialism – Historical Materialism 
 
Historical materialism concerns human history. In this case, the term 
materialism should be understood in a sense that differs from naturalism. It is 
question neither of the influence of climate on societies nor the explication of all 
changes according to material causes (cf. Seligman 1901: 613). Historical 
materialism claims that material conditions of a society somehow determine its 
organization, development, institutions, and ways of thinking. By “material 
conditions”, one has to mean the given way of producing and reproducing the 
means of human existence (viz., the economic sphere). 
Marx did not use the expression historical materialism but there is a very famous 
page of his Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859) in which 
he described the relationship between the economic structure of a given society 
and its institutions and ways of thinking. In this page, Marx stated that in a given 
society individuals “enter into definite relations” which he called “relations of 
production” (MEW XIII: 1-11; trans from Marx 1955: 362-4). These relations 
correspond to “a given stage in the development of their material forces of 
production.” The totality of these productive relations constitutes the “economic 
structure of society” (ibid.). In turn, the economic structure of society is “the real 
foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which 
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correspond definite forms of consciousness.” Marx reasoned that “it is not the 
consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence 
that determines their consciousness” (cf. Bottomore 1991: 45-48; see also Harman 
1986 and Tomberg 1969). 
By “dialectical materialism”, some Marxists meant historical materialism. For 
instance, Georgi V. Plexanov (1856–1918) employed the expression dialectical 
materialism to mean the science whose subjects are human history and economic 
origins of thinking. “The criterion of the ideal,” as he put it in his Development of the 
Monist View of History (1895), “is economic reality. That was what Marx and Engels 
said […]” (Plekhanov 1947: 260). According to Plexanov, dialectical materialism 
became the section of Marxist studies that concerns the relation between thinking 
and economic reality. But Plexanov was not the only one who emphasised such an 
interpretation. 
In the same period, there were also scholars who focused on the human history 
from a materialistic standpoint. Their aim was more practical than speculative. The 
Marxist historical account offered them a key to interpret the social dimension in 
which they had to operate. Even if they employed the expression of “dialectical 
materialism” or other similar notions, they alluded to human history and 
especially to the relation between thinking and historical-economic constraints. So 
by “consciousness”, or “class-consciousness”, they meant the mental 
representation of the world peculiar of the proletariat. 
In his On Materialist Dialectic (Ueber materialistische Dialektik, 1924), Karl Korsch 
(1886–1961) addressed the influence of economic dimension over thinking: 
“Hegel’s method need only be turned over; by which a materialist dialectic would 
emerge that would determine not reality by thought but rather thought by 
reality.” He used the notion of “materialist dialectic” to indicate the field of 
research (history and society) of Marxist science. In his History and Class 
Consciousness (Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein, 1923), György Lukács (1885–
1971) identified dialectical materialism with the doctrine that explains the relation 
between thinking and social existence.  
One more example needs to be mentioned. Lenin was a Marxist scholar who 
employed the notion of dialectical materialism in a wide sense. He esteemed it a 
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study both of nature and the human history. But, after all, he studied only the 
relation between economic structure and ways of thinking. Lenin saw Hegel’s 
dialectics as the “most comprehensive and profound doctrine of development” 
even written. And he acknowledged that “laws of motion” describe both “the 
external world and […] human thought” (Lenin 1980: 7-9; then he mentioned 
Engels’ Feuerbach even if he said that he was mentioning Marx). By contrast, Lenin 
wrote almost nothing about nature. He preferred to analytically study questions 
concerning history. 
Thảo continued to use “historical materialism” to describe his adhesion to 
Marxism until 1949. For instance, in his article of 1946 entitled Marxisme et 
phénoménologie (Marxism and Phenomenology), he employed the expression 
historical materialism (see Thảo 1946a). The hearth of the matter in Thảo (1946a) was 
the thesis that some economic elementary conditions furnish the context (l’allure 
générale) in which several ideological interpretations of the world could be 
conceivable. Thus, by “Marxism”, Thảo meant what has been called in this 
paragraph historical materialism. 
 
3.4. Dialectical Materialism as Official Ideology in the USSR 
 
During the 1930s dialectical materialism is the subject of a wide debate. Once 
again, the expression was taken to mean a method whose validity cannot be merely 
reduced to human history. In this regard, the intrusion of Stalin in the debate 
concerning dialectical materialism was crucial. In 1938 Stalin published Dialectical 
and Historical Materialism. In this pamphlet, he categorically stated that 
 
Dialectical materialism is the world outlook of the Marxist-Leninist party. It is called 
dialectical materialism because its approach to the phenomena of nature, its method 
of studying and apprehending them, is dialectical, while its interpretation of the 
phenomena of nature, its conception of these phenomena, its theory, is materialistic. 
[…] 
Historical materialism is the extension of the principles of dialectical materialism to 
the study of social life, an application of the principles of dialectical materialism to 
the phenomena of the life of society, to the study of society and of its history. […] 
When describing their dialectical method, Marx and Engels usually refer to Hegel as 
the philosopher who formulated the main features of dialectics. This, however, does 
not mean that the dialectics of Marx and Engels is identical with the dialectics of 
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Hegel. As a matter of fact, Marx and Engels took from the Hegelian dialectics only its 
“rational kernel,” casting aside its Hegelian idealistic shell, and developed dialectics 
further so as to lend it a modern scientific form. […] 
 
Stalin declared that dialectical materialism (diamat) is the official ideology of the 
USSR. After that, he defined dialectical materialism as an approach to studying the 
phenomena of nature and not only human history (in the case of human history, 
Stalin employed the expression “historical materialism”). So he clearly 
distinguished dialectical materialism from historical materialism by considering 
the latter as a section of the former. Then Stalin saw in Hegel’s dialectics the 
rational kernel (the method) of dialectical materialism.  
The ideology that Stalin suggested allowed the Soviet power to reinforce 
scientific works concerning human history as well as natural sciences (biology and 
physics). In this way, Stalin could promote, for instance, the Soviet biological 
research as an alternative to Western one. More specifically, Stalin’s aim was to 
encourage Lysenkoism. Lysenkoism was political campaign supported by the top 
brass of USSR and conducted by the Russian biologist and agronomist Trofim 
Lysenko (1898–1976). As a director of the Soviet Union’s Lenin All-Union Academy 
of Agricultural Sciences, Lysenko took a position against genetics and Western 
science-based agriculture. He suggested a kind of biology different from the 
genetic Darwinism which represented the most significant framework of Western 
sciences of nature in the same period. 
In the 1949 Thảo’s article, the expression dialectical materialism already appeared 
in the title: Existentialisme et matérialisme dialectique (Existentialism and dialectical 
materialism; see Thảo 1949a). But Thảo’s choice of the expression dialectical 
materialism seems to be ambiguous. Like Korsch and Lukács, Thảo meant with 
dialectical materialism a peculiar interpretation of human history. For instance, here 
is how Thảo (1949a) descibed what history is: “History is merely not a movement of 
economic relations, but the becoming of existences that realize themselves in such 
a relation: a limitless class struggle.” In this way, Thảo’s employ of the expression 
“dialectical materialism” does not seem to differ from what he talked about in his 
article of 1946. 
The situation changes in PDM. Not only did dialectical materialism appear in the 
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title, a relevant section of the book is also devoted to a dialectical study of natural 
development. After this section, Thảo offered a description of human history. Thus, 
Thảo’s choice of “dialectical materialism" was not merely formal but rather it could 
be understood as an adhesion to a more comprehensive philosophical perspective. 
At the same time, Thảo’s description of natural evolution seems to have more to do 
with Lysenkoism than with genetic Darwinism of European biology. Lastly, Thảo 
probably knew the scientific and philosophical assumptions implicit in the term 
“dialectical materialism”. The point is that the framework of dialectical 
materialism allowed him to describe the origins and development of consciousness 
from a non-reductionist point of view. 
 
3.5. Dialectical Materialism in France 
 
The introduction of dialectical materialism in France passed through the 
anthology À la lumière du marxisme (see Wallon 1935) edited by the so-called Cercle 
de la Russie neuve (CRN; see Gouarné 2010). The volume linked dialectical 
materialism with Hegelian dialectic. This effort led the scholars of the CRN to set 
out a peculiar historical epistemology of sciences. On the one side, according to the 
Hegelian dialectics, every scientific method has its own validity, but it must also be 
reckoned to be a historical product. On the other side, dialectical materialism 
shows the way every science should also be conceived as the result of some 
historical conditions (cf. Carlino 2015: 10).  
In the same period, the French Communist Party (Parti Communiste Français, 
PCF) supported the exact opposite assumption. To PCF, the main predecessor of 
Marxism was not Hegel but rather the French traditional rationalism of Descartes 
revisited by 18th-century mechanistic materialism (especially Lamettrie and 
Voltaire). This ideological assumption marked the development of French Marxism 
and a change of theoretical framework was also imposed to the CRN. Since Marx’s 
dialectical philosophy of history had been seen as the culmination of French 
materialism and rationalism, the dialectical materialism itself must be seen as a 
non-historical framework that should govern every scientific method. The French 
version of such a project could be summarised by the formula of modern rationalism 
 67 
as it is shown by the subtitle of one of the most significant French Communist 
reviews of the 1940s: La Pensée. Revue du Rationalisme Moderne (The Thought. Review 
of Modern Rationalism; see Tosel 2001). Finally, on this point, we should also 
mention the project Encyclopédie de la Renaissance française (Encyclopedy of French 
Renaissance; see Wallon 1945) which, after the WW2, was in charge of 
reconstructing the entire edifice of knowledge on a dialectical materialist basis (cf. 
Feron 2017: part 2, ch. 1). According to Stalin’s diamat, the Marxʼs dialectical 
method could be legitimately employed within every scientific field (cf. Carlino 
2015: 10).  
It would be useful to specify that, in this way, Engels’ project – which argued for 
the ontological value of the dialectics – became the guideline to extend the field of 
the validity of laws discovered in human history to natural sciences. And it is not a 
coincidence that Engels’ Dialectics of Nature had been translated into French by 
Denise Lévy and published with the introduction by Pierre Naville (1904–1993) in 
1950 (see Engels 1950). This translation had been preceded by the publication of 
some abstracts in the review La Pensée (1948, n. 16: 3-10; 1949, n. 25: 3-10; 1949, n. 
26: 3-17; 1950, n. 31: 19-28). 
The ideological establishment of dialectical materialism in France intersected 
with the Soviet debate between Lysenko and Nikolaj I. Vavilov (1887–1943). 
Specifically, Vavilov was the main representative of the Mendelian genetic trends 
in the USSR. In 1936 and 1938 first traces of the argument between Lysenko and 
Vavilov appeared. But in 1948 the great debate concerning Lysenkoism officially 
began in Russia. In France, in October 1948, the French review Europe entirely 
devoted an issue to the debate and published the translations of the most relevant 
texts of the argument. In La Pensée (1948, n. 21), the Professor at the Faculty of 
Medicine in Paris and member of the Academy of Medicine Marcel Prenant (1893–
1983) and the Professor at Faculty of Medicine in Paris Jeanne Lévy published two 
articles that described the debate in great detail (see Prenant 1948 and Lévy 1948). 
One year later, Prenant wrote three articles dealing with the role of Lysenkoism in 
the history of genetics published by the review La Pensée (see Prenant 1949 a, b, c). 
Specifically, Prenant (1949a) took Lamarck’s legacy in genetics into account. 
Prenant understood that the main conundrum of Lysenkoism concerns the 
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inheritance of acquired characters. Since the most famous supporter of this theory 
was the French naturalist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744–1829), the explanation of 
Lysenko’s genetics needed a deep understanding of Lamarckism. Prenant 
considered the interdependence organism-environment as one of the main 
principles of Lamarckism. To Lamarck, a change in the environment implies 
changes of habits and, consequently, changes of actions. Actions, in turn, produce a 
modification of organs that could be inherited13. Prenant’s efforts to rehabilitate 
Lysenko could be reckoned to be a section of a larger works conducted by the 
English biologist J.B.S. Heldane (1892–1964) and the French zoologist Georges 
Teissier (1900–1972). They suggested a biological theory that tried to conciliate 
dialectical materialism with the more recent findings in genetics. 
Thảo shared the same end. But, in addition, dialectical materialism is also a 
model for Thảo to tackle the contradictions of Husserlian phenomenology. As 
dialectical materialism has surpassed and preserved the results of Hegelian 
phenomenology, so Thao tried to overcome and preserve the results of Husserlian 
phenomenology through their integration into a broader approach to the problem 
of consciousness. This approach was that of dialectical materialism. This one was at 
the center of scientific debates concerning the system of knowledge as well as 
political debates concerning the relations between political doctrine and scientific 
research. At the same time, dialectical materialism led to the problem of the limits 
and extension of the human sciences and their relationship with the life sciences, 
namely the limits and extension of the definition of the human being and its 
                                                 
13 Thus, Prenant criticized Neo-Lamarckism of the French biologist Étienne Rabaud (1868–
1956), namely the theoretical account that considered the needs of a given organism as 
the key to explaining the use of an organ. On the other hand, Prenant sharply criticized 
Weismann’s Neodarwinism. The German biologist August Weismann (1834–1914) stated 
that a given organism inherited only and merely the inborn features given in the 
germinative plasma (plasme germinative, what we call genes nowadays) of its parents. 
Prenant tried also to conciliate Thomas Morgan’s (1886–1945) “modern” or “new 
synthesis” between Darwinian evolution through natural selection and Mendelian 
genetics with Lysenkoism. To great extent, Prenant affirmed that Morgan accepted the 
possibility that environment could influence the genes even if Morgan did never 
conduce studies on this point. Prenant (1949 b, c) highlighted that the inheritance of 
acquired characters implies the theory of the influence of the environment. Thus, he 
affirmed that a given genotype could present different phenotypes because the 
organism interacts with the environment. So Prenant criticized the French biologist 
Jacques Monod (1910–1976) who insisted that proteins govern the shaping of 
organisms. 
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relationship with the rest of the animal kingdom. The solution offered by Thảo was 
that of a dialectic of nature, that is, an organization of existing knowledge which 
enable him to account for the difference and continuity between the human world 
and nature. 
 
4. Thảo’s Dialectics of Nature 
 
In the second part of PDM, Thảo described the self-movement of becoming 
subject of nature within the framework of a monistic and materialistic ontology. 
He was totally aware of the French debate concerning dialectical materialism. On 
the one side, interestingly, he did not refuse to adopt Hegelian dialectics to 
organise the results of natural sciences and suggest a philosophy of nature. On the 
other side, he admitted some principles of dialectical materialism à la Stalin. This is 
the case, for instance, of the heredity of acquired characteristics. As Thảo put it in 
PDM: 
 
The fact of heredity does not exclude, but rather implies variation – the germinating 
cells being but an abstract moment in the organic totality, and being modified 
necessarily according to the general movement of the adaptations of the living 
organism, at least to the extent that these influence the chemical composition of 
substances in circulation. (Thảo [1951] 1986: 137) 
 
Thảo underlined how the heredity of acquired characteristics is not the only 
reason why organisms evolve. The scientific standpoint must assume the organism 
as a whole. And the entire organism is always embedded in a given environment. 
The interactions between organism and environment are then the conditions for 
understanding the heredity of both the inborn characteristics and the acquired 
ones. 
According to Thảo, the gene does not explain variations if it is considered alone. 
Assuming that variations are targeted at the adaptation of a given organism to a 
given environment, it seems that the theory of acquired characteristics involves a 
certain form of finalism. By “finalism”, one must mean “the doctrine that natural 
processes, for example evolution, are directed towards some goal” (see “finalism” 
in Oxford Dictionary). And Thảo understood that the theory of acquired 
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characteristics can involve a kind of finalism: 
 
A goodly number of scholars are opposed to the heredity of acquired characteristics 
by reason of the finalistic background that it seems to imply. […] everyone knows 
that mutilations in parents are not transmitted to their children. But an adaptation 
of the individual organism can provoke, at the level of the tissues that it concerns, 
particular secretions that, in their turn, bring about a modification of the 
corresponding factors in the reproductive cells. (Thảo [1951] 1986: 236) 
 
In support of his position, Thảo assumed a more open view concerning the 
interactions between genes and phenotype through the general interactions 
between organism and environment. Then he took exception to the simplistic view 
according to which any modification of the phenotype involves a genetic variation 
and the consequent transmission of new characters. So Thảo seems to agree with 
Lamarckism as it had been described by Prenant. 
To Thảo, genetic variations depend on the intersections of two causal chains: 
the first one moves from the outside in and the second one from the inside out, 
from genes to behaviour and from behaviour to genes. The variation depends upon 
the contingent interactions between organism and environment and, 
consequently, variation does not take place necessarily. In this way, no finalism 
seems to be assumed in Thảo’s perspective. In that passage of PDM, Thảo reasoned 
that 
 
In fact, the process is perfectly rational, since it concerns only (as Lysenko tried to 
make clear) new characteristics that introduce modifications into the formation of cells by 
the interchange of matter. (Thảo [1951] 1986: 236) 
 
Thảo mentioned Lysenkoism explicitly and, consequently, showed his own 
adhesion to that Soviet scientific paradigm. 
We cannot forget that Thảo had to justify his theory of the development of 
higher mental activities. To him, the evolution of the nervous system follows the 
dynamic described by the theory of acquired characteristics. The interactions 
between organism and environment involve some modifications of nervous 
system. Those modifications cause new functions and they could influence the 
expression and reproduction of genes. It may be possible that those modifications 
can be inherited as acquired characteristics. 
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Thảo wanted to describe the evolution of nervous system among animals as the 
sequence of more and more sophisticated cognitive functions. Those new cognitive 
functions emerged as individual adaptive responses to problems posed by the 
environment. They could be acquired and transmitted to the next generation. Thảo 
explained that point in the following way: 
 
[…] we have admitted that the advancements within the nervous system depend 
upon exercise within the framework of a specific experience, since the heredity of 
acquired characteristics has been demonstrated by the admirable works of the 
Michurinist school [that was the school of Lysenko: the Soviet botanist Ivan V. 
Michurin (1855–1935) was the predecessor of Lysenko]. (Thảo [1951] 1986: 173) 
 
Assuming that new cognitive functions became characteristics of the species, 
Thảo regarded the development of cognition as corresponding to the sequence of 
species which differ each other because of different cognitive and behavioural 
skills.  
As a further consideration, Thảo implicitly assumes the “biogenetic 
fundamental law” asserted by Ernst Haeckel (1834–1919): 
 
I established the opposite view, that this history of the embryo (ontogeny) must be 
completed by a second, equally valuable, and closely connected branch of thought - 
the history of race (phylogeny). Both of these branches of evolutionary science are, 
in my opinion, in the closest causal connection; this arises from the reciprocal action 
of the laws of heredity and adaptation...ontogenesis is a brief and rapid 
recapitulation of phylogenesis, determined by the physiological functions of 
heredity (generation) and adaptation (maintenance). (Haeckel [1899] 1900: 80)  
 
Assuming that humankind is the most sophisticated living being and the 
culmination of natural history, the ontogeny of humans reproduces the same 
stages of phylogeny and every stage of evolution corresponds to a stage of child 
development.  
In PDM, Thảo also asserted his theory of the evolution of the structures of 
consciousness, which coincides with the evolution of nervous system. After new 
circuits of nervous system appear, in turn, new structures of consciousness appear 
as a result. Specifically, consciousness appears as the result of the inhibition of the 
behaviour: the inhibited and repressed behaviour becomes the content of 
consciousness. The inhibition is the negative principle that allows the dialectical 
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development of consciousness from behaviour. 
According to Thảo, the findings of natural sciences support the following 
dialectical-materialist thesis: the natural dynamic conduces from chemical and 
physical dimension to human societies by way of dialectical shifts. To explain, Thảo 
postulated the following chain: i) the material conditions of life are the results of 
the interaction between organism and environment; ii) to solve environmental 
problem, a physiological mechanism triggers the inhibition of a given behaviour; 
iii) therefore, a new behaviour appears and modifies the anatomy of the organism. 
Thảo ([1951] 1986: 138) stated that 
 
Reality qua dialectic is movement of such a type that, in each mode of being, the 
changes of causal order that are determined by the very structure of this mode 
necessarily conclude, by the very development of their content, in the constitution of 
a new mode that absorbs the first and maintains it as suppressed, preserved, 
transcended. 
 
The hierarchy of centres in the higher animals (spinal cord, cerebral trunk, and 
cerebellum, corpus striatum, cortex) does, indeed, correspond to the genetic series 
of behaviour: reflex displacement, locomotion or orientation, affective automatism 
(apprehension), voluntary activity (detour and manipulation). But we know that, at 
each level, the inferior centre is inhibited by the superior centre [...]. (Thảo [1951] 
1986: 145-146). 
 
Thảo probably regarded dialectical materialism as a new materialist version of 
Hegel’s dialectical philosophy. As Hegel’s dialectic, the development of cognition 
follows the sequence: Given-Negation-Sublation. Every stage of the evolution of 
cognition is composed of those three moments. The result of the dialectical 
dynamic cannot be accomplished without the intermediary moment. This one 
denies the form of the first moment and, consequently, allows the emergence of 
the last moment. But the intermediary moment does not deny the content of the 
first moment. Indeed, the content of the first moment becomes the form of the last 
moment. In other words, the behaviour appears at the last moment as the 
realization of the potentialities embedded in the first moment (a previous 
behaviour). So, the first moment potentially contains the last one. Thảo regarded 
the intermediary moment of dialectics as a physiological mechanism that inhibits a 
given behaviour. He set out the thesis that each moment is suppressed, preserved, 
and realized in the following one thanks to the mechanism of repression or 
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inhibition of the previous behaviour. Inhibition indeed produces a new behaviour 
and accordingly a new attitude to the environment. 
 
5. Thảo – Merleau-Ponty 
 
Thảo’s project was not the only one facing the relation between consciousness 
and nature. Merleau-Ponty’s La structure du comportement (The Structure of 
Behaviour, 1942) needs to be regarded as the work that opens the way, broadly 
speaking, to a materialistic reading of the Husserlian phenomenology. In this 
regard, Montag (2013: 46) writes that “Merleau-Ponty had in some respects opened 
this path [criticism towards Heidegger’s existentialism and revaluation of Husserl] 
by showing the way in which phenomenology might be compatible with a certain 
materialism.” A comparison between Thảo’s and Merlau-Ponty’s account is 
consequently needed. 
It is quite clear the existence of a close biographical relationship between 
Merleau-Ponty and Thảo during the 1940s. And this relationship must be regarded 
under the sign of Husserl. Here it could be useful to remember what Thảo (1991: 6) 
tells us: “[in 1941, Merleau-Ponty] read us extracts from his thesis in preparation 
on the Phenomenology of perception, and often said that all this would end in a 
synthesis of Husserl, Hegel, and Marx [Il nous lisait des exrtaits de sa thèse en 
préparation sur la Phénoménologie de la perception, et disait souvent que tout cela 
finira par une synthèse de Husserl, Hegel et Marx.].” After the WW2, Merleau-
Ponty and Thảo were the main promoters of the founding of Husserl-Archives in 
Paris (Toadvine 2002b: 236). Then, between 1949 and 1950, Merleau-Ponty 
organized five debates between Thảo and Sartre on the relation between 
existentialism and Marxism (cf. Thảo 1991: 1). 
From a philosophical point of view, at least, we found the attempt of both Thảo 
and Merleau-Ponty to criticise some metaphysical assumptions of sciences and 
philosophy. Specifically, against idealism, they argued for the embodied origins of 
the consciousness, and, against dualism, they suggested that, ontologically, the 
psychological dimension and material world are inseparable. At the same time, 
against reductionism, they admitted the phenomenological differences among 
 74 
forms of reality (physical, biological, and psychological). 
Thảo’s articles of the 1940s must be regarded against the background of 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological Marxism. Specifically, in those years, Thảo and 
Merleau-Ponty tried to describe the materially and historically situated origins of 
consciousness. And, in this regard, both of them appreciated Husserlʼs theory of 
ante-predicative experience of the world. 
To Merleau-Ponty, the great merit of phenomenology would be the fact that it 
shows the fundamental correlation between the subject and the world (cf. 
Toadvine 2002b: 238-239). Merleau-Ponty ([1945] 1981: xiv) wrote that “far from 
being, as has been thought, a procedure of idealistic philosophy, phenomenological 
reduction belongs to existential philosophy: Heidegger’s ʻbeing-in-the-world’ 
appears only against the background of the phenomenological reduction.” It could 
be useful to remember that the phenomenological reduction (or bracketing) is 
indeed the philosophical operation which suspends our naïve opinions and 
preconceptions and allows returning to both our lived experience of the world and 
the things themselves (die Sache selbst) (cf. Hua III.1: § 62). To Merleau-Ponty, the 
external world is pre-given and the subject is already in the world (cf. Behnke 2002: 
37). So “subjectivity and world cannot be understood in separation from each 
other” (Zahavi 2002: 13).  
Then the world is the milieu in which, and the background against which, our 
perceptions, thinking, scientific and philosophical theories, ideologies, etc., arose 
(id., p. xi). To Merlau-Ponty, perception is the most original form of being-in-the-
world and, for this reason, “the most important lesson which the reduction teaches 
us is the impossibility of a complete reduction” (id., p. xiv) in so far as the 
subjectivity is always embodied and situated within a natural as well as historical 
context (see Merleau-Ponty 1946). Describing this fact is exactly the task that 
existentialism should assume. 
In 1946, Thảo discussed the Husserlian notion of Lebenswelt (monde de la vie, 
lifeworld) viewed as the melting point between phenomenology and Marxism. 
Principally, lifeworld is the pre-given perceived concrete pre-scientific historical 
world. By this, he described what he called “infrastructure existentielle”, i.e., the 
production of ideal entities and ideologies against the background of ante-
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predicative experience of the lifeworld (see Thảo 1946a). In Existentialisme et 
matérialisme dialectique (1949), Thảo invoked the notion of “Dasein” and the 
corresponding theory of choice (Entschlossenheit) suggested by Martin Heidegger 
(1889–1976). Thảo explained that Dasein’s choice must be seen as a historical-
situated choice. To him, it means that the choice affects a given ego whose role in a 
given society is defined by some given economic relations (Lebenswelt). Simply put, 
changing our own existence is not an abstract free choice. Instead, it may be an 
empirical and practical choice prescribed by our own social role. As a result, the 
Husserlian “transcendental ego” coincides with the flesh and blood human being. 
Thảo paraphrased Heidegger’s notion of in-der-Welt-sein and thus regards the world 
as the concrete practical and social dimension in which we live (see Heidegger 
[1927] 2006). 
In PDM, Thảo radically changed his perspective and changed his own attitude 
towards Merleau-Ponty’s insight. To Thảo the phenomenological method of 
reduction to the sphere of lived experience isolates, by definition, the lived 
dimension of a phenomenon from its material dimension, that is, its belonging to 
both the living body and the actual behaviour (cf. Thảo [1951] 1986: 34-36). Thus, 
against Merleau-Ponty ([1945] 1981: xiv), Thảo acknowledged that the Husserlian 
philosophy was a kind of idealism: the objective conditions of the material world 
are reduced to a moment of subjectivity.  
Thảo did not describe the Husserlian philosophy as the result of the dialectics 
between the real intentions of the author and their incomplete contradictory and 
unclear explanation in Husserl’s published writings. This one was Merleau-Ponty’s 
account – who thus opposed Husserl to idealism (cf. Merleau-Ponty [1945] 1981: 
vii): to him, phenomenology is not a doctrine but an unfinished task which must 
not “be taken as a sign of failure” because phenomenology “was a movement 
before becoming a doctrine or a philosophical system” (id., p. xi)14. By contrast, to 
Thảo, the Husserlian philosophy fails to accomplish its own task, that is, to grasp 
                                                 
14 As Toadvine (2002a: xvi) remarks, “Merleau-Ponty was certainly not a Husserl scholar 
in any strict sense of the term.” And Seebohn (2002) underlines how Merleau-Ponty 
disagreed with Husserl’s phenomenological method, ultimately. It seems that Merleau-
Ponty agreement with Husserl is highly selective – and the same does not apply to 
Thảo, whose first part of PDM must be regarded as a detailed commentary of the 
Husserlian philosophy as a whole.  
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the things themselves, in so far as phenomenology constantly discover the thing as 
the product of consciousnessʼ intentional acts. What phenomenology needs is to be 
transcended by way of a radicalisation of reduction: since the being is constituted, 
then the subject itself, as being, must be reckoned to be constituted and the 
subjectivity is the result of a movement for which it is not responsible (see Feron 
2017: part ii, ch. 1; cf. Thảo [1951] 1986: 128-130). This movement is nothing but the 
natural evolution of species and the historical development of societies. And then 
phenomenological analysis of lived experience could be meaningful only against 
the background of the monistic and dialectical materialism. 
As a consequence, some words need to be spent to explain Merleau-Ponty’s 
materialistic reading of the Husserlian phenomenology. Smyth (2010: 160) suggests 
that Merleau-Pony argued for a “phenomenologization of naturalism” – while, 
interestingly, Benoist (2013) regards Thảo’s phenomenological approach as a 
“naturalization of phenomenology”. To Thảo, indeed, phenomenology is 
transcended by natural sciences and dialectical materialism. Against that, to 
Merleau-Ponty, phenomenology could offer a good keystone in order to correct 
some philosophical errors in natural sciences. According to Bruzina (2002: 178), 
“Merleau-Ponty came to phenomenology from an interest in the biology and 
psychology oh human existence.” In April 1939, Merleau-Ponty joined the Husserl’s 
Archive in Leuven while he was writing his Phénomènologie de la perception 
(Phenomenology of Perception; see Van Breda 1962 and cf. Bruzina 2002: 175). On 
the contrary, Thảo came to biology and psychology in order better to justify some 
phenomenological assumptions. In both cases, phenomenology had been 
embedded in a naturalistic framework. But the choice to adapt phenomenological 
account to natural sciences or vice versa exactly marks one of the most relevant 
differences between Thảo and Merleau-Ponty. 
Interestingly, what Thảo and Merleau-Ponty suggested seems to be a 
dialecticalization of naturalism. Specifically, we should focus on the fact that Thảo 
and Merleau-Ponty seem to share the same attempt to conciliate the Husserlian 
phenomenology with life sciences by way of Hegelian dialectical logic. According to 
Flynn (2011), “the Hegelian influence on The Structure of Behaviour should not be 
underestimated” (Flynn 2011). To Merleau-Ponty, there are some stages of 
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behavioural structures which can be observed in nature. The hierarchical relation 
among those forms of life is dialectical. “Each of them has to be conceived as a 
retaking and ‘new structuralization’ of the preceding one” (Merleau-Ponty [1942] 
2013: 278). Indeed, the lower order is cancelled, as independent, and also retained 
by the following one simultaneously – that recalls Hegel’s notion of sublation 
(Aufhebung), of course. So Merleau-Ponty ([1942] 2013: 232) wrote  
 
the physic-chemical actions of which the body is somehow composed, instead of 
taking place in parallel and independent sequences, [...] instead of becoming 
entangled in a set where everything depends upon everything and no cleavage 
would be possible, they take the shape, in the words of Hegel, of relatively stable 
“knots” or “whirl” – the functions, structures of behaviour – so that the mechanism 
doubles as a dialectical. 
 
That may recall Thảo’s description of natural dynamic that conduces from 
chemical and physical dimension to human societies by way of dialectical shifts 
(Thảo [1951] 1986: 138). As Thảo ([1951] 1986: 137) put it: “Inasmuch as life 
transcends matter, it suppresses matter by preserving it – the negation resulting from 
the preservation, and the preservation being implied in the negation.” Thus, both 
Merleau-Ponty and Thảo disapproved of Hegel’s idealistic dialectics and, 
consequently, regarded dialectics as the autonomous movement of life itself. 
But one cannot dismiss the fact that Merlau-Ponty (1946) refused to consider the 
project of the dialectical materialism à la Engels as meaningful. To him, the main 
error of Engels has been to revisit the Hegelian idea of the dialectics of nature. For 
Merleau-Ponty (1946), indeed, the matter is an almost passive entity that humans 
alone could transform into a dialectical entity by way of labour, i.e., a peculiar way 
to interact with nature. In other words, matter does not contain an autonomous 
principle of production, viz. matter does not contain an inner dialectical 
dynamism. In turn, there are explanations of humans neither from the point of 
view of matter nor from the point of view of animals. Human social and practical 
life is the reason to admit an impassable gulf between beasts and humans. 
As a consequence, Merleau-Ponty’s and Thảo’s theories of language were quite 
different. Merleau-Ponty ([1942] 2013: 180) explicitly asserted that “the animal 
lacks the symbolic behaviour that it would be necessary to find in the external 
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object, under its diverse aspects, an invariant [...].” So the symbolic behaviour is 
the main feature of humans. It consists of the capability of producing concepts, 
that is, the representation of invariant properties of objects. Thus, “in animal 
behaviour signs are still signals and never become symbols” (id., p. 183). Against 
that, Thảo regarded “symbolic function” as the general feature of all mammals. In 
this way, human language is nothing other than a specific manifestation of the 
more general symbolic function. And Thảo did not refute that animals have 
consciousness. By contrast, Merleau-Ponty ([1942] 2013: 191) held that 
consciousness is a specific feature of humans: 
 
The gestures of the behaviour, the intentions that the behaviour marks in the space 
around the animal do not target the real world or the pure being, but the being-for-
the animal, i.e. a certain environment characteristic of the species. They do not 
show the conscience, that is, a being whose whole tends to know, but rather a 
certain way of treating the world, “being-in-the-world” or existing. 
 
As a final point, the fact cannot be ignored that, many years later, Thảo 
explained how one of the main goals of PDM was exactly to develop and transcend 
the phenomenological account of Merleau-Ponty: 
 
I tried to develop in a radical and systematic way, and to carry on to its last 
consequences, what in Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, etc., was only a fragmentary and 
inconsistent tendency. They were tempted by Marxism, but they did not, or rather 
did not want, break with the Phenomenology. In my 1951 book, I think I made the 
break [J’avais essayé de développer de manière radicale et systématique, et porter 
jusqu’à ces dernières conséquences, ce qui chez Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, etc... n’était 
encore qu’une tendance vélléitaire, fragmentaire et inconséquente. Ils étaient bien 
tentés par le marxisme, mais n’arrivaient pas, ou plutôt ne voulaient pas, rompre 
avec la Phénoménologie. Dans mon livre de 1951, je crois avoir fait la rupture.]. 
(Letter from Tran-Duc-Thảo to Rossi-Landi, Hanoi, 27 January 1972; see figure 14).  
 
Thảo discussed the same topic on another occasion: “It was necessary to choose 
between existentialism and Marxism. Sartre and Merleau-Ponty fail to decide; or 
rather they had already opted for existentialism” (Thảo 1991: 6). 
 
6. Thảo’s Criticism towards Existentialism and Physicalism 
 
Thảo ([1951] 1986: xxv) highlighted what he considered the core of Husserl’s 
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doctrine of consciousness: “the world is ideally in my consciousness when I am 
really in it.” On the one side, the consciousness cannot be regarded as independent 
of reality. On the other side, for the phenomenological consciousness, the reality 
exists and may be lived only inside consciousness itself. According to Thảo, there 
are three possible developments of that theory: i) the reduction of the objective 
world to the subject; ii) the reduction of the subject to the objective world; iii) the 
monist account that assumes the dialectical relation between subject and world. 
The first solution has been chosen by physicalism. The second one was selected by 
existentialism. Thảo agreed with the third solution. 
The reduction of the world to the subject was the assumption that characterizes 
existentialism (cf. Thảo [1951] 1986: xiv-xv). It may be useful to remember that in 
1948 Thảo wrote a review of Introduction à la lecture de Hegel (Introducing to the 
Reading of Hegel: Lectures in the Phenomenology of Spirit, 1947) of Alexandre 
Kojève (1902–1968). In this regard, Thảo (1988a: 149) wrote: 
 
My article, directed against the existentialist interpretation of Hegel by Kojève, 
allowed me at the same time to liberate me from the idealistic point of view of 
Husserl. It was the bridge that made me go from Husserlian phenomenology to 
dialectical materialism. 
 
The debate between the two philosophers continued in their private 
correspondence too (see Jarczyk, Labarrière 1990). The main content of Thảo’s 
criticism regarded Kojève’s existentialist reading of Hegel. Thảo remarked that 
Kojève’s reading had been influenced by a dualistic insight which supported the 
ontological difference between nature and spirit, animals and humans (cf. Thảo 
1948: 495). To Kojève as well as to Merleau-Ponty, there is no ontological unity of 
natural and human dimensions and Marxism cannot be anything but historical 
materialism merely.  
Assuming that Thảo’s philosophical project already aimed to achieve a monistic 
materialism and explore the dialectics between matter and consciousness, Kojève’s 
assumption makes it impossible to suggest a dialectics of nature which defends the 
ontological unity of nature and history. Against dualism, Thảo’s monistic project 
aimed to describe the way the natural material world must be dialectically seen as 
“identité de l’identité et de la non identité” (identity of identity and difference; id., p. 
 80 
496): that means the human dimension has its own properties without reducing it 
to mere physical dimension or separating it from natural world (cf. id., p. 519). 
In PDM, Thảo examined Heidegger’s concept of being-in-the-world (cf. Heidegger 
[1927] 2006: §§ 12-13) and acknowledged that Heidegger reduced the world to a 
moment of the structure of subjectivity (cf. Thảo [1951] 1986: xxviii). In other 
words, the world cannot be seen as the condition of subjectivity but rather the 
world exists as such because there is a preceding subjectivity. As a consequence of 
the autonomy of subjectivity from material and objective conditions, Thảo 
explained how Heidegger’s (and Sartre’s) existentialism “revealed its own 
inconsistency by giving way to the pure negation of the real conditions of 
existence in the pure subjectivity of ‘resolute decision,’ where individual 
arbitrariness systematically was erected as the ultimate foundation of all true 
value” (ibid.). 
Unlike existentialism, Thảo did not consider the world as the other 
transcendental pole of consciousness. Consciousness could have a representation 
of the world only because each person is concretely in the world and acts in it. 
Consequently, Thảo suggested an inversion of transcendental account. We are in 
the world and we do something in it because we are the result of the self-motion of 
the world itself. And for this reason, the world is meaningful to us: we are the 
world becoming conscious of its own self. 
The reduction of the subject to the objective material world is the way which 
had been chosen by the traditional materialist account (or physicalism, as itʼs often 
known). Thảo distanced himself from this framework and criticised the notion of 
“matter” implicitly employed by physicalist descriptions which, essentially, 
conceived matter as a passive entity as well as determined by mechanical chains of 
causes. That means that a piece of matter does not have the property of self-
motion in itself. Then matter cannot be reckoned to be intrinsically dialectical. In 
Thảo’s view, physicalist account cannot justify the origins of consciousness since it 
cannot explain how both self-conscious and lived experience arose from passive 
receptive matter. To Thảo, physicalism risked becoming a kind of empiricism. This 
risk would conduce to relativism and solipsism. Physicalism would assume that 
values and truths depend upon the psychological and physical constitution of 
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every individual. 
Interestingly, to Thảo phenomenology supported – as it is well known – the 
emergence of subjectivism and existentialism because of its idealistic assumption, 
but phenomenology simultaneously involves the same problems of physicalism. 
Indeed, Thảo’s treatment of Husserl’s last and unpublished writings led him to 
affirm the relevance of the sensible, empirical, concrete conditions to individuate 
the origin of meaning and goals of human life – the same went for Merleau-Ponty 
([1945] 1981: vii-xxi) as well. But Husserl’s phenomenology of lived experience 
risked reducing the law of logic to psychological mechanisms (the so-called 
psychologism: see Kusch 2015; Carr 2007; Hanna 2008; Hopkins 2006; Moran 2008). 
In this regard, Thảo wrote: 
 
But then, once more the ghost of psychologism rears its head. How would it be 
possible to justify within the framework of material nature, (i.e., animal and social) 
the truth to which the intentions of consciousness lay claim - truth that one can 
dispute in particular cases but that no-one would know how to deny in principle 
without at the same time denying himself? (Thảo [1951] 1986: xxiv)  
 
Since Husserl’s latest writings constantly referred to corporeal organization of 
the body and webs of socio-historical relations among consciousness, other egos, 
and the world, what Thảo emphasized is the incapability of Husserl to justify the 
autonomy of truth from time and empirical dimension. So Thảo remarked that 
Husserl’s account risks paradoxically becoming identical with its enemy: the 
“sceptical relativism” (id., p. xxii). In other words, Husserl had been incapable of 
radically separating transcendental consciousness from psychological 
consciousness. 
To Thảo, both physicalism and existentialism cannot solve two questions. 
Firstly, they cannot explain the origins of the universality of values, meanings, and 
truth in so far existentialism reduced them to a product of subjectivity while 
physicalism reduced them to the psychophysical constitution of individuals. 
Secondly, they cannot explain how matter becomes consciousness and 
consciousness remains, at the same time, part of the material world. As a result, 
Thảo had to solve the following task: to justify the origins of truth without 
dismissing the real and concrete relations between consciousness and material 
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objective world. To achieve these goals, Thảo defended dialectical materialism as 
the only viable way to transcend the unproductive opposition between objectivism 
and subjectivism which entails scepticism and relativism. 
 
7. Thảo’s Notion of Matter 
 
In PDM, Thảo attempted to unearth the implications of the notion of materiality 
by fitting with the dialectical self-development of matter from inorganic 
dimension to historical world. Thus understood, materiality entails several 
emergent stages of complexity, each of them characterized by new functions. Far 
from shallowly reducing more complex functions to chemical interactions, that 
paved the way to physicalism, Thảo acknowledged the ontological unity of reality 
and elucidated the peculiarity of each stage of living being. According to Engels’ 
Ludwig Feuerbach (see MEW XXI), Thảo shed light on matter as subject of its own 
development. Materiality is not a substrate indifferent to the significations that it 
involves but entails several different levels of consciousness. Simply put, 
consciousness is nothing but materiality becoming conscious of its own self. 
Together, these considerations, also clarify the way in which Thảo considered 
dialectical materialism “as the only conceivable solution to problems raised by 
phenomenology itself” (Thảo [1951] 1986: xxi). In support of his position, Thảo 
explained that 
 
Materiality is no longer this particular region, which in its abstract meaning, seemed 
to be incompatible with though: it is the primordial and ever present form of the 
movement that elevates it to life and consciousness. […] Since the naïve attitude has 
been definitively suppressed by the reduction, the practice of the description of pure 
lived experience is necessarily absorbed within a dialectical materialism that 
suppresses it in its properly phenomenological sense in order to preserve it in its 
resultant form and to elevate it to a superior level. It is, indeed, a matter of 
“bracketing” the world of constituted appearances, which the fetishism of naïve 
consciousness takes for realities in themselves, and of returning to true being 
through the constituting subjectivity. But the latter is not the Heraclitean flux of pure 
consciousness: it is the real movement by which nature becomes conscious of itself in 
biological evolution and human history. (id., p. 129) 
 
To Thảo “the absorption of the point of view of consciousness in natural reality 
is the sole conceivable way to escape from the phenomenological impasse” (id., p. 
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124). Dialectical materialism transcends phenomenology and its dualism. “The 
description of antepredicative significations refers back to the conditions of 
material existence and necessarily places the subject within the framework of 
objective reality.” That is the biological evolution and human history which are, 
thus, the conditions for having the human peculiar form of consciousness, i.e. the 
rational thinking. 
Thảo knew that at the heart of the debate lay questions concerning knowledge 
and truth. And then he tried to suggest a dialectic-materialist explanation of the 
origins of universality and truth that transcends the risk of solipsism and 
relativism. We have indeed seen how materialism risks leading to reduce the law of 
logic to psychological mechanisms. This was the conclusion of the so-called 
psychologism. Dupont (2014: 12) defines psychologism as “the view that rules of 
logic are not timeless, universal truths but simply empirical generalization about 
mental processes, and may therefore be elucidated by psychological 
experimentation.” To Thảo, the rules of logic cannot be elucidated by psychological 
experimentation but rather by materialist-dialectic analysis. So the rules of logic 
are not timeless surely. But they can be understood as empirical generalization 
only in a broad sense. 
Specifically, Thảo regarded the material existence as the conditions for having 
the generalization of some experience. Given that to Thảo matter should not be 
considered as passive. Rather “materiality is the authentic origin of all meaning 
and value” (Thảo [1951] 1986: xxvii); the material relation between humans and 
nature must be regarded as the source of all meaning and value. Another way of 
saying this is that intentional significations do not apply to the world as a product 
of a consciousness that transcends it, but rather they stem from the concrete 
interaction between humans and nature. “In the real process of production man is 
homogeneous with matter, and it is in that material relation itself that the original 
relation of consciousness to the object that it perceives is constituted as 
‘constituted meaning’” (id., p. xxviii). 
According to Hegel’s slave-master dialectics set in his Phenomenology of the Spirit 
(ch. iv) and Marx’s Thesis on Feuerbach (MEW III), humans become conscious of the 
reality because this one is the result of their practical operations. To Thảo there are 
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some practical pre-rational skills that entailed the perception of generality and 
regularity of experience involved in collective practical activities. To illustrate, 
Thảo ([1951] 1986: 170-172) explained the origin of logical rules and predication in 
the following way: 
 
Yet, it is clear that the permanent use of the tool has entailed, from the emergence 
of the very first human horde, the constitution of a number of collective habits as 
techniques that are acquired in the group […] In short, if we define productive 
activity as activity that ends with its result according to rules, it is clear that these 
rules are constituted, first of all, outside of consciousness, in the reality of behaviour 
as an objective consequence of the material conditions of the use of the tool. […] 
Thus, the ideal production of the object, in the positing of the judgement, finds its 
authentic foundation in the real production, where articulated sounds are 
engendered. Universality is but a result in which is reflected the indefinite 
possibility of repetition that is implied in the objective structure of the process of 
the tool. Thereby, the phenomenon of knowledge, in its historical upheaval and its 
truth-value, is ultimately justified. […] Mankind, at its beginnings, had at its disposal, 
in almost all cases, a purely symbolic mastery by means of the simple exercise of 
language, which worked an imaginary transposition of the elementary productive 
schemes upon all the perceptive giveness. […] All further progress will consist in 
transmitting the ideal work of the concept from the purely symbolic stage of verbal 
exercise to the rational stage of logical operations, reproducing the complex 
organization that assures the efficacy of real labour. 
 
To Thảo, regularities are outside the subjectivity. They depended upon the 
regularities and rules taking place in the goal-oriented collective cooperative use 
of tools. Vocalizations fixed those regularities into the mind. Another way of 
phrasing this is that language mediated the internalization of regularities and fixed 
concepts. The main feature of concepts is indeed to be general. Thus, the thought 
reflects the regularities that the subject sees and realizes within the horizon of 
collective practical experience. And language involves the predication and other 
logical operations – which combine concepts – to reproduce or fixed that 
regularities. The universal validity of concepts is thus related to the social working 
context which the subjectivity is embedded in. 
To summarise, according to Thảo, human-specific cognitive skills are the result 
of the internalization of some practical skills and arose from the observation of 
regularities involved in repetitive collective practices. The repetition of shared 
actions involves the lived experience of generality, i.e., the actions may be 
repeated in several different situations and the product of labour may be stored for 
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a long time. And then language fixes this experience and causes the emergence of 
rational thinking. 
Obviously, some scholars were less than enthusiastic about this solution as far as 
collective cooperative activities already required the ability of abstract reasoning 
(see Brouillet 1975). But Thảo did not implicitly assume some cognitive skills for 
explaining generalization but rather he suggested the existence of some practical 
skills. The know-how and practical tacit expertise precede the explicit knowledge. 
For this reason, psychological analysis cannot account human peculiar cognitive 
skills. Generality is embedded in practical life before being the structure of 
thought. Labour represents the condition for having human reasoning and is the 
point of departure of every research concerning both, nature and development of 
rational thinking. 
 
9. Thảo’s Notion of Consciousness 
 
Before concluding this chapter devoted to the main assumptions of PDM, it is 
necessary to analyse Thảo’s notion of consciousness since it shows the way Thảo 
described how materiality may become conscious of itself. The notion of 
consciousness (Bewusstsein, conscience) was one of the technical terms of Husserl’s 
philosophy (for the relation between intentionality and consciousness in 
Husserlian works see Chrisholm 1967; Künne 1986; Siewert 2011; also cf. Dennett 
1989: Ch. 10; Simons 2004: 581–600). Consciousness and its acts form the field of 
research of phenomenology. Specifically, the lived experience of consciousness 
must be regard as the horizon in which phenomena appear to consciousness. And 
phenomena are the unquestionable objects of phenomenological description. Then 
phenomenology assumes the point of view of subjective experience of phenomena 
and does not investigate if the reality of phenomena it refers to exists outside the 
dimension of consciousness. In detail, phenomenology describes what kind of acts 
allows phenomena to appear. For this reason, the subjectivity is a transcendental 
subjectivity, a subjectivity that transcends reality because is the condition for 
having phenomena. 
Consciousness is not a faculty but rather an intentional function. This means 
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that consciousness is always about something, it an act that refers to something. 
Every act of consciousness refers to a given content – what Husserl called meaning, 
noema. This one is not the real object outside consciousness, but rather what is 
given to consciousness as the target consciousness ideally tends to. The way in 
which consciousness refers to its content is the noesis: this is the act of 
consciousness that makes sense of the content. The noesis is the ability of 
consciousness to establish synthesis, unify, distinguish, etc. The intentionality of 
consciousness exactly corresponds to such a noetic-noematic structure. To Husserl, 
consciousness is simultaneously consciousness of the object (noema) and 
consciousness of self (noesis). 
Thảo refused to regard the intentional character of consciousness as the 
absolute source of meaning. Assuming that the lived experience of consciousness is 
always directed to an intentional content, for Thảo there is the risk to assume that 
this intentional content exists only inside the movement of consciousness and, 
consequently, that consciousness is the absolute source of meaning. To him, 
consciousness is the result of the self-movement of matter in biological evolution 
and human history. Thus, consciousness arose as a result of biological and social 
conditions. As a consequence, the content of consciousness cannot be seen as 
detached from their natural and historical sources. In other words, “lived experience 
is but an abstract moment of real life” (Thảo [1951] 1986: 129-130). 
At the same time, Thảo suggested a new definition of consciousness which had 
been extensively based on a biological insight. Previously, one cannot refute that, 
at that time, several scholars refused to employ the notion of consciousness in the 
field of psychology. The Vocabulaire de psychologie (Vocabulary of Psychology, first 
edition 1951) edited by Piéron refused to consider consciousness as a scientific fact: 
the definition stated that consciousness is an inner and incommunicable 
phenomenon that cannot been studied from the objective point of view of science 
(see Piéron 1951). At least, some traces of the consciousness appear at the level of 
behaviour. Nevertheless, there were some scholars who accept the notion: Paulhan 
(1887: 53), Bergson (1907: 156), Rey (1908: 256), Ribot (1910: 37), Claparède (1917: 
362-363), Piaget ([1936] 1965), Chevalier (1943: 23), etc. 
In PDM Thảo described the evolution of the structures of the behaviour. His aim 
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was to show the way in which different structures of behaviour corresponds to 
different levels of consciousness. Consciousness is the lived experience of a given 
organism which depends upon some physiological and psychological mechanisms. 
Generally, the lived experience of a given stage of the development is the result of 
the inhibition of a simpler behaviour by way of a new form of behaviour. 
Consciousness is the experience of becoming aware of the form of the previous 
behaviour15. Specifically, Thảo ([1951] 1986: 145) underlined how each behavioural 
level entails the awareness that was implicitly involved in the previous stage: 
 
Thus, on the condition of taking into account a systematic time-lag, it is possible to 
make the phenomenological series and the real series coincide in a strict manner, 
since the intentional forms of each stage are identified with the real forms of the 
preceding stage. The lived meaning of consciousness comprises nothing more than 
the abstract movement of by-passed structures in the evolution of behaviour.  
 
A given level of consciousness shows as its own content the unconscious 
intentional target of the previous behaviour. The consciousness, in other words, is 
not aware of the content of the present behaviour but rather of the content of the 
previous stage exactly because it has been inhibited and is now a conscious 
content. But it means that the real target of the present behaviour constantly 
escapes all consciousness. At the same time, the real meaning of the present 
behaviour is accompanied by a consciousness which is always late and 
disconnected from actual goals. What consciousness grasps as its own consciously 
intended content is the target of the inhibited behaviour. 
From a physiological standpoint, Thảo insisted that a more sophisticated 
nervous system can inhibit the previous behaviour and allows the awareness of the 
real content of the previous behaviour: 
                                                 
15 We cannot undermine the fact that, when Thảo described behaviour, he did not support 
behaviourist account. Behaviourism was a psychological framework very popular in the 
first half of 1900 whose leading spokespeople were Ivan Pavlov (1849–1936), John B. 
Watson (1878–1958), and Burrhus Skinner (1904–1990). Against behaviourism, Thảo 
regarded behaviour as the conceptual key to describe consciousness and subjectivity 
without excluding any research into inner psychological processes. Thảo did not 
consider the mind as a black box whose mechanisms are irrelevant. Nevertheless, he 
deemed behaviour to be the ontological and epistemological point of departure for 
every analysis of consciousness (cf. Thảo [1951] 1986: 166). Indeed, consciousness is 
nothing but the result of the dialectic of behaviour. 
 88 
 
Consciousness is the movement of deferred behaviour, which sends us back the 
deferred circuits in the course of the nervous influx. […] but we know that, at each 
level, the inferior centre is inhibited by the superior centre, and this fact 
corroborates the definition of consciousness as an outlined and repressed 
movement. Thus, subjectivity is but the formal aspect of the real dialectical process, 
in which each new structure represses the one that precedes it and absorbs it in a 
lived interiority. (id., p. 145-146) 
 
Thảo affirmed that consciousness refers “back to the structure of the real subject, 
namely the living body as the centre of movements” (id., p. 139). And he added that 
“it is not originally consciousness that determines behaviour, but rather behaviour 
that produces consciousness” (id., p. 166). Thus, the lived body is the condition for 
having consciousness. Specifically, the lived body reacts to external stimuli. Then 
the external stimulus involves some bodily reactions. When lived body inhibits the 
reaction, it gives rise to consciousness as a result of the stop of the reaction at the 
level of the nervous system. Indeed, “consciousness, as consciousness of the object 
[the target of the act], is precisely nothing but the very movement of these 
repressed outlines” (id., p. 140). 
Thus, the phenomenological intentional noetic-noematic relation is the abstract 
and idealized inner result of inhibition (cf. id., p. 152). More specifically, since the 
nervous system keeps the outline of the previous inhibited behaviour, the target of 
the inhibited behaviour becomes the content consciousness tends to (noema). It is 
consciousness of the object. On the other side, the noesis corresponds to the 
inhibited behaviour which is reflected into consciousness. It is consciousness of the 
self. As Thảo put it: 
 
I am necessarily conscious within myself of the meaning of the object for me 
[consciousness of the object], since this meaning, because it is actually lived, is 
nothing but the very movement of forms of behaviour that have been repressed in 
me [consciousness of self]. (ibid.) 
 
The new behaviour with all of its moments is conserved as learned behaviour. 
“Every act, once accomplished, leaves its trace in the form of a disposition of the 
living organism to repeat it; not, of course, in its particular details, but in its 
general structure” (id., p. 141). And Thảo highlighted that each level of the 
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biological evolution results from a modification of nervous system: 
 
The structure of the nervous system that results from the whole evolution does, 
indeed, reproduce the different stages that we have just outlined. The hierarchy of 
centres in the higher animals (spinal cord, cerebral trunk, and cerebellum, corpus 
striatum, cortex) does, indeed, correspond to the genetic series of behaviour: reflex 
displacement, locomotion or orientation, affective automatism (apprehension), 
voluntary activity (detour and manipulation). (id., p. 145) 
 
This is the outline of Thảo’s proposal to integrate (and save) phenomenological 
analysis of lived experience within the framework of dialectical materialism. What 
phenomenology describes is a moment of the real development of consciousness in 
biological evolution. In this way, phenomenology effectively reflects the real 
movement of becoming subject of matter and translates it in philosophical terms. 
However, since phenomenology ignores that the intentional relation and lived 
experience of consciousness are nothing other than the results of the dialectics of 
behaviour, phenomenology must be regarded as a form of idealism. The 
transcendental account of phenomenology must therefore be absorbed and 
integrated into dialectical materialism which describes how consciousness arises 
from a real bodily relation between the organism and the environment. 
As consciousness is the result of the negation of the by-passed inhibited 
behaviour, the field of phenomenological research seems to be the result of the 
negation of real interactions between subject and reality (see Benoist 2013: 36). 
Phenomenological analysis of consciousness and its transcendental account has 
been transcended, suppressed, and conserved by dialectical materialism. It offers 
the fundamental principles to correctly interpret the results of phenomenology. 
But we should add that phenomenology offers dialectical materialism the key to 
analyse the subjective lived experience beyond the description of natural and 
social conditions of consciousness and inner experience. 
What must be still explained is how human-specific cognition arose in biological 
evolution. In dealing with the transition between the dialectics of nature and 
human history, between animal consciousness and human consciousness, Thảo’s 
interest in language and its origin, along with tool-making, arose for the first time. 
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Chapter Two 
The Symbolic Function in Animals and Humans 
 
 
 
Seele des Menschen Wie gleichst du dem Wasser! 
Schicksal des Menschen, Wie gleichst du dem Wind! 
(Johann Wolfgang von Goethe) 
 
 
 
1. Introduction. - 2. Some Terminological Issues. – 3. The Physiological 
Foundation of the Symbolic Function. - 4. The Semiogenesis. - 5. The Process 
of Understanding. - 6. The Dog Barking. - 7.1. Communication Skills in the 
Chimpanzee. - 7.2. The Development of Language in the Child. - 8.1. The Role 
of Labour. - 8.2. The Objective Value of Language. - 8.3. The Formation of 
Language. - 9. Concluding Remarks on Human Language. 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In PDM, Thảo regarded human language as rooted in animal communication 
systems. For this reason, we must deal with the slow development of animal 
communication systems before focusing on human language. Nonetheless, Thảo’s 
theory of symbolic behaviour raises two problems. Firstly, He described the 
development of the symbolic function in a few dense pages. Secondly, the 
treatment of symbolic behaviour follows the detailed description of animal 
behaviour and consciousness. We decided to introduce the reader to the core of 
Thảo’s theory after having focused on its more general elements, along with the 
treatment of some topics related to animal behaviour in general. As a consequence, 
the first pages of the present chapter can seem to be too abstract. But we believe 
that there are clear advantages in this approach, especially when we will tackle the 
detailed analysis of symbolic behaviour in its different forms. In this case, the 
reader will have at disposal all the elements which are needed to understand the 
more sophisticated issues of Thảo’s approach to symbolic function and human 
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language. 
 
2. Some Terminological Issues 
 
Thảo suggested that “the universal notion of expression or symbolic function 
[fonction symbolique]” (Thảo [1951] 1986: 166) refers to the more general act of 
signification we can observe in both animals and humans. And then he added that 
“from this point of view it [the symbolic function] seems to be presented for the 
first time in mammals.” The symbolic function exactly associates a given 
expression with a signification. In his words: “we obviously understand 
‘expression’ here in its strict sense as intentional expression that consciously 
intends a signification” (ibid.). 
The symbolic function paves the way for a new form of intentionality in the 
process of animal kingdom. The intended meaning (sens visé, noema) is not 
experienced in the subjectivity of consciousness, but simultaneously appears on 
the behaviour itself as the meaning it expresses. Simply put, the symbolic act is a 
real act which gives the subject the consciousness of signifying and showing the 
own purposes. The intended meaning acquires an objective value. 
Some terminological remarks are now needed. Thảo divided the products of the 
symbolic function into symbols and signs. When Thảo talked about symbolic 
function in non-human animals, he used the notion of symbol. In this case, the 
plane of expression partially represents some aspects of the signified. Instead, 
when Thảo used the notion of sign, he described human language. In both cases, 
the structure of the symbolic function remains untouched: a given expression 
intends a signification. To put it another way, the relation between expression and 
signification is the symbolic function. Added to this, by the semiotic notion of 
expression, Thảo minded a behaviour that evokes a signification (signification). Thảo 
said that the expression cannot be regarded as an act that merely accompanies body 
movements. In fact, the expression is an explicit communicative behaviour. 
In Thảo’s pages devoted to communication and language, one can read words 
such as intention, intentionality, expression, signification, consciously, consciousness, 
sense, etc. Thảo seems to employ a phenomenological terminology. But he 
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suggested a theory of expression that has little to do with Husserl’s one. The 
phenomenological terminology is frequently at odds because Thảo also employed 
those terms in a psychological and ethological way. 
Certainly, Thảo seems, however, to accept some Husserlian assumptions. Firstly, 
to both, Husserl and Thảo, the expression tends to a signification. Husserl (2001: 
188), wrote, for instance, that “meaningful signs, i.e. expressions.” And Thảo set out 
that the expression refers to a signification because there is the intention to 
signify, i.e., the act is oriented to the signification. Husserl (2001: 189) wrote that 
“the articulated sound-complex […] first becomes a spoken word or communicative 
bit of speech, when a speaker produces it with the intention of ʻexpressing himself 
about something’.” Then Thảo argued that the expression has the function to show 
the intention of the ego to the alter-ego. Thus, the communicative function of the 
expression requires the presence of an alter-ego that understands the intention of 
the ego. In this regard, Husserl (2001: 189) set out that “speaking and hearing, 
intimation of mental states through speaking and reception thereof in hearing, are 
mutually correlated.” Nonetheless, Thảo disagreed with Husserl in many respects. 
To Thảo, the word signification has two meanings. Firstly, it means the symbolic 
act, the function of intentional expression (l’acte symbolique de signification, the 
symbolic act of signification). And, secondly, it means what signs and symbols evoke, 
i.e., the intended meaning. Assuming that the signification only exists at the level 
of the behaviour, the symbolic act is the act that produces signification, the act of 
signification. 
In general, the function of intentional expression is to manifest a signification 
(an intention, a desire, etc.) to another individual. In this vein, the signification 
coincides with the (presumed) purpose of the ego, i.e., the reason why the symbolic 
act takes place. In effect, the symbolic function takes place within a communicative 
circle that presupposes at least two partners. But it does not necessarily mean that 
the real purpose of the ego necessarily coincides with the intention signified by the 
expression. And, in the case of human language, the signification coincides with a 
concept or a system of concepts. 
In the most elementary form, the expression is a sensible datum that reveals the 
purpose of the addresser by way of a motivated relation with the signification. For 
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instance, the barking of a dog is an expression that evokes the act of the attack and 
thus reveals the purpose of the dog to chase a stranger away. A more sophisticated 
behaviour is the simulation. It entails the use of a gesture to communicate an 
intended meaning that is not the real purpose of the performer of that gesture. 
Lastly, there is also the ability to universalise experience. That is a language-
specific skill. And, in this case, we transcend the narrow limits of communication 
and enter the cognitive role of symbolic function. That is, when Thảo described 
human language, he did not take communication into account, but he rather 
preferred to describe the way symbolic function opens the dimension of rational 
thought. 
What immediately stands out when we consider Thảo’s theory of the symbolic 
function among mammals other than humans is the fact that he regarded the 
expression as a means of communication. The expression indeed communicates 
the intention, the desired target of the actions of the ego. The expression, in turn, 
depends upon practical purposes to be fulfilled or environmental problems to be 
solved. The pragmatic function of the expression subordinates the communicative 
one. That is to say, the expression is a way to influence the others and to affirm the 
own intention by way of communication. Human language is no exception, since it 
arose during collective and cooperative activities. But human language also 
supports the emergence of the consciousness of those activities in the form of 
conceptual intentional contents. 
Thảo affirmed that the intentional expression is the act that consciously tends to a 
signification. It means that the act is accompanied by consciousness and, at the same 
time, it tends to a signification. Unlike mechanical responses to external stimuli, 
the symbolic act entails a more or less sophisticated consciousness of the act as 
well as the intentional relation between the expression and the signification. As we 
will see, the intentional expression presupposes a peculiar form of inhibition that 
involves the consciousness of the intentional expression as such. In this vein, the 
symbolic function arises from the suspension of the action and its transition into a 
symbolic behaviour rather than being a co-product of the action. But caution must 
be paid to the fact that intentionality does not always mean voluntary acts but 
rather directness and consciousness of the act. A more detailed description of that 
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mechanism of inhibtion is now required. 
 
3. The Physiological Foundation of the Symbolic Function 
 
In Chapter 1, we have already described the extent to which Thảo thought of the 
inhibition as the most essential mechanism which is the precondition for having 
consciousness of the actual life. The inhibition is still at work at the level of the 
symbolic behaviour. 
The intentional expression depends upon the physiological mechanism of 
inhibition (for the notion of “inhibition” see Buser, Kaufmann & Widlöcher 2016). 
Some environmental or behavioural conditions inhibit the reaction of the 
organism at the level of the behaviour and then the behaviour itself becomes the 
expression of both, the repressed action and its intended meaning. For this reason, 
the intentional expression cannot be characterized in terms of mechanical co-
products of some actions. For instance, Thảo ([1951] 1986: 166) suggested that 
fishes do not show symbolic skills. “Even though the production of sounds is 
already encountered in certain fish, it can only be a matter, at this level, of a simple 
accompaniment of action itself.” By contrast, the condition for having symbolic 
function exactly depends upon the inhibition of the act at its first stage of 
accomplishment. And, thus, the partially inhibited act becomes a symbolic act that 
communicates the purpose of the organism. 
Thảo regarded the inhibition of a given action as the starting point of the 
development of the symbolic intelligence. Once the achievement of the real 
purpose by way of the corresponding behaviour is inhibited and the organism does 
not accomplish the action but simply sketches it out, a part of the unaccomplished 
act is transformed into the plane of the expression of the purpose. Thus, the 
organism performs a symbolic intentional behaviour which communicates its 
intentions. The inhibition transforms the real purpose into an intention that may 
be communicated. That means that there is no communicative intention before the 
inhibition of the behaviour.  
Thảo illustrated the difference between the notion of “sketch” (ébauche) and the 
notion of “outline” (esquisse). The sketch is the movement at the first step of its 
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accomplishment. The outline is the general shape of the total sequence of 
movements. The organism usually employs a certain amount of nervous energy to 
accomplish a given act. While the accomplishment of the act is inhibited after its 
beginning, the remaining nervous energy is still at work at the level of the nervous 
system and involves the outline of the inhibited act as a whole. Thus, there are two 
moments: i) the sketched-out act is the act which is stopped at its first stage 
because of some inner or environmental constraints, and ii) the outline is the 
continuation of the repressed act at the level of the nervous system. The sketched-
out act becomes the plane of the expression of a signification that is lived at the 
level of the nervous system by the organism. 
Because of the repression of the act, the real purpose of the sketched-out act is 
lived by the subject at the level of the nervous system. The individual, then, 
experiences the act as the signified intention – as if the act was accomplished. In 
this way, the outline may be reckoned to be the idealized form of the 
unaccomplished act. The repressed act may then become the object of 
consciousness. Specifically, the repressed outline gives the subject the 
consciousness of signifying his intention by way of the sketched-out act. So Thảo 
([1951] 1986: 167-168) stated: 
 
It should be noted that we are clearly distinguishing the two notions of sketch 
(ébauche) and outline (esquisse). Outline stops at the level of nervous commands, and 
so is reflected as intentional movement. Sketch is, on the contrary, a real act that 
begins at the muscular level, but cannot be accomplished because of an external 
obstacle or previously ingrained conditions. Or even because the stimulus is itself 
but sketched out and does not reach the threshold necessary for a complete 
response. Yet, the sketched-out act implies precisely its very accomplishment in the 
form of a repressed outline that is experienced as an intentional movement in which 
there is defined the signification whose sketch becomes expression. 
 
Thảo insisted that the nervous stimulus that causes a given reaction cannot be 
accomplished because of an external obstacle or ingrained conditions. The external 
obstacle and ingrained conditions involve both the stop of the reaction at its 
beginning and the sketched-out movement. That dynamic involves a new kind of 
behaviour: the sketched-out act becomes a symbolic act that evokes a given bodily 
schema (the outline). The new behaviour (the symbolic act) is “experienced as an 
intentional movement in which there is defined the signification whose sketch 
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becomes expression” (vécu comme un mouvement intentionel où se definit la 
signification dont l’ébauche devient l’expression). So, the symbolic act becomes a 
goal-oriented communicative behaviour. That behaviour becomes the expression 
whose function is to evoke a signification. But signification is not something that 
exists before the expression but rather is defined by the expression itself. 
The expression is symbolic exactly because it refers to the unaccomplished act. 
If the act would be completely accomplished, we observe a complete and realized 
relation behaviour-target. And in this case, there would be no intentionality or 
consciousness. Since the accomplishement of the behaviour is sketched out, the 
actual behaviour-target relation is only lived by the subject in the flow of inner 
experience. Furthermore, that lived relationship between the behaviour and the 
target is also communicates by the symbolic behaviour itself as the signification it 
expresses. To put it another way, the expression is lived as if it would be the 
accomplished act. Thus, the expression is lived by the organism as a noesis-like 
experience. Moreover, the expression tends to a signification that is nothing but 
the intentional content of noesis, the intended meaning consciousness tends to, 
i.e., the noema. 
As in the case of other intentional relations, in the case of the symbolic act, too, 
inhibition transforms the practical purpose of the unaccomplished act into the 
content of consciousness. But the symbolic act shows a peculiar feature. Since it is 
an inhibited behaviour, the symbolic sketched-out act determines the emergence 
of consciousness of the outline of the inhibited behaviour. This is the first-degree 
of the intentional noesis-noma relationship, i.e. the lived experience of the outline 
of the unaccomplished behaviour. Furthermore, since the symbolic behaviour is 
addressed to the alter-ego, the symbolic behaviour also communicates the lived 
experience of the organism. That is the second-degree intentional relationship, i.e. 
the intentional relationship between the expression and the signification it tends 
to.  
Nonetheless, the actual content of the meta-intentional act cannot be lived 
before the emergence of a new and more complex intentional behaviour that 
suppresses, preserves, and transcends the previous one. In other words, 
consciousness as consciousness of the signification is not the origin of the symbolic 
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act but rather its result. In the following paragraph light will be shed on that point. 
 
4. The Semiogenesis 
 
Thảo regarded the inhibition of a given action as the starting point of the 
development of symbolic skills. Exactly because the organism does not accomplish 
the action but simply sketches it out in front of the alter-ego, that organism could 
perform a symbolic behaviour. Then he introduced several different symbolic acts 
which mark the transition from symbols to signs. Previously, it could be useful to 
remember that the sequence of symbolic skills corresponds to the development of 
symbolic skills in the child. Thảo analysed three main stages and two intermediary 
stages of the evolution of the semiotic skills. The following pages will schematically 
describe the stages of the different semiotic skills we can observe in animals as well 
as their development in the child. Along with these factors, we should also consider 
different forms of interaction with the surrounding environment. In this regard we 
can highlight that, according to Rossi-Landi (2016), one of the main contribution of 
Thảo’s theory of symbolic function was the homology between the symbolic 
behaviour and practical and manipulating skills. 
 
A1. The first stage (manipulation): the barking dog, the nine-month-old child. 
 
The expression means the action that it sketches because the expression 
displays only the first step of the sequence of movements of the unaccomplished 
act whose intention is meant by the expression. In turn, the signification 
corresponds to both, the unaccomplished act and its intended meaning, i.e. its 
target. In this case, the symbolic function follows the principle of the synecdoche. 
The synecdoche is an expression in which a term for a part of something refers to 
the whole of something or vice versa. Obviously, the expression shows a natural 
bond with the action that it represents. Then, as an example, the dog barking is the 
repressed act of the attack which now evokes the intention of driving away the 
stranger. The symbolic function is employed by the barking dog to involve changes 
in the environment, to manipulate the behaviour of someone else. In this way, the 
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organism, which produces the symbolic act of the first level, is not aware of the 
meta-intentional value of the symbolic function. The dog is conscious of the 
intention of the repressed act, i.e., to drive away the stranger by way of its 
behaviour. But the dog is unaware of having accomplished it by way of a 
communicative behviour. See below § 6 for more details. 
 
A2. The first intermediate stage (intermediary): lower apes, the one-year-old 
child. 
 
The plane of expression would appear as an intermediary that can serve 
organismʼs own purposes. To Thảo, the stage of intermediary is characterized by 
the consciousness of the efficacy of a given symbolic behaviour of the first stage. 
The use of a given intermediary symbol establishes an actual (material) 
relationship between the symbolic behaviour and its environmental effects. The 
intermediary symbolic behaviour is perceived as a voluntary act. See below § 7.1 
for more elaborate treatment. 
 
B1. The second stage (instrument): the chimpanzee, the 13–17-month-old child. 
 
Chimpanzee employs symbolic acts as instruments. This new behaviour appears 
only sporadically and is determined only by the immediate situation within the 
limit of perceptual field. In these cases, the symbolic act is understood as a real 
substance with its intrinsic efficacy. For this reason, from the point of view of the 
symbolic function, the stage of the instrument entails a new symbolic behaviour: 
simulation and lying. Individual’s intention determines to what extent a symbolic 
act is employed for laying or not. Thus, the difference between the general 
symbolic function and the instrumental function does not concern the nature of 
signs/symbols but rather their use. Indeed, the instrumental use of symbolic acts 
requires the understanding of the intrinsic meaningfulness of the expression 
independently of the real intention of the user. See below § 7.1 for more details. 
 
B2. The second intermediate stage (efficacious mediation): the chimpanzees, the 
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18-month-old child. 
 
At this level, symbols become signs. They are means of communication within a 
given community. Generally, the symbolic behaviour is employed as means to 
influence the others. Before being a countersign of thought, symbols are means of 
acting in the world. In this vein, before being a means of reasoning, language in a 
wide sense is a mode of action. But in this case, the symbol becomes a sign, i.e., 
cultural based voluntary behaviour whose symbolic function does not depend upon 
the motivated link between expression and signification. In the child, the 
behaviour displays vocalizations that have multiple meanings (polysemy). The 
arbitrary bond between reference and vocal sign is the condition for having 
changes of designation. The flexibility of reference outperforms some linguistic 
skills: the child can employ the same vocal signs in different contexts. In this way, 
the child can generalize the experience. But, assuming that the vocal signs in the 
child remain instruments to flexibly communicate the own intentions, vocal signs 
remain related to the private and contingent desires of the child. See below § 7.2 
for more elaborate treatment. 
 
C. The third stage (tool): human language. 
 
Human language has an objective form. In other words, languages transcend the 
desires of individuals and exist before the birth of a given individual. Indeed, the 
precondition of language is the existence of previous social habits. In this vein, 
Thảo argued that language arose from protolinguistic interjections which were a 
determinate moment in the general process of production and using of tools. They 
were vocalizations that rhythmically coordinate collective efforts. Slowly, they 
became the meaningful expression of the corresponding action. In this case, 
human-specific cognition shows the cognitive and semiotic mechanism of 
metonymy: the semantic transfer is based on the relation of contiguity between the 
effect and the cause. Thus, our ancestors employed working interactions to refer to 
the corresponding activity. In order to explain the referential power of human 
language, Thảo argued that the cognitive and semiotic mechanism of the 
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metaphor: imaginary transposition of the elementary productive schemes upon all 
the perceptive givens. This metaphor follows the rules of analogy. The analogy 
establishes a relation of similarity between two different terms by virtue of the 
morphological resemblances of the objects. In this instance, the first words of 
human language – that meant actions and productive schemes – began to refer to 
several different things. 
To summarise, human language could have three functions:  
 
a. Pragmatic function: the protolinguistic interjections rhythmically 
coordinated common purposive activities. 
 
b. Social function: language enables the member of a given community fixing 
and sharing significations. 
 
c. Heuristic function: language began to refer to things and allows knowing 
and acting upon different things in different situations. 
 
Thus, languages are originally rooted in practical life. And practical life gives 
language its objective form. Consequently, physiological and anatomical conditions 
do not play a direct causal role in the origins of human language. As the tools, 
language behaviour is no more used simply in the present situation, but also 
produced, preserved, cared for. In a phrase, language is a collective habit, namely a 
technique that is acquired within the community and transmitted from generation 
to generation. The peculiar signification of linguistic words is called concept, that is, 
the symbolic form in which a determinate moment of production is outlined. In 
this way, the concept is nothing other than the internalisation of a given 
behavioural schema. But this schema has a social value in so far as it arose from 
common goal-oriented activities. Because of the mechanism of analogy, a given 
concept could be realized, in principle, in an infinite number of occurrences. 
Consequently, the world became anthropomorphic as a result of productive 
activities and language. See below §§ 8.1-3 for more details. 
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5. The Process of Understanding 
 
Before describing the previous schematic outline of the main stages in the 
development of symbolic function, some remarks concerning Thảo’s theory of 
communication are needed. He described the production and understanding of a 
symbolic act in the following way: 
 
The appearance of the visitor releases in the animal a sudden movement that is at 
once stopped and repressed by the presence of an obstacle or by reason of previous 
conditioning. Thus the reaction is only sketched out by the barking, and it is 
achieved by a simple outline of attack that is not actually realized, but which 
thereby gives to the subject the consciousness of signifying its intention of driving 
away the stranger. The latter [the stranger], on his part, responds by sketching out a 
movement of flight, but without really accomplishing it, since the animal itself had 
only sketched its movement of attack. The flight thus is sketched out, and just as 
soon arrested, is achieved in the form of an outline that is experienced as an ideal 
movement in which the subject perceives the behaviour of the animal as, to be sure, 
an attack, but as an attack that is simply signified, but not actually realized. In other 
words, the barking of the dog appears to the visitor as an expression whose meaning 
he understands. Thus since the phenomenon of expression has been defined as a 
sketched-out behaviour, understanding results immediately from the response, 
since it itself consists only in a sketching out that is repressed at once. We should 
note that this sketch, in its turn, functions as an expression whose signification 
refers back precisely to understanding itself: by sketching his movement of flight, 
the visitor signifies that he has understood the behaviour of the animal. In its turn, 
the animal responds by redoubling its barking, demonstrating thereby that it 
understands that the other has understood it and should be prepared to flee. In this 
way the primordial correlation, in which the foundation of reciprocity is defined, is 
constituted. Since the symbolic act, or the sketched-out act, provokes a response 
that is itself sketched out and in which is expressed the manner by which the other 
is affected by the expression of the first, it is this being affected itself which, in its 
turn, affects the first subject and arouses in it a new expression. Thus the real 
movement of sketched out behaviour is experienced as an exchange of intentional 
acts of reciprocal understanding, each affecting the other in the very same manner 
in which he himself is affected: the other affects me by means of the affect by which I have 
affected him (Thảo [1951] 1986: 166-167) 
 
Seemingly, Thảo described a circle of communication which is composed of four 
moments: i) expression; ii) reception; iii) expression as a response; iv) reception. 
These four moments implies two subjects: i) the sender and ii) the receiver. These 
two subjects change their roles during the communicative dynamic: i) the ego 
communicates his/her intentions; ii) the alter-ego understands what the other has 
communicated; iii) the ego, too, communicates her understanding and, thus, 
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becomes, in turn, sender; iv) the ego understands both the communicative 
intention of the other and the fact that her own intention has been understood. 
To Thảo the process of signification requires the presence of two interlocutors, 
who explicitly evoke each other their intentions by means of symbolic acts, i.e., 
sketched-out reactions. Since communication is essentially based on sketched-out 
behavioural reactions, Thảo highlighted the role of the body to trigger the process 
of mutual understanding and explained understanding in terms of behaviour. The 
understanding is not a cognitive event that happens independently of the 
corporeal experience of the world. There are a number of serious implications 
arising from this assumption. 
Interestingly, understanding a symbolic act is not an unconscious mechanical 
reaction to stimuli. The reaction is merely sketched-out: the understanding is not 
simply realised but rather symbolised. The stranger does not simply run away but 
rather communicates her own intention to run away. The inhibition is the 
condition for understanding the other: according to Thảo, the alter-ego 
understands the intention of the other because of the lived experience of the own 
sketched-out behavioural reaction to the symbolic behaviour of the other. Once 
again, “understanding results immediately from the response” because “it is not 
originally consciousness that determines behaviour, but rather behaviour that 
produces consciousness” (Thảo [1951] 1986, 166). On this view, the stranger 
understands the intention of the dog and attributes a given mental state to the dog 
by living the own behavioural reaction.  
The symbolic act is a goal-oriented action that evokes the intentions, desires, 
etc., of the addresser. Thus, the symbolic act already offers some indications that 
may be the basis for further inferences of one or more unknown mental states of 
the other. But there is no guarantee that could a priori justify the success of 
communication. Only the mutual exchange of behavioural responses confirms the 
hypothesis on the intentions of the alter ego. 
The reciprocity appears at the end of the first communicative circle message-
understanding-response-understanding. In support of his position, Thảo argued for 
a theory of communication as the condition for having reciprocity. Thảo’s 
behavioural theory of reciprocity may be elucidated against the background of 
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some psycholinguistic trends of the epoch (see Damourette and Pichon 1930 and 
especially Bloomfield ([1933] 1973: 22-23; see Chapter 12 for more details about 
Watson and Naville). But the topic of the correlation of reciprocity was one of the 
main issues of the Husserlian phenomenology (see Zahavi 1996, Römpp 1992, 
Kozlowski 1993, Iribarne 1994). This one is not the right place to deal with the 
question of Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity (Intersubjektivität; see Hua XIII; 
XIV; XV; IX: 431; XVII: 243; VI: 469). But what needs to be underlined is the fact that 
Husserl focused on the transcendental subjectivity as the functional centre of 
sense-giving. To Husserl, the intersubjectivity is already given in the primordial 
structure of the subjectivity. To Husserl, the intersubjectivity is a pre-given and 
pre-linguistic structure of consciousness. In this vein, the intersubjective function 
of consciousness is the preconditions for having communication (cf. Kozlowski 
1993: 273; Patočka 1998: 184). Against that, Thảo affirmed that the reciprocity is not 
something that is pre-given, but reciprocity is rather the result of the circle of 
communication. 
 
6. The Dog Barking 
 
Now, we have a disposal all the elements to deal with Thảo’s description of the 
symbolic function in greater detail. First, he described how the simplest form of 
intentional signification can be traced back to the dog barking: 
 
On the other hand, it would be difficult to deny the presence of intentional 
signification in the barking of a dog opposing the entrance of an unknown visitor, or 
in the behaviour by which it manifests its desire to play at returning a thrown 
object, or to lead its master towards a definite place. (Thảo [1951] 1986: 166) 
 
The barking (expression) evokes a given action (signification) by sketching out 
it:  
 
One could not very well speak, here of a simple accompaniment of action, since the 
very action in question (e.g., to chase the stranger away or to return the ball) is not 
really accomplished, but simply sketched out, and is only valid qua sketched out in 
this barking or this coming and going in which the animal has the air of being 
precipitated toward an imaginary object. The sketch of the act appears as the 
precise expression that symbolizes the act itself that has been left unfinished 
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As a result, the sketched-out symbolic act of barking displays only the first step 
of the sequence of movements of the attack and evokes the action as a whole. In 
other words, the barking follows the principle of synecdoche: the synecdoche is an 
expression in which a term for a part of something refers to the whole of 
something or vice versa. 
Thảo partially followed Darwin’s theory of the expression of the emotions set 
out in his The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872). Indeed, Darwin 
(1872: 50-51) gave the example of the behaviour of a dog in front of “a strange dog 
or man in a savage or hostile frame.” Interestingly, the example of the dog was 
very popular in French psychological handbooks at the time of Thảo (for instance, 
cf. Rabier 1884: 590; Cuvillier 1937: 249-250). More interestingly, the example of the 
dog had been frequently regarded as an argument in favour of the theory of 
sketched-out expressive signs. Before Cuvillier (1937: 249-250) and Chevalier (1943: 
Ch. 7), Rabier (1884: 590) had argued for the so-called Bell’s theory in his handbook. 
In his Essays on the Anatomy and Philosophy of Expression (1824), Charles Bell 
(1774–1842) suggested that natural signs mean the actions that they sketch (les signes 
signifient les actions qu’ils ébauchent). Contrarily to conventional signs that 
previously require the knowledge of the social convention that establishes their 
meaning, natural signs are universal and understandable by all. 
As a result, the dialectics of behaviour of the barking involves two levels: i) the 
dog wants to attack; ii) the dog communicates that she wants to attack. A 
physiological mechanism involves the transition from (i) to (ii). The symbolic act 
did not accidentally symbolize a signification but rather it transforms a given 
behaviour into its intended object (the signification). Thus, one of the conditions 
for having communication (symbolic acts) is the repression of the first intention: to 
chase the stranger away by way of the attack. The first intentional relation does 
not disappear but becomes the object of a higher intentional relation. The barking 
dog reveals meta-intentionality. The barking intends a signification that was the 
intentional structure of a previous behaviour. But this does not mean that the dog 
is aware of this meta-intentionality: “the intended meaning in its consciousness is, 
evidently, concerned only with the very act of chasing the stranger away” (Thảo 
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[1951] 1986: 168). 
Thảo affirmed that the real content of the barking is the following: “the dog that 
barks chases the stranger away through the intermediacy of its barking” (ibid.). 
The truth of behaviour is the symbolic act as an intermediary. Nonetheless, the 
dog’s lived experience “does not yet refer back to the truth of behaviour” (ibid.). 
From the perspective of dog’s lived experience, the barking is simply a goal-
oriented action as any other – the dog acts as if the attack has taken place. In a 
phrase, the dog is merely aware of having chased the stranger away but is not 
aware of having produced a symbolic act. The dog gains the experience of the 
intended meaning of the attack but not perceived it as a symbolic act. 
In short, the symbolic act suppresses, preserves, transcends the intentional act 
of the attack. The dog becomes explicitly aware of the lower intentional act. But 
the dog cannot be explicitly aware of the symbolic act as such. The real experience 
of the content of an intentional act cannot be lived before the emergence of a new 
and more complex intentional act that suppresses, preserves, and transcends the 
previous one.  
 
7.1. Communication Skills in the Chimpanzee 
 
From 1917 to 1937, several studies devoted to chimpanzees have been published 
(see for instance Köhler 1917 and 1921; see also Guillaume & Meyerson 1987) and 
Thảo mentioned those studies explicitly: cf. Thảo [1951] 1986: 163-165, 237 (Köhler); 
id., p. 164 (Guillaume); id., p. 169 (Crawford). The question facing anthropoids’ 
communicative skills had had a problematic history between the 19th and the 20th 
century (see Radick 2007 and Gensini 2013). In any case, the interest in animal 
communication and especially in communication behaviour in anthropoids was 
stated by several scholars during the 19th century (see Darwin 1872; cf. Romanes 
1882: 471-498; Morgan [1894] 1903: 59).  
To Thảo chimpanzees employ symbolic acts as instruments:  
 
The symbolic function is constituted in mammals, in its roughest form, as a simple 
result of the interruption of the real act. It thus appears only in a sporadic manner 
within the framework of direct behaviour. Its conscious utilization is produced only 
 106 
at the level of the instrument. (Thảo [1951] 1986: 168) 
 
Thảo had already explained what he meant by “the level of the instrument”. 
Firstly, we should remember that among the anthropoids, the utilization of the 
instrument is the development of intermediary behaviour (cf. Thảo ([1951] 1986: 
162).  The intermediary behaviour consists of the inhibition of direct manipulation 
by way of an intermediary object: “the displacement of an object brings closer 
another one that was beyond the reach of the subject” (id., p. 161). After this 
intermediary behaviour is established, the same movement tends to be reproduced 
and takes the shape of a new intentional behaviour. “In this use of the instrument, 
the anterior movement is repressed and experienced as an intentional movement 
in which the subject is conscious of getting hold of the object through the 
intermediacy of the stick” (id., p. 162). 
This new behaviour (the level of the instrument) is determined only by the 
immediate situation within the limit of perceptual field. The instrument could be 
only sporadically perceived as a real substance with its intrinsic efficacy (id., p. 162-
163). Thus, care should be taken because the “instrumental function will be 
understood only at the following stage, with the employment of the tool” (id., p. 
163). That is to say, only humans understand the instrument with its intrinsic and 
permanent efficacy. The fact that anthropoids have a horizon that is limited to the 
immediate situation does not enable them to be aware of the constancy of the 
instrumental function. Like the dog was not aware of the symbolic function as 
such, the chimpanzee is aware of the symbolic function but is not aware of the 
instrumental function as such. As we have already seen, the dialectics of behaviour 
entails the fact that the awareness of the real content of a given behaviour could be 
effective gained only against the background of more sophisticated conducts. 
A case of intrinsic efficacity of a symbolic behaviour is the lying. The idea Thảo 
developed offers the tools to advocate a theory of lying from a semiotic 
perspective: 
 
[…] with anthropoids, where one sees the behaviour of simulation being developed. 
Everyone knows that chimpanzees in captivity love to play tricks on visitors by 
pretending to give them an object and quickly withdrawing it as soon as someone 
extends his hand in order to grasp it. We then see them enjoying the discomfiture of 
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the naive visitor, and sometimes even profiting from the situation by hitting him or 
stealing something from him. (Thảo [1951] 1986: 168-169) 
 
Like the barking dog, the chimpanzee displays a communicative behaviour 
(symbolic act). In contrast to the dog barking, the chimpanzee does not mean what 
really want by his own behaviour. For the chimpanzee, the symbolic act is not an 
“immediate expression” as the dog barking which means the intention to attack 
the stranger. The intention of the dog and the intention intended by the symbolic 
are the same. For this reason, the dog is not aware of the potential meta-
intentionality of its act. Instead, the chimpanzee produces a conduct (to give 
visitors an object) whose goal does not coincide with chimpanzee’s real intention 
(to hit the visitor or stealing something from him). From the point of view of 
chimpanzee’s lived experience, the communicative behaviour is something that is 
at disposal and can be employed for producing some effects. Another way of 
phrasing it is that the chimpanzee is aware of the meta-intentionality of the 
symbolic act. The symbolic act is understood as an instrument. 
Among chimpanzees, “vocal emissions”, as Thảo put it, “can already take on the 
symbolic signification of an efficacious mediation.” In Thảo’s view, the 
instrumental function of signs employed by chimpanzees cannot be reduced to 
simulation. Chimpanzees may also use signs as shared means of communication. 
Specifically, they benefit from the instrumental function of signs in order to 
coordinate their common activities. In this vein, signs serve as instruments to 
influence the others. For this reason, Thảo talked about an “efficacious mediation” 
of instrumental signs. Readers are invited to note the use of the notion of sign.  In 
this case, in fact, vocalizations are means of communication withing a given 
community. This phenomenons anticipates what will happen in the second 
intermediate stage in the development of the symbolic function. 
 
7.2. The Development of Language in the Child 
 
The second intermediate stage of the symbolic function pertains to the language 
of the child. Thảo was extremely careful as far as human language is concerned. He 
was aware of the fact that the analogy between communicative behaviour among 
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chimpanzees and vocal signs in the child is superficial. Thảo was aware that the 
child grows up in a linguistic context and exercises her own linguistic skills form 
the very early stages of life. But this fact does not prevent him to compare the 
instrumental use of verbal signs in the child with the cooperative cries of 
chimpanzees. In both case, signs are employed as instruments to carry out a desire. 
“Vocal emissions of the child [...] appear as symbolic forms of instrumental 
efficacy.” The child employs vocal emissions as “means of acting upon the object.” 
Thus, from the point of view of the child, vocal emissions have an instrumental 
efficacy. Before being a countersign of thinking, words are means of acting in the 
world. Before being a means of reasoning, language is a mode of action. The same 
assumption had been suggested by some anthropologists of the period such as 
Mauss (1968: 358) and Malinowski (1923: 450). 
Thảo ([1951] 1986: 169) mentioned some examples from Piaget ([1945] 1991: 216-
218) to suggest that the child does not directly act in the world but speaks in order 
to persuade the partner to do what the child cannot yet do alone. Thus, the partner 
can be defined as “the most efficacious instrument of the child’s desires.” 
More specifically, vocal signs can be instruments exactly because they name the 
instrument. Vocal signs have the double function of naming the instrument and to 
be instruments. The two aspects are not mutually exclusive. To the child, the 
partner (grandfather, mother, father, etc.) is an instrument. In turn, the child 
employs vocal signs in order to name those instruments: “Panana” means the 
grandfather – or anyone else – and refer to the instrument. So “Panana” does not 
mean a flesh and blood person but rather a function: vocal signs “refer to concrete 
means of acting upon the object” (Thảo [1951] 1986: 169). At the same time, vocal 
signs have an instrumental efficacy because they influence the partner. The child 
employs vocal signs as instruments for satisfying her own desires. Indeed, the vocal 
signs have no effects on reality directly. They, however, can be employed as 
instruments for persuading the partner to do what the child wants the partner 
does. The vocal signs are “symbolic forms” that have an “instrumental efficacy”. 
According to Thảo, one cannot forget that the child can outperform the 
effectiveness of vocal signs by displaying some gestures: “showing his father a 
lamp.” Thus, the vocal signs are still supported by motivated signs. In the same 
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way, the physical context in which the child speaks plays a relevant role in order to 
individuate the object of desire. The communication in the child is therefore still 
related to the perceptual field.  
To Thảo, vocal signs have multiple meanings (polysemy). As a matter of fact, the 
symbolic function of the dog barking was totally embedded in the plane of the 
expression. The meaning of the barking is suggested by the barking itself and the 
intention of the dog coincides with the meaning of the barking. By contrast, the 
simulation of chimpanzees already shows the ability to differentiate the meaning 
of a given symbolic behaviour from the intention of the users. In the child, vocal 
signs are polysemous because the plane of expression does not always mean the 
same referent, but rather an abstract function. The independence of the reference 
from the plane of expression allows the child to use vocal signs in different 
situations and to achieve different ends. The arbitrary bond between the reference 
and the verbal sign is the condition for having changes of designation. Indeed, 
vocal signs can have their own peculiar instrumental function exactly because the 
child can flexibly adapt them to several different situations. 
The child is not aware that vocal signs can be employed as tools. As a 
consequence, the child continues to use vocal signs as if they are instruments. To 
explain, Thảo ([1951] 1986: 174) wrote 
 
Thus in the case of the child who does not yet know how to construct phrases, the 
verbal sign is already the object of true production and so takes the form of a tool 
defined by an objectively determined structure, even though its intentional meaning 
bears only on its mode of effectiveness for its instrumental function. 
 
 
8.1. The Role of Labour 
 
Thảo affirmed that human language arose during collective activities (tool 
making and using) among our human ancestors. To coordinate collective efforts 
and transmit practical knowledge, our ancestors ejaculates some sounds (working 
interjections). Thảo implicitly suggested that sociability is not enough for having 
language. What is required is the fact that social behaviour must take the shape of 
labour (travail). In fact, among mammals, one may observe social behaviour and 
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cooperation in general. Among humans, instead, social life takes the shape of 
labour. To Thảo, labour is the main condition for having human language. Instead, 
physiological and anatomical conditions do not play a direct causal role. 
Thảo followed Engel’s theory of tool making as a key notion in order to explain 
the specific features of humankind. Engels’ Dialectics of Nature in its general outline 
yields a view on the applicability of laws of dialectics at the most recent scientific 
findings. In spring 1876, Engels wrote a short essay entirely devoted to The Part 
Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man (Anteil der Arbeit an der 
Menschwerdung des Affen; see MEW XX: 444-455; written in May-June 1876, firstly 
published in 1895 by the German review Die Neue Zeit n. 6; now the ninth chapter of 
his Dialectics of Nature). As the title shows very well, Engels set out the thesis that 
transition from apes to humans had been allowed by collective labour. 
Preliminary, Engels pointed out that humanity is a part of nature. Consequently, 
human peculiar skills do not essentially differ from those possessed by other 
mammals. Thus, the first explanation of the difference between humans and other 
mammals should be sought in anatomy. And right after, what Engels began to 
emphasise is the idea that erect posture is “the decisive step in the transition from ape 
to man” (MEW XX: 444; trans. in Engels 1934). To him, erect posture freed hands 
from the task of walking. Our pre-human ancestors – “a particular highly-
developed race of anthropoid apes” – began use hands to attend new tasks. Unlike 
apes, they have always their hand at their disposal and gradually attained “ever 
greater dexterity.” In turn, more complex movements implied the gradual 
emergence of anatomical modification concerning muscles, ligaments, and bones. 
And, in turn, new anatomical features facilitated ever new tasks. 
But what did those free-hands do? To Engels, hominid began to make tools. 
Indeed, among hominids, a rudimentary ability to consciously anticipate actions 
and goals began to raise. Interestingly, Engels stated that “the animal merely uses 
the environment, and brings about changes in it by simply presence; man by his 
changes makes it serve his ends, masters it” (id., p. 452). In addition, Engels called 
labour (Arbeit) the skill of consciously mastering the environment with tools. 
“Labour,” he writes, “begins with the making tools [Werkzeugen]” (id., p. 449). 
Engels does not say much more than this. Engels rather focused on the 
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consequences of the development of labour. Firstly, labour “necessarily helped to 
bring the members of society closer together” (id., p. 446). Secondly, labour and 
social life brought out the necessity to communicate with others. “Men in the 
making arrived at the point where they had something to say to each other.” In this 
manner, Engels explained “the origin of language from and in the process of 
labour.” But Thảo explicitly rejected that language arose from the need to 
communicate. And he did so by polemically quoting Engels:  
 
In other words, it is true that man has spoken because he “has something to say.” 
But what he “had to say” was not presented originally in an intentional form: the 
human ancestor did not say what he thought because he thought it, but thought it 
because he said it, and he said it because he stopped doing it. (Thảo [1951] 1986: 169-
170) 
 
Thảo assumed that language involuntary arose during social goal-oriented 
actions among our human ancestors, while Engels suggested that the need to 
communicate was the main reason that forced our ancestors to speak. 
 
8.2. The Objective Value of Language 
 
Thảo ([1951] 1986: 163) wrote that the tool making and using radically changes 
the ontological status of the mediating object. “The mediating object will no longer 
be used simply in the present situation, but also produced, preserved, cared for.” 
That is the development of a tradition and stable collaboration. The collaboration 
partially appears among chimpanzees but achieves its complete form only among 
humans (id., p. 165; Thảo quotes Köhler 1927: 158-159). Traditions appear only with 
the humankind. Among humans, tradition and collaboration take the shape of 
organization and education. Then tool making must be seen against the 
background of communal activities and is accompanied by other collective habits. 
Specifically, collective habits are techniques that “are acquired within the group 
and transmitted from generation to generation” (Thảo [1951] 1986: 165). The same 
goes for language. 
Interestingly, Thảo stated that “productive activity” (activité productrice) is an 
activity that follows some rules. Those rules are constituted “outside consciousness, 
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in the reality of behaviour as on objective consequence of the material conditions 
of the use of the tool” (id., p. 171). The formation of language from protolinguistic 
interjections follows the same logic. In the same manner, protolinguistic 
interjections were originally assimilated into a determinate moment in the general 
process of production. As a result, earliest protolinguistic interactions were 
constituted outside of consciousness. And for this reason, language can be defined 
as a collective product. 
Our ancestors unintentionally emitted some sounds during their efforts to 
coordinate their movements. Then those sounds began to be expressed to mean 
the corresponding movements. In this way, the emission of sounds reinforces the 
stabilization of the representation of those movements. Thus, language reinforces 
cognitive skills and involves the conceptualisation of productive rules it is 
embedded in. “Productive activity” is reflected “in the symbolism of language” (id., 
p. 175). In this vein, according to Thảo, language is nothng but the internalization 
of the actual behaviour of tool making and using. 
According to Thảo, the “objective form” of language depends upon a particular 
form of social relations that are the conditions for having a given linguistic system. 
The dimension of social and practical life is what Thảo calls objectivity. It is the 
same for all of the members of a given community and exists at the level of the 
behaviour before being translated into the forms of subjective lived experience. As 
a result, language specifically conveys meanings that are shared and objective 
rather than being an instrument to communicate individual’s intentions. In this 
instance, “objective” means three things at least: i) languages transcend 
individual’s desires; ii) languages exist before the birth of individuals; iii) languages 
are rooted in practical life. The “conceptual forms” (formes conceptuelles) differs 
from the signification conveyed by the instrumental use of vocal signs because 
language conveys meanings that are quite stable and generally intelligible. 
Here what Thảo began to emphasise is the way in which techniques and 
education deeply modified the life of our ancestors. To him, new collective habits 
arose from tool making activities: 
 
Yet, it is clear that the permanent use of the tool has entailed, from the emergence 
of the very first human horde, the constitution of a number of collective habits as 
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techniques that are acquired in the group and which do not solely concern the 
fabrication of each tool, but also the modalities of its use. (id., p. 170) 
 
The question facing Thảo at this juncture is how older behaviour became part of 
the process of production and changed its meaning. To him, natural behaviour 
became a collective habit: 
 
Thus, though the function of the tool, the form of production extends to the totality 
of human activities, inasmuch as they are henceforth objectively determined by the 
technical habits of the group. […] The same is true for the behaviour that originally 
concerned only the body itself, such as the acts of walking, running, climbing, etc., 
as they are integrated as determined moments in the general process of production. 
(170-171) 
 
Then tool making as established social activity marked the beginning of human 
culture. And the same goes for sounds: “the animal cry becomes human language 
by being articulated within the structure of productive labour” (id., p. 171). The 
sounds produced by all of the members of the group during the production of tools 
lost their natural value and became linguistic sounds. 
 
8.3. The Formation of Language 
 
Thảo’s hypothesis on the origins of language may recall the tradition that 
properly begins with the German philosopher Ludwig Noiré (1829–1889). Noiré 
suggested a very successful theory. Noiré’s theory theory was meticulously 
described by Steinthal ([1851] 1888), Plekhanov ([1907] 1976), Mauthner (19122), 
Bogdanov ([1923] 2015), Cassirer (198013), Jespersen (1922), Janet (1934), Révesz 
(1946), to mention just few scholars. Noiré cleared his theory in a book entitled 
Ursprung der Sprache (Origin of Language, 1877). The major premise of that book was 
the thesis that language arose gradually. But the minor premise was that only 
humans had the skills for creating language. According to Noiré, the necessary 
skills for creating language did not depend on rationality but rather on sociability. 
To some extent, Noiré’s stand regarded the idea of considering cooperation as a 
human-specific feature that entailed an unprecedented form of cooperation 
already at an early stage of human evolution. Before speaking, our ancestors 
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already cooperated to achieve common ends. What Noiré considered his own 
contribution to the debate on language origins was his assumption that language 
(and reasoning, of course) originally arose during collective purposive activities. In 
his words: “Language and life of thought arose in the context of shared and common 
goals posed by common action, that was the original work of our ancestors [Es war die 
auf einen gemeinsamen Zweck gerichtete gemeinsame Thätigkeit, es war die urälteste 
Arbeit unserer Stammeltern, aus welcher Sprache und Vernunftleben 
hervorquoll.].” (Noiré 1877: 331). Consequently, Noiré reasoned that language arose 
in the context of cooperative tasks. The efforts made in the context of those tasks 
produced involuntary vocalizations. The involuntary vocalizations performed 
during cooperative tasks constituted the earliest words of human language. Over 
time, these involuntary vocalizations became shared and recognised by the group. 
They originally mean some aspects of the action. 
In a similar vein, Thảo ([1951] 1986: 169-170) wrote: 
 
We now have the elements that are necessary to re-embark upon our development 
and to define, in an adequate way, the intentionality of language. Inasmuch as the 
symbolic act is a sketched out act whose meaning consists in its very outlined and 
repressed accomplishment, the utterance of the verb results from rhythmic halts in the 
collective use of the tool, as a sketched-out movement of production, ideally ending in 
the productive operation itself, and experienced as a signified intention. 
 
When Thảo employed the notion of “rhythm”, he probably alluded to the debate 
concerning the relationship between language and music. That debate began in the 
19th century when Darwin insisted that human use of voice has its natural roots in 
animal courtship. But the theory of the German economist Karl Bücher (1847–1930) 
set out in his Arbeit und Rhythmus (Labour and Rhythm, 1899) deserves a special 
mention. To him, singing, collective working, and body movements are intimately 
linked among primitive peoples who rhythmically coordinate their collective 
efforts. It is, then, understandable why several scholars tried to conciliate his 
theory with Noiré’s one. Noiré (1877: 360), too, considered music, dance, singing as 
simultaneous to speech at the beginning. The core of Noiré’s theory– i.e., language 
arose during cooperative tasks – remains untouched in such a rhythmical version. 
Bücher, however, never quoted Noiré’s theory. And the stress on pragmatic 
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function of language/singing was more evident in Bücher’s theory.  
To Thảo, collective activities entail some vocalizations. Those vocalizations 
rhythmically coordinate collective efforts. The needs of collective production and 
reproduction of tools entail those rhythmical vocalizations. If those vocalizations 
are performed without the corresponding productive action, they could become a 
symbol that evokes the productive activity. In this case, vocalizations are a 
sketched-out movement of production: they are a moment of the production that 
is used to evoke the total process of the production. And those vocalizations could 
be understood by all the members of the group because all of them share the same 
productive experience. So, he wrote that “the ideal work of the concept is but the very 
movement of real work being interrupted for an instant by virtue of its objective 
structure and being continued on the symbolic plane by the use of the word” (Thảo 
[1951] 1986: 169-170). 
Thảo talked about the general mechanism of symbolic transposition in the 
following way: the reproduction of working interjections when the work is 
interrupted entails the emergence of a conceptual correlate, i.e., the outline of the 
corresponding operation. That conceptual correlate becomes the meaning of the 
working interjections which, in turn, becomes a word in a linguistic sense. What 
Thảo describes is the transposition of practical action into the form of thought. 
Such a transposition is mediated by vocalizations, i.e., a part of the collective use of 
tools which can be performed independently of the act itself and evokes that act. 
The lived experience of linguistic significations, i.e., the intended meaning of 
language, then corresponds to the outline of collective production of tools. 
With concept Thảo ([1951] 1986: 183) meant “the symbolic form in which a 
determinate moment of production is outlined.” Vocalizations support a 
determinate moment of production and become the sketched-out act that 
symbolically evokes a moment of production. According to Thảo, the fundamental 
feature of the concept is that it could be “realized, in principle, in an infinite 
number of occurrences” (id., p. 59). The metaphor seems to be the cognitive 
mechanism that allowed our ancestors employing the same words to mean 
different states of affairs (according to Aristotle it is the metaphor of the third 
type, see Poet. 1457B, 1- 1458, 17). Thảo wrote that “mankind, at its beginnings, had 
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at its disposal, in almost all cases, a purely symbolic mastery by means of the 
simple exercise of language, which worked an imaginary transposition of the 
elementary productive schemes upon all the perceptive givens” (id., p. 172). To 
clarify, language was originally the internalization of productive schemes. The 
earliest words mean a certain productive schema. Later, they began to be employed 
in order to mean new state of affairs. 
Thảo quoted the following example: “Thus children who are beginning to speak 
identify clouds with the smoke of a pipe” (the example can be found in Piaget 1945: 
241). This metaphor is based on the mechanism of the analogy in the sense of 
Bartha (2013): analogy “is a comparison between two objects, or systems of objects, 
that highlights respects in which they are thought to be similar.” Thus, analogy 
establishes a relation of similarity between two different terms: the smoke of a pipe 
is similar to clouds, or vice versa. Interestingly, the comparison conduces from the 
term that is more known by the subject to the term that is less known. For this 
reason, establishing similarities may have a heuristic function.  
Further, the similarity between clouds and the smoke of a pipe is possible by 
virtue of their morphological resemblances. In detail, their morphological 
resemblances are based on their gaseous state. The similarity is composed of three 
terms: smoke of a pipe → nebulous, cloudy, foggy, indefinite, dense, etc., → clouds. 
The intermediary term reveals the properties that the other two terms have in 
common. One may also underline, however, that the similarity highlights what two 
terms have in common but at the same time does not make explicit their 
dissimilarities.  
Thảo ([1951] 1986: 237) suggested that the verb had had an essential role in 
primitive languages: 
 
It goes without saying that work resumes in principle soon after the emission of 
sound. We still have the opportunity of reliving these original experiences in 
practical life. Thus the cry “heave ho!” [“ho...hisse!”] arises from the objective 
structure of a collective effort of traction and is immediately comprehensible in that 
very work. We know, moreover, that the verb occupies a privileged place in 
primitive languages. 
 
It may be interesting to highlight that an interjection such as “ho...hisse!” might 
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mean the corresponding action by virtue of a cognitive mechanism very similar to 
the metonymy. Usually, metonymy is a figure of speech in which the semantic 
transfer is based on the relation of contiguity. In the case of the “ho...hisse!”, 
metonymy expresses the effect in order to mean the cause. Thus, our ancestors 
employed working interaction in order to refer to the corresponding activity. 
Thảo’s assumption implies three problems at least. Why did Thảo take it to for 
granted that “the verb occupies a privileged place in primitive languages”? In 
effect, he considered such a view as widely shared. What does it mean “primitive 
language”? Sure enough, it is not quite clear what kind of language Thảo talked 
about. Why did he regard the verb as the most relevant linguistic element? Some 
historical factors could help to answer these questions. 
On the one side, the issue of primitive thinking was deeply debated at the epoch. 
A wide range of anthropologists dealt with that question: for instance, Thurnwald 
(1922, 1928, and 1938), Levy-Bruhl (1910, 1922, and 1949), Leroy (1927), Malinowski 
(1923: 310-312). And, generally, the tradition, which stressed on the primacy of 
verbs, implicitly underlined the primacy of action over thinking. 
On the other side, to Noiré (1877: 342; cf. also id. 1885: 135, 143), the earliest 
words originally designated the action (Verbum) and the patient (Objekt) 
simultaneously (as Geiger 1868: 386; see also Steinthal [1851] 1888: 295). But the 
supporter of Noiré’s theory did not always suggest the coexistence of verbs and 
names at the level of primitive language. For instance, Bogdanov (2015: 15), 
Buxarin (1925: ch. 6d), and Janet (1936: 64) quoted Noiré and the 19th-century 
comparative-historical linguistics (cf., for instance, Müller 1887: 272) to support the 
theory of the verbs as first linguistic roots. 
 
9. Concluding Remarks on Human Language 
 
Generally, Thảo described the socio-psychological preconditions of language 
rather than the anatomy-physiological ones. But one cannot dismiss that, to Thảo – 
even if he was a little bit reticent to admit that, from the point of view of ontogeny, 
language is an acquired/innate faculty. This remark is based on Thảo’s assumption 
that the ontogeny recapitulates the phylogeny (see Chapter 1 for more details). 
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According to Thảo, language is the result of two conditions. First, human 
language conveys meanings which are the internalization of modes of production. 
Second, human language depends upon the culturalization of a more general 
symbolic function that humans share with other mammals. At the beginning of 
human phylogeny, language surely was a part of a more general structure of the 
human-specific behaviour, i.e., labour as the practical horizon of common 
activities, traditions, habits, and techniques. 
Thus, Thảo set out that language arose from protolinguistic working 
interjections that rhythmically coordinated common goal-oriented activities. In 
other words, those interjections were part of the collective use of the tool. In this 
way, the objective structure of labour transformed animal cries into linguistic 
words. When the interjections are emitted independently of the actual process of 
labour, they begin to mean the part of the productive activity they usually are 
associated to. Working interjections thus evoke the productive activity in the form 
of a cognitive correlate, that is, the concept, the outline of that activity, its 
behavioural schema. 
To Thảo signification is not a mental entity which exists before being produced 
by the speech. For this reason, Thảo said that language did not arise from the need 
to communicate. The sign produced its signification: then, Thảo implicitly 
criticised the semantic theory set out by Husserl in his Logical Investigation (see 
Benoist 2013). There are no significations without and beyond the real production 
of signs. Nonetheless, we must add that Thảo was talking about the origins of 
language rather than the full-fledged language. 
After the formation of speech, what characterises human language is the 
possibility to designate conceptual structures. They are the same for all the 
members of the community because they reproduce the operative structures of the 
actual process of production. We must note that the actual and objective process of 
tool production is a collective habit that can be reproduced countless times. As the 
conceptual strucutres reproduce that process of production in the form of thought, 
the conceptual structures, too, can refer to several different situations and are thus 
free of constraints and space-time influences. 
The symbolic behaviour of mammals shall ensure the mediation from practical 
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behaviour to consciousness. Specifically, the sketched-out act mediates the 
translation of the target of practical behaviour into the intentional content of 
consciousness. Since the direct behaviour is repressed, a sketched-out act is 
performed and becomes the symbolic act that tends to an intended signification, 
i.e., the target and the intention of the inhibited act. The motivated bond between 
expression and signification exactly shows that the mediation took place. In the 
same way, working vocalizations had still the role of mediation from practical life 
to consciousness. By contrast, full-formed language seems to be more independent 
from practical life. Once conceptual structures are at disposal of the speaker, she 
can produce a chain of concepts independently of the immediate situation. 
Another way to say this is that full-fledged language entails arbitrary signs whose 
production is independent of the immediate working situation. A clear advantage 
of this ability is the fact that consciousness can orient behaviour, even if the 
behaviour is still determined by the objective conditions of actual life. That is, 
consciousness can orient the behaviour towards more sophisticated modes of 
production, even if the need to put in place those sophisticated modes of 
production depends upon the objective conditions of actual life. In other words, 
full-fledged language enables humans to freely and consciously reproduce in the 
form of thought possible or impossible actions. Reasoning emerges every time 
when humans stop doing something and imagine other ways to do it. 
Nonetheless, Thảo’s theory raises some problems. First, we must note that 
human semiotic behaviour could be hardly reduced only to conceptual language, of 
course. We cannot dismiss the fact that there are also other functions of language 
which depends upon the need better to communicate. But Thảo neglected to deal 
with those other means of communication. Does the human-specific semiotic 
behaviour employ other semiotic abilities? Human language is the result of the 
development of certain semiotic skills (immediate expression, simulation, vocals 
schemes, etc.) but it is not clear if Thảo admitted that those semiotic skills continue 
to be effective in fully-developed languages. In a phrase, he did not explain if there 
is a coexistence of more semiotic skills next to the fully-fledged language. It would 
have been interesting if Thảo had spent some words in this regard. 
The universal value of both conceptual knowledge and language is only the 
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result of the reflection in consciousness of the indefinite possibility of repetition 
implied in the objective structure of the process of the tool-making. And language 
merely reflects what already exists at the level of the behaviour. That means that 
labour already depends upon some practical skills which allow producing, 
reproducing, and storing tools. These practical skills are then internalized by way 
of language and become cognitive skills, i.e., concepts and conceptual operations. 
One could ask if there is a kind of practical and pre-linguistic know-how that is 
already at work in production. As we have seen, at the level of thought and 
consciousness, the mechanism of generalisation of concepts is under the influence 
the metaphor. One could ask if the metaphor is a result of the internalization of 
proto-metaphorical practical ability or it is rather something that emerge with 
language. Is there a relationship between metaphor and tool-making? Is the 
metaphor a mediation between actual life and reasoning? How could metaphor 
conduce to the ability to generalise the experience in the form of thought? 
Unfortunately, Thảo did not answer these questions. 
The mechanism by which the structure of practical life becomes a conceptual 
structure is entirely based on the conventional association between some sounds 
and a given moment in the production process. Those sounds mediate the 
transition from practical life to the life of conscience. When sounds are part of the 
production process they have only a functional and pragmatic value. Therefore, 
they are understandable by all those involved in the production process. Thus, the 
linguistic meaning of linguistic sounds exists only at the level of consciousness in 
the form of conceptual structures. These conceptual structures are shared by the 
whole social group because they have a social value as they reproduce a collective 
habit – which is also a universal moment in human history. But can we really deal 
with language when dealing with expressions associated with the production 
process and without conceptual signification? It seems that in this case we are 
dealing with pre-linguistic expressions. These pre-linguistic expressions could 
have a linguistic meaning only because the production process has been 
interrupted. And, therefore, language in the strict sense is separated from practical 
life. 
Thảo well described how language allows conceptual universal knowledge, i.e., a 
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system of intended concepts which are independent of space and time. But it is 
questionable whether the fully-fledged language could be also context-related and 
effectively refers to reality itself. In effect, the fully-fledged language merely refers 
to mental contents. Those contents are the abstract moment of real practical 
relation with the environment. In other words, the intended meaning the symbolic 
function refers to is the negation of the reality of behaviour. 
It seems that Thảo’s theory of language exacerbates the isolation of 
consciousness from practical life. Given that human reasoning depends upon 
language, humans cannot know the reality itself but contents of consciousness. At 
the same time, humans still operate in the real concrete world. In this vein, Thảo 
involuntarily argued for an irreconcilable fracture between symbolic consciousness 
and the real individuals. The problem facing Thảo at this juncture is how to 
conciliate the linguistic ego and the real subject of practical life. 
Thảo was acutely aware of that conundrum. Here is who he decribed the point 
in 1974: 
 
[…] the method so defined, namely, the analysis of lived experience practiced on the 
basis of dialectical materialism, only seemed to yield effective results for 
understanding animal behavior, as exhibited in the first chapter of part two. [...] 
Which is to say, the project, so attractive as an Aufhebung offered practically no 
assistanc for the essential task, namely the analysis of human realities. (Thảo [1974: 
37] 2009: 297-298) 
 
There was nothing to do but take the work up from the beginning, to pose the 
problem not as a lived, phenomenological analysis of consciousness, pursued on the 
positions of dialectical materialism [une analyse vécue, phénoménologique, de la conscience, 
pratiquée sur les positions du matérialisme dialectique], but rather an application of 
dialectical materialism to the analysis of lived consciousness [une application de la 
dialectique matérialiste à l’analyse de la conscience vécue], and to solve it through its very 
content, namely through the orderly reproduction of the actual, material process, 
where the movement of subjectivity is constituted. (Thảo [1974: 38] 2009: 299) 
 
A few years before, in a letter, Thảo explain that, in PDM, 
 
In reality, I lacked to understand Marx’s indications about language as a mediation 
between social practice and consciousness [En réalité il me manquait d’avoir 
compris les indications de Marx sur le langage, comme médiation entre la pratique 
sociale et la conscience.]. (to Rossi-Landi, Hanoi, 27 January 1972; see fig. 14) 
 
 122 
In Thảo’s following works, language still represents the core of the mediation 
between social practice and consciousness. But he seriously changes his own 
conception of language. In this vein, we must better understand why he said that 
“Marx’s indications about language” explain the mediation between practical life 
and consciousness. To clarify this point, the following chapters will be devoted to 
the description of the new theory Thảo suggested after he had published PDM. 
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Chapter Three 
The Semiotics of the Language of the Real Life 
 
 
 
Die Produktion der Ideen, Vorstellungen, des Bewußtseins ist  
zunächst unmittelbar verflochten in die materielle Tätigkeit  
und den materiellen Verkehr der Menschen, Sprache des wirklichen Lebens.  
Das Vorstellen, Denken, der geistige Verkehr der Menschen  
erscheinen hier noch als direkter Ausfluß ihres materiellen Verhaltens.  
(K. Marx) 
 
 
 
1. Towards a New Semiotic Model. - 2. Saussure and Structuralism(s). - 3.1. The 
Object of Semiology. - 3.2. Arbitrariness versus Motivated Signs. - 3.3. 
Saussure’s Mentalism. - 4.1. Saussure’s Notion of Value (I). - 4.2. Saussure’s 
Notion of Value (II). - 4.3. Similarities between Mercantilism and Saussurism. - 
4.4. Rossi-Landi’s Theory of Value. - 5.1. The Language of Real Life (I). - 5.2. The 
Language of Real Life (II). 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Towards a New Semiotic Model 
 
In PDM, Husserl’s phenomenology was accused of being a kind of idealism (cf. 
Thảo [1951] 1986: 7). The major constraint of phenomenology, and in particular of 
the practice of transcendental reduction to the dimension of lived experience, was 
that Husserl was not radical enough, and hence oscillated between a trend towards 
realism and the retreat to an idealistic insight. In particular, the reduction to 
transcendental subjectivity as a pole constituting phenomena would have had to be 
much more radical: in this case, the phenomenologist would have shown i) that the 
transcendental ego itself would be nothing but the historical and concrete ego, ii) 
that transcendental subjectivity is itself constituted in the movement of natural 
and social history that precedes it, iii) that consciousness is always preceded by the 
life of the organism and its activities, iv) that the pre-categorial experience should 
be reckoned to be an experience taking place at the level of animal life and is not 
peculiar to humans, v) that lived experience would be the abstract aspect of real 
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life.  
To the extent that Thảo’s purpose is to describe from a monistic perspective the 
emergence of consciousness from matter, no form of dualism can be defended. This 
is far from enough, however, to reject the Husserlian philosophy in every respect. 
Thảo admits that certain concepts and research carried out by Husserl could be 
successfully integrated into his theoretical project. This is particularly true of the 
analysis of lived experience described in the second volume of the Ideas (Hua IV), 
which shows how the individual psychic dimension corresponds to the experience 
of animal life and how the same transcendental constitution would follow and 
reproduce dynamic that goes from matter to life and from life to spirit in the sense 
of social existence (cf. id., §§ 1-34).  
Thảo did not consider dialectical materialism as a radical alternative to Husserl’s 
philosophy, but rather, in the second part of his PDM, he attempted to incorporate 
some phenomenological ideas and certain results of the phenomenological method 
into a dialectical materialist framework. Specifically, Thảo’s aim is to explain the 
origin of the specific form of consciousness observable in humans from the point of 
view of a monistic metaphysics, and more particularly a materialist one. For this 
reason, PDM seems to be the continuation of the Engels’ Dialectic of Nature by other 
means. 
Nonetheless, Thảo’s theory of human consciousness set out in his PDM seems to 
overshoot the target. The symbolic behaviour of mammals, as well as first human 
vocalizations, are supposed to ensure the mediation from practical behaviour to 
consciousness. Instead, the human fully-fledged language is a system of abstract 
operations which lacks a middle term that explains how they could be seen as the 
reflection of practical life and socio-historical condition. And, since human 
consciousness depends upon language, humans cannot know the reality itself but 
contents of consciousness merely. The fully-fledged language refers to a content of 
consciousness, i.e., the abstract moment of real practical relation with the 
environment. Assuming that linguistic signification is nothing other than the 
result of the negation and idealization of the real relation with reality and material 
things, language only refers to abstract idealized contents.  
Given that the main interest of Thảo is to explain the origin of human 
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consciousness, he understood that his main subject of research must be the human 
language. The problem facing Thảo at this juncture is how i) to conciliate the 
linguistic ego and the real subject of practical life, and ii) justifying the link 
between language and consciousness. To achieve his purpose, Thảo must 
reorganise his semiotic model in order to explain i) how human language could 
interact with the external world from the beginning and ii) how the fully-formed 
language might still mediate the internalisation of social practical life into 
consciousness. 
In the 1960s, Thảo was again engaged in a vast research project on the origin of 
consciousness and language, as evidenced by a series of articles that will be 
collected in his ILC. In this book, Thảo sought to explain human cognition – 
following the indications of the classics of Marxism – through the practical and 
collective life of our ancestors. Given the relevant role of language, then, to Thảo, i) 
consciousness emerges in and through the language considered in its materiality 
and in its practical and operational function; ii) language is not an object, but it is 
mediation between humans and reality, between humans, and between the 
individual and the won self; iii) language cannot be studied as an autonomous 
reality, but it must be observed within the social and practical life - this is the first 
condition that must be satisfied so that a discourse on language could be 
considered as scientific. 
To establish the main principles of his new semiotic model, Thảo polemically 
criticised certain passages of Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics (Cours de 
linguistique générale, 1916; henceforth CLG) and aimed to develop a materialistic 
semiology. This chapter will be especially devoted to explaining structure and 
consequences of Thảo’s criticism of Saussurean semiological model. 
 
2. Saussure and Structuralism(s) 
 
The reception of the CLG inseparable from its drafting and especially its 
circulation (Puech 2013a, see also the vulgata which Lepschy 1966 talks about), and 
the history of European structuralisms must be seen against such a background 
(Puech 2013b). In Saussure’s posthumous book, indeed, very famous pairs of 
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concepts – such as diachrony/synchrony, langue/parole or signified/signifier – had 
been introduced. From the 1950s, these notions became the keywords of so-called 
structuralism (see Dosse 1991; 1992). 
Structuralism could be previously regarded as a manifold intellectual movement 
that saw the concept of “structure” as the starting point for research in several 
different fields. A structure is a non-empirical system of elements whose meaning 
depends upon their reciprocal relations. And every element of the structure does 
not exist before the others and has a primacy over the others in no way. Beginning 
in the 1950s, there was a particular phenomenon to report. According to Chiss et al. 
(2015) and Léon (2013), the term “structure” is crystallized within the French 
human sciences and, in the 1960s and 1970s, a generalized structuralism took place 
and was characterized by the trans-disciplinary value of the term “structure”. 
In the France of the 1960s and 1970s, there was opposition to the structuralist 
thesis and, in particular, to the structuralist reading of certain hypotheses of the 
CLG. Among them, criticisms that came from the Marxist front was particularly 
significant historically in establishing a relatively homogeneous position of 
strategic, ideological and theoretical opposition to the dominant structuralist 
discourse. To quote only two examples, we should recall a few articles by Lucien 
Sève – dear friend and editor of Thảo – and some works by Henri Lefebvre (1901–
1991) (see Sève 1984 and Lefebvre 1971). 
We may sum up the disagreement between generalised structuralism and 
dialectical materialism by two main points: i) first of all, our authors criticise the 
absence of a dialectical relation between synchrony and diachrony, between the 
structure and the process, and condemned the resurgence of the old opposition 
between Eleatism and Eraclitism (see especially the criticism of Lefebvre 1971: 70); 
ii) the autonomy of structures leads one to think of structures as metaphysical 
entities, to identify the ideal with reality, the products of science with affective 
reality (the same ontological structuralism denounced by Eco 1968). 
 Thảo’s criticisms towards Saussure must be regarded against the background of 
this debate. We cannot dismiss that Thảo was deeply interested in French cultural 
world and knew that structuralism was broadly successful in France during the 
1950s and 1960s, understanding that Saussure was the main source of that 
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theoretical framework. Thảo ([1974: 39] 2009: 301) wrote: “In 1964 I heard the first 
echoes of the resounding success of structuralism in the west. A study of Ferdinand 
de Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics became an urgent necessity”16. Thảo 
understood that a theory concerning the first linguistic signs and the formation of 
language had to contend with the most influential available semiotic model. It was 
Saussure’s semiotics whose applications extensively transcended linguistic 
sciences. 
The CLG in itself was not Saussure’s first-hand writing but rather the result of 
the adjustments made by the editors after his death. The analysis of Saussure’s 
manuscripts showed the content of Saussure’s thought in a more faithful way (see 
Godel 1969; see also De Mauro in Saussure [1967] 2011: 285-456). Nonetheless, Thảo 
did not know such studies. To him, Saussure’s thought totally coincided with the 
theories set out in the CLG. But Thảo did not consider structuralism the only 
possible way for reading Saussure. 
Thảo offset what could be safeguarded of the CLG and what cannot. Accordingly, 
Thảo decided to begin his discussion of the CLG with the concept of “arbitrariness” 
employed by Saussure to describe the unmotivated link between signifier and 
signified. After that, Thảo took Saussure’s notion of “value” into account so as to 
reveal the ideological assumptions and conundrums that lead to neglect a correct 
evaluation of the nature of linguistic signs. 
 
3.1. The Object of Semiology 
 
Between 1974 and 1975 Thảo published two articles entitled De la phénoménologie 
à la dialectique matérialiste de la conscience (From phenomenology to the materialistic 
dialectic of consciousness; see Thảo 1974, 1975) which served as an introduction, 
partly biographical and partly theoretical, to the ILC. In the first article Thảo 
                                                 
16 For instance, see Jakobson 1963, Barthes 1964, Todorov 1965, Althusser at al. 1965, 
Greimas 1966, Foucault 1966, Lacan 1966, and Piaget 1968. According to Chiss et al. 2015 
and Léon 2013, the term “structure” crystallized itself in the field of humanities in 
France already during the 1950s. In 1959 two conferences took place in Cerisy-la-Salle 
entitled of Sens et usage du terme de structure and Genèse et Structure. In this regard, see 
also Goldmann 1970. Lévi-Strauss (1959) and Merleau-Ponty (1960) need mentioning in 
this regard. Finally, for Eastern Structuralism see Sèriot 1999. 
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almost exclusively dealt with the theory of the sign proposed in the CLG. Thảo 
believed that both, his hypothesis about the origin of language as well as the 
semiology which was its theoretical support, were radically in disagreement with 
certain hypotheses of the CLG taken up by structuralism. 
Thảo regarded the notion of “arbitrariness” as the key concept of Saussure’s 
semiotics (as De Mauro 2011: note 138). The CLG introduced the notion of “sign” 
(signe) to designate the combination of the two faces of every linguistic term, the 
signifier and the signified: “The linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a 
concept and a sound-image” (CLG: 98; trans., p. 66). Saussure proposed “to retain 
the word sign [signe] to designate the whole and to replace concept and sound-
image respectively by signified [signifié] and signifier [signifiant]” (CLG: 9; trans., p. 
67). To him, the bond between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary, viz. the 
signifier is not linked by inner bond to the signified. “The bond between the 
signified and the signifier is arbitrary. Since I mean by sign the whole that results 
from the associating of the signifier with the signified, I can simply say: the 
linguistic sign is arbitrary” (CLG: 100; trans. p. 67). 
In Thảo’s view, the attention that Saussure has constantly accorded to the 
arbitrariness obscured a wide range of signs that may be hardly reduced to 
linguistic signs.  
Saussure conceived linguistics as part of a more general science of signs that he 
called “semiology” (CLG: 100; trans., p. 68). To Saussure “linguistics can become the 
master-pattern for all branches of semiology although language is only one 
particular semiological system.” Indeed, semiology concerns “the whole group of 
systems grounded on the arbitrariness of the sign”. Assuming that linguistic signs 
are totally arbitrary, they “realize better than the others the ideal of the 
semiological process”. Therefore, language is the most characteristic of all systems 
of expression and must be assumed as the classification principle in semiology.  
In the same passage, Saussure devalued “completely natural signs” (CLG 100-
101; trans., p. 68-69). Those signs are based on “the rudiment of a natural bond 
between signifier and signified” and, consequently, have an “intrinsic value”. 
Saussure called such signs “symbols” and regarded them as the signs that are 
“never wholly arbitrary”. 
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Thảo called into question the primacy of linguistic signs in semiotics. More 
precisely, in CLG, Thảo saw traces which can be a support for a semiology that is no 
longer centred on the model of verbal language:  
 
However, the author [Saussure] himself, in an early part of the book, had recognised 
the existence of an entire class of signs, introduced as “natural signs”—either 
entirely natural, like pantomime, or partially so, like signs of politeness, symbols, 
etc. All these signs are characterized by “a certain natural expressiveness” that lends 
them “intrinsic value.” (Thảo [1974: 39] 2009: 301) 
 
We can thus read, clearly and even highlighted throughout the Course in General 
Linguistics, the possibility and the necessity of another semiology. (id., p. 303) 
 
Thảo refused to assimilate all kinds of signs to arbitrary signs: “I was surprised 
by the boldness with which the principle of the arbitrariness of the sign, taken 
from the study of spoken language, was extended to all signs in general for the 
establishment of semiology as a general science of signs” (id., p. 301). 
Consequently, Thảo engaged in an analysis of the nature of non-wholly arbitrary 
signs and the intrinsic motivation of speech acts: “Already, ordinary language 
seeks to attain – through intonation, word and phrase choice, sentence order – a 
certain expressive quality, which is, as such, unregulated by the conventional 
codes and contributes, sometimes decisively, to meaning” (id., p. 302). 
In this respect, Thảo’s semiotic project revaluated symbols and partially 
motivated signs within the real life. Indeed, his theory of the origins of language 
must begin with the analysis of the fundamental and early signs that were the 
precursors of developed linguistic signs. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to 
transcend the representation of linguistic systems and analyse two kinds of links: 
the bond between signifier and signified and the link between symbols and reality. 
 
3.2. Arbitrariness versus Motivated Signs 
 
Thảo disagreed with the primacy of arbitrariness and condemned the extension 
of the properties of linguistic signs to all kinds of signs. In detail, he did not agree 
with Saussure’s assumption that semiology should merely be addressed to 
arbitrary features of signs. Though semiology would have also to study natural 
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signs, Saussure affirmed, it must solely focus on their conventional aspects. 
Against that, Thảo even doubted that languages could be regarded as systems of 
arbitrary signs at all. To Thảo ([1974: 39] 2009: 302), scientific language may be seen 
as the best example of a wholly conventional system. “The semiotic ideal based on 
the principle of the arbitrariness of the sign seems to achieve full value only for 
scientific language, which aims primarily to clearly express distinct ideas, and to 
that end uses conventional language as much as possible.” But ordinary language 
employs certain motivated means, such as onomatopoeias, inflexions, stress, 
syntactic reversal of the normal order of words and phrases in a sentence, 
indexical, and so forth. Those means of expression are not always codified by the 
conventional rules of the speech, but they contribute to understanding the 
intentions of the partner. 
Thảo mentioned other examples of symbols: miming, gesturing, pantomime, 
artworks, facial movements, and so forth. What they have in common is the 
tendency to establish a direct link between the meaningfulness of the signifier and 
the signified. As a consequence, those signs have an intrinsic value even if they 
could be partially arbitrary, of course. And this is the point that Thảo’s semiotics 
focused on: 
 
[The dialectical semiology] would study the immense variety of modes of expression 
and that is oriented toward an ideal – opposed to the scientific ideal of conventional 
distinction founded on the principle of the arbitrariness of the sign – that we might 
call the aesthetic ideal: mimicry, ritual, symbol, various figurative processes, the 
infinity of gestures and physiological games that precede, but always accompany 
and sometimes substitute for speech – all finding their greatest fulfillment in art. 
(Thảo [1974: 40] 2009: 303)  
 
Thus, Thảo stressed the need to take what he called “the general system of 
intrinsic signs” into account. As he stated, that system is opposed to “the general 
system of arbitrary signs”. The structure of the system of intrinsic signs is based on 
the intrinsic meaningfulness of the signifier. But Thảo went much further and 
suggested that the system of intrinsic signs is the condition for having the system 
of arbitrary signs. This is the core of Thảo’s theory: 
 
Quite clearly, the first system [the system of instrinsic signs] founds the second [that 
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of arbitrary signs], since it directly demonstrates in sensible intuition the content of 
meaning to which the second gives a conventionally formally more distinct 
expression, in order to develop it at the discursive level. (Thảo [1974: 40] 2009: 303).  
 
To illustrate, the system of intrinsic signs directly exhibits the meaning of a 
given expression to perception. For instance, the sight of a person starring at 
something is enough to understand what she means. In the same way, an 
aggressive and threatening tone is enough to understand the intention of the 
partner. At a subsequent stage, the system of arbitrary signs gives the message a 
conventional and discursive expression.  
So Thảo stated that it would be quite wrong to equate the system of intrinsic 
signs with the system of arbitrary signs. Consequently, it is also wrong to reduce 
the structure of whatever sign to linguistic signs. In Thảo’s view, language in a 
wide sense is “the movement of signs in general”. With regard to the origins of 
speech, language took the shape of gestures and vocalizations whose performance 
conveyed meaning because of the “intrinsic expressiveness” of those signs. 
It seems that Thảo regarded Saussurean arbitrariness more in terms of the 
conventional relationship between signifier and meaning than in terms of non-
motivation. And his argument seems to rest precisely on such assimilation of 
arbitrariness to conventionality: conventionalism must necessarily assume a pre-
existing communicational, cognitive and social layer. Such a remark may seem 
trivial, given the philosophical reflection on language since Plato’s Cratylus at least, 
and much has been written about the vicious circle implicit in conventionalist 
positions. As indicated in the ILC, Thảo was well aware of this debate and what 
interests him is rather to take a position against tautologies and pleonasms proper 
of a semiology which takes a system of signs that refer to each other as its subject 
matter:  
 
It is quite clear that if the whole meaning of signs merely consists in their referring 
to one another, without ever referring directly to things, then we are practically 
enclosed in a world of signs, so that we no longer see what speaking of things could 
mean. […] (Thảo [1973] 1984: 33) 
 
However, the importance of Thảo’s thesis rests elsewhere: in fact, it wants to 
clarify the genetic development of the arbitrariness of signs. 
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3.3. Saussure’s Mentalism 
 
One of the most interesting aspects of the remarks proposed by Thảo is the 
reproach of mentalism and idealism to the ashamed of Husserl and Saussure. The 
CLG reckoned that “the linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept 
and a sound-image” (CLG: 98; trans. p. 66). And the sound-image (signifier) “is not 
the material sound, a purely physical thing, but the psychological imprint of the 
sound, the impression that it makes on our senses.” Of course, Saussure had argued 
that the mental nature of the sign depended on previous perceptual experience, 
although the linguistics took the psychic aspect of linguistic phenomena alone into 
account. However, Thảo ([1974: 42] 2009: 309) constantly highlighted how the 
“modeling of the signifier on the material conditions of social practice” – that is, 
the concrete semiotic act that takes place in practical life – remains the essential 
starting point to explain every psychic entity. 
For Thảo ([1975: 25-26] 2009: 314-315), indeed, 
 
It is obvious that this idea, placing language on the pure ideal plane of 
consciousness, separates it completely from the material activity of human beings in 
the social production of their existence. However, such a theory is obviously 
inspired by a psychology that is no longer acceptable today: “The psychic character 
of our acoustic images,” says Saussure, “appears well when we observe our own 
language. Without moving the lips or the tongue, we can talk to ourselves or 
mentally recite a piece of verse” (ibidem) [see CLG: 98-99, trans., p. 66]. In reality we 
cannot separate internal language, as a pure ideal operation, from actual movements 
more or less outlined – from voice and gesture. These movements are always being 
accomplished, even when we do not see this clearly from the outside. The ideal 
operation is accomplished only on the basis of material signifying acts, and merely 
to stop some of them – for example to press the tongue between the teeth – is 
sufficient to slow intellectual activity considerably. 
[...] 
The ideal signifier, as a “psychic imprint” experienced in consciousness, thus rests 
necessarily on a material signifier, of which that “imprint” is precisely the ideal 
reproduction, and it is in virtue of this material signifier that language serves as the 
mediation between the material social practice and the interior life of consciousness  
[...] 
 
Thảo (1975: 26-27) mentioned Husserl and the notions of noema and noesis in 
order to explain the psychic nature of the signified and the signifier described by 
Saussure.  
Husserl would be the clearest and coherent example of “subjective reflection” 
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(Thảo 1975: 24) and the Husserlian phenomenology would be a theory of 
knowledge which excludes from its research horizon the material and bodily 
relation between the subject and the external object to the mind. According to 
Thảo, the Husserlian distinction between noesis (intentional act) and noema 
(intentional object) – thay are the two terms of every intentional structure – 
precisely neglected the role of the external material world in the cognitive process 
(cf. Hua IV: § 87-127). 
The noema would therefore not be the image of the real object that exists 
outside the subject of knowledge and with which the subject establishes a 
relationship before any intentional lived experience. The noema exhausts the 
reality of the knowable object (Hua III: §§ 87-96). In support of his position, Thảo 
equated the Husserlian theory of knowledge with the empirio-criticism targeted by 
Lenin in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (1908). For the empirio-criticists 
(Avenarius, Mach, Bogdanov) – by putting aside the various aspects of the issue – 
knowledge of the world depends on the knowledge of the complexes of sensations 
which refer only ideally to the existence of external objects. 
Thảo added that, given the coincidence of the object of the mind (image, idea, 
representation, etc.) with the real known object or only knowable one, Husserl 
would support an anti-realistic thesis. Dialectical materialism, on the contrary, 
would imply an epistemology for which sensations is the manifestation of a real 
interaction with material objects which are independent of the subject – whose 
sensations are precisely their images. Since humans are natural beings which adapt 
to a natural world that precedes their existence, they can know the objective 
material reality – although in an incomplete manner. 
For Saussure, the object of linguistics is not, as Thảo wrote, the concrete 
individual act of speaking (parole), but the arbitrary system of signs taken in its 
psychic nature (langue). Thus, Thảo declared that the sound-image (signifier) would 
not be very different from the noesis as well as the concept (the signified) could be 
reckoned to be the Husserlian noema. Another way of saying this is that the 
Husserlian theory of intentionality as a noetic-noematic relation does not differ 
essentially from the Saussurean description of the signs from the point of view of 
the langue. Here is how Saussure descibed the langue: 
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Whereas speech is heterogeneous, language, as defined, is homogeneous. It is a 
system of signs in which the only essential thing is the union of meanings and 
sound-images, and in which both parts of the sign are psychological. (CLG: 32; trans., 
p. 15) 
 
Given that Thảo dismissed Saussure’s assumption of the social nature of the 
langue, he tried to demonstrate that the noesis and the noema – and the same goes 
for the signified and the signifier – are nothing more than the interiorised psychic 
epiphenomenon of the actual semiotic movement. The latter is first presented as 
an objective semiotic behaviour – namely, social, embodied and preconscious – 
that supports the collective practices and activities of a given community. As a 
complex of gestural and verbal motivated signs shared by the group and rooted in 
the context in which they are produced, the system of intrinsic signs precedes and 
promotes the emergence of individual cognition, consciousness, concepts, and 
psychic images. 
As a matter of fact, for Thảo, human consciousness must be regarded as the 
product of following factors: a certain anatomy (in particular, the bipedal posture), 
certain neuro-physiological mechanisms (to be placed in the brain), but, above all, 
the particular characteristics of collective life of our ancestors which have marked 
the evolution of our species. The name given by Thảo to the latter is “material 
behaviour” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 17). 
According to Thảo (1975), the psychic nature of the signified-noema and the 
signifier-noesis is the result of the individual’s internalization of a social practice 
that takes place, first and foremost, in the biological body and in the social life. And 
it is this social and linguistic practice that will serve to explain the phylogenetic 
and ontogenetic origin of consciousness. 
 
4.1. Saussure’s Notion of Value (I) 
 
Thảo’s project also aimed, among other things, to define in a detailed way, on 
the one hand, the relationship between value and arbitrariness and, on the other, 
the relationship between value and signification. In relation to the first point, the 
question is particularly important because, without surprise, the history of 
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Saussurian philology was marked by a debate on the logical dependence between 
value and arbitrariness (cf. CLG 157; trans., p. 113). On the one hand, some say that 
Saussure deduces arbitrariness from value (see Engler 1962: 62; Derossi 1965: 83; 
Jäger 1976: 237; Wunderli 1981: 225); on the other, there are scholars who claim 
that Saussure followed the inverse approach (cf. De Mauro 2011: fn. 138). 
In relation to the second point (namely, the relation between value and 
signification), we cannot forget that, like the debate on the notion of arbitrariness 
which became particularly animated after the articles of Pichon (1937) and 
Benveniste (1939), around the concept of value a rich bibliography arose over the 
years (for the debate on arbitrariness cf. De Mauro 2011: 413-416; for the debate on 
value, see Sofia 2013). In this corpus, it is possible to highlight two tendencies that 
are particularly relevant to the present work.  
The first one concerns the relationship between value and signification. The 
debate on this point has been revived recently after the publication of Saussure’s 
Ecrits de linguistique générale (2002; henceforth ELG), and in particular a passage of 
the manuscript on the double essence of language (1891; see ELG: 17-88) in which 
Saussure seems to identify value, meaning, function and usage (cf. ELG: 28). The 
identification of value and signification (sustained by some even before the 
publication of the ELG: for instance, see Jäger 1976: 216; see also Malmkjær 1991: 
437; Bright 1992: III, 406; Bouquet 1992: 91; id. 1997: 317; Rastier 2002) entailed the 
reaction of those who argued that signification cannot be completely reduced to 
value. This is in agreement with both the handwritten notes of the course auditors 
(CLG / E: 1854 B, C, E, D) and with what is said in the CLG itself (CLG: 158). 
On the other hand, the second trend concerns the debate on the sources of the 
Saussurean notion of “value.” There have been those who have tried to identify the 
economic sources of Saussurean notion of value (cf. Koerner 1973: 68; Sljusareva 
1980: 541; Ponzio 2005: 2; Ponzio 2015; Joseph 2014), or those who have challenged 
this approach (cf. Godel 1957: 235), and, finally, those who have argued for the 
linguistic sources of this notion (cf. Auroux 1985: 295; Swiggers 1982: 329; Haßler 
2007). Scholars have pointed out that the comparison between language and 
economics was a long-time theoretical operation long before Saussure and its 
traces can already be found in Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Leibniz (see Kilic 2006; cf. also 
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Aarsleff 1979: 42; Cerquiglini 1989: 36) or Turgot (cf. Auroux 1985: 296). 
 De Mauro (2011: fn. 165) had already stressed that Saussure knew the debate in 
political economy and, especially, he had knowledge of the Methodenstreit between 
Carl Menger (1840–1921) – who was one of the greatest theorists of marginalism – 
and the historical school of Gustav von Schmoller (1838–1917). De Mauro did not 
exclude that Saussure had read the Manuale di economia politica (Handbook of 
Political Economics, 1906) by Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923) who was, along with Leon 
Walras (1834–1910), an eminent member of the school of Lausanne. As Ponzio 
(2005) has pointed out, Saussure shared with several theoreticians of marginalism 
and neo-classical economics several methodological principles17. 
Thảo was one of the few scholars who attributed a particular significance to the 
eminently economic source of the Saussurean notion of value. And, along with 
other Marxist scholars, Thảo was fascinated by the comparison between language 
and economics. This comparison was further developed by other Marxist authors 
who also disagreed with the self-enclosed conception of value in Saussure and tried 
to deepen the economic homology between signifier / signified and use value / 
exchange value (see Lefebvre 1966; Goux 1968; Schaff 1968: 207; Baudrillard 1972; 
Latouche 1973; Rossi-Landi 2016: 180-181; see also Bourdieu 1977; Rossi-Landi 2003 
[1968] and id. 1977). For Thảo’s part, he did not reject the validity of the concept of 
value in itself. He admitted that the differential relation among signs is essential 
for expressing nuances of meaning, for articulating precisely the several different 
meanings of the same word, for defining more accurately certain concepts and to 
make them clear and distinct. On the other hand, Thảo believed that the semiology 
of the CLG was too weak to clearly establish the boundaries between the two 
notions, that of signification and that of value.  
What Thảo criticised was the reduction of signification to value, since, according 
to him, the signification also concerns i) the intrinsic value of signs which are not 
                                                 
17 A short list is given below (these analogies, of course, imply a certain reading of the 
CLG): i) political economics must use mathematical tools; ii) the choice of the static 
point of view and criticism towards the historical school; iii) the analysis must refer to 
the level of the market itself as an already constituted entity; iv) the value of a product 
or service is determined by its marginal utility, i.e. the degree of satisfaction from the 
point of view of the buyer (subjective perception); v) the overall price of the commodity 
is fixed by the interaction of supply and demand and is necessarily imposed on all 
individuals. 
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totally arbitrary; ii) the differential value of arbitrary signs (the Saussurean value); 
iii) the relationship between signs and the transcendent entity (material reality, 
pre-linguistic experience, etc.). In the next pages, we will see how Thảo tried to 
define the nature of signification starting from the criticism – in the Kantian sense 
of delimitation of limits and legitimacy – of the Saussurean notion of value. 
 
4.2. Saussure’s Notion of Value (II) 
 
According to Thảo, Saussure’s fallacies are in particular clear when Saussure 
affirmed that “in language, as in any semiological system, whatever distinguishes 
one sign from the others constitutes it” (CLG: 168; trans., p. 121). Firstly, Saussure 
established that language represented the touchstone of any semiological system. 
Secondly, in that way, Saussure introduced the notion of “value” as a differential 
relation among signs of a given linguistic (or semiological) system. Thirdly, a 
system of intrinsic signs is neglected by Saussure and thus excluded from the field 
of semiotics. 
The discussion of the notion of value in the CLG (see Chapter IV) follows the 
introduction of the famous diagram of the amorphous mass which was supposed to 
explain the nature of the language as a form. For Saussure, thinking before 
language would be an “amorphous and indistinct mass” (CLG: 155; trans., p. 112). A 
given language orders the indefinite plane of jumbled ideas and the equally vague 
plane of sounds by articulating them into psychic segments (signifiers and 
signifieds). 
In this passage, according to Thảo, the semiotics of Saussure would be defective, 
since it would show the idealistic hypothesis that supports it. Linguistic signs alone 
would be the condition of the possibility of rational thinking. It follows that 
reasoning after language requires no attachment to the sensible, bodily, and 
material world external to the knowing subject. To Saussure “language is a system 
of interdependent terms in which the value of each term result solely from the 
simultaneous presence of the others” (CLG: 159; trans., p. 114). As a result, each 
sign has its peculiar value by virtue of differential relations with the other signs of 
the system. 
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Consequently, for Saussure, “within the same language all words used to express 
related ideas limit each other reciprocally” (CLG: 160; trans., p. 116). To Thảo, then, 
Saussure fell into the same error of Husserl. To him, the object of thought (in this 
case, the signs) corresponds to the real object of all knowledge. To Thảo (1974: 41), 
that of Saussure, more than a “linguistic theory of verbal meaning” (i.e., a 
semantics), is a “gnoseological theory of the concept” (i.e., a theory of knowledge). 
If Thảo succeeds in demonstrating the coincidence of value and signification, he 
could show more forcefully the idealism implicit in the theory of language as form. 
Saussure, however, explicitly rejected that assumption: 
 
When we speak of the value of a world, we generally think first of its property of 
standing for an idea, and this is in fact one side of linguistic value. But if this is true, 
how does value differ from signification? Might the two words be synonyms? I think 
not, although it is easy to confuse them [...]. (CLG: 158; trans., p. 114)18 
 
Evidently, Saussure did not admit the coincidence of value and signification. The 
signification concerns the inner and arbitrary relationship between signifier and 
signified. The value, on the contrary, concerns the relationship of a given sign with 
the other signs of a linguistic system. 
But assuming that linguistic signs do not express pre-existing ideas but rather 
concepts that are influenced by the linguistic systems (CLG: 161; trans., p. 118), “the 
concepts are purely differential and defined not by their positive content but 
negatively by their relations with the other terms of the system” (CLG: 160; trans., 
p. 117). According to Thảo (1974), if the linguistic value entirely determines the 
conceptual content of thought, the link between knowledge and state of affairs is 
totally dismissed. Thus conceived, the knowledge completely depends upon the 
relations among linguistic signs. Thus, Thảo questioned the validity of the 
autonomist conception of the linguistic system that Saussure seems to support. 
Remarkably, Thảo (1974) regarded that consequence of the theory of linguistic 
value as contradictory. To Thảo, at the very beginning of the book, Saussure had 
reasonably affirmed that “I have defined things rather than words” (CLG: 31; trans., 
                                                 
18 Cf. De Mauro 2011: footnote 231. This hypothesis is confirmed by ms. notes of the 
students relating to the course of December 7, 1909 (CLG/E 1854 B, C, D, E). There have 
been scholars who have noticed that Saussure’s position seems different in the ELG: 28. 
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p. 14). Thus, Thảo suggested that Saussure had implicitly admitted a certain 
relation between language, knowledge and the state of affairs, even if Saussure 
seems to neglect it when he described the relationship between languages, 
thinking, and reality19. 
Thảo’s arguments (cf. Thảo [1974: 41-42] 2009: 303-305) started with a 
commentary on the CLG passage (159-160; trans., p. 115-117) in which Saussure 
explains the analogy between economic and linguistic values in relation to the 
difference between linguistic value and signification. Thảo then underlined a 
certain ambiguity in the way in which Saussure had put the difference between 
value and signification. It must be remembered that this CLG passage is particularly 
affected by the work of the editors. Most of the epistemological implications would 
disappear if the interventions of the editors are left aside. Much of Thảo’s 
argument, at least from a philological standpoint, cannot, therefore, be considered 
as pertinent. 
 
4.3. Similarities between Mercantilism and Saussurism 
 
Thảo highlighted the conundrum that, in his opinion, was implicit in Saussure’s 
theory of value. As Saussure put it: 
 
[All values] are apparently governed by the same paradoxical principle. They are 
always composed: (1) of a dissimilar thing that can be exchanged for the thing of 
which the value is to be determined; and (2) of similar things that can be compared 
with the thing of which the value is to be determined. 
Both factors are necessary for the existence of a value. To determine what a five-
franc piece is worth one must therefore know: (1) that it can be exchanged for a 
fixed quantity of a different thing; e.g. bread; and (2) that it can be compared with a 
similar value of the same system, e.g. a one-franc piece, or with coins of another 
system (a dollar, etc.). In the same way a word can be exchanged for something 
dissimilar, an idea; besides, it can be compared with something of the same nature, 
another word. (CLG: 159-160; trans, p. 115) 
 
Thảo’s aim was to show the identity of value and signification in the text of the 
CLG. Assimilated to economic value, the linguistic value is at the point of 
                                                 
19 By the way, Thảo neglected the whole issue of “the point of view” Saussure ([1916, 1995] 
2011: 8) talked about. 
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convergence of the signified-signifier relation (in the terms of the CLG: word-idea) 
and the relation among the signs (words). But the CLG added that the value of a 
word is not fixed so long as one merely indicates that it can be “exchanged” with 
this or that concept, namely that it has such and such a meaning. One must 
compare the word with other words, or similar values. It follows that the content 
of the word in question is not really determined only by the opposition with other 
words that are part of the same system. On this basis, Saussure introduced the 
distinction between value and signification: the value of a word depends on the 
relation of comparison with different words while the meaning depends on the 
relation of exchange with a concept. 
From this, Thảo introduced his criticism towards the notion of value on these 
lines of the CLG, showing how exchange and comparison are, in fact, a single 
relation: 
 
[…] The relation between the word and the idea that determines its signification is 
introduced as a relation of exchange, homologous to the relation of exchange 
between money and merchandise, and the relation between words is introduced as a 
relation of comparison homologous to the relation of comparison between various 
currencies. And here again these two relations amount in reality to the same thing. 
(Thảo [1974: 42] 2009: 307)  
 
Thảo’s argument develops in three moments. First, he wanted to show that the 
comparison between words supposes the relation of exchange sign-idea. On the 
other hand, the sign-idea exchange supposes the relation of comparison between 
words. In the first case, to define the value of a word by comparing it with other 
words, one needs to know, preliminarily, the meaning of the other words with 
which one compares the word in question. In the second case, in order to define 
the meaning of a word, one must make a comparison with other words which allow 
us to offer a definition. Thus, Saussure’s argument for the difference between value 
and signification is invalid because in both cases there is a differential relation 
between the signs: the signification supposes the value and, in turn, the value 
supposes signification. 
We cannot explain how the signs differ from each other, except by appealing to 
a meaning that would be already assumed. For instance, to Saussure, if someone 
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asks what the French word redouter (dread) means the answer would be based on 
the differential relation of redouter with other words such as craindre (fear) and 
avoir peur (be afraid). Consequently, Saussure said that “if redouter did not exist, all 
its content would go to its competitors” (CLG: 160; trans., p. 116). To Thảo, such an 
assumption involves a vicious circle: if one says that redouter is not craindre, thus, 
one already knows the meaning of redouter. The differential relation among signs 
does not explain the meaning of a given sign. The signification depends upon the 
value only apparently20. 
Interestingly, Thảo (1974: 42) brought out similarities between Saussure’s notion 
of value and the Marx’s criticism set out in his Capital (cf. MEW XXIII: 49-160) of the 
19th-century vulgar political economy. To clarify Thảo’s criticism, one must bear in 
mind Marx’s theory of merchandise: merchandise – whether money or not - can be 
exchanged with other goods and may be compared to all others. Each product has a 
value that manifests itself in the comparison (exchange value, Tauschenwert) with 
other products. The goods in question are comparable on the basis of the same 
unit: the working time required for their production. Thus, exchange and 
comparison would not be the source of value. The origin of the value of the 
merchandise is, in fact, the necessary time for its production. Nevertheless, the 
relationship among goods is necessary to know the value of the merchandise. For 
this reason, a particular form of merchandise, the money is considered the general 
equivalent of all other goods. In this sense, not only is money merchandise, but all 
goods are potentially currency. Thus, the Saussurian relation between money and 
merchandise and money-money are in reality the same. And according to Marx, 
although the value of a commodity does not show itself outside the exchange with 
other goods, that is to say, in the form of the relative value of exchange, each 
product has a solid core that transcends the world of the exchange. 
Similarly, to Thảo, without a reference to the real world of communication and 
production of signs, no explanation of the value of a sign could be possible. The 
abstract system of signs needs to be traced back to the real acts of communication 
taking place in collective cooperative activities. For Thảo it is, therefore, necessary, 
                                                 
20 Godel (1957: 221) and De Mauro (1965: 129-130) had already highlighted that aporia. In 
any case, Thao describes a dictionary conception of value: to define the value of a sign 
one must define it by means of other signs of the system (cf. Eco 1984: 74). 
 142 
so as to solve these difficulties, to distinguish the value which has a sign in the 
system – exchange value – and the value which has a sign in itself – the value in a 
strict sense, i.e., the intrinsic signification. To Thảo the intrinsic signification is, 
indeed, an original datum because it is a prerequisite for any comparison or 
exchange between signs. 
Before concluding, it seems quite relevant that even the recent readers of 
Saussure have brought to light the same conundrum: 
 
What is dissatisfying in Saussure’s discussion of value is that he is so insistent on its 
difference from meaning that he never gets to grips with their complex 
interrelationship. He points out that value is a part (and only a part) of meaning, but 
leaves us to infer what the rest of it is. He ignores the fact that, even in his own 
examples, the only way we know that the value of mouton is different from that of 
sheep is that the former has a broader range of meanings. While it appears to be 
implicit in his discussion that value emerges from meaning, he does not say so, let 
alone explain how it happens. (Joseph 2004: 67)21 
 
4.4. Rossi-Landi’s Theory of Value 
 
An argument similar to that developed by Thảo against the notion of value was 
used by the Italian Marxist semiotician Ferruccio Rossi-Landi for very different 
purposes and with another evaluation of the CLG: 
 
It is clear that he [Saussure] is not here investigating what each of these words may 
mean, what can be its signification, that is, what particular linguistic labour could 
have formed those three relationships of signans-signatum (signifiant-signifié) [the 
three relations are those between redouter, craindre and avoir peur]. If the problem of 
Saussure was posing was the second one, he could not deny that the words in 
question have a value independent of their opposition and which precedes them. 
Saussure is asking what the value of those words is, specifically the value in the field 
to which they belong. And it is represented by their mutual opposition, that is, by 
their exchange value. (Rossi-Landi 2016: 234-235). 
 
For Rossi-Landi (2016: 208) “the meaning of a word is its value or rather its 
values in the language.” He argued for the idea that “these values must be traced 
back to human labour that makes them what they are.” Referring to Marx’s theory, 
Rossi-Landi distinguished between three different meanings of the word value: i) 
                                                 
21 However, it should not be forgotten that a limit to the principle of absolute arbitrariness, 
which the notion of value depends on, had already been indicated by Saussure himself 
and identified in relative arbitrariness (see CLG: 181-182; trans., p. 131-132). 
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use value: the result of differentiated human labour that produces a sign, namely 
the union of semantization of the link between a signified and a signifier, the 
function that the sign has to respond to a need for communication, the 
signification; ii) value: the amount of undifferentiated human labor necessary for 
the production of a sign considered in isolation from others and taking its position 
in a given language into account; iii) exchange value: the phenomenal form of the 
value that appears only in the moment when the sign is in the opposition to other 
signs (e.g., exchange between equivalents) with other signs in a sentence, in a field 
of signs or within a given language. 
Unlike Thảo, Rossi-Landi thus excludes that in the CLG it is a matter of 
determining the origin of meaning. In this case, indeed, Saussure “could not deny 
the words in question a value independent of their opposition and the former” (id., 
p. 235). Interestingly, Rossi-Landi highlighted that the signification of a word 
genealogically precedes the opposition to the other signs. Thus, signification is 
previously assumed before every theoretical analysis of exchange value. In the 
meantime, the analysis should actually ignore signification because its aim is to 
grasp value (and its phenomenal manifestation, the exchange value) as the result 
of undifferentiated human labour (cf. id., p. 238). 
As D’Urso (2014: 57) wrote, Rossi-Landi “has limited its reflection at the 
phenomenal moment of the mercantile comparison of values, omitting what the 
Capital has taught. The exchange in the broad sense is also the production and, 
therefore, the production that needs to be analysed and demystified [ha limitato la 
propria riflessione al momento fenomenico del confronto mercantile dei valori, 
tralasciando quanto gli aveva insegnato il Capitale, ossia che lo scambio in senso 
lato è anche produzione e che perciò è quest’ultima che bisogna analizzare e 
demistificare]” (the same remarks could be addressed to both Schaff [1968: 207], 
and  Bourdieu [1977: 24]). From this point of view, a great advantage of Thảo’s 
theory is that he had not reduced the value of signs only to the differential relation 
and at the same time suggested to investigate the field of social production of 
intrinsic signs and fundamental significations. But unlike other Marxist 
intellectuals who have tried to reflect on the notion of linguistic value through the 
model of economic value proposed by Marx, Thảo did not develop the unsuccessful 
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homology between the sign and the merchandise through the dichotomy use 
value/exchange value (see, for instance, Lefebvre 1966, Goux 1968; Baudrillard 
1972, Latouche 1973). 
Thảo’s aim was thus to denounce the fetishism of the langue: he wanted to show 
historically determined social relations in which relations between words only 
appear. Indeed, Thảo considered language as a differential system of signs which 
are the product of past social labour. As such, whether one separates the practical 
relationship between the real practice of language and the external world, the 
langue becomes the object of new linguistic practices such as the inter-definition of 
terms in the case of technical languages. In the latter case, what Thảo seems to 
think of is a sort of metalanguage (or metasemiotic) which, to the extent that it 
applies to the semio-linguistic matter already produced, cannot be considered the 
primary function of language. There would, therefore, be a hierarchy in the 
production of signs ranging from the semio-linguistic relationship with reality in 
practical and social life to disciplinary metalanguages. 
 
 
5. The Language of Real Life (I) 
 
Thảo’s main aim was to determine the outlines of a semiology which deals with 
a set of several systems of signs that is wider than that of arbitrary verbal signs. In 
turn, such semiology will serve as a theoretical and methodological basis for 
addressing the problem of the origin of language and consciousness. More 
relevantly, assuming that there are some signs whose signification depends upon 
their performance in a social working context, Thảo suggested that the 
internalization of such significations allows the mediation between practical life 
and consciousness. 
These assumptions lead Thảo to assume a critical attitude towards the 
Saussurean notion of value. The notion of value reveals a cognitive mechanism that 
supports rather sophisticated language practices: the ability to distinguish and 
define words in a given language. But because such linguistic practice needs to be 
explained, according to Thảo, it is necessary to suppose a more original linguistic 
practice which is constantly oriented towards the world and essentially linked to 
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other social practices at the same time. 
Given that Thảo assumed the primacy of practical life over thinking, he must 
investigate linguistic practices in the context of the needs determined by history. 
Thus, there would be a continuum of systems of signs within a community and 
stem from each other. Nonetheless, it is necessary to admit a kind of primordial 
ground which is at the base of the edifice of the arbitrary signs as well as the more 
sophisticated linguistic practices such as the technical and scientific languages. 
This layer is in harmony with practical life and as such is inseparable from the 
relationship with the physical and social environment.  
It could be useful now to spend some words about a notion extensively 
employed by Thảo. It is the notion of “language of real life” (langage de la vie 
réelle). And in this regard, Thảo (1974) called his own semiotic project the 
“semiotics of real life”. What does “language of real life” exactly mean?  
The main source of that notion is a passage of Marx and Engel’s German Ideology 
(Die Deutsche Ideologie; MEW: III, 11, 26 and 30-31). The lines in which they 
introduced that notion, however, are not very easy. Thus, the quotation from 
German Ideology preliminary requires a brief remark. 
The German philosophers held that ideas and conceptions arise from concrete 
social relations and practices. The mind is not a separate substance independent of 
matter but rather the embodied capability of producing representations. More 
specifically, the mind obtains the contents of its representation from interactions 
with the surrounding environment and the intercourse with the others. 
Consequently, there are not a priori concepts. In the same way, representations are 
never totally disconnected from social practice. Furthermore, representations 
always require the support of signs. And linguistic signs essentially take the shape 
of material sounds. As a result, human symbolic cognition arises from the real 
intercourse of men and takes place because of the materiality of sounds. Given the 
pragmatic origins of both cognition and linguistic utterances, Marx and Engels 
suggested that language is part of social labour and allows the material intercourse 
of men. For this reason, Marx and Engels called that language the language of real life 
(Sprache des wirklichen Lebens). 
As Marx and Engels (1998: 42) put it: 
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The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly 
interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the 
language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, at this 
stage still appears as the direct efflux of their material behaviour. 
 
[…] man also possesses “consciousness”, but, even so, not inherent, not “pure” 
consciousness. From the start the “mind” is from the outset afflicted with the curse 
of being “burdened” with matter, which here makes its appearance in the form of 
agitated layers of air, sounds, in short, of language. Language is as old as 
consciousness, language is practical consciousness that exists also for other men as 
well, and for that reason alone it really exists for me; language, like consciousness, 
only arises from the need, the necessity of intercourse with other men. Where there 
exists a relationship, it exists for me: the animal does not “relate” itself to anything, 
it does not “relate” itself at all. For the animal, its relation to others does not exist as 
a relation. Consciousness is, therefore, from the very beginning a social product, and 
remains so as long as men exist at all. (id., p. 49-50) 
 
Interestingly, Thảo’s translation differed from the French translation of Éditions 
sociales (see Marx & Engels 1968: 50). He translated: 
 
La production des idées, des représentations, de la conscience, est tout d’abord 
immédiatement entrelacée dans l’activité matérielle et les relations matérielles des 
hommes, dans le langage de la vie réelle. La représentation, la pensée, les relations 
spirituelles des hommes apparaissent encore ici comme l’émanation directe de leur 
comportement matériel. [italics ours]. (Thảo: 1975: 27) 
 
The Éditions sociales translation was:  
 
La production des idées, des représentations et de la conscience, est d’abord 
directement et intimement mêlée à l’activité matérielle et au commerce matériel des 
hommes, elle est le langage de la vie réelle. La représentation, la pensée, les relations 
spirituelles des hommes apparaissent encore ici comme l’émanation directe de leur 
comportement matériel. [italics ours] 
 
The German version was: 
 
Die Produktion der Ideen, Vorstellungen, des Bewußtseins ist zunächst unmittelbar 
verflochten in die materielle Tätigkeit und den materiellen Verkehr der Menschen, 
Sprache des wirklichen Lebens. Das Vorstellen, Denken, der geistige Verkehr der 
Menschen erscheinen hier noch als direkter Ausfluß ihres materiellen Verhaltens. 
 
Thảo regarded the language of real life as identical to (or coextensive with) the 
material activity and the material intercourse of humans. By contrast, the French 
translation identified the language of real life with the production of ideas, of 
conceptions, of consciousness. The German version was elliptic effectively. In any 
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case, to Thảo, the language of real life does not immediately coincide with the 
production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness but it is rather what 
production of ideas arises from. 
In order to better understand the special attention paid by Thảo to his own 
translation of the passage from the German Ideology, we have to note that his 
translation of the same passage in his ILC differed from that he suggested in 1975. 
In ILC, he mentioned the translation in the Éditions sociales version: 
 
“La production des idées, des représentations et de la conscience, dit Marx, est 
d’abord directement et intimement mêlée à l’activité matérielle et au commerce 
matériel des hommes, elle est le langage de la vie réelle. La représentation, la pensée, 
les relations spirituelles des hommes apparaissent encore ici comme l’émanation 
directe de leur comportement matériel.”  (Thảo 1973: 35) 
 
The fact that Thảo was concerned about the translation of the passage of the 
German Ideology seems to be clear if we consider the errata corrige of the ILC that he 
sent to Antoine Spire, along with a letter dated 20 Juin 1973 – three months after 
the publication of the ILC. First, Thảo said that the reference to the German edition 
must replace the reference to the Éditions sociales translation. Secondly, he added: 
 
The German text is elliptical and admits several possible translations. We followed 
that of the Soviet edition of Marx-Engels Works (in Russian) t. 3, p.24. Moscow. 1955. - 
We emphasize “in the language of real life.” [Le texte allemand est elliptique et 
admet plusieurs traductions possibles. Nous avons suivi celle de lʼédition soviétique 
de Oeuvres de Marx-Engels (en russe) t. 3, p.24. Moscou. 1955. - Cʼest nous qui 
soulignons “dans le langage de la vie réelle.”] 
 
The text says: “Die Produktion der Ideen, Vorstellungen, des Bewußtseins ist 
zunächst unmittelbar verflochten in die materielle Tätigkeit und den materiellen 
Verkehr der Menschen, Sprache des wirklichen Lebens.” [Le texte porte: “Die 
Produktion der Ideen, Vorstellungen, des Bewußtseins ist zunächst unmittelbar 
verflochten in die materielle Tätigkeit und den materiellen Verkehr der Menschen, 
Sprache des wirklichen Lebens. ”] 
 
The translation of Social Editions reports “Sprache” to “ist” and not to “in”, and 
gives: “... elle est le langage de la vie réelle.” [La traduction des Editions sociales 
rapporte ʻSpracheʼ à ʻistʼ et non pas à “in”, et donne: “... elle est le langage de la vie 
réelle”.] 
 
According to our interpretation of the concept of the “language of the real life”, it 
has two moments: a first, simply material, when it projects a meaning without 
consciousness, and a second when, reflecting on itself, it produces the consciousness as 
consciousness of this meaning. If, then, we do not link “Srache” with “in” but rather 
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with “ist”, the text would speak of the language of real life taken at its second moment, 
as “the production of consciousness.” [Suivant lʼinterpretation que nous proposons 
du concept du “langage de la vie réelle”, celui-ci comporte deux moments: un 
premier, simplement matériel, où il projette une signification sans conscience, et un 
second où, se réfléchissant sur lui-même, il produit la conscience comme conscience de 
cette signification. Si donc lʼon rapporte “Srache” non pas à “in” mais à “ist”, le texte 
parlerait du langage de la vie réelle pris à son second moment, comme “production de 
la conscience”.] 
 
As we have here the only classical text in which this concept is discussed, its 
elliptical syntax might well indicate that Marxʼs thought, at the time of writing it, 
was not yet entirely fixed on this point. It is even more necessary, and interesting, to 
use it, since in this case it should be considered in some way as a typical example of 
the language of real life. [Comme nous avons ici lʼunique texte classique où il soit 
question de ce concept, sa syntaxe elliptique pourrait bien indiquer que la pensée de 
Marx, au moment où il lʼa rédigé, n'était pas encore entièrement fixée sur ce point. Il 
en est dʼautant plus nécessaire, et intéressant, de lʼutiliser, puisquʼen ce cas il devrait 
être considéré lui-même, en quelque manière, comme un exemple typique du 
langage de la vie réelle.] (see fig. 15). 
 
Some remarks are needed. First, in 1973, Thảo realized that the French 
translation of the Éditions sociales he had mentioned was inaccurate. For this reason, 
Thảo (1975) directly reported his own new translation – which is the same he 
suggested in the errata corrige. Second, the all of the above shows that, before 
1973, he did not realize that the French translation of the Éditions sociales did not fit 
very well his own understanding of the notion of the language of real life. It might 
depend upon the fact that Thảoʼs theory of the language of real life has been 
developed independently of the French translation – which appeared only in 1968. 
As a matter of fact, Thảo (1966: 14) – which was the first version of Thảo (1973: 35) – 
chose his own translation of the passage of the German Ideology: “La production des 
idées, des représentations et de la conscience, dit Marx, est tout d’abord 
immédiatement entrelacée dans l’activité matérielle et les relations matérielles des 
hommes, dans le langage de la vie réelle.” In other words, Thảoʼs theory did not 
change between 1966 and 1975. He just made a bad choice in 1973 since he took for 
granted the Éditions sociales version.  
Third, Thảo insisted that language arises outside and before consciousness. In 
this way, he transcended the following traditional conundrum: if language 
supposes the existence of consciousness as its source and consciousness needs 
language to arise, the question of language origins is impossible to solve because 
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“consciousness presupposes language and language, consciousness” (Thảo [1973] 
1984: 19). Against that, Thảo suggested that the meanings of fundamental and 
motivated signs does not depend upon a pre-existing consciousness that 
voluntarily gives them such meanings. Relevantly, the internalisation of signs of 
this kind allows the rising of consciousness as a social product. 
From the point of view of the formation of human speech, Thảo (1973, 1974, 
1975) asserted that language arose from the collective labour among our pre-
human ancestors. He invoked the notion of the language of real life in order to 
explain how language initially took the shape of a practical social tool. Thảo was 
interested in precisely define the nature of first signs employed by our human 
ancestors to coordinate their collective activities and joining their common 
attention. Thus, he introduced his semiotic project and called it semiotics of the real 
life. 
 
5.2. The Language of Real Life (II) 
 
The history of the relationships between Marxism and language sciences has 
been largely debated for the last one hundred years. Although a relatively small 
amount of Marx and Engelsʼs writings were devoted to language (cf. Marx and 
Engels 1974), philosophers, linguists, sociologists, and semioticians tried various 
ways to put in place a Marxian trend in language sciences. Nonetheless, historians 
and philosophers of language sciences rarely drawn attention to the fascinating 
notion of the language of real life. The present paragraph is not intended to be 
“complete” or to record all of the examples of scholars who mentioned the notion 
of the language of real life. It will simply explore some questions about that notion, 
comparing Thảoʼs approach with assumptions of other Marxist scholars. Before 
that, it could be nonetheless interesting to add that the question facing the notion 
of language of real life transcends the narrow limits of the history of Marxism. For 
instance, that notion was also employed by Charles Bally (1865–1947; cf. Curea 
2015: 74). Maybe independently of Marx, by langage de la vie réelle, Bally meant the 
everydayʼs life forms of communication whose main feature is to be non-wholly 
arbitrary. 
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For our purposes, we should take note that the language of real life was seen by 
Marx as the practical, real consciousness (cf. MEW III: 31). That raises the question 
whether the language of real life was a sort of metaphor employed by Marx to 
describe real interactions between humans against the background of praxis. The 
French philosopher Henri Lefebvre seems to accept this understanding of the 
notion. In his words: 
 
The representations, the ideas, have their origin in the “commerce” of individuals 
among themselves, in exchanges, in the communication of consciousnesses, in the 
real activities which constitute praxis (social practice). To formulate them, theorists 
are needed. They are individuals who think according to a group or a social class. 
These idéologues clarify and sum up the vague meanings, which appear here and 
there in praxis. They derive general, coherent, systematized theses as much as 
possible: ideologies, including religions, philosophies, morals. They therefore start 
from the “language of real life” to elaborate their representations and create “the 
language of politics, laws, religion, morality, philosophy” [Le représentations, les 
idées, ont leur origine dans le “commerce” des hommes entre eux, dans les 
échanges, dans la communication des consciences, dans les activités réelles qui 
constituent la praxis (pratique sociale). Pour les formuler, il faut des théoriciens. Ce 
sont des individus qui pensent en fonction dʼun groupe ou dʼune classe sociale. Ces 
idéologues dégagent et unissent entre elles les significations vagues, écloses ça et là 
dans la praxis. Ils en tirent des thèses générales, cohérentes, systématisées autant 
que possible: les idéologies, y compris les religions, les philosophies, les morales. Ils 
partent donc de la “langue de la vie réelle” pour élaborer leurs représentations et 
créer “la langue de la politique, des lois, de la religion, de la morale, de la 
philosophie”.]. (Lefebvre 1966: 93) 
 
In a phrase, the language of real life is nothing but the social praxis which 
embodies certain significations, certain ways of thinking. The role of ideologies is 
to suggest general theories of that praxis. It seems that Lefebvre did not link la 
communication des consciences with the language of real life. To him, the language of 
real life is nothing other than a metaphor which serves to oppose real life to 
ideologies. In a similar way, Rossi-Landi argued that “Marx described a Sprache des 
wirklichen Lebens as the material behaviour of humans in working relations [Marx 
infatti parlava di una Sprache des wirklichen Lebens riferendosi al comportamento 
materiale di uomini in rapporto di lavoro]” (Rossi-Landi 2016: 70). And he added that 
“the principle that the individual does not communicate only by the verbal 
behaviour but also by the whole non-verbal behaviour is a heuristic fundamental 
instrument [uno strumento euristico fondamentale è il principio che lʼuomo 
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comunica non solo con il suo comportamento verbale, ma anche con tutto il suo 
comportamento non-verbale]” (ibid.). According to Rossi-Landi, the language of 
real life is a more general behaviour than verbal language. The language of real life 
is a language of things (linguaggio delle cose), ie., the semiotic structure of the non-
verbal behaviour of humans in working relations. Against that, the French linguist 
Jean-Jacques Lecercle wondered 
 
whether the expression “the language of real life” is a simple metaphor, since ‘real 
life’ is no more liable to possess its language than flowers. And I would like to think 
that Marx’s formula goes further. At first sight, this text repeats the materialist 
thesis that ideas have a material origin, in “real life” understood as a material 
activity – i.e. labour and production – and material relations – i.e. social relations:  
language is the product of social relations which it helps to fix and develop. But why 
characterise this real life as “language” or attribute a “language” to it? Because the 
materialist thesis is, in fact, two-fold: it affirms not only that ideas have a material 
origin, but also that they have a material existence. And the material existence of 
ideas precisely takes the form of language and of the institutions constructed 
around it. (Lecercle 2006: 94) 
 
It is a little-known fact that Thảo suggested a semiological project under the 
sign of the notion of language of real life. He was one of the few Marxists to have 
taken the notion of language of real life seriously. According to him, the language 
of real life was not a metaphor. 
In previous paragraphs, exploring Thảoʼs attempt to work out a position in 
which the notion of language of real life plays a relevant role has enabled us to 
better understand that notion. We have investigated the way Thảo gave significant 
attention to the language of real life, laying out a fascinating chapter in the history 
of the interactions between Marxism and linguistics. Readers have been introduced 
to Thảoʼs approach to the study of language behaviour.  
The main element in the approach Thảo suggested to the problem of the 
language of real life is the need of investigations into linguistic interaction in 
everyday life. This approach interfaces in multiple ways with sociology and 
sociolinguistics, because the language of real life must be regarded as a substantial 
part of social life. For this reason, Thảo disagreed with every kind of cognitive 
analysis of language behaviour. He preferred to point out the socio-historical 
conditions of language behaviour, insisting that language cannot be divorced from 
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the concrete forms of social intercourse.  
At this juncture, we would like to shift attention to fact that the language of real 
life is a social activity, a material behaviour, along with the intercourse with other 
individuals and production and reproduction of the means of existence (see below 
Chapter 6). As a result, the language of real life is largely influenced by the social 
and practical behaviour within a given society. Additionally, the fact cannot be 
ignored that the language of real life is radically embodied. But we have not to do 
with the embodied approach to language suggested by Lakoff and Johnson (2003). 
The embodied nature of language must be complemented by the social and 
practical life. According to Lecercle (2006: 182), the speaker of the language of real 
life is “the ‘labouringʼ body of praxis.” 
During the 1970s, social determinations in language behaviour were widely 
acknowledged. In the same, social constraints on bodyʼs activity were largely 
recognised. According to the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002), 
languages “exist only in the practical state, i.e. in the form of […] linguistic habitus 
[…]” (Bourdieu 1991: 46). The British sociologist John B. Thompson (born in 1951) 
described the notion of linguistic habitus in the following way: “the habitus is a set 
of dispositions which incline agents to act and react in certain ways” (Thompson 
1991: 12). In turn, “dispositions generate practices, perceptions and attitudes […] 
without being consciously co-ordinated or governed.” They reflect the social 
conditions within which they were acquired and become a second nature. And the 
partially-unconscious language behaviour seems to involve a peculiar form of what 
Bourdieu (1991) calls hexis corporelle, a long-lasting organization of dispositions. 
However, it is not enough to say that the language of real life is embodied. The 
body of the speaker cannot be reduced to a natural fact. 
We can complete this picture by way of assumptions set out by other scholars. 
According to Thompson (1991: 1), “linguistic exchanges can express relations of 
power” in many ways. Along the same line, Bourdieu (1991: 86) set out that 
“language is a body technique […] in which oneʼs whole relation to the social world, 
and oneʼs whole socially informed relation to the world, are expressed.” In this way 
– over and above the individual differences which exist, Thảoʼs approach to 
language seems to be very close to that set out by Bourdieu. He argued that 
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language is the product of a complex set of social, historical and political 
conditions of formation. For this reason, the traditional semiological analysis of 
languages reduced the language behaviour to an abstract and self-sufficient system 
of signs, rather than focusing on socio-historical conditions of production and 
reception of messages. 
In a similar way, the French linguist Marcel Cohen (1884–1974) regarded 
language as  
 
body technique and intellectual invention, spoken language is incorporated into the 
physiological function of the normal life of humans in society. He asks for a 
muscular learning which we hear and to some extent see the results. This learning is 
accompanied by a storage of possible reactions in the cerebral substance, in a way 
that the texture entirely escapes us until now. We know that all of the operations 
are carried out in a defined social context. We also know that virtual voluntary 
connections are established in such a way that different externalizations (consisting 
of spoken language fragments) can correspond to different social situations 
[technique du corps et invention intellectuelle, le langage parlé est incorporé au 
fonctionnament physiologique de la vie normale de lʼhomme en societé. Il demande 
un apprentissage muscolaire dont nous entendons et dans une certaine mesure 
voyons les résultats. Cet apprentissage est accompagné dʼun emmagasinement de 
possibilité de réactions dans la substance cérébrale, dʼune manière dont la texture 
nous échappe jusquʼà présent entièrement. Nous savons que le total des opérations 
sʼeffectue dans un cadre social détérminé. Nous savons aussi que les connexions à 
réalisation volontaires virtuelles sont établies de telle sorte que des extériorisations 
différentes (consistant en fragments de langage parlé) peuvent correspondre à des 
situations sociales différentes.]. (Cohen 1971: II, 110). 
 
As we have just seen, the relationship between language and social structures 
was largely debated in France in the mid-20th century (see also the works of 
Mounin, Marcellesi, Gardin, Dubois, Calvet, Encrevé). But we must also add that 
Thảo showed the desire to explain the origins of human consciousness. The 
consciousness depends on the forms, conditions, and types of the language of real 
life. To put it another way, the language of real life provides the form and the 
contents of conscious experience. As we will see in next chapters (see especially 
Chapters 5 and 6), consciousness is nothing but inner speech, the inner 
reproduction of language interactions. Firstly, consciousness arises from the 
internalisation of language behaviour, along with brain activity and body 
movements. Secondly, conscious contents take the shape language gives them. 
Thảo argued that we speak on the basis of background knowledge, more or less 
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diffuse, mostly unproblematic, background convictions, customs, modes of 
behaviour and of ethics, tradition, and common sense. The language of real life is 
not an instrument at the speaker’s disposal, there is no transparency of language, 
or of meaning at this level. The subject, rather, becomes a speaker by appropriating 
a language that is always-already collective. Thirdly, in so far as the language of 
real life is a creation within a social milieu and takes the shape of an interchange, 
what the subject internalises is not just the bodily form of language behaviour and 
relevant social meanings communicated through this interchange, but also the 
form of the dialogue itself (see below Chapter 6). From a philosophical standpoint, 
the language of real life is the existence of our ideas, it is the means by which we 
can conceptualise our existence. In this regard, it would be useful to mention 
Lecercleʼs (2006: 96) own suggestion linking language, consciousness, and social 
relations. One the one side, the language of real life is the means for thinking our 
real life and having conscious representations of it. On the other side, it “freezes 
and veils” that same representation. Indeed, the language of real life also imparts 
false consciousness, unconscious mistaken ideas which distort and invert reality. 
On the basis of the previous lines, we can state that Thảo provided a more 
concrete definifiton of the collective consciousness described by the French 
sociologist Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) in his Les formes élémentaires de la vie 
religieuse (The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, 1912). Thảoʼs approach to the 
language of real life seems us to be too close to Durkheimʼs theory of symbols. 
According to Durkheim, collective consciousness cannot be seen as an abstract and 
ideal dimension, but it rather takes the shape of concrete things (the symbols) 
which can be assimilated by individualsʼ consciousnesses. Nonetheless, collective 
consciousness is not regarded by Thảo in the same way Durkheim did. Thảo seems 
to accept the suggestions of some scholars to free the notion of consciousness from 
every metaphysical element. To mention just an example, the collective 
consciousness is conceived by the Russian sociologist Georges Gurvitch (1894–1965) 
as the mediation between the economic structure and the superstructure. Thảo 
gave the same function to the language of real life. Moreover, according to Thảo, 
the language of real life is an a posteriori entity that is produced by the lived 
activity of collective labour. At the same time, it seems to be an a priori principle 
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from the point of view of the individual, as it precedes and involves the individualʼs 
consciousness. 
We should now highlight that Thảo was eminently interested in the cognitive 
and gnosiological value of the language of real life. Thus, we have seen that not 
only does language of real life convey un- and preconscious significations, it also 
supports every intellectual activity. We are thus able to develop some elements 
present in the notion of language of real life. We are now entering the domain of 
the philosophy of science. We cannot neglect the fact that the real practice 
(including available knowledge, technologies, working relations, institutions, etc.) 
largely orients our ways of thinking. In this way, science does not differ from any 
other ideological form. Interestingly, assuming that the language of real life is the 
basis of systems of arbitrary signs, we can reason that it is the base of scientific 
metalanguages, including that of linguistics. Another way of saying this is that the 
scientific metalanguage of linguistics arises from linguistsʼ real working practice, 
along with ambiguities, inaccuracy, unconsciousness, and so forth.  
In this regard, Samain (2007) could help us to better understand some 
consequences of Thảoʼapproach. According to Samain, the language of a given 
scientific discipline is not only composed of terms but also of various language 
habits (jargon of trades, argumentative modes, words that are meaningful only in a 
specific discursive context and that cannot be reduced to a terminological network, 
etc.). Specifically, systematic terminology networks are the result of abstractions 
and arise from the real practice of scientists. First, there are discourses and 
practice in which words have an instrumental nature. After that, the abstractions 
involve the production of terminologies and notions. In this vein, understanding 
the real origin of scientific terminology compels us to trace back the function of 
scientific vocabulary to its genesis. In the final analysis, this was one of the main 
aims of the Husserlian notion of Lebenswelt. And Thảo seems to have accepted and 
developed this aspect of the phenomenological method. Nonetheless, we have to 
add that, for Thảo, the modus operandi of symbolic production cannot be reduced to 
the activity of consciousness. Rather, it stems from the social intercourse. 
What Thảo described under the label of the language of real life is a sort of 
collective intelligence, a shared group intelligence emerging from cooperative 
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activities. Thảo seems to develop an idea which had already been proposed by 
Merleau-Ponty in the early-1950s: 
 
Articulated language is itself only the highest point of concentration of a duller 
language that humans speak to each other by the symbols that their economic, 
political, religious and moral coexistence creates. [...] A theory of truth would, 
therefore, be superficial if it did not take into account, along with the speaking 
subject and the linguistic community, the living subject, wanting, evaluating, 
creating and working in the historical community, and the reports of truth that 
individuals can and can tie with that historical community [le langage articulé nʼest 
lui-même que le plus haut point de concentration dʼun langage plus sourd que les 
hommes se parlent les uns aux autres par les symboles que crée leur coexistence 
économique, politique, religieuse et morale. […] Une théorie de la vérité serait donc 
superficielle si elle ne prenait en considération, outre le sujet parlant et la 
communauté linguistique, le sujet vivant, voulant, évaluant, créant et travaillant 
dans la communauté historique, et les rapports de vérité quʼil peut et pourra nouer 
avec elle.]. (Merleau-Ponty 2010: 1828) 
 
We cannot rule out the possibility that both Merlau-Ponty and Thảo had been 
seriously affected by Husserlian notion of Lebenswelt. They developed that notion 
and explained the social and embodied origins of conscious contents. And in a 
similar way, they tried to avoid the risk of idealism, relativism, and solipsism which 
was more or less implicit in Husserlian account (see below Chapter 4). And the way 
chosen by Thảo was the notion of the language of real life. As a matter of fact, the 
language of the real life is the mediation between social practice and 
consciousness; it is something that we can place in the dimension of social 
relations as well as in the dimension of consciousness; it is simultaneously a social 
fact and the base of subjectivity; it mediates both the relationship between the 
subject and the object and the relation between the subject and the own self; it is a 
real bahaviour, a learned or inherited disposition which can be adapted to 
individualsʼ needs; it conveys social meanings which, in turn, enables the 
subejctive lived experience; it is the intersubjective base of our thoughts as well as 
the shared framework of our thinking; it translates the empirical conditions of 
existence into the background of our higher mental activities. Consciousness shows 
an impersonal dimension which is the sign of the presence of the social dimension 
in us. But this social dimension is not an abstract entity, it is rather marked by 
social differences and conflicts. In any case, the subject is not an abstract and 
isolated entity that can be analysed independently of social dimension. We are the 
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result of present and past social relations with the others. And those social 
relations take the shape of language behaviour. As a result, the understanding of 
human consciousness asks us to examine the formation of language behaviour. 
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Chapter Four 
Signs, Intentionality, Reality 
 
 
 
Autrement dit, d’une simple définition du concept de signification, 
présentée dans le cadre de la science du langage, on passe 
sans peine à une position philosophique qui consiste, sinon à nier, 
du moins à déclarer inutile et dénuée de sens  
la réalité du monde exterieur. 
(T.D. Thảo) 
 
 
 
1. Thảo’s Ontological and Epistemological Assumptions. - 2. Lenin’s 
‘Materialism and Empiriocriticism’. - 3.1. Husserl’s Subjective Idealism (I). - 
3.2. Husserl’s Subjective Idealism (II). - 4. Thảo’s Theory of Semiotic 
Intentionality. - 5. Language and Reality. - 6. Naïve Realism. - 7. Thảo’s Theory 
of Semiotic Cognition. - 8. Beyond the Phenomenological Approach? 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Thảo’s Ontological and Epistemological Assumptions 
 
Not only did Thảo’s semiotic project try to transcend and complete Saussure’s 
semiology, it also sought to overcome the Husserlian theory of consciousness. To 
Thảo, the Husserlian theory of consciousness, indeed, betrayed the same idealism 
of Saussure’s notion of value because both Saussure and Husserl had dismissed any 
relation between thinking and mind-independent reality. 
It would be useful to remember that Thảo’s PDM did not codify dialectical 
materialism as an alternative to Husserl’s phenomenology but rather Thảo 
integrated phenomenology into dialectical materialism. Thảo tried to rehabilitate 
Husserl’s approach and showed a desire to conciliate Husserl’s analysis of 
consciousness with descriptions of animal cognition. Against that, the general 
outline of ILC yields a materialistic and dialectical view on origins of human 
language and consciousness. Despite what he wrote in the first book, in ILC, Thảo 
regarded dialectical materialism as the alternative to phenomenology. In 
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particular, he felt certain dissatisfaction with Husserl: Husserl’s idealistic account 
cannot represent a touchstone to investigate the origins of consciousness. The 
point is that Thảo addressed the difficulties of phenomenology to explain the 
origins of consciousness. Then we find Thảo suggesting that investigations into the 
origins and structures of consciousness must be conducted in conjunction with the 
assumption of dialectical materialism without any support of phenomenological 
approach. 
A brief analysis of Thảo’s remarks against Husserl will allow us to introduce a 
relevant philosophical topic: the link between language, cognition, and reality. But 
we must previously pay special attention to the fact that Thảo’s theory of 
consciousness depended upon some ontological and epistemological assumptions. 
Schematically, they are: 
 
1. Matter is a philosophical concept that means the objective reality: 
1.1. The objective reality exists prior to the knowing subject and exists 
independently of the knowing subject (= naïve realism); 
1.2. Nothing exists outside matter (= materialist monism); 
1.3. Consciousness depends upon matter: consciousness is the product of the 
activity of the brain; 
1.4. Humans are the products both of the biological evolution and of social 
history. 
 
2. Humans can know the objective reality: 
2.1. Sensations are the result of the interaction between the organism and the 
environment; 
2.2. Sensations link thinking and reality – they are the starting point of 
knowledge (= sensationalism); 
2.3. The criterion of knowledge is the practice, i.e. the ability to reproduce 
the laws of reality. 
 
3. There are no things in themselves: 
3.1. The thing-in-itself is not absolutely unknowable – it is momentarily 
unknown; 
3.2. The difference between phenomena and things in themselves can be 
reduced to the difference between what is known and what is not yet known. 
 
4. There are three relations between the knowing subject and objective reality: 
4.1. The relation of presence between objective reality and the perceiving 
subject to which the objective reality is given in sensations; 
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4.2. The relation of belonging between the perceiving subject and its 
sensations; 
4.3. The relation of conformity between sensations and objective reality. 
 
And it seems quite relevant that Thảo’s ontological and epistemological 
assumptions we have just enumerated may have been stimulated by the reading of 
some dialectic-materialist theoreticiansʼ writings. At this point, we must say a few 
words concerning Engels’ description of the debate on epistemology in his Ludwig 
Feuerbach (cf. MEW XXI: 274-275) which Thảo seems to refer to by way of Lenin’s 
Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (1908). But before coming to the core of Thảo’s 
criticism towards Husserlian phenomenology, we will place Thảo’s theory in the 
context of philosophical debates on human cognition. The reason for this 
digression is the fact that it is important to emphasise that he questioned the 
validity of phenomenology because, in Thảo’s view, the Husserlian method did not 
differ from the longstanding tradition of subjective idealism. So conceived, 
phenomenology could be criticised on the base of the same arguments already 
employed by Engels and Lenin to support their materialistic and realist account. 
 
2. Lenin’s ‘Materialism and Empirio-Criticism’ 
 
In his Materialism and Empirio-Criticism Lenin (1972) wrote: 
 
In his work Ludwig Feuerbach Engels divides philosophers into ʻtwo great campsʼ – 
materialists and idealists. Engels […] sees the fundamental distinction between them 
in the fact that while for the materialists nature is primary and spirit secondary, for 
the idealists the reverse is the case. (id., p. 22-23) 
 
Specifically, the opposition between materialism and idealism could be 
explained in the following way: 
 
Are we to proceed from things to sensation and thought? Or are we to proceed from 
thought and sensation to things? The first line, i.e., the materialist line, is adopted 
by Engels. The second line, i.e., the idealist line, […]. (id., p. 34) 
 
Specifically 
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Materialism is the recognition of “objects in themselves,” or outside the mind; ideas 
and sensations are copies or images of those objects [see Engels’ theory of Abbilder in 
his Ludwig Feuerbach in MEW XXI: 292-293]. The opposite doctrine (idealism) claims 
that objects do not exist “without the mind”; objects are “combinations of 
sensations”. (Lenin 1972: 14) 
 
But there are some philosophers who are placed by Engels and Lenin between 
these two great camps. They are the agnostics: “the agnostic does not go beyond 
sensations and asserts that he cannot know anything certain about their source, 
about their original, etc.” (id., p. 118; see also Engels’s Über historischen Materialismus 
in MEW XII: 287 ff.). Among them, we should mention David Hume (1711–1776): 
 
[Hume] says the same thing in his Treatise of Human Nature (part IV, sec. II, On 
Scepticism Towards Sensations): ʻOur perceptions are our only objects.ʼ (p. 281 of the 
French translation by Renouvier and Pillon, 1878.) By scepticism Hume means 
refusal to explain sensations as the effects of objects, spirit etc., refusal to reduce 
perceptions to the external world, on the one hand, and to a deity or to an unknown 
spirit, on the other. (id., p. 25) 
 
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), too, must also be reckoned to be a philosopher 
whose thought cannot be reduced to idealism merely: 
 
The principal feature of Kant’s philosophy is the reconciliation of materialism with 
idealism, a compromise between the two, the combination within one system of 
heterogeneous and contrary philosophical trends. When Kant assumes that 
something outside us, a thing-in-itself, corresponds to our ideas, he is a materialist. 
When he declares this thing-in-itself to be unknowable, transcendental, other-sided, 
he is an idealist. Recognising experience, sensations, as the only source of our 
knowledge, Kant is directing his philosophy towards sensationalism, and via 
sensationalism, under certain conditions, towards materialism. Recognising the 
apriority of space, time, causality, etc., Kant is directing his philosophy towards 
idealism. (id., p. 232) 
 
But Kant’s philosophy could entail a kind of fideism: “fideism positively asserts 
that something does exist ʻbeyond the world of perception’” (id., p. 128). 
The idealist trend could assume several shapes. One of them is relevant for our 
purposes. That is the subjective idealism. Some remarks concerning George Berkeley 
(1685–1753) are here needed. As Berkeley affirmed in his A treatise concerning the 
principles of human knowledge (1710), besides the ideas or objects of knowledge there 
is someone who perceives them, i.e., “mind, spirit, soul or myself” (cf. Berkeley 
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1710: § 2). Ideas cannot exist outside of the mind that perceives them. As a result, 
Berkeley affirmed that to exist means to be perceived (“Their esse is percipi”; cf. id., p. 
§ 3). And Berkeley considered the notion of the existence of “matter or corporeal 
substance” (§ 9) as a “contradiction,” such an “absurdity” (§ 14). To him, the thing 
is a collection of sensations marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one thing. 
After having discussed Berkeley’s subjective idealism, Lenin (1972: 68) 
mentioned “the work of a classical representative of subjective idealism, Johann 
Gottlieb Fichte [1762–1814], published in 1801 [Sonnenklarer Bericht an das größere 
Publikum über das eigentliche Wesen der neuesten Philosophie]”: 
 
[…] the fundamental philosophical line of subjective idealism. The world is my 
sensation; the non-self is “postulated” (is created, produced) by the self; the thing is 
indissolubly connected with the consciousness (ibid.) 
 
Against the subjective idealism, Lenin highlighted the existence of the so-called 
naïve realism. It “consists in the view that things, the environment, the world, 
exist independently of our sensation, of our consciousness, of our self and of man 
in general” (id., p. 69). And “materialism deliberately makes the ʻnaive’ belief of 
mankind the foundation of its theory of knowledge” (ibid.).  
Thảo’s philosophical assumptions correspond to the description of materialism 
set out by Lenin on the basis of Engels’ writings. To Thảo, matter is primary and 
consciousness secondary (see also Engels’ Ludwig Feuerbach in MEW XXI: 277-278). 
Thảo did not assume consciousness as the starting point of the process of 
knowledge (as Engels already stated in his so-called Anti-Dühring: see MEW XX: 32-
33). Instead, he affirmed that we must proceed from things to sensation and then 
to consciousness. Things must be seen as objects of the world which exist prior to 
consciousness and independently of consciousness. In support of his position, he 
admitted that experience and sensations are the only media of our knowledge, but 
we can know something certain about their source (see also Engels’ English 
introduction to Entwicklung des Sozialismus von der Utopie zur Wissenschaft in MEW: 
XXII: 297). And the source of sensations should not be reckoned to be a thing in 
itself which is unknowable on principle (see also ibid.). Rather the slow process of 
knowledge of the objective reality is the task of humans. Nonetheless, it is always 
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partially and historically related (see also Engels in MEW XX: 78). 
As a consequence, we can understand why Thảo saw his own materialism as a 
radical alternative to every kind of subjective idealism. Specifically, Thảo’s 
materialism – as well as Lenin’s one – is presented as a reaction to subjective 
idealism. Consequently, it could be useful to describe the scope of Lenin’s criticism 
of subjective idealism in order better to understand the reasons why Thảo called 
the phenomenology “subjective idealism” and refused it. 
Lenin’s Materialism and Empirio-Criticism focused one of the most popular theories 
of knowledge of the epoch. It was the so-called empiriocriticism whose main Russian 
supporter was Alexander Bogdanov (1873–1928). Bogdanov was a Bolshevik 
politicians and militant during the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917 (for 
bibliographic information see Biggart, Dudley and King 1998, Biggart, Glovelli, 
Yassour 1998, White 1998, Adams 1989, Krementsov 2011). In 1904–1906, he 
published the three volumes of his philosophic essay Empiriomonizm 
(Empiriomonism).  
In his Empiriomonizm, Bogdanov merged the main assumptions of Marxism with 
Ernst Mach’s empiriomonism (1838–1916) and Richard Avenarius’s (1843–1896) 
empiriocriticism. The German-Swiss philosopher Avenarius supported a kind of 
radical empiricism. He admitted the indissoluble co-ordination of the self and the 
environment (Avenarius 1905: §§ 83-84). To him, the sensation is taken as primary; 
it is the sole entity we know (id. 1876: §§ 89-90). Similarly, Mach defended the idea 
that what we call things are complexes of sensations: “ʻThe thing’ is rather a 
mental symbol for a complex of sensations of relative stability” (Mach 1897: 473). 
Thus, he esteemed the question concerning the existence of bodies beyond 
sensations superfluous. To him, as a matter of fact, the notion of “body” is a 
heuristic device. 
We must add that Avenarius (1876: § 95) tried to purify Kantism of the 
assumption of the thing-in-itself. But, according to Lenin, the thing-in-itself 
Kantian assumption was the core of Kant’s materialism. Thus, Avenarius 
empiriocriticism seems to be close to Berkeley’s subjective idealism. It is no 
coincidence that in a similar vein, Fichte refused the notion of thing-in-itself (cf. 
Lenin 1972: 230). In a similar way, Mach (1922: 299) set out that his own philosophy 
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was closer to Berkeley’s and Hume’s ones than to Kantism. The empiriocriticists 
then explicitly based their analysis upon the refusal of Kantian thing-in-itself and 
it seems they referred to both Humean scepticism and Berkeleian subjective 
idealism. 
Lenin grimly recounted empiriocriticism. He first showed how empiriocriticism 
leads to solipsism. Assuming that bodies are complexes of sensations, “it inevitably 
follows that the whole world is but my idea” and “it is impossible to arrive at the 
existence of other people besides oneself” (Lenin 1972: 34). Then Lenin linked 
empiriocriticism with the tradition of subjective idealism – according to which the 
external reality is nothing other than subject’s sensation and the thing is 
indissolubly connected with consciousness (id., p. 68). He stated: 
 
There is nothing but a paraphrase of subjective idealism in the teachings of Mach 
and Avenarius we are examining. [...] The different methods of expression used by 
Berkeley in 1710, by Fichte in 1801, and by Avenarius in 1891-94 do not in the least 
change the essence of the matter, viz., the fundamental philosophical line of 
subjective idealism. The world is my sensation; the non-self is ʻpostulatedʼ (is 
created, produced) by the self; the thing is indissolubly connected with the 
consciousness; the indissoluble co-ordination of the self and the environment is the 
empirio-critical principal co-ordination; – this is all one and the same proposition, 
the same old trash with a slightly refurbished, or repainted, signboard (Lenin 1972: 
69) 
 
Lenin eventually argued that empiriocriticism failed to justify naïve realism: 
“thought and reality are inseparable, because reality can only be conceived in 
thought, and thought involves the presence of the thinker” (id., p. 72). He had 
already written: 
 
For every scientist who has not been led astray by professorial philosophy, as well as 
for every materialist, sensation is indeed the direct connection between 
consciousness and the external world; it is the transformation of the energy of 
external excitation into a state of consciousness. This transformation has been, and 
is, observed by each of us a million times on every hand. The sophism of idealist 
philosophy consists in the fact that it regards sensation as being not the connection 
between consciousness and the external world, but a fence, a wall, separating 
consciousness from the external world — not an image of the external phenomenon 
corresponding to the sensation, but as the “sole entity”. (id., p. 45-46). 
 
Against that, as we have seen, Lenin argued that matter must be taken as 
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primary, as the starting point of the process of knowledge. Thus, sensations are the 
effects of the interaction between a given organism and mind-independent 
material things. In detail, sensations are nothing other than the effect of the action 
of mind-independent object on the body of the knowing subject. To Lenin, 
dialectical materialism alone could offer a satisfactory justification of naïve realism 
as far as it leads to regard matter as the epistemically mind-independent reality. 
 
3.1. Husserl’s Subjective Idealism (I) 
 
Previous observations pave the way for understanding how Thảo questioned the 
validity of phenomenology against the background of Lenin’s criticism towards 
subjective idealism in general and empiriocriticism in particular. In this way, 
indeed, Thảo could radicalise his materialistic opposition to the Husserlian 
idealism. 
Thảo (1974, 1975) explained his own perspective on phenomenology after the 
publication of PDM. He said that, with his first book, he had wanted to offer 
Marxism a tool to analyse the lived experience and answer existentialist trend 
back. As we have previously seen in the first chapter: 
 
I hoped in so doing to provide Marxism with an analytical instrument to investi- 
gate the interiority of lived-experience [le vécu] and thus to oppose some 
constructive response to objections from philosophies on the subject. I took aim at 
existentialism in particular, which, at least in its Sartrean incarnation, sought to 
take over the Marxist problematic and which, while recognizing to a certain extent 
the truth of historical materialism for the domain of social facts, accused it of 
denying the specificity of the problems of consciousness. (Thảo [1974: 37] 2009: 297) 
 
So Thảo wrote that the first chapter of the second section of PDM – that was 
devoted to the origins of consciousness – could be seen as an example of the way in 
which phenomenological investigations may be “absorbed in some affirmative way 
into Marxism” (Thảo [1974: 37] 2009: 297). But he wrote that despite positive 
results – namely, the description of the material origins of consciousness – the 
phenomenological method and its assimilation into dialectical materialism 
“offered practically no assistance for the essential task, namely the analysis of 
human realities” (id., [p. 37] p. 298). 
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Thảo was sure that Hegelian notion of to sublate (aufheben) enabled him to 
successfully embed the Husserlian approach into Marx’s framework. Nevertheless, 
the attempt of adapting Husserl to Marxism thanks to Hegelian notion of Aufhebung 
was not easy. Thus, Thảo wondered if Husserl’s philosophy had actually been 
abolished, preserved, and transcended by dialectical materialism. The answer is no. 
“Marx had not subjected Hegel at all to the characteristic steps of Hegelian 
dialectic itself” (Thảo [1974: 37] 2009: 298). In other words, since Marx did not 
sublate Hegelian dialectic, Thảo would have improperly pretended to sublate the 
Husserlian phenomenology. To sublate, as a matter of fact, entails the fact that “the 
denied and surpassed moment remains stable with respect to its over- all structure 
and is absorbed in the moment that transcends it” (ibid.). As a result, he had 
improperly tried to assimilate the general structure of phenomenological analysis 
into dialectical materialism. 
Now, to Thảo, although Marx seems to employ the same concepts of the 
Hegelian dialectic, “they are homonymous concepts insofar as they refer, in fact, to 
the same dialectic of things, but they are only related through a theoretical content 
that is not only opposed, but moreover intrinsically heterogeneous” (ibid.). 
Specifically, while Hegel neglected the material dialectic of reality, Marx described 
“this process [the process of movement of reality] in its own reality, which 
involved an entirely original elaboration of the dialectical method – a radical 
creation where the categories of movement are directly defined according to the 
very movement of matter in its actual structure” (Thảo [1974: 37] 2009: 299). In the 
same way, Thảo argued that in ILC he still employed phenomenological notions 
such as intentionality, consciousness, lived experience, etc., but he meant by them a 
different content: 
 
As the subjective method [of phenomenology] is unutilizable by reason of the very 
principle of its progression, the analysis of consciousness will only be possible by a 
strictly objective method. It is true that we always speak of lived experience; we 
describe its structure and analyse it in its movement and in its signification, since it 
is precisely this that we want to know. But at no moment can there be a question of 
directly analyzing it as such. Self-consciousness, as all consciousness in general, must 
proceed at the level of the object. (Thảo [1975: 29] 2009: 323) 
 
The question is what exactly Thảo reproached to the Husserlian phenomenology 
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and what he meant when he called phenomenology subjective method. 
Thảo (1975: 24) argued that the Husserlian phenomenology represents the 
clearest and most coherent account of “subjective reflection”. That is because 
Husserl reduced the triadic relation among the knowing subject, sensations, and 
the external world to a double one. To Thảo, indeed, 
 
Thus we have three terms: (1) objective reality as matter, or the outside world; 
(2) our sensations, which are [its] images, in other words, the sensible images in 
which objective reality is given [to us]; and finally, (3) “we” or “the human 
being”, in other words, the perceiving subject who has these sensations or 
sensible images and to whom objective reality is given in those images. 
Between these three terms, three relations arise: the relation of presence 
between objective reality and the perceiving subject to which it is “given” in 
his sensations, the relation of belonging between the perceiving subject and 
“his” sensations; and finally the relation of conformity (Übereinstimmung, 
Engels [see MEW XXII: 297]) between sensations and objective reality of 
which they are “the image”. And it is the simultaneous movement of all three 
relations which defines the epistemological dialectic of an actually lived 
relationship of the consciousness and the object: objective reality is given to the 
human being in his sensations that are the image of it. (Thảo [1975: 24] 2009: 
310) 
 
Thus, the Husserlian theory of consciousness had dismissed mind-independent 
things since Husserl dealt only with the relation of belonging between the 
transcendental subject and the contents of its lived experience. Since 
phenomenology merely described the lived experience of the subject and 
neglected the real relation between the subject and the material external reality, 
the Husserlian philosophy is a kind of subjective idealism. Provisionnally, the 
subjective idealism is when the knowable world is reduced to the content of 
consciousness of the knowing subject. 
Thảo’s criticism may be partially justified. Phenomenology started from the 
observation that the phenomenon is what is absolutely given to consciousness and 
is unquestionable. What is doubtful, however, is the transcendent existence of the 
object which experience refers to. The consciousness and the totality of lived 
experience, therefore, constitute the field of phenomenology (see Hua III.I: § 33). 
And the belief in the existence of the world is suspended (i.e., the so-called 
phenomenological reduction; see Hua III.I: § 32). 
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Thus, it is no coincidence that Husserl considered Humean sceptical doubt about 
the existence of the world independent of the subject as his philosophical starting 
point (for the philosophical continuity from Hume to Husserl see Mall 1973 and cf. 
Husserl 1953: 198). As a consequence, he refused to adopt a Kantian perspective. 
According to Zhok (2012: 112), “it is important to observe that the question that 
Fichte raised while criticising the Kantian notion of ‘Thing-in-itself’ remains alive 
for Husserl.” 
We have seen that the same criticism towards Kant was shared by subjective 
idealists such as Avenarius and Mach. They argued for a development of Humean 
agnosticism and dealt with the contents of consciousness merely. According to 
Lenin, the refusal of Kantian things-in-itself leads to agnosticism or to Fichtean-
like subjective idealism. And from agnosticism to subjective idealism, it is short 
road. The sceptical doubt about both, the existence of mind-independent things 
and the possibility to know them, lead researchers to take interest in the subjective 
reflection of the subject on its own sensations, representations, etc. 
 
3.2. Husserl’s Subjective Idealism (II) 
 
For Husserl phenomenology must deal with intentionality, understood as the 
property of lived experience to be about something. To Thảo, the Husserlian 
distinction between noesis (intentional act) and noema (intentionally held object) 
lead to dimiss the external world (cf. Hua III.I: §§ 87-96):  
 
This appears with particular clarity in Husserl, whose work brought subjective 
reflection, under the title of “phenomenological reflection,” to its most refined. 
Without denying the existence of the real object to which a consciousness is actually 
oriented, he leaves it aside to focus solely on the “given” that seems to him 
absolutely certain: immanent lived experience as such. It appears that this “given” 
includes two moments: first, the subject with his lived acts, or noesis; second the 
object intended as intended, or “intentional object,” the noema. The intentional 
object is from the outset distinguished from the actual object, since it is only the 
intended object as intended in opposition to the external, actually intended object—
in other words, in materialist terms, it is only the image of the actual object. But it is 
“revealed” in the course of phenomenological analysis that the external, actually 
intended object was, precisely, only the intended object as intended. In other words, 
in virtue of the phenomenologist’s self-reflection, the actual object is assimilated to 
the intentional object, which is in fact only its image, and as a result the external 
world is reduced to “intentionalities” of my consciousness. (Thảo [1975: 24] 2009: 
 169 
311) 
 
In Thảo’s view, it is important to emphasise the similarities between the 
Husserlian philosophy and the tradition of subjective idealism. He highlighted that 
Husserl did not refute the existence of the world, but he rather suspended the 
belief in the existence of the world (for instance cf. Hua III.I: § 31). Given that, lived 
experience is what remains after phenomenological reduction, it is a field of 
objects which existence is indubitable. Phenomenology must firstly describe lived 
experience as such. As a consequence, to Thảo, Husserl did not put in relation the 
lived experience of consciousness with real relations between the knowing subject 
and external reality. Once again, in Lenin’s terms, Husserl merely dealt with the 
relation of belonging between the perceiving subject and its sensations and 
neglected the other two relations: the relation of presence between the objective 
reality and the perceiving subject and the relation of conformity between 
sensations and the objective reality. 
Thảo was a bit unfair to Husserl. Husserl had in fact tackled the problem of 
conformity between lived experience and external object since he described how 
the own body can actively confirm the lived experience through movements in the 
space (cf. Hua III.IV: § 38). And this does not oblige Husserl’s account to fall into the 
Fichtean alternative (cf. Zhok 2012: 114). Anyhow, the noetic-noematic intentional 
relation between the intentional act and the intended object is in danger of turning 
phenomenology into idealism – as Husserl’s pupils had already noticed (see 
Tedeschini 2014). As a result, Thảo ([1975: 24] 2009: 311) stated that  
 
Husserl had in reality mutilated and deformed the actually lived relation of con- 
sciousness to its object. This relationship, which is in fact constituted on the basis of 
three terms [the subject, the object, and the sensations], now, under the gaze of the 
phenomenologist, only includes two: noesis and noema, so the three relations 
outlined above are confused in the syncretism of the “noetic-noematic” relation. It 
follows that the actual object that in the actually lived experience of consciousness 
was given to the subject in its subjective image, namely sensation, is now brought to 
ideal and more or less mythical constructions within the noetic-noematic relation 
[...]. Such a definition amounts to replacing the actual object with a complex of 
sensations, the famous synthesis of Abschattungen (silhouettes) that, although 
regulated by laws introduced as a priori, can never reach the object itself as existing 
outside of consciousness and independently of it. 
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To explain, by “noesis” (or intentional morphé), one must understand the act by 
which consciousness interprets sensations (or sensitive hyle) as a manifestation of 
the same object. In this sense, the object is the “noema”, the meaning of the object, 
the object as understood, as a result of constitutive operations of consciousness. 
Further, Husserl set out in his Cartesian Meditations that being and consciousness 
belong together (cf. Hua I: 84). In this way, it would seem that he suggested a 
theory very close to “the principle of the correlation” set out by empiriocriticists. 
As a consequence of the subjective method of phenomenology, according to 
Thảo, Husserl cannot explain the relation with other egos. Since the reality is 
reduced to the phenomena constituted by the activity of the ego, then 
phenomenology becomes a kind of solipsism – just as empiriocriticism done: 
 
In reality, with the subjective method, the relation of self to self is necessarily 
introduced in the pure abstract formalism of I=I, a kind of internal mirror that 
immediately returns to the subject his own image as himself, such that it becomes 
impossible for any question to be posed as to its origin and its foundation. And being 
locked in the circular emptiness of such an abstraction, the ego no longer conceives 
of others except as on this narcissistic mirror-image model, as if as fixed monads, 
each on its own internal mirror, of which the content causes a same egological form 
to be indefinitely reproduced. (Thảo [1975: 27] 2009: 318) 
 
Now it could be useful to remember that for Husserl the object is an ideality 
constituted in a presumed manner by consciousness, the result of the syntheses of 
the various aspects of the thing the consciousness presumes to refer to the same 
reality, to the same unity of possible experience, something identical to itself 
beyond all its variations. Abschattungen (outlines, aspects, perspectives) is the 
Husserlian term that indicates the way in which the spatial thing manifests itself in 
perception. Thảo assimilates in this way the Husserlian theory of Abschattungen to 
the empiriocriticists theory of the complexes of sensations sharply criticised by 
Lenin. 
Of course, Husserl had criticised empiriocriticism in his Logical Investigations (see 
Hua XVIII). To him, indeed, Mach’s phenomenalism was a kind of psychologism and 
subjectivism in so far as the validity of concepts would depend upon the bio-
psychic structure of the knowing subject. Husserl did not agree with 
phenomenalism whereby the mind-independent thing is reducible to sensations 
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and other mental events. And according to Husserl, the noema does not construct 
the reality but rather it tends to make the reality appear. The noema pretends to be 
the reality but it is the medium between the subject of knowledge and the mind-
independent thing. Thus, the subject does not know the reality directly but rather 
by means of the noema. 
Husserl regarded the psychologism as a kind of relativism. To the psychologism, 
in fact, the truth is only in connection with a certain psychic structure. Thus, the 
existence of things would be reduced by the psychologism to a mental event and 
reality would be nothing but the connection between mental images (cf. Hua XIV: 
151). According to Husserl, phenomenalism leads to solipsism and scepticism. As 
we have seen, Husserl accepted the Humean scepticism, but at the same time he 
tried to solve the main conundrum of the Humean scepticism by way of the 
description of the lived experience. 
In any case, to Thảo, the Husserlian view did not allow a comprehensive analysis 
of lived experience. And, thus, Husserl’s idealism cannot be embedded in a 
materialist theory of real consciousness. Against that, Thảo’s materialistic account 
argued for an epistemology in which “the real objectivity is given to humans 
thanks to sensation that is its image.” In this vein, he had to change his method 
and dismissed phenomenological methodology:  
 
to pose the problem not as a lived, phenomenological analysis of consciousness, pursued on 
the positions of dialectical materialism, but rather an application of dialectical materialism 
to the analysis of lived consciousness, and to solve it through its very content, namely 
through the orderly reproduction of the actual, material process, where the 
movement of subjectivity is constituted. (Thảo [1974: 38] 2009: 299)  
 
Thus, Thảo’s aim is now to describe the real intentionality of consciousness as it 
appears since we consider the three relations of belonging, presence, and 
conformity. He had to explain how conscious lived experience could intentionally 
refer to the real world. At the same time, he had also to explain the way in which 
the belief in the existence of mind-independent things could arise. 
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4. Thảo’s Theory of Semiotic Intentionality 
 
Thảo developed his materialist theory of intentionality by distancing himself 
from the Husserlian phenomenology. At the same time, Thảo disagreed with Lenin 
in some regards, as we will see in the paragraph 7. For the time being, we must 
remind the reader that, according to Lenin, dialectical materialism regards 
thinking as the result of material life. And material life is nothing other than the 
relations between the ego and both, the physical and social environment. Thảo, 
too, suggested that thinking must be regarded as something that depends upon the 
interactions with the others as well as with the physical environment (mind-
independent things). Specifically, the most fundamental relationship between 
humans and physical environment is mediated by social relations. And social 
relations involve a form of language, i.e., the language of real life.  
As we have seen in Chapter 3, against Saussurean semiology and its assumption 
of the psychical nature of signs, Thảo claimed that the semiotics of the language of 
the real life must deal with the material embodied origins of psychical dimension. 
The criticism towards Saussurean semiology leads Thảo to rehabilitate motivated 
signs and language-reality relations. According to Thảo, Saussure and Husserl 
dismissed the real context in which both signs and cognition arise. In fact, the pre-
conscious, collective, and semiotic structure of social practices involves the 
development of individual cognitive skills. The same is true so as to explain the 
origin of psychic intentionality. 
The language of real life has been seen as a practical tool which conveys some 
fundamental significations and a community employed to interact with the 
physical environment. Assuming that, Thảo linked the analysis of intentionality 
with his description of language. To explain how lived experience referring to 
mind-independent things arises, Thảo introduced in ILC the notion of “gestural 
indication” (pointing). In essence, Thảo claimed that indicative gesture satisfies a 
certain number of objective requirements designed to materialistically explain the 
emergence of psychic dimension. As a matter of fact, pointing is a real movement 
which entails material relations between humans and external world against the 
background of social practices. Unlike Husserl, Thảo insisted that the directness of 
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intentional acts is not a process that exists inside our mind but rather something 
that must be conceived as a body movement displayed during collective activities. 
As we have seen, the psychic signifier is the result of the internalisation of a 
material signifier. In the same way, the psychic signified is the result of the 
internalisation of a material signified produced by the signifier of motivated 
fundamental signs (see below Chapter 6 for more elaborate treatment). Since the 
Saussurean signifier-signified psychic relation corresponds to the Husserlian 
noetic-noematic cognitive relation, Thảo argued that the material signifier of the 
pointing corresponds to the embodied intentional semiotic act which refers to the 
real mind-independent object. Similarly, the signified produced by pointing 
correspond to the sensation of the intended object perceived as a mind-
independent thing. Simply put, pointing changes human perception of the object 
because it establishes the intended object as mind-independent reality. Thus, Thảo 
([1975: 26-27] 2009: 316) wrote: 
 
We thus see that the ideal signifier, as a lived gestural-verbal act ideally reproducing 
the material, gestural-verbal signifier, defines what Husserl wanted to designate as 
noesis, namely the ideal activity of the subject of consciousness, but we see also that 
he mutilated and deformed it, in particular by removing the originary lived act of 
indication of the object, the lived act that reproduces on the ideal plane of 
consciousness the actual movement of indication. Correlatively the ideal signified, 
as the ideal image reflecting the tendentious image signified on the material, 
sensory-motor level, defines what Husserl wanted to designate noema, the 
“intentional object,” but which he equally mutilated and deformed by eliminating 
the fundamental moment that ideally reproduces the relation of the exteriority of 
the object vis-à-vis the subject, the ideal image of the exteriority of the actual object, 
a moment by which the intentional object is distinguished from, and at the same 
time is related to, that actual object of which it is the ideal lived image. 
 
Thảo anchored both consciousness and intentionality in collective semiotic 
activities and especially in the semiotic act of gestural indication. So what Thảo 
argued for is a theory of semiotic embodied intentionality. And so conceived, 
pointing explains how the belief in the existence of the real mind-independent 
world arises. Not only did pointing involve the original intentional relation 
subject-object, it also entails the belief in the external world as such. Thảo ([1975: 
25] 2009: 313) wrote:  
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This gesture is thus the material constitutive movement of the actual real 
intentionality of consciousness taken in its most fundamental form, that by which 
consciousness is consciousness of the object in its objective reality, as existing beyond 
the subject and independently of it. 
 
According to Bimbenet (2011: 96), this is the main task of every explanation of 
process of hominisation: 
 
We know ourselves as a particular biological species, or as a historically and 
culturally situated humanity; but we continue to live the world not as ‘a’ subjective-
relative world, but as ‘the’ world. In the ‘natural attitude’, as Husserl says so well, we 
are naturally and viscerally realistic. We meet the world as what is, in the strongest 
sense that can be imagined, it always exists before and without us. (id., p. 92) 
 
Thảo’s semiotic intentionality solved the main conundrum of the Husserlian 
phenomenology since it shows how the belief in the existence of the external 
mind-independent world arises without dismissing the bodily relation with that 
world. In support of his position, not only did Thảo describe the intentional 
relation as phenomenally already done, he also explains how that intentionality 
arises and why it can be justified. The mind-independent thing is no longer an ideal 
target of lived experience but rather a real material thing the subject interacts 
with. Against the Husserlian phenomenology, Thảo’s semiotic intentionality 
intends a real mind-independent object and does not stop at the eidos of the thing, 
at the psychic intentional noetic-noematic relation. 
We cannot neglect the fact that intentional relation with mind-independent 
reality takes place against social relations. And the social exchange of gestural 
indications must be regarded as the origin of self-consciousness (see Chapter 5 for 
more details). So Thảo argued against the Husserlian idealist assumption 
concerning self-consciousness as inner-relation between individuals and their own 
self. Thảo must solve this conundrum and demonstrate how self-consciousness 
arises from social relations: “There remains for now the relation of the subject to 
itself, this constant return of self to self, in which consists the intimate structure of 
lived experience as such” ([Thảo 1974: 27] 2009: 317).  
Thảo’s analysis started from social relations in order to investigate the origins of 
self-consciousness. Thus, the relation with the others is not a result of a solipsist 
comparison of self with others as Husserl stated in his Fifth Meditation. In contrast 
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with that, and according to Marx and Engels (cf. MEW 23: 67), Thảo ([1975: 27] 2009: 
318) highlighted that “the mirror is in others [le miroir est dans les autres].” But Thảo 
added that language allows the emergence of self-consciousness in so far as 
individuals address signs to themselves by the mediation of the others: 
 
It seems, in fact, that in this first, still embryonic form of the collective at work at 
the end of human evolution, the original gesture of indication, with its 
accompanying exclamation, is necessarily exchanged in reciprocal recognition, 
wherein each subject sees himself in others as if in a mirror and hears himself in 
others as if an echo. That reciprocal feature of a sign remains here at the material, 
sensory-motor level, since we have not yet crossed the threshold of the animal level. 
However, with the contradictions that appear in the development of collective work, 
certain situations are produced where the movement of the sign sent by an 
individual subject is immediately identified with those of others, so that he immediately 
returns to himself, which means that he is addressed to himself from those others 
with whom he had just identified himself. (Thảo [1975: 28] 2009: 319) 
 
Cooperative relations with fellows are, then, the conditions for having self-
consciousness. And the internalization of social working relations is nothing but 
the internalization of language as a social fact (Thảo was evidently sympathetic to 
Marx’s Outlines of the Critique of Political Economy; cf. MEW XLII: 390). 
To conclude, semiotic intentionality transcends the narrow limit of the 
Husserlian intentionality. It puts in relation the knowing subject with the real 
world. Remarkably semiotic intentionality seems to solve the main conundrum of 
PDM. Thảo can now describe the mediation between practical life and linguistic 
consciousness once the fully-developed language emerges. And he showed the way 
in which fully-formed language could be context-related and it effectively refers to 
the reality-in-itself. Signs refer no more to mental content. Thảo could thus 
conciliate the linguistic ego and the real subject of practical life. 
 
5. Language and Reality 
 
As Thảo put it, the language of real life modifies the epistemic attitude of 
individuals towards mind-independent things. Indeed, fundamental signs – and, 
above all, pointing – establish a new epistemic relation between knowing subject 
and external reality. As we have seen, Thảo (1974) accused Saussure to be an 
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idealist because he reduced our cognition to differential relations among signs. In 
the same way, in his ILC, Thảo ([1973] 1984: 33) wrote, Roman Jakobson’s (1986–
1982) semiotics felt in the same error (cf. Jakobson 1963: 41). If any sign translates 
itself into another sign, then, Thảo added, “the whole meaning of signs merely 
consists in their referring to one another, without ever referring directly to things” 
([1973] 1984: 33). Thus, the speaker is epistemically separated from physical reality. 
And, in the same way, linguistic signs are decoupled from the body of the speaker. 
Against that, to Thảo, mind-independent objects are essential to analyse the 
system of intrinsic signs. The question facing the relation between language and 
mind-independent objects involves a wide range of topics such as semantic 
reference, representational content, justification of knowledge, and so on. For 
instance, Thảo wrote that the simple indication of a given object establishes the 
reference within a communicative act between two partners takes place. The 
simple indication could be the gesture of the pointing as well as vocal indexical, of 
course. 
To Thảo, the indicative gesture must be regarded as the first step of linguistic 
signification. In this regard, Thảo invoked an example made by Jakobson:  
 
Suppose I want to explain to a unilingual Indian what Chesterfield is and I point to a 
package of cigarettes. What can the Indian conclude? … He will gather what 
Chesterfield is and what it is not only if he masters a series of other linguistic signs, 
which will serve as interpretant of the sign under discussion [Jakobson, 1963: 41-42, 
from Thảo [1973] 1984: 33] 
 
To Thảo, it was a serious error to consider the other signs as interpretants of the 
pointing. Indeed, Thảo ([1973] 1984: 34) wrote, “the indicative gesture simply 
means that it is a question of this very object […] such a meaning is understood by 
the gesture itself, it has no need to be interpreted.” He admitted that the pointing 
cannot say anything about the properties of the object22. But this did not mean that 
                                                 
22 So Thảo followed Hegel’s theory of sense certainly: “Moreover, sense-certainty appears 
to be the truest knowledge; for it has not as yet omitted anything from the object, but 
has the object before it in its perfect entirety. But, in the event, this certainty proves 
itself to be the most abstract and poorest truth. All that it says about what it knows is 
just that it is; and its truth contains nothing but the sheer being of the thing” (Hegel 
[1807] 1977: 58). 
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other signs can serve as a substitute of the pointing23. They simply add ancillary 
information to pointing. In other words, the pointing participates in creating the 
frame of reference and establishes the referent. Then other signs explain the 
properties of that object. 
In support of his position, Thảo suggested that pointing does not require any 
system of arbitrary signs to be understood. The indicative gesture performs a 
denotative function while other motivated and arbitrary signs add supplementary 
connotative information: 
 
Now if, for example, one adds by a mimetic sign this it is something to be smoked, one 
will have shown a certain particular property of that object, and will not have 
explained the meaning of the gesture of pointing with the finger. […] (id., p. 34) 
 
Thus, the indicative gesture means outside the relationship with other signs and 
directly refers to the thing itself. This one is perceived by way of the indicative 
gesture and, consequently, appears in its material existence. For this reason, the 
thing could be understood to be the shared frame of reference that allows every 
linguistic act. 
Semiotic intentionality of indicative gestures is also the source of the 
experience of the mind-independent world as the target of common efforts, 
discourses, sciences, etc. As Bimbenet (2011: 197-199) stated: 
 
The gesture of indication places us immediately in an intersubjective space where 
the points of view interact with one another. [...] He [the child who points] 
“declares” the thing to the address of people around him. In so doing, he constitutes 
it as the invariant term of a multiplicity of possible determinations. The thing once 
named or designated can reveal itself in its infinity of aspects. [...] The public 
declaration of a thing enriches it with no new content, but institutes it as an 
invariant term under a multiplicity of possible looks. It opens the space of multiple 
perspectives.  
 
For this reason, Thảo had stated that fundamental signs – among which we 
should mention the pointing – must be reckoned to be the semiotic base of 
                                                 
23 Hegel, too, wrote that language cannot substitute the pointing: “They mean ‘this’ bit of 
paper on which I am writing – or rather have written – ‘this’; but what they mean is not 
what they say. If they actually wanted to say ‘this’, then it is impossible, because the 
sensuous This that is meant cannot be reached by language, which belongs to 
consciousness, i.e. to that which is inherently universal” (Hegel [1807] 1977: 66). 
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conventional systems of arbitrary signs. 
Interestingly, in a similar way, Husserl already and explicitly mentioned the role 
of perception to determine the meaning of demonstrative expressions such as this 
(cf. Hua IV: Sixth Investigation, § 5). And after him, although he took the fully-
developed language into account, Karl Bühler (1879-1963) argued that 
demonstrative expressions required gesture and perceptions which specify their 
meaning, their reference (cf. Bühler 1934: 90). 
It is not surprising that the same attempt to find the origins of consciousness 
and language by adapting the Husserlian theory of intentionality to semiotics could 
be observed in the writings of Hendrik Pos (1898–1955):  
 
Since it does not appear specifically as speech, language must be understood as the 
continuation of the organs of sight and action par excellence, eyes and hands. (Pos 
[1933] 2013: 117)  
 
The outstretched hand that does not reach its goal is converted into a hand that 
realizes an act of language. While in itself it remains an organ that does not attain its 
goal, it is understood and ultimately understands itself as a hand that indicates. 
Before language, there is, therefore, the gesture and, as the very first origin of 
language, the gesture of the outstretched hand. (id., p. 119)  
  
What emerges from these quotations is the fact that some scholars who were 
concerned with certain phenomenological issues tackled the question of the 
reference and that of gestural indication as well. 
 
6. Naïve Realism 
 
According to Thảo “the meaning of the indicative gesture in no way refers to 
any other sign. It uniquely and directly refers to the thing itself in its external 
existence as independent of the subject” ([1973] 1984: 34). Since Thảo believed that 
arbitrary fully-formed languages are based on pointing which involves the belief 
that the world exists independently of the subject, then, systems of arbitrary signs 
depend upon the psychological attitude of naïve realism. Thus, the belief that the 
world exists independently of the subject must be regarded as the gnoseological 
justification of meaningfulness of arbitrary signs. 
Naïve realism is the common-sense theory of perception: there are objects out 
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there in the world, and those objects have the properties that they appear to us to 
have (see Genone 2016). In the same way, Thảo ([1973] 1984: 35) wrote that the 
pointing is the “mediation which assures the correspondence between knowledge 
and things.” Assuming that sensations link thinking and reality and the criterion of 
knowledge is the practical interaction with the physical environment, then 
pointing seems to provide a solid basis for having the correspondence between 
concepts and reality. 
To Thảo, the semantic content of indicative gestures is the necessary foundation 
for conceptual knowledge: “It is the meaning of this sign which is the basis of the 
concept of matter, as an essential concept of the theory of knowledge” (ibid.)24. 
Conceptual knowledge needs the relation to the objective sensible reality and this 
relation is involved in indicative gestures. Only later, within fully-formed 
languages, systems of arbitrary signs allow conceptual inferences, generalizations, 
abstractions, and so forth25. 
The awareness of the object as mind-independent thing marks the most 
relevant difference between humans and animals. To Thảo, animals perceive the 
object but do not perceive the object as mind-independent. Of course, they have a 
disposal gestures, but they must be understood to be forms of grasping. Thảo 
admitted that primates could recognize indicative gestures as such: “when the 
finger is pointed in order to indicate an object to an ape, his look follows the 
extension of the experimenter’s hand gesture to the indicated object” ([1973] 1984: 
19). But “gestural activity of apes denotes feeling and action” (id., p. 20) rather than 
“meaning of the object.” Thus, apes cannot employ indicative gestures as means to 
state or announce the thing to someone else. They understand pointing and merely 
employ it as imperative means to achieve an individual goal. According to more 
recent studies (Vauclair & Bertrand 2002: 309, 323-324; Vauclair 1992: 125, 134, 175; 
                                                 
24 In this way, Thảo agreed with Hegel’s Phenomenology: “The knowledge or knowing is at 
the start or immediately our object cannot be anything else but immediate knowledge 
itself, a knowledge of the immediate or of what simply is” (Hegel [1807] 1977: 58). 
Federici (1970) notes: “[For Thảo] Matter can only be defined as ‘what is independent of 
consciousness’ (independent and not merely ‘external’). […] Sense indicates objects as 
objective reality, independent of the subject, and this independent reality is already 
implied in the sense itself.” 
25 To Hegel, too, the fully-fledged language must be regarded as the dimension of the 
universal and general notions (see Hegel [1807] 1977: 66). 
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Lestel 2001: 143), the pointing among chimps must be regarded as injunctive, either 
because it responds to a request from the experimenter, or because it expresses an 
interested request, and not the desire to share information (cf. also Bimbenet 2011: 
291).  
For Thảo ([1973] 1984: 5) “the indicative gesture marks the most elementary 
relation of consciousness to the object as external object.” The world is no more 
my world; it becomes the transcendent world which exists outside me, 
independently of my will, and existing for the others. On the contrary, the animal 
perceives the object as part of the own behaviour: “the object is not detached from 
his own sensory-motor organization.” The perception of the object entails the 
corresponding psychic image among animals, of course, but such an image “can be 
defined only in terms of the potential action.” For the ape, the object is nothing 
other than the last physical extension of the own body. The pressure of needs 
causes a perception of the object as something that is actually “touched” and 
manipulated rather than something that is perceived and then indicated.  
In other words, among animals, the relation to the object implies the direct 
behavioural continuity with the external things, so that the perception of the 
object does not take place at distance. For the same reason, the means of 
expression among apes (gestures, cries, etc.) serve as signals and refer to the 
emotional biological aspect of a given situation. Regarding this dynamic, Thảo 
wrote: 
 
And it is precisely because the psychic image of the object presents itself 
contiguously with the potential movements already more or less set in operation in 
the body of the animal that he is incapable of indicating the distant object, even 
though the distance of the object is minute. In other words, he does not have the 
concept of distance as such, so that his perception, though it is of the external object 
does not include awareness of the externality of the object. (ibid.) 
 
Otherwise, among humans, the indicative gesture exactly reveals the ability to 
refer to external things as such. External things are thus something that exists 
although it is not the object of potential actions.  
To Thảo, it does not mean that gestures at a distance do not derive from 
gestures employed by our primate-like ancestors, of course. But since apes perceive 
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the situation by way of contiguity, humans show the consciousness of the distance 
and exteriority of the object. 
 
7. Thảo’s Theory of Semiotic Cognition 
 
Before concluding, it seems important to show the differences between Thảo’s 
and Lenin’s theories of knowledge. As we have seen above, to Lenin the error 
underlying empiriocriticism was that of reducing the objective world to our 
sensations and representations. In contrast with empiriocriticism, Lenin thought of 
the process of knowledge in terms of direct realism: the object is directly perceived 
and perceiving it does not depend on something internal the mind. Not only does 
the external mind-independent reality exist, it is also knowable through human 
sensations. To him, indeed, “the mind does not exist independently of the body […] 
mind is secondary, a function of the brain, a reflection of the external world” 
(Lenin 1972: 95; about the brain cf. Engels’ Anti-Dühring in MEW XX: 33). 
In this way, Lenin merged his ontological monism – i.e., matter is the only 
substance which makes up the universe – with his theory of sensation as reflection 
of mind-independent things26. The ontological homogeneity between the mind and 
things is the condition for having epistemic correspondence between 
representations and external reality. To Lenin, there is an epistemic condition that 
justifies our beliefs. The praxis – i.e., the interactions between humans and 
                                                 
26 Lenin’s theory of knowledge appealed to some Russian psychological trends of the 
epoch (see McLeish 1975). To Sechenov (1863) conscious and unconscious actions are 
bodily reflexes whose origins are the sensory simulation. Then this one entails the 
corresponding muscular movements and psychic acts. Sechenov acknowledged that the 
behaviour could be described as the necessary link between organism and 
environment. He introduced the notion of “reflex arc”: the physiological mechanism 
that transforms environmental energy into activity. The behaviour was regarded as an 
automatic and involuntary body’s response mediated by the nervous system with the 
formation of a reflex arc that generates a response as a result of a stimulus coming from 
the environment or from the body itself. Sechenov’s physiology became the starting 
point for Pavlov’s psychology and then Pavlov further developed Sechenov’s account 
concerning reflexes. Lenin regarded Pavlov’s theory of reflection as psychological 
example to support his own theory of knowledge. According to Lenin, all matter 
possesses the property of reflection. Consequently, mind is a function of the brain that 
reflects the external state of affairs. Language is nothing but an instrument of 
communication and a reflex of external reality (see Asratyan 1982, Losev 1984, 
Bodarenko 2008). 
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environment – must be regarded as the testing ground of our representations of 
external reality: 
 
Thus, the materialist theory, the theory of the reflection of objects by our mind, is 
here presented with absolute clarity: things exist outside us. Our perceptions and 
ideas are their images. Verification of these images, differentiation between true 
and false images, is given by practice. (Lenin 1972: 119) 
 
In this way, according to Lenin, sciences unconsciously assume a realist and 
materialist theory of knowledge. This is nothing but naïve realism. 
In ILC, Thảo quoted several times Lenin (1972). Indeed, they agreed on various 
assumptions. For instance, Thảo regarded sensation as the image of mind-
independent things. And, in this instance, he supported the idea that the universe 
is composed of matter alone. His monistic materialism led him to consider the 
mind as a result of the neural-physiological mechanisms of the brain (see below 
Chapter 6 for more elaborate treatment). So, the naïve realism must be seen as the 
most fundamental form of knowledge. Like Lenin, Thảo regarded the interaction 
between the body and a given environment as the starting point for having 
knowledge. 
Thảo’s view, however, differed from Lenin’s one regarding the role of signs. To 
Lenin, signs are nothing other than instruments to communicate the already 
acquired knowledge of the world (Losev 1984). Indeed, sensations alone could be 
reckoned to be the beginning of peculiar human knowledge. Not only did Thảo date 
back the emergence of the most fundamental forms of human knowledge to the 
period of prehominids, he also introduced the language of real life as essential part 
of the process of knowledge. In this vein, Thảo would agree with Lenin’s theory of 
knowledge as he, too, suggested that social practice represents the real dimension 
in which human knowledge of mind-independent things could be justified. But 
Thảo stated that the social practice takes the shape of the language of real life. 
To Thảo, the object of sensations is not the material thing in itself but rather the 
mind-independent thing as it is presented by the pointing within a social context. 
Indeed, he wrote that “the indicative gesture simply means that it is question of 
this very object, the ‘this here’ as objective reality given to sense intuition and 
nothing more” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 34). 
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Though he attempted to take the issue of language far more seriously than 
Lenin, Thảo’s theory of semiotic knowledge was conceived along the lines of 
Lenin’s materialism and realism, of course. So Thảo stated: 
 
“Matter”, says Lenin, “is the objective reality, which is given to us in sensation.” 
Naturally, the word “given” must be understood here in an active sense. “The 
senses” specifies Lenin “show reality”. They show it to us precisely because of the 
indicative gesture which defines the very act of sense intuition as sense certainty. 
Objective reality is “given” to us in sensation in the sense that it is indicated to us by 
sensation. (id., p. 34) 
 
Interestingly, fundamental signs support sensation of mind-independent 
objects. That is to say, fundamental signs do not replace sensations but rather they 
direct the attention to a given mind-independent material thing. While in Lenin’s 
insight knowledge starts as passively and mechanically product of physiological 
mechanisms, Thảo highlighted how both semiotic intentionality and social practice 
modify the way sensations grasp objective reality. 
 
8. Beyond the Phenomenological Approach? 
 
Thảo presents his own approach as diametrically opposed to Husserl’s one. 
Indeed, Husserl suspended the naïve realism and the general thesis of the natural 
attitude: the world exists. The reduction (or epoché) exactly suspends the belief on 
the existence of mind-independent things (Hua XXIV: 122). This scepticism leads 
Husserl to state that there can be no doubt that the phenomenon appears to the 
subject. In this way, the act of consciousness constitutes the field of research of 
phenomenology because it is beyond doubt while the existence of mind-
independent things is not apodictic. By contrast, to Thảo, the existence of the 
world is the starting point to investigate the origins of consciousness. 
While Husserl’s phenomenological project started from the field of phenomena 
to describe the processes that lead us to believe in the existence of mind-
independent things (Hua I), Thảo took for granted that the mind-independent 
things exist in themselves as matter in motion. From a peculiar notion of matter, 
then, Thảo illustrated how consciousness arose and how the belief in mind-
independent reality dialectically develops. Thus, Thảo and Husserl wanted to 
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describe how something can appear to consciousness, what kind of subjectivity is 
at issue, what kind of subjective acts allows the emergence of a certain field of 
objects, etc. But they assumed two different perspectives.  
Thảo tried to solve the question by way of genetic investigations into the origins 
of consciousness and assumed as a starting point the existence of matter in motion 
and as his endpoint the subjective knowledge of that reality. And Thảo integrated 
this description into a wider research on the nature of humankind. In support of 
his position, he illustrated how practical collective life and semiotic skills are the 
preconditions for having access to the reality as matter in motion. Thảo’s approach 
aimed to transcend the epistemological dualism between the subject of knowledge 
and the object of knowledge and assumed the ontological identity of them. 
But, in this manner, Thảo dismissed the difficulties emerging from the 
scepticism concerning the mind-independent reality. In so far as Thảo took for 
granted the mind-independent reality and defined it as matter in motion by 
dialectical materialism, he was not interested to demonstrate the existence of the 
mind-independent reality. He was rather more interested in the description of the 
way the consciousness of mind-independent reality arose. Thus, Thảo’s approach 
seems to be weaker than Husserl’s one exactly because Thảo did not demonstrate 
the ultimate basis of his ontology. What he illustrated is rather the epistemological 
defence as well as the genetic development of his own ontology – which was based 
on the belief in the mind-independent reality conceived as matter in motion. 
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Chapter Five 
Consciousness: what is it, who has it, and how does it arise? 
 
 
 
Ainsi le psychique, dans son sens humain, 
ne peut pas se comprendre directement à partir du biologique. 
Il implique la médiation des déterminations sociales, 
fondées sur la dialectique historique des forces productives 
et des rapports de production, et développées dans le langage. 
(T. D. Thảo) 
 
 
 
1. Preliminary Remarks. - 2. Language as Social Matter. - 3.1. The Relation of 
Reciprocity. - 3.2. Consciousness as Self-Consciousness. - 3.3. Consciousness as 
Consciousness of the Object. - 4.1. The Soviet Debate on Consciousness. - 4.2. 
The Western Debate on Consciousness. – 4.3. Conclusions. 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Preliminary Remarks 
 
The question facing the origin of speech involves the question of the most 
elementary form of contents which subjective inner lived experience focuses on. 
Does language reorganize the pre-linguistic experience? To what extent does 
language have an influence over thought? What kind of conscious contents does 
language convey? As we have announced in the previous chapter, the subjective 
lived experience is called by Thảo consciousness. It is not easy to define what 
consciousness is. According to Thảo, subjective lived experience has two 
distinguishing characteristics: i) it is conscious, namely subjective lived experience 
must be regarded as the individual’s inner experience and had to be described from 
the first-person perspective – that had already been suggested by Descartes in his 
Meditations; ii) it is intentional, namely subjective lived experience refers to a given 
content (mental states and processes, things, properties and states of affairs, 
concepts, and so on) – as it had already been affirmed by Brentano (see above 
Chapter 1). Since lived experience is conscious, the subject is also aware of the own 
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conscious mental activity. At the same time, lived experience is nothing but the 
consciousness of the contents it tends to – that is the consciousness of the object. 
Thus, simultaneously, the conscious lived experience is consciousness of the object 
and consciousness of self. We can anticipate that, to Thảo, the language of real life 
allows the emergence of conscious lived experience. To point the fact, language 
mediates the internalisation of the contents of our experience. It translates the 
experience of the world into stable contents of consciousness. On the one side, we 
can be aware of our inner experience because it is objectified in language. On the 
other side, consciousness could refer to something else by way of language. Not for 
nothing is intentionality the main characteristic of fundamental signs like the 
gestural indication. Finally, we must remark that for Thảo the dimension of 
conscious lived experience seems to coincide with that of thinking. 
What immediately stands out when one analyses Thảo’s theory of consciousness 
is the fact that he had to accommodate the material origin of thinking with human-
specific cognition. That is an issue that was extensively handled in the Marxist 
literature (cf. MEW II: 136; id., XX: 32, 354). Thảo ([1974: 38] 2009: 299-301) 
introduced the conundrum in the following way: 
 
Toward the end of the fifties, a riveting and impassioned general discussion on the 
nature of consciousness was beginning in the Soviet Union27. […] the classics of 
Marxism-Leninism had not yet specifically pursued a concrete science of 
consciousness. In order to establish a research methodology in this area, it was 
necessary, it seems, to clarify the concept of consciousness vis-à-vis the most 
general categories of dialectical materialism, namely matter and motion. The world 
is but matter in motion or movement in matter, and the task of knowledge is to 
study matter in its many forms of movement. […] The science of consciousness 
should thus, it seems, define its object as a certain form of the movement of matter 
[…] However, such a definition would, in fact, equate consciousness with mere 
physical movement […]. It remains, nonetheless, that consciousness displays an 
incontestably ideal character […]. 
 
At the heart of the debate about the nature of consciousness lie questions 
concerning the ontological primacy of matter. They are: Why are humans aware of 
the contents of their lived experience? If we assume that material object is not able 
                                                 
27 Thảo (1974: 38) invoked: “L’origine de la conscience de Spirkine, La nature de l’image de 
Tioukhtine, Le problème de la conscience dans la philosophie et la science de la nature de 
Chorokova, Comment naquit l’humanité de Séménov.” Because of our lack of knowledge of 
Russian, we cannot account for that debate unfortunately. 
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to intentionally refer to something else, why is our lived experience intentional? 
How can physical brain processes be about things or ideas? How can intentionality 
arise from matter? And how can mind-dependent thoughts refer to mind-
independent things? Since we assume a materialistic approach, what kind of 
interactions are maintained by the brain with the mind? What kind of materialistic 
theoretical frame provides the best explanation of peculiarities of human-specific 
cognition? 
Before coming to the core of Thảo theory of consciousness and to illustrate how 
he answered to previous questions, some remarks concerning materialistic 
dialectic framework are needed. We should place Thảo’s theory in the context of 
Marxism-Leninism and pay special attention to ontological and epistemological 
relations between mind and matter. 
Thảo offered a wide analysis of the emergence of consciousness from matter and 
suggested a philosophical and ontological theory that justified his assumptions. 
Thảo ([1973] 1984: 26) argued for “the dependency of consciousness, as a secondary 
factor in relation to matter, which is the primary element.” Thus, in contrast to 
dualism, Thảo refused to admit the existence of two kinds of substances. Mind and 
brain, consciousness and body share the same ontological substrate. Indeed, he 
argued for “the fundamental unity of the two opposed terms, a unity which is 
expressed in material monism.” From an ontological point of view, there is no 
difference between mind/consciousness and the brain. Consciousness is nothing 
but an emergent ability of given bodies, or, a function of the brain. 
Nonetheless, consciousness seems to be something that differs from matter. 
Even today, scholars wonder if consciousness could be explained from a 
materialistic point of view (see Koch 2005). The main concern is the question how 
the brain could produce lived experience. From an epistemological perspective, 
Thảo ([1973] 1984: 26) wrote, “the opposition between matter and consciousness 
has an absolute meaning.” It seems that there is a contradiction between the two 
theories of consciousness, the epistemological and the ontological one. 
Consciousness is rooted in matter but it seems to transcend matter. Even if both 
consciousness and matter can be reduced to same substance “matter”, from an 
ontological standpoint, the knowing subject is epistemologically aware to 
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transcend the material world. In a similar way, the third-person perspective 
usually employed to describe material phenomena such as the brain functioning 
appears to be ineffective to describe the lived experience. Thảo invoked Lenin’s 
theory of consciousness in order better to explain this conundrum. Lenin, indeed, 
wrote that 
 
Of course, even the antithesis of matter and mind has absolute significance only 
within the bounds of a very limited field – in this case exclusively within the bounds 
of the fundamental epistemological problem of what is to be regarded as primary 
and what as secondary. Beyond these bounds the relative character of this antithesis 
is indubitable. (Lenin 1972: 167-168) 
 
The materialist elimination of the “dualism of mind and body” (scil., materialist 
monism) consists in the assertion that the mind does not exist independently of the 
body, that mind is secondary, a function of the brain, a reflection of the external 
world. (id., p. 95) 
 
We will return to this point further. For the time being, we should note that for 
Thảo, consciousness is the product of both, biological evolution and development 
of social practice. To Thảo consciousness is not a separate substance independent 
of matter but rather the embodied capability of lived experience “to keep a certain 
distance” from what it refers to. And the semiotic intentional act of pointing had 
been regarded by Thảo as the most fundamental form of consciousness because 
this kind of gestures establishes the most elementary distance between the 
knowing subject and mind-independent things28. 
As Thảo put it, not only does matter must be understood to be a physical 
element (body and mind-independent things), it must be also seen as the social 
environment. Thus, consciousness is something material not just because it is a 
function of the brain, but rather because it emerges from the material behaviour of 
humans. The social life-process of production and reproduction of means of 
existence constitutes, then, the precondition of consciousness. But we must add 
that social life-process is interwoven with language behaviour. Thus, in the 
                                                 
28 Thảo insisted that “it goes without saying that this description [of the most elementary 
form of consciousness of the mind-independent thing] is only fully valid under the 
original conditions of hominization, or the gestation period of genus Homo. In the second 
part of anthropogenesis, namely sapientation or the formation of Homo sapiens, the 
motion is internalised, to be followed by indefinitely complicated forms” (Thảo [1973] 
1984: 202) 
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following paragraph, we will focus on the way the language of real life involved in 
collective cooperative activities is the condition for having the emergence of some 
human-specific cognitive functions and to what extent it mediates the interaction 
between consciousness and reality. 
 
2. Language as Social Matter 
 
Thảo ([1973] 1984: 16) defined what consciousness is by invoking some lines 
from Marx’s German Ideology: “language is practical consciousness [die Sprache ist 
das praktische [...] wirkliche Bewußtsein]” (MEW III: 30; Marx & Engels 1998). Some 
words concerning the Marxian approach to consciousness and language are now 
needed. To Marx, language is a multi-dimensional device which interacts with the 
physical environment so as to solve material problems. The multidimensionality 
depends upon the fact that language must be simultaneously regarded as i) social, 
ii) embodied, iii) and practical. Language is the first mode of being of thinking. This 
one must be seen as the practical ability involved in problem-solving. And both 
language and thinking have their common origin in social practices. Thus, since 
thinking and language are intertwined, the nature of consciousness must be 
studied in relation to both the life of the body and social relations. 
The social nature of both, language and consciousness, had been highlighted by 
Marx, who, as a consequence, stated that “language is as old as consciousness” and 
consciousness is “from the very beginning a social product, and remains so as long 
as men exist at all” (MEW III: 30; Marx & Engels 1998). Thảo wanted to explain how 
the language of real life transforms consciousness in a social fact. Thảo wrote that 
language of real life is “integral part” of the act of consciousness (Thảo [1973] 1984: 
16). And he defined the act of consciousness as “language, or unity of the signifying 
act, as material signs, with what it signifies [avec sa signification]” (id., p. [34] 16). 
What impact can language have on consciousness? And to what extent can 
language enable us to solve the puzzle of consciousness? 
Now we should spend a few words about Engelsʼ theory of matter because it 
largely influenced Thảoʼs treatment of language behaviour. According to Engels, 
“motion in the most general sense” must be conceived “as the mode of existence, 
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the inherent attribute, of matter” (MEW XX: 354: trans. from Engels 1987: 362). In 
the utterance “the motion of matter”, “matter” means the subject (the so-called 
genitive subjective): the motion of matter is matter in motion. Matter is the only 
ontological substrate of all that exists. It takes the shape of several different ways 
of motion. To Engels, the motion of matter could take the shape of basic 
mechanical motion, the motion of celestial bodies, chemical decomposition and 
combination, the motion of molecules, heat and light, electricity and magnetism, 
life, consciousness, thinking, etc. (cf. MEW XX: 325, 575-576). 
In mentioning Engels, Thảo tried to solve what he considered the most relevant 
problem of consciousness. He did not neglect that “consciousness, in so far as it 
actually exists must have something material in itself.” But Thảo also stated that 
“naturally, we must not conclude from this that consciousness would itself be 
material” (id., p. 26). This does not mean that consciousness is an immaterial 
substance. Even if consciousness requires a certain body to appear, this does not 
mean that consciousness is something material in the same way as the body. To 
point the fact, consciousness is nothing other than the awareness to have 
transcended the material reality. As this discussion implies, Thảo did not regard 
consciousness as a function of the brain merely. To him, the body alone cannot 
explain the origins of consciousness, even if it is a necessary condition for having 
consciousness. How can we explain the material and ideal nature of consciousness 
at the same time? 
As has been seen, the language of real life is a social activity preceding the 
emergence of consciousness as individualʼs psychic phenomenon. And the 
language of real life is taken as a material behaviour that has something material in 
itself. The materiality of the language of real life is nothing but the concrete 
embodied and social production of gestural-verbal signs. Those signs are what 
Thảo called “matter of linguistic sign” (id., p. 26). As a result, the material substrate 
of consciousness is nothing other than the material movement of the language of 
real life. 
To Thảo, first, consciousness is the result of the motion of the matter that 
composed the brain: “knowledge is the brain itself in its motion of thinking” (Thảo [1973] 
1984: 29). But the brain is not enough. The peculiar motion of the brain requires 
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the support of signs, i.e., “the idealization characteristic of the motion of inner 
language.” Thảo stated that “consciousness must, therefore, be more exactly 
defined as the idealized form of the motion of inner language” (ibid.). Consciousness is 
the result of the internalisation of the language of real life. Interestingly, Thảo 
regarded the material nature of the language of real life as “social matter”. Here it is 
important to bear in mind that “language first of all objectively consists of material 
behaviour as the language of real life, a direct expression of material activity and of 
the material relations among workers” (ibid.). 
On the one side, the language of real life is material because it is composed of 
concrete production of signs. On the other side, it is a social product involved in 
collective cooperative activities. So Thảo wrote: “social matter, in its linguistic 
layer, is defined as the ensemble of signifying acts, gestures and utterances, in the 
structure of reciprocity.” The social exchange of signs is the condition of both the 
individual internalisation of language and the emergence of consciousness. To 
illustrate this point, it could be useful to invoke the following explanation provided 
by Thảo: 
 
Consciousness must, therefore, be more exactly defined as the idealized form of the 
motion of inner language. And since it exists only in that language, the only “form of 
the motion of matter” in question here is, strictly speaking, language itself. 
Language first of all objectively consists of material behaviour as the language of 
real life, a direct expression of material activity and of the material relations among 
workers, and raises itself to consciousness in inner language where the subject 
addresses himself starting with the image of the others in which he recognizes 
himself in the identity of his own lived experience. (id., p. 29) 
 
So Thảo regarded the language of real life as the infrastructure of consciousness. 
Interestingly, through inner language, “on the one hand” consciousness “stands out 
from the material movement which produces it” (id., p. 27). This material 
movement simultaneously concerns bodily dispositions of a certain organism and 
the ensemble of social relations. On the other hand, consciousness “cannot be 
separated from that material movement from which it stands out.” In fact, 
consciousness exists in so far as it employs linguistic signs – which arose from 
concrete material social relations – and constantly requires the support of outlined 
and sketched-out body movements. 
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Thảo did not dismiss that “the material component always remains present, in one 
way or another, in the ideal form” (id., p. 15). The inner language arose as sketched-
out and outlined gestural communicative movements that a given individual 
addresses to him/herself. In support of his position, Thảo observed that 
 
When I look at an object, I naturally don’t have to point it out to myself in order to 
obtain the “sense certainty” of its objective reality. But the material act of indication 
is revealed in the motion of the glance. The human eyes have an expression that we 
do not find in the animal. The animal orients his eyes toward the object, the human 
gaze indicates the object, to himself as well as to others.  
As for the gesture of the hand, one rarely finds it externalised. It nevertheless 
remains present in the form of an internal outline. (id., p. 15) 
[…]  
The movement of the glance and the gesture of the hand, outlined or completed, are 
associated with the exclamation addressed internally to oneself: we feel it outlined, 
so to speak, in the movements of the throat and tongue, and, moreover, we also 
happen to externalise it as “Ah!” or “That!”  
[…]  
And as we have already noted, the outlined movement or internal movement is just 
as real, as material, as the externalised movement. This can be demonstrated by 
monitoring the bioelectric currents at the muscular level. Moreover, when we think, 
we do indeed feel the action of the vocal organs and the hand. The subject is 
conscious of what he thinks, thanks to the internal perception, starting from the 
kinaesthesia, and visual and auditory associations of the outlined motion of his 
gestures and of his voice. When we say that language expresses thought or 
consciousness, this simply means that formulated language expresses generally 
explicitly and in an externalised way the meaning expressed in an outlined and 
abbreviated manner in internal language. (id., p. 16) 
 
Lastly, we must note that, once again, as in PDM, Thảo seems to suggest that 
consciousness arises as a result of the inhibition of a given behaviour. 
Consciousness is the internalisation at the level of the nervous system of an 
inhibited intentional behaviour. More specifically, consciousness takes the shape of 
the inner language, i.e., the inner outlined motion of gestures and voice. But there 
is a crucial distinction to be made when we compare Thảo’s theory of 
consciousness in PDM and in ILC. In the second case, as a matter of fact, 
consciousness arises through the language of real life as semiotic interaction with 
the surrounding physical and social environment. In ILC, Thảo did not neglect the 
role of relations of reciprocity and real interactions with objects. And the notion of 
the language of real life allowed him to explain the mediation from practical life 
and inner lived experience. In this way, inner language as the inner form of the 
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language of real life is not the result of the repression of the real behaviour but 
rather it is its inner reproduction at the level of muscular activity. In other words, 
there are no more functional differences between inner outlines and external 
behaviour. 
 
3.1. The Relation of Reciprocity 
 
As we have already noted in the previous paragraph, for Thảo the relation of 
reciprocity with other individuals is the condition for having the emergence of 
both, self-consciousness and consciousness of the object. In Thảo’s view, the aim of 
providing a satisfactory explanation of consciousness needs a previous description 
of dynamics taking place in social relations. The fellows exchanged indications at a 
distance to each other during purposive cooperative activities. Then “each is thus, 
alternatively, or even simultaneously, the giver and the receiver of the indication, 
both the one who guides and is guided” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 8). The same process is 
involved in ancient social relations as well as in current ones. To Thảo that 
situation is the condition for having the relation of reciprocity. The fellows see 
reciprocally other fellows as givers and receivers of the indication and, 
consequently, “each sees in the other a being similar to himself, making the same 
gesture.” In this vein, each fellow sees the other as another self. But before having 
something like the self, it is necessary that individuals assume the point of view of 
the community which they take part in. 
According to Thảo, given the existence of human-specific social relations, the 
image of the others leaves a trace in the brain of individuals: “the enduring image 
of the social environment.” From a cognitive perspective, that image could be 
regarded as other’s people gaze. Each person begins to judge him/herself from the 
point of view of the others. Another way of saying this is that the relation of 
reciprocity involved the ability to see the own behaviour from the point of view of 
the community.  
To support this hypothesis, Thảo invoked an example from Marx’s Capital (MEW 
XXIII: 67, footnote 18): “The man first sees himself in the other man as in a mirror. 
Peter only relates to himself as a man through his relation to another man, Paul, as 
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being of like kind.” Some remarks concerning this translation are needed. This is 
our English translation of Thảo’s own French translation of the Marx’s German text 
(cf. Thảo 1973: 20). Remarkably, the French translation of the Éditions sociales 
differed from German version as well as from Thảo’s translation. The German 
original version reads:  
 
Da er weder mit einem Spiegel auf die Welt kommt noch als Fichtescher Philosoph: 
Ich bin ich, bespiegelt sich der Mensch zuerst in einem andren Menschen. Erst durch die 
Beziehung auf den Menschen Paul als seinesgleichen bezieht sich der Mensch Peter 
auf sich selbst als Mensch. Damit gilt ihm aber auch der Paul mit Haut und Haaren, 
in seiner paulinischen Leiblichkeit, als Erscheinungsform des Genus Mensch. (MEW 
XXIII: 67, footnote 18; italics ours) 
 
The French translation invoked by Thảo, in fact, translated Marx’s German text 
in the following way:  
 
Comme il ne vient point au monde avec un miroir, ni en philosophe à la Fichte dont 
le Moi n’a besoin de rien pour s’affirmer, il se mire et se reconnait d’abord seulement dans 
un autre homme. Aussi cet autre, avec peau et poil, lui semble-t-il la forme 
phénoménale du genre homme. (Marx 1969: 67, footnote 2; italics ours) 
 
The English translators of Thảo ([1973] 1984) pointed out that “unfortunately 
this very sentence of Marx was omitted in the French edition” (Daniel J. Herman 
and Robert L. Armstrong in Thảo [1973] 1984: 202). This is not entirely true: the 
French translation omitted the passage concerning Paul and Pierre but translated 
the passage “[…] bespiegelt sich der Mensch zuerst in einem andren Menschen.” 
One can also appreciate the choice to translate “sich bespiegeln” with “se mirer”. 
Indeed, the root “mir-” could recall to mind the word “mir-oir”. And Marx’s 
German text played with the correspondence between “der Spiegel” and “sich 
bespiegeln”. Otherwise, it is debatable the addition of “se reconnait” because the 
verb se reconnaître did not appear in the German version. However, we could admit 
that it was somehow implicit. 
Thảo’s translation highlighted the metaphor of the mirror more than the 
German one. Specifically, Thảo (1973: 20) translated: 
 
L’homme […] se voit lui-même tout d’abord dans l’autre homme comme dans un miroir. Ce 
n’est que grâce à son rapport avec l’homme Paul comme avec un être semblable à 
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lui-même, que l’homme Pierre entre en rapport avec lui-même comme avec un 
homme [italics ours]. 
 
Thảo’s emphasis on the metaphor of the mirror is significant. He constantly 
employed the expression “comme dans un mirroir” (as in a mirror) to explain the 
relation of reciprocity all over his ILC. By this, it would be quite wrong to omit that 
“as in a mirror”. 
The English translation of Thảo ([1973] 1984: 8) does not respect Thảo’s version 
of Marx’s passage: “a man […] first sees and recognizes himself in another man. Peter 
only relates to himself as a man through his relation to another man, Paul, in 
whom recognizes his likeness [italics ours].” Evidently, the English translation of 
Thảo ([1973] 1984) is actually a translation of the French version of the Éditions 
sociales. This choice does not permit to highlight how Thảo sometimes preferred his 
own translations and sometimes he opted for French translations of the Éditions 
sociales. In other words, the English translation of Thảo ([1973] 1984) does not do 
justice to Thảo’s choice to highlight, in different moments of his reasoning, the 
reciprocity or the notion of mirror. For instance, he opted for the translation of the 
Éditions sociales in the following passage: 
 
“A man”, says Marx, “first sees and recognizes himself in antoher man” [“L’homme’ 
dit Marx, “se mire et se reconnaît d’abord seulement dans un autre homme”.]. (Thảo 
[1973: 27] 1984: 12) 
 
For this reason, we have preferred to translate Thảo’s own French translation 
rather than quoting the English translation of Thảo ([1973] 1984). In the same way, 
we cannot invoke the English version of Marx’s Capital we usually employ because 
it, too, radically differs from Thảo’s translation of the German text. In detail, the 
English version translated Marx’s passage in the following way:  
 
Since he [the man] comes into the world neither with a looking glass in his hand, nor 
as a Fichtian philosopher, to whom “I am I” is sufficient, man first sees and recognises 
himself in other men. Peter only establishes his own identity as a man by first 
comparing himself with Paul as being of like kind. And thereby Paul, just as he 
stands in his Pauline personality, becomes to Peter the type of the genus homo. 
(Marx 1887: 55, footnote 19; italics ours) 
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But coming back to the Thảo’s theory of the relation of reciprocity, we may note 
that he supplemented Marxʼs insight with a further detail. Not only did our 
ancestors recognize themselves in the others as in a mirror in so far as they saw 
each other when they reciprocally exchanged indicative gestures during goal-
oriented cooperative activities, they also heard each other. “The guidance 
movement does not consist in simply tracing a direction, it has essentially the 
function of a call” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 9). To him, guidance gestures were 
accompanied by vocalizations. Thus, “the workers call themselves to the work-
object by means of gesture and voice, and each one sees himself in the others as in 
a mirror and hears himself in the others as in an echo” (ibid.). 
The exchange of gestures and vocalizations entails the fact that relation of 
reciprocity precedes self-awareness. In this regard, Thảo made the following 
example: “when we sing in unison, our own voice seems to come as much from the 
others as from ourselves” (id., p. 10). Although the subject is active and 
intentionally addresses signs to the others, the subject perceives his/her own 
actions as made by the group as a whole. To Thảo collective cooperative activities 
are so pervasive that the subject is aware to be part of the group before being 
aware to be an individual. 
In this way, Thảo refused the idea of self-consciousness as a private relation of 
the self with the self. As we have seen in the previous chapter, he criticised 
Husserl’s theory, according to which the relationship with the other egos is 
nothing but the result of a solipsistic comparison of the own self with the others 
(this theory was described in Husserl’s Fifth Meditation)29. Instead, to Thảo, the 
experience of the others is the source of self-consciousness as awareness of the fact 
that I am similar to the other egos that I see and hear. The consciousness of the 
others precedes self-consciousness. And nobody can dismiss the primacy of 
practical life as a condition for having self-consciousness. 
Before concluding, it needs to be highlighted how Thảo was aware that the 
image of the others that individuals internalise cannot be reduced to an abstract 
                                                 
29 But it is necessary to remember that Husserl had insisted that the experience of the 
world is radically intersubjective (see Hua I: 123; IX: 431; XIV: 289, 390; XV: 5; XVII: 243; 
VI: 469). For this reason, he had also analysed the nature of transcendental 
intersubjectivity (see Hua I: 35, 182; VIII: 449; IX: 295, 474; XV: 110). 
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image of the others in general: “he recognizes himself in the image of the others in 
a form that is identified, modified, and oppositional or antagonistic according to 
whether it concerns his own group or different groups, friends or enemies” (id., p. 
27). In this vein, Thảo argued for sophisticated forms that relations of reciprocity 
assume over time. He also illustrated that relation of reciprocity extensively 
depends upon the role that each person plays within a given social group (family, 
labour, state, etc.). 
But, since we turn to phylogeny, the established collective point of view which 
is internalised by everybody is still unconscious at the beginning: “at the stage at 
which we have arrived, of course, perception consists only of sensor-motor images 
which are not conscious” (id., p. 8). The question facing Thảo at this juncture is 
how the transition from sensory-motor psychism to the original form human 
consciousness took place among our ancestors. 
 
3.2. Consciousness as Self-Consciousness 
 
The language of real life entails self-awareness. The gestures employed by the 
group during collective cooperative activities (the objective form) become gestures 
at a disposal of the subject that begins to address them to him/herself (the 
subjective form). Simply put, the internalisation of the language of real life is 
explained by Thảo as the transition of the objective form of indication to the 
subjective one. This transition is thus the appropriation of indicative gestures.  
Thảo ([1973] 1984: 7) called “objective form of indication” the signalling 
behaviour that each one addresses to the others during collective purposive 
activities. It is “the signalling behaviour that makes possible a concentration of 
collective efforts on the same object.” To Thảo, the indication was enriched by the 
subjective form over time. While the objective form of indication concerns the 
exchange of gestures during collective activities, the subjective form regards the 
private employ of indication: “once the structure of the gesture is established, the 
subjects applies it to himself. In other words, he points out the object to himself” 
(ibid.). Thảo described the main features of the subjective form of indication in the 
following way: 
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The indicative gesture to oneself naturally derives from the gesture we use in 
pointing things out to others. […] The indicative gesture to others, which we have 
defined in its original form as a guidance act at a distance, implies, in fact, at least 
two subjects, one guiding and the other guided, separated by a certain distance. In 
the case of the indicative gesture to oneself, we have only one subject, both guiding 
and guided, so how under these conditions can guidance be accomplished “at a 
distance”? Evidently, the movement is possible only if the subject considers the 
distance, so to speak, in relation to himself. Moreover, it is what we more or less feel 
within ourselves if we make this gesture or some other signifying gesture to 
ourselves. The phenomenon is quite evident in the case of the “internal dialogue” 
when I address myself in the second person: I obviously place myself in the position 
of another, who is precisely myself, and it is from that point of view that I address 
myself to myself as another. (id., p. 7-8) 
 
The subjective form of indicative gesture depends upon previous relations of 
reciprocity. As a result, self-consciousness seems to be the result of the 
internalisation of social relations. The subject reproduces on oneself the semiotic 
exchange with the others. Then each person places him/herself in the position of 
the others and keeps a certain distance from him/herself.  
We cannot deny that “this calling to himself which takes up the call of the 
others is immediately realized on the vocal level, for the exclamations which 
answer one another blend like a choir” (id, p. 10). In fact, “the form of reciprocity is 
even more marked in the exclamatory component than in the gestural one” (id., p. 
9). At the animal stage, indeed, everyone can observe the relevance of the 
“reciprocity of cries”. Slowly, “at the prehominid stage, the cry becomes an 
exclamation” (ibid.). Thus, the process of self-signalising is firstly realized on the 
vocal level and then is extended to the gestural one. 
Finally, we must note that Thảo suggested that the collective use of signs slowly 
took the shape of the subjective form of indication because of needs arising during 
collective activities. For instance, a fellow finds him/herself isolated from the rest 
of the group. The habit of collective activities leads the subject to perform gestures 
and vocalizations even if the others are far away. Given the role of the subject in 
situations of this kind, the subject “starting with the others with whom he identifies, 
points out the object to himself” (id., p. 11). In this way, the subject begins to distance 
him/herself from the content of own lived experience and sees him/herself from 
the point of view of the others. In other words, self-awareness appears as a 
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sporadic employ of the gestures that are addressed to the self. 
Assuming that the language of real life is primarily a social fact and it precedes 
self-awareness, at the beginning, consciousness is “simply collective” (id., p. 14). 
Simply put, “it does not in any way contain the form of the ‘I’ [moi].” Indeed, Thảo 
wrote: 
 
At the birth of the prehominid, the gesture of reciprocal indication in the collective 
work of adaptation implies a complete assimilation among subjects who indicate to 
one another the object of their common efforts: consciousness thus appears as 
“mere herd-consciousness” or “sheep-like consciousness”. Lived experience is still 
“anonymous”. (14-15) 
 
Not only does the relation of reciprocity seem to be the condition for having 
self-consciousness, the perception of the object as the target of cooperative 
collective goal-oriented activities needs also to be regarded as the support for the 
development of self-consciousness. To Thảo, as a matter of fact, “consciousness 
appears identically as consciousness of the object and consciousness of self” (ibid.). 
To anticipate what we will illustrate in the following paragraph, in so far as our 
pre-human ancestors began to address indicative gestures to oneself rather than 
merely employing them to coordinate collective efforts, they showed the ability to 
transcend immediate needs and to distance themselves from their own behaviour. 
In other words, the subjective form of indication led our pre-human ancestors to 
both the abstract reasoning and the self-awareness. 
 
3.3. Consciousness as Consciousness of the Object 
 
To Thảo ([1973] 1984: 8), the “objective form of indication” was “the signalling 
behaviour that makes possible a concentration of collective efforts on the same 
object.” Then, the subjective form of indicative gestures must be regarded as “the 
first intentional relation of subject to object, as the original consciousness of the 
object” (id., p. 7). Thus, the internalisation of indicative gestures conditions the 
emergence of consciousness of the object as the ideal content of lived experience.  
One must also remember that “the indicative gesture, as distance guidance, is a 
call for work on the indicated object” (id., p. 9). And, since it is a call, “it is naturally 
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completed by the normal form of a call, the vocal form.” Remarkably, Thảo insisted 
that “the form of reciprocity is even more marked in the exclamatory component 
than in the gestural one” (id., p. 9). At the animal stage, as we have already said in 
the previous paragraph, anyone can observe the relevance of the “reciprocity of 
cries”. Slowly, “at the prehominid stage, the cry becomes an exclamation.” As is 
clear from this passage, exclamation could be regarded as “the original form of 
verbal language.” The first word ever pronounced has been something like: this 
here! But we must remark that vocalizations could become exclamations among our 
ancestors because they were accompanied by gestures: “when the cry accompanies 
the indicative gesture, it takes, thereby, the meaning of the object” (ibid.). 
In so far as the work-object is the target of both, collective cooperative activities 
and gestural-verbal signs, it is perceived in a peculiar way. We have already 
illustrated that the subject consciously regards the object as an independent entity. 
The animals, otherwise, perceive the object only as part of their own body. To 
Thảo, this peculiar way of perceiving things is called “perceptive image” (id., p. 11). 
Not only did human ancestors perceive things as the other mammals, they were 
also conscious of the object as the independent thing: the consciousness of the 
object is “the image of the object posited as external” to consciousness. As such, we 
want to ask: how can consciousness of the object as external and independent 
thing arise from the perceptive image? 
The tendential meaning of gestural indications already contains the description 
of the thing as the mind-independent entity. But this tendential meaning is still 
unconscious before the individuals internalise such a semiotic practice. As we have 
seen, thanks to the subjective form of indication individuals apply the indicative-
vocal gesture to themselves; the subject “points out the object to himself” and “calls 
himself” (id., p. 10). As has been seen, too, “the indicative gesture to oneself 
naturally derives from the gesture we use in pointing things out to others.” Only 
when individuals address the gestural-verbal sign to themselves, they become 
conscious of the object as an independent thing: 
 
in the indicative gesture to oneself, such as it has just arisen, the subject gives 
himself an image of the object in its not only most elementary but also most 
fundamental determination, that is, its objective externality, a determination where 
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the object appears as the “this here!” (ibid.) 
 
Thus, the object is not perceived as work-object of urgent collective activities 
anymore. It is rather observed as a peculiar and singular thing, it becomes the 
singular object now perceived. 
Interestingly, Thảo stated that consciousness as consciousness of the object is 
the image of the object. Then he insisted that “of course, when we speak of 
consciousness as an image of the object, we mean it in the active sense, as a 
productive act of image” (ibid.). Conscious contents are not the copy of external 
world merely. As a matter of fact, they require the activity of gesturing as its 
condition of possibility. The language of real life is the activity that produces the 
image of the object as the external object at the preconscious level of tendential 
meaning. After that, consciousness emerges as internalisation of the tendential 
meaning produced by the language of real life. Consciousness, in other words, 
reproduces in the interiority of the lived experience the productive act of 
signifying already performed by the language of real life. Against a mechanistic 
interpretation of Lenin’s theory of reflection (see below Chapter 6 for more 
details), Thảo seems to argue for a dialectical version of interactions between the 
knowing subject and the real material world. 
It shall be our concern to substantiate this thesis in the next chapter. For the 
time being, we shall leave that point open. Now we should attempt only to map out 
the main lines of the debate on consciousness in the USSR in the mid-20th century 
as well as in the Western Countries. Of course, the scope of the present chapter 
compels us to limit ourselves to a cursory examination of this issue. It is a problem 
of great complexity, and even superficial treatment of it would have necessitated 
enlarging the present chapter considerably. Nonetheless, precisely in order to 
understand Thảoʼs conception of consciousness, it is essential to add more context 
and mapping out the main trends of debates on the so-called mind-body problem. 
 
4.1. The Soviet Debate on Consciousness 
 
 
We have already mentioned Thảoʼs record of the “great and general […] debate 
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on the nature of consciousness” taking place in the USSR in the 1950s. The present 
paragraph exactly deals with the attempt to describe Thảoʼs theory against the 
background of that debate. Unfortunately, we cannot translate from Russian and, 
consequently, we have to seek the support of Graham (1987) in order better to 
complete our analysis.  
As a preliminary, we should simply observe that Russian psychologists had to 
conciliate the thesis that consciousness is nothing other than a particular motion 
of matter with the thesis that consciousness has an ideal character. These two 
assumptions largely depended upon Soviet dialectical materialist approach to the 
philosophy of science. Here it is important to bear in mind that an enormous 
attention to dialectical materialism has been a constant theme in Soviet 
psychology. As mentioned several times previously, dialectical materialism is a 
challenge for the study of consciousness. Assuming that there is nothing in the 
objective world other than matter in motion, it follows the risk of reductionism 
and physicalism. Looked at from the angle of our concern, there is the risk to 
reduce the description of the higher mental activity to physiological processes.  
It is instructive to note that dialectical materialism, however, was carefully 
distinguished from the earlier materialism of the 18th century. To point the fact, 
the principle of the transition of quantity into quality supports the view that the 
laws of development of matter exist on different levels (see above Ch. 1). In short, 
every definite stage of the motion of matter involves a new organisation of matter 
which, in turn, shows new qualities and properties that distinguish it from 
previous ones. 
It is remarkable that the so-called Soviet struggle for consciousness had already 
begun in the 1920s (cf. Graham 1987: 166). In Russia, the early 20th century was 
marked by rapid development of Pavlovʼs method. It would be useful to specify that 
before Pavlov, in his Reflexes of the Brain (1863) Sechenov had already argued that all 
acts of conscious or unconscious life are reflexes. In this connection, we should like 
to make a special point of the fact that Pavlovʼs method was based “on the 
assumption that psychic phenomena can be understood on the basis of evidence 
gathered externally to the subject” (cf. Graham 19897: 158). The focus on behaviour 
and third-person point of view implied a profound disagreement with the 
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introspective approach of many investigations of mental activity at the turn of the 
century, like that of Gustav Fechner (1801–1887), Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920), and 
Edward Titchener (1867–1927). At the end of the 1920s, the defenders of psychology 
as a discipline which had to be independent of a purely physiological description of 
mental activity had still defended introspective approach. But, in the 1920s, 
Wladimir M. Bexterewʼs (1857–1927) “reflexiology” gain in popularity (see below 
Ch. 8 for more elaborate treatment). Bexterewʼs research in neurobiology focused 
on brain anatomy and conditional reflexes. More remarkably, his studies explored 
the role of conditional reflexes in higher nervous activity. Generally, according to 
Graham (1987: 175), we could say that the negative attitude of the reflexiology 
toward psychology could be largely explained by the objective need to criticise the 
vestiges of subjectivism in psychology. 
Nevertheless, in the early 1930s, Bexterew’s approach gradually lost its 
popularity and the place of psychology in the Soviet Union became “more secure” 
(cf. Graham 1987: 167). The 1930s is the decade of the first works of Lev 
Semyonovich Vygotsky (1896–1934), Alexander Luria (1902–1977), Nikolaevich 
Leontʼev (1903-1979), and Sergei Leonidovich Rubištein (1889–1960). They were a 
group of psychologists who suggested a kind of nurturism. According to them 
“human thought is primarily influenced by the social environment” (cf. id., p. 60) 
rather than being merely influenced by physiology. For our present purposes, we 
do not need to consider the theories of those scientists in great detail. 
Nevertheless, before we address the debate on consciousness taking place in the 
USSR at the end of the 1950s, we must begin by sketching a particular landscape of 
relationships that have existed between the psychologists of the 1930s and those of 
the 1950s and 1960s. 
Vygotskyʼs writings were in disfavour from the 1930s to the end of the 1950s. 
During Stalinian era, Vygotskyʼs theory of thinking and speech was contradicted by 
Stalin himself who wrote in his Marxism and Linguistics that bare thoughts free of 
language material do not exist. To Vygotsky, instead, the child who has not yet 
internalised speech as social fact shows a kind of pre-linguistic thought which is 
very similar to the embryonic thought of some species of animals (cf. Graham 1987: 
171). What we should emphasise here, however, is the fact that Vygotsky 
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highlighted the socio-historical influences conveyed by language which surpassed 
the physiological mechanisms of the brain. Vygotsky gained international 
popularity in 1962 when his Thought and Language (or Thinking and Speech, 1934) had 
been published in English, although that edition was heavily abbreviated. In the 
USSR, the rebirth in Vygotskyʼs writings occurred only after Stalinʼs death (cf. 
Graham 1987: 173). Like Vygotsky before them, Luria and Leontʼev set out that the 
origins of higher forms of conscious behaviour were to be found in the individualʼs 
social relations with the external world (cf. id., p. 186). They tried to incorporate 
Marxism into psychological theory in an anti-reductionist way. Consciousness is a 
higher form of cognition which cannot be reduced to brain mechanism. Rather it 
must be reckoned to be the product of the relationship between the organism and 
the social environment. 
In a similar way, in his Foundations of General Psychology (1940; cf. Graham 1987: 
176), Rubinštein refused to reduce the psychic dimension to the physical one. 
Remarkably he published three authoritative books on the nature of consciousness 
at the end of the 1950s. But, in the 1950s, there was also a strong tendency toward 
the liquidation of psychology entirely, replacing it with Pavlovian psychology (cf. 
id., p. 175). In this regard, Rubinštein set out that there is a category of conscious 
phenomena that are ideal and are different from material ones. Nevertheless, those 
ideal phenomena must be regarded as ideal only in so far as we assume an 
epistemological standpoint. As a matter of fact, from the ontological standpoint, 
there is no difference between the psychic dimension and the physical one because 
both are two forms of the same reality. If we want to know what the world is made 
of, we have to answer: matter. But if we wonder how we can learn about the 
consciousness, we cannot answer that the mechanisms of the brain allow us 
offering a comprehensive account of human conscious activity. 
In May 1962, the All-Union Conference on Philosophic Questions of Higher 
Nervous Activity and Psychology took place in Moscow (Graham 1987: 191). There 
were the supporters of Rubinšteinʼs approach who set out that reflexes could be 
understood whether as physiological mechanisms or as psychic phenomena. Some 
scholars, such as Fedor Fomich Kalʼsin (1904–1975), argued for the reduction of 
psychic to physical. For others, thought was seen as an extremely complex 
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movement of matter, but, nonetheless, a movement of matter (N.V. Medvedev, 
B.M. Kedrov, and A.N. Riakin). Other authors more radically thought that psychic 
activity itself is material and thus consciousness must be seen as the effect of 
nervous processes (V.M. Arkhipov, I.G. Eroškin). Other scholars denied that reflex 
activity could be the same as psychic activity. On the one side, there were 
scientists, such as Nikolai Bernštein (1896–1966) and others, who argued that 
physiologists had to transcend the too reductive notion of reflex activity and 
looking for other physiological mechanisms which would explain phenomena 
which ware usually the subject matter of psychology. On the other side, there were 
scholars such as V.V. Orlov who affirmed that psychic activity as the ideal activity 
of the brain is the subject matter of psychology. 
One other extremely pertinent consideration needs to be added here. The 
already mentioned Soviet philosopher and psychologist Alexander Spirkin (1918–
2004) taught philosophy and psychological disciplines in the universities of 
Moscow from 1946 and earned his doctorate in philosophy in 1959. In the same 
years of Thảo, he tackled the issue of the essence and origin of consciousness. As a 
matter of fact, his dissertation was devoted to the origin of consciousness. He 
seems to have had a certain influence on Thảo’s conception of the origins of 
language. And for this reason, it could be useful to spend few words about his 
approach. For the time being, however, we do not dwell on the extent Thảo and 
Spirkin adopted the same set of assumptions – which the main assumptions of 
dialectical materialism were – although they suggested two different solutions of 
the question of the origins of human language (see below Chapters 7 and 8). 
Unfortunately, we cannot translate from Russian and, consequently, we cannot 
take the following Spirkin’s writings into account even if they could be very 
interesting for present purposes: язык (Language) collected in Мышление и 
язык (Thought and Language, 1958), Происхождение сознания (The origin of 
consciousness, 1960), Сознание и самосознание (Consciousness and Self-
consciousness, 1972). For this reason, some Spirkin’s translated writings (1959, 
1966, 1984, 1990) are regarded here as the sources for explaining his philosophical 
account even if some of them have been published during the 1980s. For all we 
know, Spirkin (1966) seems to be the Spanish translation of his язык (Language, 
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1958) which Thảo ([1973] 1984) quoted several times. 
For Spirkin (1984: 99) consciousness is “a function of the brain” and “the highest 
function of the brain characteristic only of men” (id., p. 100). As this discussion implies, 
Spirkin argued for “the dependence of the level of consciousness on the degree of 
organization of the brain” (id., p. 101). Nonetheless, “it is not these processes 
[occurring in the brain] that constitute the essence of consciousness.” Indeed, 
“there is no, and neither can there be, consciousness outside society, outside 
knowledge accumulated in the course of mankind’s history and outside the 
specifically human modes of activity worked out by mankind” (id., p. 100). 
According to Spirkin, consciousness is “a generalized and purposeful reflection of 
reality, anticipatory mental construction of actions and foreseeing their results, and rational 
regulation and self-control” (id., p. 100). In this sense, consciousness could be 
reckoned to be “a reflection of the external world.” And “the content of the psyche 
itself […] is a reflection of reality in the form of subjective images” (id., p. 101) in so 
far as “the reflection of a thing in the brain is thus an active reflection connected 
with the processing of transformation of external impressions” (id., p. 103). Spirkin 
insisted that “consciousness is a subjective image of the objective world,” “a 
synthetic description of an object obtained in the course of object-transforming 
activity.” Language takes part “in mental activity as its sensuous basis” (id., p. 117). 
However, to Spirkin, “thought is largely determined by its links with reality, while 
language can only partially modify the form and style of thought” (id., p. 118). One 
the one side, “consciousness and language form a unity [… but they are not the 
same]” (id., p. 117). On the other, consciousness “reflects reality, while language 
designates it and expresses it in thought.” In short, to Spirkin, consciousness is a 
functional property that emerges from both the activity of the brain and 
interactions with surrounding physical and social environment. 
To summarise the essence of the Soviet debate on consciousness, we can say 
that, after the success of Pavlovian methods, some philosophers and psychologists 
had to suggest a way to put in place an objective study of consciousness from the 
point of view of materialism, along with the criticism of subjectivism and 
introspection. Some of them had also to justify consciousness as an autonomous 
subject matter against Pavlovian reflexiology and other forms of physiological 
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approach to mental activities. The struggle between physiologists and 
psychologists took its most radical form in the fight between a sociologically 
oriented psychology (nurturism) and the individualistic methods of 
neurophysiology. Against the background of a debate concerning the potentialities 
of physiology, some dogmatic concerns regarding the main theses of Marxism-
Leninism and the right way to understand what materialism is were at work. For 
this reason, we have to point the fact that some scholars had to substantiate the 
dialectical law of transition from quantity to quality. From what has been 
established, it follows that consciousness must be regarded as qualitatively 
different from its physical support, although consciousness emerges only from the 
body. In the final analysis, the main efforts of some Soviet philosophers and 
psychologists were to support an anti-reductionist theory of consciousness which 
did not dismiss a certain mental activity of the body. They had to describe the new 
properties which emerge at the new level of complexity of higher mental activity. 
Meanwhile, they cannot admit that mental activity takes place without 
corresponding brain activity. What emerges from all that has been said is a wide 
concept of “matter in motion”. Some scholars regarded the social milieu 
surrounding the individual being as a particular form of motion of matter. It would 
be the key to explaining the emergence of consciousness from a materialistic 
standpoint. Correspondingly, a lot of importance is given to language as social 
meditation between individuals. This is a quick picture of the Soviet debate on 
consciousness. Against the background of a such a context, Thảo suggested his own 
theory of consciousness. Accordingly, the brain activity is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for explaining the nature of human consciousness. Instead, 
consciousness is the result of the internalization of the language of real life which 
mediates between higher mental activities and practical, social and corporeal 
activities. 
 
4.2. The Western Debate on Consciousness 
 
After having tackled the Soviet struggle for consciousness, let us now move to 
the contemporary Western debate on mind/body relationship. Little wonder that 
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both Soviet scholars and American ones shared similar concerns. The fact is not 
surprising because those similarities are perfectly understandable once we recall 
the basic features characterising the puzzles surrounding consciousness as well as 
the mind-body problem. For instance, we can go so far as to say that following 
questions resume one of the main philosophical concerns at the mid-20th century: 
Is it possible a scientific theory of consciousness? Is it possible an objective 
psychology of consciousness? What kind of characteristics does a theory of 
consciousness have to exhibit if our aim is to suggest a naturalist approach to the 
study of consciousness? Should we reduce consciousness to physiological or 
neurological mechanisms? What kind of organization of matter really gives rise to 
the plurality of phenomena that we call consciousness? Needless to say, along with 
more urgent topics, we should note that, first of all, most of those recent concerns 
did not essentially differ from age-old questions which have been asked by 
philosophers since the Ancient Greece (see Heinämaa, Lähteenmäki, Remes 2007). 
Velmans (2009: 3-4) lists some of what he considered the hardest philosophical 
questions underlying the issue of consciousness: Is the universe composed of one 
thing (monism)? Or are there two (dualism)? Does the world have an observer-
independent existence (realism)? Or does its existence depend in some way on the 
operations of our own minds (idealism)? Is knowledge of the world “public” and 
“objective”, and knowledge of our own experience “private” and “subjective”? If 
so, how is it possible to establish the study of consciousness as a science? What is 
consciousness and where is it? How can we understand the causal relationships 
between consciousness and matter and, in particular, causal relationships between 
consciousness and the brain? What is the function of consciousness? How, for 
example, does it relate to information processing? What forms of matter are 
associated with consciousness – in particular, what are the neural substrates of 
consciousness in the human brain? What are the appropriate ways to examine 
consciousness, to discover its nature? Which features can we examine with a first-
person approach, which features require a third-person approach, and how does 
the former and the latter relate each other? 
We shall now devote a few words to a brief analysis of the main philosophical 
trends in the study of consciousness in the English-speaking world. Of course, there 
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is no date of birth of the debate, but we can consider The analysis of mind (1921) by 
Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) as a key work to understanding some assumptions of 
the debate on consciousness in the English-speaking world in the mid-20th 
century. To Russell philosophy of mind should analyse and clarify psychological 
concepts we usually employ. By the way, he suggested a kind of neutral monism 
which was too close to empiriocriticism. For Russell bodies and minds are not 
different substances but rather neutral stuff, i.e. different collections of sensations 
which can refer to both, inner experience or brain mechanisms. This approach 
justified a kind of dualistic methods in the study of consciousness. In his 
posthumous Philosophical Investigations (1953), the Austrian philosopher Ludwig 
Wittgenstein (1889–1951) shared Russellʼs concerns to clarify our concepts and 
expressed some dissatisfaction at traditional ways of understanding consciousness. 
In the same period, the British philosopher Gilbert Ryle (1900–1976) sharply 
criticised Cartesian dualism and the idea of ontological separateness of the soul, 
the so-called ghost in the machine. In his The Concept of Mind (1949), he set out that 
psychological terminology refers neither to inner states or events nor to cerebral 
mechanisms. Rather it describes observable behavioural dispositions. More 
radically, the German philosopher Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970), whose theory was 
seriously informed by Wittgensteinʼs early writings, argued that the language of 
psychology had to be reduced to that of physics in so far it should describe 
observable behaviour and cerebral states. 
Some philosophers were somewhat sceptical about the ontological 
independence of soul/mind from the behaviour or the body. In the first half of the 
century, similarly, some psychologists dismissed investigations into inner states of 
consciousness and rejected introspection as a scientific psychological method. 
American psychologists such as John B. Watson and Burrhus Frederic Skinner, who 
had been largely influenced by the Pavlovian notion of reflex, merely described 
observable behaviour. In the 1950s, however, this trend, the so-called behaviourism 
was largely criticised. The fact that behaviourism did not focus on the analysis of 
mental activities basically contributed to eclipse behaviourism in favour of 
cognitivism during the 1950s. 
As we have already seen, the Soviet debate on consciousness, which took place 
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in the same period, arose as a consequence of certain dissatisfaction about 
Pavlovian behaviourist trends in Soviet psychology. We can so highlight that a 
point of convergence between American and Soviet scholars related to the same 
dissatisfaction about physicalism and reductionism. But we should also note the 
fact that solutions suggested by Soviet scholars largely differed from those set out 
by American ones. Just to mention one example, Vygotskian psychological 
approach played a significant role in allowing the progress of sociological study of 
consciousness in the USSR. An approach like that was totally absent in the United 
States.  
To move forward, we should now mention some works that determined the 
emergence of the cognitive trends in American study of consciousness: George A. 
Millerʼs (1920–2012) 1956 Psychological Review article The Magical Number Seven, Plus 
or Minus Two, Noam Chomskyʼs (born in 1928) 1959 Review of Verbal Behavior, by B.F. 
Skinner and his critique of behaviourism, and Ulric Neisserʼs (1928–2012) 1967 book 
Cognitive Psychology. According to cognitivism, the concepts of information, 
computation, and feedback allow us to describe thinking as an information 
processing. The analogy brain-hardware / mind-software was introduced to 
describe the functional organization of mental activities. Like computers, as a 
consequence, the mind should be regarded as largely independent of its particular 
physical support. Cognitivism also reduced the role played by experience, which 
was one of the key concepts of behaviourism. The supporter of that new trend 
suggested that a finite number of combinatorial programs in the mind could 
generate infinite kinds of behaviour. 
At this point, it could be useful to tackle some assumptions of Putnamʼs 
conception of mental activity even if we shall limit ourselves to a general analysis 
of his philosophical approach to the study of mind. In his Minds and Machines (1960), 
Hilary Putnam (1926–2016) introduced the label functionalism to describe his 
approach to human cognition. Mental states could be described in functional terms 
on the model of the functional states of a computer. In his 1963 Brains and Behavior, 
Putnam set out that mental states do not refer to a set of behavioural disposition as 
Carnap, Ryle, and Russell had already argued. For Putnam mental states are inner 
states of the organism which show the following unilinear sequence: a given 
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sensitive input determines a given motor output. And the term “function” serves 
to define an inner state rather than its material support. At this stage, Putnam still 
defended a materialist standpoint even if he acknowledged the need to apply a 
different method to the study of mental activity. In Robots: Machines or Artificially 
Created Life? (1964), Putnam radicalized his anti-materialism and added that mental 
states are something essentially different from the brain states in which they are 
implemented. The same mental state can be implemented by different brain states 
(this is the so-called Argument for the Multiple-Realizability Thesis). In his 
Philosophy and Our Mental Life (1973) he actually set out that there is no explanation 
for our behaviour grounded on physical laws. In short, Putnam suggested that the 
mind is not a substance but rather an activity whose definition is based on the 
functions it performs. After all, Putnamʼs approach seems to arise from the same 
concerns we have seen at work among those Soviet psychologists who tried to 
justify the psychic activity as a subject matter independent of physiological 
descriptions of brain mechanisms. 
Nonetheless, at the same moment, materialism and physicalism were largely 
appreciated by philosophers. In 1956, The British philosopher Ullin Place (1924–
2000) set out the well-known mind-brain identity theory: consciousness is a process 
of the brain. Mind and brain seem to be two different things to our experience. 
However, they are the same. Mental activities could be reduced to lower-level 
physical events. Placeʼs gain certain popularity in the US when the Australian 
philosopher Jack J.C. Smart (1920–2012) gave some speeches devoted to it. A few 
years later, the Australian philosopher David M. Armstrong (1926–2014) defended 
the central-state theory in his A Materialist Theory of Mind (1968). According to him, 
Ryleʼs behavioural dispositions have to be understood to be physical states. The 
central nervous system could show the processes which explain the role we usually 
attribute to mental states. In the 1960s, the American philosopher David Lewis 
(1941–2001) set out his causal theory of mind: each state of mind is definable through 
the relationship of cause and effect with external stimuli, behavioural responses, 
and other mental states. Assuming that mental states interact with other causal 
physical chains, they must be seen as states of the central nervous system. 
A different approach was that of the Austrian philosopher Herbert Feigl (1902–
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1988) who suggested that mind and brain mean different things, though they refer 
to the same physical phenomenon. According to On Mental Entities (1953) of the 
American philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine (1908– 2000), psychologists have 
to study the brain without assuming the existence of mental entities. He refused 
every ontological dualism. These philosophers may be grouped together under the 
labels of eliminativism. Nonetheless, in the same period, some works had been 
published to criticise materialism, mind-brain identity theory, and the possibility 
of physicalist descriptions of the inner psychological world. In this connection we 
should mention Saul Kripkeʼs (born in 1940) Identity and Necessity (1971) and 
Thomas Nagelʼs (born in 1937) What is it like to be a bat? (1974). 
We are now able to determine the meaning of the debate on consciousness in 
the English-speaking world over the course of the period in question. In the 1950s, 
behaviourism did not seem to offer adequate theoretical support for an 
understanding of subjective conscious experience. Many believed that psychology 
and the study of consciousness cannot be reduced to physiology, neurophysiology, 
or the study of observable behaviour. To point the fact, it is by no means clear how 
to solve what Chalmers (1996) called the hard problem of consciousness, namely how 
to explain a state of consciousness in terms of its neurological basis. The objective 
account of natural sciences seems not be able to explain how subjectivity arises. 
Thus, many philosophers tried to justify the study of phenomenal consciousness, 
that is, of the subjective first-person experience, in other ways. This need arose 
from the Cartesian assumption of privileged access to our states of consciousness. 
This assumption can, however, lead to what U. Place regarded as the 
phenomenological fallacy: one cannot believe that the phenomenal distinction 
between mental states and brain processes proves the existence of some 
immaterial reality. Conversely, some scholars highlighted an explanatory gap: it is 
difficult to find a satisfactory explanation of how consciousness is linked to the 
physical world (Levine 1983). We cannot explain how consciousness may produce 
causal effects on both the body and behaviour. 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
 
In the previous paragraphs, we have explored to what extent the philosophical 
debate on consciousness between the 1950s and 1960s was more or less marked by 
the same problems in the USSR as well in the US. Look at from the angle of our 
concerns, we shall take note of the fact that, in the 1950s, dissatisfaction was 
growing with regard to Pavlovian reflexiology and classical behaviourism. It 
became even more clear that conscious subjective experience cannot be explained 
by mere physiological approaches. One other extremely pertinent consideration 
needs to be added here. Psychology aims to be independent of physiology by 
defending the autonomy of its subject matter, i.e., consciousness. Meanwhile, both 
scientific findings and ideological constraints obliged some scholars not to 
contradict certain materialistic assumptions. Symptomatically, considerable efforts 
have been made in that respect. Compromises between materialism and non-
reductionist approach to consciousness took several different shapes. In any case, 
as we have also made clear, we can go so far as to say that, for our purposes, the 
question can be summarised by the following conundrum. We should either 
dismiss reductionism and thus lose the causal role of mind (epiphenomenalism) or 
we should defend the causal efficacy of mind by way of reductionism and thus 
weaken the ontological autonomy of consciousness. We have so far only pointed 
out the general outlines of the debate on consciousness at the mid-1950s. But the 
general framework we have mapped out allows us better to understand Thảoʼs 
proposal. 
Thảo tried to justify the objective study of consciousness without reducing 
consciousness to physical states. In this vein, he felt the same need of other 
contemporary psychologists and philosophers. He refused the eliminativism as 
well as the materialist reductionism. To him, consciousness exists and can be 
described in terms of language behaviour. He did not exclude that neurological and 
physiological factors are the preconditions for having consciousness. Note for 
instance the role of sketched-out movements. In this vein, Consciousness is 
radically embodied. For Thảo consciousness cannot be separated from corporeal 
movements which support language behaviour. But body movements can only 
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partially explain the functioning of consciousness. By contrast, the internalisation 
of a particular kind of behaviour, the linguistic relation of reciprocity, seems to be 
the better way to describe the emergence of the most elementary form of 
consciousness. 
Before tackling the last point, we must note that Thảo wanted to remain faithful 
to the Brentanian and Husserlian anti-reductionist conception of consciousness 
and subjectivity. But, according to Thảo, phenomenology does not allow us to have 
privileged and pre-empirical access to our internal states. According to Thảo, the 
phenomenologist interprets the data of inner sense in the light of a particular 
image of humans, which, in turn, depends on a particular historical-cultural 
tradition, that of Descartes. Thảo, therefore, did not refute the existence of that set 
of phenomena that are grouped and described by phenomenology. He denies the 
scientific appropriateness of phenomenological way of grouping them and 
describing them. Thảoʼs aim was to explain the material origin of intentionality 
and self-consciousness. So Thảoʼs materialism did not deny that consciousness 
exists. But that does not mean that for Thảo consciousness is a non-material entity. 
Thảo restricted the term “consciousness” to situations where phenomenal content 
is present (where one is conscious of something). At the same time, although 
consciousness is a higher-order property of brains, the search for neural conditions 
does not provide a comprehensive approach to explain consciousness. To Thảo, as 
a matter of fact, the practical interactions with surrounding environment allows us 
to assume the behaviour rather than the body-machine as the starting point for 
explaining the emergence of consciousness. Saying that consciousness is a state of 
the brain is not enough. For Thảo we cannot dismiss the fact that human brain is 
the result of natural evolution and social history. 
Thảoʼs conception of consciousness did not aim to describe how consciousness 
can determine the behaviour. Rather, its goal is to show how language behaviour 
determines the emergence of consciousness. In this way, consciousness seems to be 
a mere epiphenomenon of language behaviour. To point the fact, he did not 
describe how consciousness interacts with behaviour. Thảo seems to support a 
kind of epiphenomenalism, that is, mental events are caused by physical events in 
the body but have no effects upon any physical events. In this vein, Thảoʼs efforts 
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to isolate mental properties and to highlight the epistemological irreducibility of 
mental states to bodily states led him to suggest a theory that shared some 
assumptions with dualism. Specifically, it seems that Thảo argued for property 
dualism: consciousness is a non-physical property of physical phenomena. 
Remarkably, anti-materialists like Nagel and Kripke argued for assumptions of this 
kind. In short, we can admit that Thảoʼs treatment of consciousness is limited to 
the phenomenological description of the emergence of consciousness as well as of 
the subjective experience related to language behaviour, rather than being based 
upon the attempt to show how consciousness can determine the behaviour. 
To summarise Thảoʼs conception of consciousness, we can mention the 
following remarks: 
 
In order to expose the situation as a whole, we can say that in the experience 
actually spontaneously lived by consciousness; we are dealing with three plans. In 
the foreground, there is the real object, the external world itself, given in its sensible 
image as existing outside of consciousness and independently of it, which means 
that it existed before it and would exist just as well without it. In the second plane, 
there is the experience with its two moments: the lived act of the subject as an ideal 
signifying act, and its intended meaning, namely the sensitive image projected onto 
the object as a signified image so that the object is given in this image. Finally, quite 
at the rear, in the third plane, the inner image of the social environment appears 
more or less confusedly and in a blurred form, in which the subject sees himself and 
constantly recognizes himself, in which precisely consists the form ideally monadic 
of his experience, as lived in oneself. (Thảo 1975: 29) 
 
Thảo claimed that intentionality is a property of language before being a 
property of conscious contents. In a similar way, reflective consciousness is 
nothing other than the effect of inner language, as we will better show in the next 
chapter. In any case, consciousness must be analysed in linguistic behavioural 
terms. This can cause problems, of course. For example, it is unclear whether Thảo 
distinguished perceptions and perceptive judgments. It seems that the way we 
intentionally refer to the outside world as well as to our internal states depends on 
the description that language offers us in the form of a perceptive judgment about 
the existence of the intended object. Thảo seems to identify these perceptive 
judgments with perceptions. Our perceptions depend on the same linguistic 
activity that allows the emergence of perceptive judgments. But one could argue 
that perceptions depend upon natural preconditions and biological evolution, 
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while perceptual judgments are primarily the result of the way language produces 
beliefs about our experience. 
Assuming that consciousness is the effect of language, language makes some of 
the activities of the body accessible to consciousness. Thảo does not tell us 
anything about what is outside of the consciousness and if there are any 
unconscious mental states. Moreover, he added that conscious experience of 
intended real or ideal objects is always accompanied by awareness (or self-
consciousness). We can say that awareness is the sum of phenomenal contents plus 
reflection about the subjectʼs own perceptual experience. From this point of view, 
consciousness seems to have a merely epistemic role. Consciousness is a form of 
reflection that the mind exerts upon itself, is a function of self-monitoring. On that 
basis, according to Thảo, consciousness can be identified by the fact of having 
mental contents along with awareness. In other words, the two characteristics of 
consciousness are the intentionality of mental contents and reflexivity. 
Consciousness is, first, an effect of the language of real life. Social practical life, 
interactions with the surrounding environment, biological predispositions, and 
language behaviour are main elements that determine the emergence of 
consciousness. Consciousness is nothing but the effect of language behaviour being 
addressed to the one’s own self. For the same reason, there is no inner private 
experience in a strict sense. Because of social nature of language, consciousness, 
too, is a social product and as such every inner conscious experience is mostly 
social. For this reason, Thảoʼs theory refused any kind of individualism in studying 
consciousness and inner experience. 
Thảo was a supporter of the traditional Marxist nurturist view which 
emphasized the role of social and environmental influences over consciousness. It 
is clear, from the very start, that Thảoʼs conception of consciousness can be 
successfully compared with the Vygotskian approach to the same topic. As we have 
already mentioned earlier, as a matter of fact, Vygotsky, Luria, and Leontʼev 
stressed on the socio-historical origins of consciousness. We are not able to judge 
whether or not Thảo was familiar with the Vygotskian approach to consciousness 
and language. Surely, Thảo squarely focused on the socio-historical influences 
conveyed by language which surpass the physiological mechanisms of the brain. 
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The sociogenesis of consciousness seems to be the solution to the puzzle of 
consciousness. In detail, the dialogical nature of language behaviour allows us 
understanding consciousness as a particular form of dialogue. Consciousness is 
nothing other than a form of language behaviour. In connection with this, 
consciousness is not deprived of its bodily support and can interact with the 
surrounding environment. Language behaviour is indeed a new qualitative level in 
the material world which cannot be ontologically separated from matter, even if it 
shows some specific features. 
Thus, Thảo argued for the social nature of our cognition. The matter constitutes 
the support of consciousness is not only the matter of the brain but also the matter 
of social relations. Specifically, human social behaviour takes the shape of the 
language of real life. It is the social matter and support for having the emergence of 
consciousness from the activity of our brains. As a consequence, consciousness is 
nothing more than inner language. Conscious experience is reduced to the form of 
phonemic imagery or inner speech. Certainly, one could question the fact that 
inner speech exemplifies the whole of conscious experience. But one should 
previously understand how the contents of consciousness arise. For this reason, we 
must better explain how language can be regarded as the mediation between 
practical life and inner lived experience. In the next chapter, we will exactly deal 
with this topic. 
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Chapter Six 
From the Language of Real Life to Inner Language 
 
 
 
« Le langage de la vie réelle », tel qu’il se présente ici, est 
évidemment l’expression immédiate du mouvement de 
«l’activité matérielle » et de « relations matérielles des hommes ». 
Ce trois moments : l’activité matérielle, relations matérielles et 
langage de la vie réelle, constituent le « comportement matériel »  
des hommes, dont la conscience ou la pensée est originairement 
« l’émanation directe ». 
(T.D. Thảo) 
 
 
 
1. Thảoʼs and Vološinov-Baxtinʼs Theories of Consciousness. 2. Language as 
Material Behaviour. - 3. Consciousness as Reflection. - 4. “Two layers of 
meaning”. - 5. Consciousness and the Language of Real Life. - 6.1. The 
Fundamental Signs. - 6.2. The Tendential Image. - 6.3. The Tendential 
Meaning. - 6.4. The Development of Idealized Meaning. - 6.5. The Corporeal 
Components of the Inner Language. - 7. Thảo’s Theory of the Inner Language. 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Thảoʼs and Vološinov-Baxtinʼs Theories of Consciousness 
 
Before turning to a detailed analysis of the emergence of inner lived experience 
of conscious contents through the language of real life, we should like to make a 
special point of the fact that Thảo was not the only philosopher who sympathised 
with Marxism and tackled the issue of consciousness from the point of view of 
language behaviour. It is not possible in a limited space to comment on the history 
of the issue in the Marxist tradition. We have already mentioned the Vygotskyian 
trend in psychology. And we will return to Vygotsky at the end of the present 
chapter. For the time being, our comments will focus on another scholar, who dealt 
with the question of consciousness and language and suggested a theory similar to 
Thảoʼs one. The following digression will perform the function of introducing the 
detailed analysis of Thảoʼs conception of inner language. 
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We will compare Thảoʼs approach to consciousness with that set out in a book 
published in the USSR at the end of the 1920s: Marxism and Philosophy of Language by 
Vološinov-Baxtin (first published in Russian in 1929; Engl. Transl. 1973). Looked at 
from the angle of our concern, we know for sure that Thảoʼs theory of language did 
not cover the large number of topics Vološinov/Baxtin dealt with. And it is true 
that Thảoʼs conception of consciousness merely reveals only a few hints of a 
general theory of ideology. Conversely, the main goal of Marxism and Philosophy of 
Language is to illustrate the main outlines of a theory of ideology (i.e., human socio-
cultural activity in a very broad sense rather than a system of ideas). We should 
briefly mention, however, the characterization of ideology described by 
Vološinov/Baxtin (1973: 12): “Its real place in existence [of the ideological as such] 
is in the special material of signs created by man.” Given that “without signs, there 
is no ideology” (id., p. 9), then a wide theory of signs is vital to understand 
ideology. Abstracting from the fact that Thảoʼs conception of consciousness should 
be read against the background of a glottogenetic tale, we cannot underestimate 
that, surprisingly, the theory of signs suggested by Vološinov/Baxtin is similar to 
that of Thảo in many respects.  
That is really interesting. It is very unlikely that Thảo read Marxism and 
Philosophy of Language. As is well known, as a matter of fact, written in the late 1920s 
in the USSR, the book went back to being popular in the 1970s. Even the name of 
the author of the book is still discussed. Is the literary critic Mixail Baxin (1895–
1975) the author of the book or should we prefer to regard his student Valentin 
Vološinov (1895–1936) as the author? Let scholars debate on that point (see 
Brandist 2002; Sériot 2010; Bronckart & Bota 2011; Tylkowski-Ageeva 2012). We will 
merely focus on some of the Vološinov/Baxtinʼs theses. We believe that it is not 
only necessary to read some lines of Marxism and Philosophy of Language to 
appreciate the similarities between Voloshinov-Baxtin and Thảo, but that we 
should also take advantage of that comparison in order better to understand Thảoʼs 
conception of consciousness. We will analyse those similarities in great detail. If we 
consider reasonable that Thảo did not read Vološinov/Baxtin until the 1970s at 
least, we must reason that the shared assumptions of their theories depend upon a 
common theoretical framework. This is perfectly understandable once we recall 
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the basic feature characterizing the theses on language set out in the German 
Ideology. 
We shall limit ourselves here to a general analysis of the main philosophical-
linguistic positions set out in the German Ideology. We have already had occasion to 
note that for Marx language is as old as consciousness. Given the material nature of 
language, the mind is from the outset afflicted with the matter, which here makes 
its appearance in the form of agitated layers of air, sounds, in short, of language. To 
Marx language is the immediate reality of consciousness. And, as Lecercle (2006: 
94) noticed, for Marx “language plays a similar role to the imagination in Kant, 
which, as is well known, serves as an intermediary, by means of its schemata, 
between intuition and understanding: language serves as an intermediary between 
real life and the ideas that derive from it.” Consciousness and language arise from 
the need of intercourse with other individuals. As a consequence, the language of 
real life is seen as the practical, real consciousness. In turn, consciousness is 
affected by the socio-practical origin of language. Consciousness is, therefore, from 
the very beginning a social product. 
Let us move on to Vološinov-Baxtinʼs theory. For Vološinov/Baxtin – as for 
Marxʼs German Ideology and Thảo (1973) – “consciousness itself can arise and become a 
viable fact only in the material embodiment of signs” (Vološinov/Baxtin 1973: 11). To 
Thảo, who offered a detailed analysis of psycho-motor mechanisms underlying 
inner language, consciousness is the result of the material motion of language. 
“Outside objectification, outside embodiment in some particular material (the material of 
gesture, inner word, outcry), consciousness is a fiction” (id., p. 87). In short, for 
Vološinov/Baxtin “the reality of the inner psyche is the same reality that of the sign” (id., 
p. 26). Accordingly, “outside the material of signs there is no psyche” (id., p. 26). 
Our authors have exactly the same concern. They had to demonstrate the 
material nature of consciousness without reducing it to brain mechanisms. 
Assuming that “outside the material of signs there is no psyche, there are 
physiological processes, processes in the nervous system, but no subjective 
psyche” (id., p. 26), as a consequence, consciousness cannot be reduced to 
“physiological processes occurring within the organism” (ibid.). But it does not 
mean that consciousness is something immaterial. Consciousness is the result of 
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the internalisation of language. As such it “could have developed only by having at 
its disposal material that was pliable expressible by bodily means” (id., p. 14). To 
point the fact, “language is produced by the individualʼs organism own means.” It 
does not depend upon “extracorporeal material” (ibid.). 
Vološinov-Baxtinʼs insight – but the same is true for Marx as well as for Thảo – is 
likely to lead to epiphenomenalism and then to the so-called dualism of properties. 
Since we assume that consciousness cannot be reduced to neurophysiological 
processes, matter and consciousness should be regarded as two different realities. 
It is sure that the materiality of language and its sensory-motor nature allowed our 
authors to admit the material nature of consciousness. But it is not clear how 
individualʼs organism own means may produce subjective lived experience. Thảoʼs 
theory of gestural indication exactly fulfilled that purpose. Preconscious semiotic 
intentionality and meanings already objectively exist before any kind of inner 
experience. Together with material movements of language, tendential meanings 
are internalised by consciousness. In other words, the referential intrinsic power of 
gestural indication was seen by Thảo as the key to explaining the most elementary 
content of consciousness, namely the consciousness of the object. 
Crucially, to Marx, Vološinov-Baxtin, and Thảo, did language not only be 
regarded as a material entity, it must also be reckoned to be a socio-practical 
phenomenon. According to Vološinov/Baxtin, as a matter of fact, “signs can arise 
only on interindividual territory” (id., p. 12). As a result, “consciousness takes 
shape and being in the material of signs created by an organized group in the 
process of social intercourse” (id., p. 13). As in the case of Thảo, we must previously 
assume the existence of “production relation” and “sociopolitical order” to explain 
the way “those social relations determine the full range of verbal contacts between 
people” (id., p. 19). To point the fact, “the sign is a creation between individuals, a 
creation within a social milieu” (id., 22). Indeed, “it is essential that the two 
individuals be organized socially, that they compose a group (a social unit); only 
then can the medium of signs take shape between them” (id., p. 12). Or, to put it 
another way, “all these forms of speech interchange operate in extremely close 
connection with the conditions of the social situation” (id., p. 20). Social relations 
need assuming as preconditions for explaining the functioning of language. 
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Remarkably, our authors highlighted the cognitive role played by language. As 
Vološinov-Baxtin reasoned: “expression is what first gives experience its form and 
specificity of direction” (id., p. 85). Conscious contents take the shape language 
gives them. Language is “the semiotic material of inner life of consciousness (inner 
speech)” (id., p. 14). We cannot underestimate what Sériot (2010) wrote about the 
link between Vološinov/Baxtin and Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835). For 
Humboldt, language activity is central insofar as it connects the understanding and 
the sensibility. As we have already noticed, language plays a similar role to the 
Kantian imagination, i.e. intermediary between intuition and understanding. In 
this regard, but only in the limit of this point, we can affirm that both 
Vološinov/Baxtin and Thảo participated in the same Neo-Humboldtian tradition 
(see Formigari 2011). A further clarification is needed. Not only did Thảoʼs 
conception of semiotic intentionality explain the role played by language to 
mediate between sensibility and understanding, it also shows to what extent 
language really interacts with mind-independent things. In this way, this thesis 
avoids any kind of idealism. 
All our authors shared the assumption that, given the “social life of the verbal 
signs” (ibid.) and the fact that “our inner world accommodating itself to the 
potentialities of our expression,” then “consciousness is a social-ideological fact” 
(id., p. 12). As the language of real life depends upon social practices, in a similar 
way, to Vološinov-Baxtin “the forms of signs are conditioned above all by the social 
organization of the participants involved and also by the immediate conditions of their 
interaction” (id., p. 21).  
In connection with this, Vološinov-Baxtin added that “the unity of the social milieu 
and the unity of the immediate social event of communication are conditions absolutely 
essential for bringing our physical-psycho-physiological complex into relation with 
language, with speech” (Vološinov/Baxtin 1973: 47). It means that “anything and 
everything occurring within the organism can become the material of experience, since 
everything can acquire semiotic significance, can become expressive” (id., p. 29). 
On that basis, the internalisation of language involves the internalisation of social 
and linguistic relations. As a result, “the individual, as possessor of the contents of 
his own consciousness, as author of his own thoughts, as the personality 
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responsible for his thoughts and feelings – such an individual is a purely 
sociological phenomenon” (id., p. 34). 
To sum up, consciousness arises through the internalisation of concrete verbal 
communication and social intercourse. As such, consciousness depends upon the 
forms, conditions, and type of verbal communication. To Vološinov-Baxtin, 
language is located between organised individuals. Like Thảo, Vološinov/Baxtin 
admitted that “verbal interaction is the basic reality of language” (id., p. 94). As we 
have already seen, that is what Thảo called relation of reciprocity. Thus “in the 
absence of a real addressee” – as in the case of inner speech – “addressee is 
presupposed in the person, so to speak, of a normal representative of the social 
group to which the speaker belongs” (id., p. 85). In a similar way, to Thảo, 
consciousness arose when the individual addresses signs to him/herself in absence 
of the others as if they were present. In other words, inner speech “has its 
stabilized social audience” (id., p. 86). It means that the flow of inner language 
must be seen as a dialogue-like phenomenon. The same is true for Thảo. To make 
this point clearer: 
 
The word is oriented toward an addressee, toward who that addressee might be: a fellow-
member or not of the same social group, of higher or lower standing (the addresseeʼs 
hierarchical status), someone connected with the speaker by close social ties (father, 
brother, husband, and so on) or not. There can be no such thing as an abstract 
addressee, a man unto himself, so to speak. With such a person, we would indeed 
have no language in common, literally and figuratively. (id., p. 85) 
 
Language cannot be divorced from the social intercourse stemming from the 
economic basis. Forms of speech, thus, “exhibit an extraordinary sensibility to all 
fluctuations in the social atmosphere” (id., p. 20). As a consequence, language 
mediates the internalisation of social atmosphere. In turn, we can become more or 
less conscious of that social atmosphere. But, in the same way, we can also be 
influenced by those social conditions. Thus, the study of language allows us better 
to understand both the emergence and dynamics of ideology: “The word is the 
most sensitive index of social change” (id., p. 19). In the next paragraphs, we will 
analyse Thảoʼs approach to ideology. But we can already anticipate that he 
accepted the same framework of Vološinov-Baxtin, even if he did not develop this 
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point accurately. 
To recapitulate, we can list some common assumption shared by our authors 
(Marx, Vološinov-Baxtin, Thảo): 
 
a. Language is a human practice involved in social interactions; 
b. Conscious contents depend upon the internalisation of language; 
c. Language is not the translation of ideas that pre-exist in consciousness; 
d. Language is the internalisation of public dialogue; 
e. The subjectivity is the result of intersubjectivity; 
f. Social origins of language mark the forms of thinking; 
g. Consciousness cannot be reduced to physio-neurological mechanisms. 
 
To avoid misunderstandings, the German Ideology might be considered as the 
common source of both Vološinov-Baxtinʼs and Thảoʼs theory of consciousness and 
language. But an assumption like that is relatively uninteresting. In the final 
analysis, the framework we have mapped out does not exclude that some ideas 
largely circulate in the Eastern Marxism. Quite the contrary, as we have already 
seen in the case of Spirkin, we could affirm that it existed a philosophical-linguistic 
tradition that more or less unconsciously followed the same lines of 
Vološinov/Baxtinʼs theory. 
If one asks the reasons why Thảoʼs theory seems to be very close to Vološinov-
Baxtinʼs one, one point must be kept in mind. The main point of convergence 
between theories related to fact that they shared the same critical target. 
Vološinov/Baxtinʼs criticism toward abstract objectivism of Saussureʼs linguistics 
may recall Thảo analysis of CLG (see above Chapter 3; cf. Vološinov/Baxtin 1973: 
57). They refused to reduce language to an abstract, stable, closed system of 
linguistic forms which have nothing in common with social conditions of its 
production. That could explain some similarities between Vološinov/Baxtin and 
Thảo. 
Interestingly the same criticism could be directed at Stalinʼs conception of 
language. In fact, we cannot neglect the fact that in the period between Vološinov-
Baxtin and Thảo, Stalin suggested a theory of language that became the official 
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doctrine in the USSR. Briefly, we can highlight that Stalin ([1950] 1953) set out that 
language is not a superstructure but a means of communication serving all the 
people. It means that a language “escapes its social and political determinations to 
become a neutral object” (Lecerlce 2006: 81). It will be fascinating to affirm that 
Thảoʼs approach to language should be reckoned to be an alternative to Stalinʼs 
one. We should remember that, in the 1980s, Thảo devoted some writings to 
criticise Stalinʼs philosophical insight. But there is no evidence that Thảo read 
Stalinʼs articles on language – even if it is quite difficult that he did not know their 
existence. In 1950, for instance, Thảoʼs friend Jean-Toussaint Desanti published 
three papers concerning Stalinʼs articles in the French review La Nouvelle Critique 
(see Desanti 1950a, b, c). At the time, Thảo was still in Paris. But we cannot 
underestimate the role played by the Saussurean semiological model in French 
structuralist trends during the 1960s. If we want to understand Thảoʼs critical 
target, structuralism seems to be a more palatable hypothesis (see above Chapter 
3). 
Before concluding, let us take note of the fact that Vološinov-Baxtinʼs aim was to 
suggest a sociolinguistic approach to ideologies, a foundation of a Marxist 
conception of ideology, an essay on the application of the sociological method in 
linguistics. Instead, Thảo tried to demonstrate how language, and then 
consciousness, arises from social practices during phylogeny. It is true that both, 
Vološinov/Baxtin and Thảo, proposed an objective psychology based on 
sociological, not physiological or biological principles. And both of them 
introduced a general theory of social origins of signs so as to individuate the social 
factors in the formation of consciousness. But the Vološinov/Baxtinʼs efforts was to 
suggest a psycho-socio-semiotics of verbal behaviour in individual interaction (cf. 
Sériot 2010: 66), or a philosophy of language as a philosophy of the ideological sign. 
By contrast, Thảoʼs concern was to show how a Marxist approach to language can 
solve some conundrums concerning the nature and origins of consciousness. And 
he assumed the point of view of phylogeny to demonstrate the validity of his 
materialistic-dialectic method. Precisely in order to understand how consciousness 
depends on social practices, Thảo had to show how the first forms of the language 
of real life are internalised by consciousness. As a result, he would show how 
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fundamental signs could be seen as preconditions for having consciousness and 
intentionality. As we have already noted, consciousness and intentionality are the 
two main characteristics of inner lived experience and then they are the two 
greatest obstacles that defenders of materialism had to face with. How can matter 
intentionally refer to something else? How can conscious contents refer to the 
external mind-independent world? How can matter become conscious of the own 
activity? How can subjective lived experience arise? 
 
2. Language as Material Behaviour 
 
In the previous chapter, we have described Thảo’s conception of the origins of 
consciousness as consciousness of the self and consciousness of the object. We have 
seen that the language of real life is the relation of reciprocity between fellows and 
interaction with surrounding physical environment. It involves the emergence of 
consciousness. On that basis, Thảo agreed with Marx who wrote that 
“consciousness is at first, of course, merely consciousness concerning the immediate 
sensuous environment and consciousness of the limited connection with other persons 
and things outside the individual who is growing self-conscious” (MEW III: 31; Eng. 
trans. from Marx & Engels 1998; italics ours). Thảo explicitly defined what he 
meant with the term “consciousness” since he invoked what Marx had written: 
“Consciousness [Das Bewußtsein] can never be anything else than conscious 
existence [das bewußte Sein], and the existence of men [das Sein der Menschen] is 
their actual life-process [wirklicher Lebensprozeß]” (MEW III: 26; trans. from Marx 
& Engels 1998; cf. Thảo [1973] 1984: 15). 
What immediately stands out when one takes Thảoʼs theory of language origins 
into account is the fact that “language is thus not simply the expression of thought 
or of consciousness” ([1973] 1984: 16). According to him, then, language “is 
consciousness itself in its ̔immediate reality’.” As has been seen, language must be 
regarded, first of all, as language of real life. The language of real life, Thảo stated, 
is one of the three moments of the material behaviour of humans (cf. Thảo [1973] 
1984: 17). They are i) the language of real life, ii) the material activity (interactions 
with the physical environment), and iii) the material relations (interactions with 
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the social environment). But caution must be paid to the fact that Thảo argued for 
the previous existence of the signs of the language of real life before the formation 
of consciousness. It seems that, unlike Marx and Engels, to Thảo – even if he did not 
explicitly admit that – the language of real life is older than consciousness.  
Thảo argued for “the existence of a language belonging to reality itself, prior to 
consciousness, from which consciousness draws its meaning” (id., p. 17). He 
admitted that “the language of real life is thus prior to consciousness” in so far as “its 
meaning consists in the immediate expression of the very moment of material 
relations and it is this objective, not conscious, meaning that subjects first 
communicate to one another in their ‘material behaviour’” (ibid.). We must now 
better understand what Thảo meant with a language that is prior to consciousness 
and how it can be the source of contents of consciousness. 
 
3. Consciousness as Reflection 
 
In the following paragraph, we must say a few words concerning Marxist-
Leninist framework, since it is the background against which Thảo’s conception of 
consciousness has been set out. The theory of knowledge of Marxism-Leninism 
affirmed that knowledge consists of approximately faithful reflection of 
independent and external world in consciousness (see Hogan 1967). But we must 
remark that, in the context of this debate, consciousness did not merely mean the 
ability to distance ourselves from contents of our experience but rather it was also 
synonymous with thought, ideal dimension, forms of thought, the dialectic of 
concepts, etc. 
In the Afterword to the Second German Edition of Capital (1873) Marx wrote: 
“the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, 
and translated into forms of thought [Bei mir ist umgekehrt das Ideelle nichts 
anders als das im Menschenkopf umgesetzte und übersetzte Materielle]” (1887: 14; 
cf. MEW XXIII: 27). And Engels wrote “we again took a materialistic view of the 
thoughts in our heads, regarding them as images [Abbilder] of real things instead 
of regarding real things as images of this or that stage of the absolute concept. [...] 
Thereby the dialectic of concepts itself became merely the conscious reflex of the 
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dialectical motion of the real world” (Engels 1946: Part IV; cf. MEW XXI: 293). What 
they would explain is the fact that I) objective world precedes and influences our 
knowledge, ii) contrary to idealism, objective world is not the result of operations 
of our thought, iii) our social consciousness reflects, or correspond to, social being 
– in other words, our consciousness is rooted in a historical and social context. 
Consciousness is not merely the mirror-reflection of objective being but is rather 
the inner reflection of real and practical interactions with surrounding social and 
physical environment. 
As we have already seen in Chapter 4, Lenin’s theory of knowledge extensively 
developed the idea that mind reflects the external world by way of sensations. 
Lenin’s objective sensationalism stated that sensation reveals the objective truth to 
humans. Attention must be paid to correct interpretation of the theory of 
reflection. As Lenin (1972: 300) noticed that “it is beyond doubt that an image 
cannot wholly resemble the model.” The image of the mind-independent thing 
must be actually regarded as the subjective image of the objective world. But we 
should add that, a starting point of knowledge, a relation of causality between 
things and sensations necessarily exists and implies a certain correspondence 
between the two terms. 
It could be useful now to return to Spirkinʼs theory once again (see above 
Chapter 5). To Spirkin (1984: 100), consciousness is “a reflection of the external 
world.” But consciousness is not the copy of the external world merely. It is rather 
“a generalized and purposeful reflection of reality, anticipatory mental construction of 
actions and foreseeing their results, and rational regulation and self-control.” Thus, 
consciousness offers a goal-oriented reproduction of the mind-independent object. 
For this reason, “the content of the psyche itself […] is a reflection of reality in the 
form of subjective images” (id., p. 101) in so far as “the reflection of a thing in the 
brain is thus an active reflection connected with the processing of transformation 
of external impressions” (id., p. 103)30. 
                                                 
30 In this way, Spirkin subscribed Pavlovian theory of reflection: in the interaction 
between organisms or things it takes place reciprocal restructuring of the inner state of 
the interacting system which involved an informational reproduction of the properties 
of the object (which leaves a memory of itself in the other and must be regarded as 
abstraction of vital information about the environment) (see Spirkin 1984: 110). 
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Spirkin insisted that “consciousness is a subjective image of the objective 
world.” It means that consciousness belongs to someone and it does not achieve a 
complete adequacy to mind-independent things. Interestingly, with “subjective 
image” Spirkin meant “a synthetic description of an object obtained in the course 
of object-transforming activity.” Similarly, to Thảo, Spirkin suggested that 
“consciousness could only emerge as a function of a highly organized brain which 
evolved through labour and speech” (id., p. 112). On that basis, consciousness has a 
“pre-history” as well as a “social history” (id., p. 110). It is the product of natural 
evolution and “the sum total of the practical and cognitive activity of countless 
generations throughout the centuries.” 
Thảo described more than Spirkin the way mind reflects objective reality by way 
of language. According to Spirkin, indeed, language is nothing but the result of 
psychological mechanism of conditioned reflex. In this respect, Spirkin wrote: 
“sounds pronounced in a given situation and accompanied by gestures were 
associated in the brain with the appropriate objects and actions, and then with the 
ideal phenomena of consciousness” (id., p. 115). Against that, Thảo suggested that 
the language of real life is not the association of sounds and representations 
exactly because fundamental signs are already meaningful. And, at the same time, 
they are the condition for having the awareness of mind-independent objects as 
external and independent. No concepts or forms of thought exist before the 
language of real life. 
To Spirkin language “serves as a means of communication and as an instrument 
of thought” (ibid.), while for Thảo the language of real life is not a mere instrument 
of thought but the essential condition for having thought. To Thảo, the language of 
real life is the most elementary form of thought. More precisely, how will see in 
next paragraphs, consciousness is the inner reflection of the language of real life as 
practical interactions with mind-independent things and exchange among social 
groups. The specific reason for this is Thảo’s need to admit that conscious thinking 
is nothing other than inner language: “the ideality of consciousness is not some 
kind of ideality ʻin itself’, but is constituted in the actual motion of idealization 
which is immediately implied in inner language” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 25). 
Consequently, consciousness could be reckoned to be the “ideal image of the 
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external world” (id., p. 26). It is the internalization and idealisation of the language 
of real life which entails the most fundamental sensuous relation between thinking 
and reality. 
 
4. “Two layers of meaning” 
 
Did not only Thảo admit that the language of real life is embedded in social 
relations, he also suggested that the meaning of the language of real life “consists 
in the immediate expression of the very movement of material relations” (Thảo 
[1973] 1984: 17). Indeed, the language of real life is a social tool to solve material 
problems. The language of real life is “the direct efflux of their [of humans] material 
behaviour” (ibid.; Thảo invoked MEW III: 26: “Das Vorstellen, Denken, der geistige 
Verkehr der Menschen erscheinen hier noch als direkter Ausfluss ihres materiellen 
Verhaltens.”). Interestingly, the language of real life could record changes that 
have arisen in social working relations before consciousness being aware of those 
changes. Consciousness is indeed the internalisation of significations which arise in 
the language of real life. In other words, “in the dialectical flow of history, 
however, new meanings are always constituted which are at first unknown to 
consciousness in the language of real life, and only become the object of 
cognizance after a period of time” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 17). 
Thus, Thảo distinguished between “two layers of meaning” (deux couches de 
significations): i) there are conscious meanings and ii) not yet conscious meanings. 
The first ones are the meanings of which consciousness is already aware while the 
second ones are the new meanings that the language of real life has already 
produced and recorded even if they have not yet become the conscious target of 
reflection. The language of real life always gets ahead of inner language and 
consciousness. Each person already employs new meanings but “he says it 
involuntarily, for this meaning is imposed objectively by the force of circumstances 
outside consciousness, in the language of real life” (id., p. 19). After that, 
consciousness may become aware of new meanings – which emerged in the 
language of real life as a response to social and physical problems. 
As a consequence, Thảo called tendential meaning the non-conscious meaning as 
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it is embedded in the language of real life and idealized meaning the conscious 
meaning. To him, these two kinds of meaning exist in every speech act nowadays 
too. And one turns into the other one: the non-conscious meaning of the language 
of real life “is directly produced by the material motion of the signs themselves, in 
so far as it is necessarily shaped by the motion of things” (id., p. 24) and the “whole 
of the already acquired content of consciousness […] has itself been established 
historically on previous forms of the language of real life.” That is to say, the 
historical development of language as a social tool must be regarded as the source 
of transition from non-conscious meanings of the language of real life to conscious 
meanings. 
Thảo made the following example: in Franklin’s analysis of labour – which had 
been analysed by Marx in his Capital – there is a contradiction between an abstract 
notion of labour and a concrete notion of labour. It is so because that opposition 
exists in reality and “this real opposition has been reflected, unknown to the 
author, in the tendential meaning of his discourse which, while presented as a 
perfectly conscious theoretical exposition nevertheless includes the non-conscious 
moment of the language of real life” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 24-25). Specifically, Marx 
wrote:  
 
The celebrated Franklin, one of the first economists, after Wm. Petty, who saw 
through the nature of value, says: “Trade in general being nothing else but the 
exchange of labour for labour, the value of all things is...most justly measured by 
labour.” (The works of B. Franklin, & c., edited by Sparks, Boston, 1836, Vol. II., p. 
267.) Franklin is unconscious that by estimating the value of everything in labour, he 
makes abstraction from any difference in the sorts of labour exchanged, and thus 
reduces them all to equal human labour. But although ignorant of this, yet he says it. 
He speaks first of “the one labour”, then of “the other labour”, and finally of 
“labour”, without further qualification, as the substance of the value of everything. 
(MEW I: 65 [(17a) Note zur 2. Ausgabe]) 
 
Some details must be now clarified. In Chapter 7, we will illustrate Thảoʼs 
conception of language as a social and practical tool which conveys some 
fundamental significations from the point of view of phylogeny. In the same 
chapter, it will be of interest to spend some words concerning an example of the 
assimilation of the social experience by the subject through the language of real 
life. In this regard, we will focus on how Thảo analysed the dialectical development 
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of both, personal pronouns and names of family members, in the third part of his 
ILC (cf. Thảo [1973] 1984: 145-198). Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness and 
clarity, we will state those points beforehand in the next paragraph. After that, our 
comments here will focus on the way how Thảo described the way tendential 
meaning turns into idealized one in the case of indicative gesture. 
 
5. Consciousness and the Language of Real Life 
 
Some questions emerge from all that has been said. How far has labour 
contributed to the formation of language? Does language convey the mark of its 
social origins? How do social origins of language affect consciousness? How far is 
consciousness affected by language and its social origins? No better answer can be 
given than the following. To Thảo labour is the most decisive factor in the 
evolution of language. Practical needs are the pre-conditions the emergence of 
certain forms of language. In turn, those forms involve the development of some 
cognitive skills. 
For instance, the communication systems of apes and anthropoids, such as cries 
and simple indications exactly correspond to the emotive natural instrument as 
objects which satisfy immediate needs. To put it another way, the form of life of 
apes and anthropoids is largely based on immediate need situations as well as their 
communication systems are. By contrast, the language of prehominids suggests the 
ability to refer to absent objects by way of a set of indicative gestures and 
vocalizations. In this regard, the evolution of the hand had considerably changed 
the living conditions of our ancestors. The first Australanthropus lived in groups 
and worked in coordination to survive and adapt themselves to new environmental 
conditions. The Australanthropus prepared and conserved instruments and got means 
of subsistence from collective hunting (see Chapters 7 and 8 for more details). In a 
similar way, the language of the Australanthropus was a little but stable set of signs 
shared by the community and performed during collective activities. For Thảo, this 
set of signs was composed of straight-line gestures and circular-arc motions of the 
arm. “The circular-arc motion […] first appeared in phylogenesis” (Thảo [1973] 
1984: 5), which is proven by the fact that children perform this sign “in some 
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emotional situations” before employing straight-line gestures. For our purposes, 
we have to stress on the fact that circular-arc motion of the arm is an act of 
guidance at distance. It entails the awareness of the externality of the thing. But 
most importantly it arose during collective hunting and thus must be regarded as a 
solution for practical needs. 
Evolution of language skills was interwoven with the development of practical 
activities. In turn, language and practical activities outperformed the cognitive 
skills of our ancestor. In connection with this, Thảo admitted that, though 
indicative gestures could be seen the necessary foundation for conceptual 
knowledge, they should not be considered as the first form of effective knowledge. 
Pointing simply shows things in themselves as stable matter. But, according to 
Thảo, “matter only exists in motion” (id., p. 35). Thus “the indicative sign must be 
developed by following the motion of the object.” For this reason, Thảo described the 
transition of indicative signs from the simple indication to the straight-line gesture 
during the phylogeny of genus homo (id., p. 48-79)31. Guidance gestures were first 
referred to objects that were perceptible in the environment. Since the systematic 
use of guidance gestures had been established, those signs began to indicate absent 
objects of biological needs and entailed the cognitive representation of them. 
Artefacts of Olduwan industry (2.6–1.7 ka; see Chapter 7 for more elaborate 
treatment) suggest that our ancestor used to address each other straight-line 
gestures which served to indicate the current work-object as well as everything 
interesting that could function as a possible work object. 
As we have already had occasion to say in the previous chapter, the use of 
gestures was the condition for having complex interpersonal relations (“relation of 
reciprocity”). The social origin of the communication system of our ancestor 
involved the emergence of a shared point of view that Thảo called collective 
cognizance. This one preceded indivdualʼs self-consciousness. In this regard, Thảo 
                                                 
31 Interestingly, Thảo described the transition from the pointing to the straight-line 
gestures in a way very similar to Hegel’s description of the transition from sense 
certainly and perception: “The Now is pointed to; this Now. ‘Now’; it has already ceased to 
be in the act of pointing to it. The Now that is, is another Now than the one pointed to, 
and we see that the Now is just this: to be no more just when it is. […] The Here pointed 
out, to which I hold fast, is similarly a this Here which, in fact, is not this Here, but a 
Before and Behind, a Right and Left.” (Hegel [1807] 1977: 63-64). 
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observed that 
 
The cognizance [prise de conscience: grasp of consciousness] of the indicative 
gesture began sporadically in the lagging prehominid hunter who repeated to 
himself the call of the others and recognized himself in them. Cognizance now 
develops into a collective cognizance where all the individuals of the group 
recognize each other in the others, since they at the same time address each to 
himself the sign which they return to one another, so that all merge in one and the 
same gesture where each sees himself in the others as in himself. The sign, 
consequently, which thus appears to each individual as experienced in himself in so 
far as he is part of the action of the group and is identified with it, is somehow 
sustained by the social relation itself. In other words, the sign has been internalized 
by the group, in such a way that it becomes for the group available experience that 
subsequently can be used at will; in other words, it can be applied not only to 
particularly interesting objects, but also to any more or less interesting object in 
general. (id., p. 12-13) 
 
To summarise what has been just said, Thảo wrote that 
 
Language first of all objectively consists of material behaviour as the language of 
real life, a direct expression of material activity and of the material relations among 
workers, and raises itself to consciousness in inner language where the subject 
addresses himself starting with the image of the others in which he recognizes 
himself in the identity of his own lived experience. (id., p. 29) 
 
In short, language arises as a social and practical tool which conveys some 
fundamental signification during collective activities. On that basis, it precedes and 
allows the emergence of lived meaning. Inner language must then be seen as the 
mediation between social language behaviour and inner life of consciousness. We 
can thus understand why Thảo criticised Husserl’s as well as Saussure’s idealism, 
he exactly refused the idea of the primacy of psychic dimension in the evolution 
and development of language. To him, instead, inner language and psychic 
linguistic dimension are the secondary product of the material life of signs. And the 
material life of signs is a peculiar form of problem-solving involved in the practical 
life of human societies. 
Along with internalisation of language behaviour, inner language also conveys 
the contradictions of a given society in the form of ideology. In these cases, 
consciousness suffers from social established habits and gives them the shape of 
ideological representations of the world. Along with the development of cognitive 
skills among our ancestors, the language of real life could also convey a distort 
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perspective on social reality. Such a distort perspective consequently involves a 
distort perception of the self. This could be the premise of a theory of the origin of 
ideology. Unfortunately, Thảo did not develop this point and did not describe how 
ideology arises in greater detail (Thảo 1975 is an exception). Nonetheless, he made 
an example of the assimilation of the social experience by the individual through 
the language of real life. That is the case of the period immediately preceding the 
emergence of personal pronouns. 
Before the end of the Lower Palaeolithic, the bipedal posture increased the 
mortality of women (the so-called “Tragedy of Women”). The anatomical 
modification of the pelvis entailed complications during childbirth. It follows a 
generational asymmetry between men and women in archaic societies. The few 
women at disposal were a prerogative of the oldest men. Ancient societies were so 
divided into three social groups: elderly men, women and young men. In so far as 
Thảo believed that language was part of the social environment, he suggested that 
the tragedy of the women affected the vocabulary, too. Words like father, mother 
and son emerged in this period. Remarkably, those words did not designate the 
natural parents, but all the men of the group (father), all the women of the group 
(mother), and all young people of the group (son). 
Then, Thảo described the social order of the first period of the Mousterian (600–
40 ka; ka: kilo annum, thousand calendar years ago) and called it “proto-
gerontocracy”. The ban to have sex with women before the age of thirty became a 
permanent institution. At the End of the Middle Palaeolithic and at the beginning 
of the Upper Pleistocene (126–11.7 ka), Thảo explained, H. Neanderthalensis 
disciplined the respect of the ban by means of sanctions such as eviration and 
introcision. The younger member of the group and all the wives had been subject 
to the control of the elders. And if they did not respect the sexual primacy of the 
elders, they incurred sanctions. 
At the beginning of the Middle Palaeolithic (300–45 ka), the gradual emergence 
of the household industry was the reason for an economic development which led 
to the increase of human longevity. In the same period, speech began to be a means 
to express individualsʼ own individuality. We can thus suggest that the use of 
pronouns emerged for the first time. It was the consequence of the household 
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industry in which the roles were strictly defined. Thảo made the example of first 
personal graves which were built in that period and which showed the awareness 
of personal identity. During the Mousterian, proto-gerontocracy and biological 
tragedy of women involved some linguistic consequences. Specifically, those social 
phenomena changed the meaning of the words father, mother, and son. In the 
previous stage, mother designated all women of the community exactly because the 
interdiction to have sex with women before the age of thirty concerned all men of 
the community. In contrast with that, later, the interdiction began to concern the 
younger alone. Mother did no more mean every woman, but every desirable woman 
because they were the wives of the elders and were still young. 
At the beginning of the Upper Palaeolithic (40–10 ka), H. faber sapiens converted 
the social meaning of the circumcision: initially it was a sanction, then, it became 
the rite of passage marking entrance or acceptance into the group and formal 
admission to adulthood in a community. Instead, the Mesolithic (11–8 ka) was 
typified by the end of the biological tragedy of women and the stabilization of 
commercial exchanges. Both of these circumstances allowed the success of 
endogamy and the consequent interdiction of incest. The division of tasks among 
family members involved a more strictly subdivision of assignments and roles. This 
point contributed to Thảo’s ongoing argument in favour of the introduction of 
personal pronouns. To him, pronouns – especially I and You – prevent the 
misrepresented identification with the father or the mother and inhibit the wish to 
own the parent of opposite sex. In effect, pronouns establish interpersonal relation 
peculiar of human societies. They must also be reckoned to be the original form of 
personal identity. 
The language of real life mediates the internalisation of social order. In fact, the 
language of real life is the immediate expression of the socio-economic order of a 
given society and, as such, it records social practice and accordingly gives shape to 
the forms of consciousness.  Let us now move on to Thảo’s detailed description of 
the internalisation of social practice by way of the language of real life. 
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6.1. The Fundamental Signs 
 
Thảo insisted that language arises outside of consciousness. In this way, he 
solved the following traditional conundrum: if language presupposes 
consciousness as its source and consciousness needs language to develop, the 
question of language origins is impossible to solve because “consciousness 
presupposes language and language, consciousness” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 19). Against 
that, Thảo suggested that the meaning of fundamental signs does not depend upon 
a voluntary act of consciousness. 
As we have seen, Thảo stated that arbitrary signs cannot be considered as a 
constitutive moment of consciousness because they presuppose consciousness as 
the source of their meaning. By contrast, the investigation into the origins of 
language and consciousness must assume a moment in which neither the fully-
fledged language nor the fully-developed human cognition already emerged. For 
this reason, Thảo introduced the notion of “fundamental signs”. 
Remarkably Thảo confirmed that fundamental signs are produced by the 
movement of the body itself and do not depend upon syntagmatic or paradigmatic 
relations to other signs. In the CLG, Saussure ([1916] 2011: 123) had instead written 
that “relations and differences between linguistic terms fall into two distinct 
groups, each of which generates a certain class of values.” To him, in fact, “in 
discourse, on the one hand, words acquire relations based on the linear nature of 
language because they are chained together.” This is the syntagmatic relation. But 
“outside discourse” Saussure continued “words […] that have something in 
common are associated in the memory, resulting in groups marked by diverse 
relations.” These are the associative relations or, in Jakobson’s terms, paradigmatic 
relations. 
Thus, to Saussure, “in the syntagm a term acquires its value only because it 
stands in opposition to everything that precedes or follows it, or to both” while 
“the associative relation unites terms in absentia in a potential mnemonic series” 
(ibid.). In other words, the signified of a term depends upon the relation of the sign 
with the other signs of a discourse or with the mnemonic series of signs. Instead, to 
Thảo ([1973] 1984: 51), for instance, indicative gesture “can take its meaning only 
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directly from the gesture: for, since it is always used by itself, it does not imply any 
relation to the other words either on the syntagmatic plane, or on the 
paradigmatic plane.” The indicative gesture can consequently be seen as the 
starting point of the development of consciousness. In effect, “the meaning of the 
indicative gesture” is “absolutely original” and “appeared objectively in the 
language of real life before all consciousness in general.” Indeed, indicative 
gestures “produces its own meaning entirely by itself” (id., p. 19).  
Now it could be useful to highlight that Thảo argued that meaning of indicative 
gestures is just an example of general and more sophisticated dynamics involved in 
the language of real life. Indeed, the meaning of the indicative gesture was called 
by Thảo tendential meaning and “can serve to characterize generally the language of 
real life in so far as it directly reflects the motion of material activity and the 
material relations of men independently of their consciousness” (id., p. 24). 
Specifically, the tendential meaning of fundamental signs is not wholly arbitrary: 
“The linguistic sign, naturally, can only be considered as a constitutive moment of 
consciousness if it somehow implies its own meaning” (id., p. 23). In the next 
paragraphs, we will analyse how such a tendential meaning emerges and how it 
becomes a constitutive moment of consciousness. 
 
6.2. The Tendential Image 
 
One of the most elementary forms of indicative gesture is the pointing. To Thảo 
the development of pointing obviously depends upon natural evolution. The ape 
can actually perceive the object as external and can also employ indicative 
gestures. Among apes and humans, the image evoked by the gesture is “a tendential 
extension of the hand gesture” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 19). Thảo called the image evoked 
by indicative gestures “tendential image [image tendancielle] since it consists of the 
tendential extension of the actual motion” (id., p. 20). Among apes, the perceived 
image of the object “can be defined only in terms of the potential action of his own 
body” (id., p. 5). It is not a mental image but rather a perceptive image that 
emerged from the behaviour as the goal which the behaviour is directed to. This 
image is thus evoked by the behaviour as the anticipated action that it has not 
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accomplished yet. Gestural indications among apes are indeed the result of the 
extension of practical attitudes towards the target of biological needs. 
Interestingly, Thảo focused on the fact that the tendential image “does not 
contain the least particle of matter” (id., p. 20). It is the “tendential extension of 
the actual motion.” Simply put, the material motion of the hand produces a surplus 
that cannot be regarded as material in the same way as the motion of the hand. In 
detail, the motion produces that surplus in so far as the motion of the hand could 
involve a sensory-motor reaction in the performer as well as in the observer. 
Indeed, Thảo affirmed that “the notion of a tendential image can serve to 
characterize the sensory-motor psychism in general.” With sensory-motor psychism, 
Thảo probably thought of Piaget’s conception of child development. 
To Piaget (1936) the sensory-motor schema is the more or less quick 
organization of sensory data to produce some movements. In the case of Thảo’s 
theory of tendential meaning, one may suggest that the motion of the hand is a 
perceptive datum that involves in the mind of both, the performer and the 
observer, a motor schema. Now, it is not required that the motor schema must 
become an effective movement. What it is important to highlight is, however, the 
fact that the viewing of the gesture involves a cognitive reaction that consists in an 
imaginary accomplishment of the gesture. This imaginative reaction entails the 
tendential image (or motor schema) of the tendential direction of the gesture. 
In so far as the motor schema depends upon the performance and perception of 
the gesture, the tendential image is indissociable from the gesture. Another way of 
saying this is that the tendential image is nothing but the motor of the structure 
sensory-motor schema and the gesture the sensory of that structure. And since the 
tendential image is nothing other than a motor schema it has a cognitive reality 
rather than material in a strict sense. 
As this discussion implies, the tendential image seems to be reduced to the ideo-
motor action. In his handbook, the French philosopher Cuvillier (1937: 129) wrote: 
“the vision of the movement alone entails the implementation of that movement.” 
It is the physiological process whereby the representation or image of an action 
brings an automatic unconscious reflexive muscular reaction. This one could be of 
minuscule degree, outlined, sketched-out, etc. The term had been introduced by 
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the English physiologist William B. Carpenter (1813–1895) in 1852. This theory was 
successfully in the scientific literature until the 1950s (for instance see the 
psychological handbook of Cuvillier 1937: 129-130, where the author discussed that 
theory as it had been set out by Théodule Ribot, Michel E. Chevreul, and Charles 
Feré). 
 
6.3. The Tendential Meaning 
 
We should now take Thảoʼs analysis of the difference between human and 
animal perception of the tendential image into account. Certainly, the essential 
role played by the tendential image is so pronounced that Thảo ([1973] 1984: 20) 
affirmed that it “characterize the sensory-motor psychism in general.” As we have 
seen in Chapter 4, Thảo argued that “when an animal sees an object, he sketches or 
outlines in his body an ensemble of movements which orient his behaviour toward 
this object according to the tendencies already established by hereditary or 
acquired associations” (ibid.). With this statement, he suggested that the ability to 
project the corporeal movement upon things is shared by humans and animals. In 
effect, “when the finger is pointed in order to indicate an object to an ape, his look 
follows the extension of the experimenter’s hand gesture to the indicated object” 
(id., p. 19).  
Nonetheless, the tendential image produced by indicative gesture among 
humans could convey something like a meaning in a strict sense. So, there is not 
anything like tendential meaning among animals. The tendential meaning, in fact, 
cannot be reduced to the image of potential actions but it must rather be regarded 
as the meaning of the object as mind-independent reality. In this vein, indicative 
gestures also represent the most elementary forms of human language in so far as 
they mark the transition from animal to human communication.  
Indeed, “the tendential image of the sensory-motor psychism at the animal level 
does not, generally, have any meaning value, for the outlined movement which 
projects it, does not function as a sign.” In effect, even if some primates show 
gestural indication somehow (for instance the pointing), this gestural activity 
“denotes feeling and action, and not ʽmeaning’ strictly speaking” (ibid.). So what is 
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the difference between humans and other primates?  
Other primates display signals as epiphenomena of practical attitudes towards 
the external object, while humans employ indicative gestures as signs, i.e., as 
means to communicate the meaning of the object to someone else. And the 
meaning of the object is nothing but the relation of exteriority to mind-
independent things. The object is not indicated and perceived as the external 
target of potential actions, but it is rather indicated as the mind-independent 
thing: 
 
[…] the image of movement toward the object, projected by the gesture of the 
subject upon the other, thereby defines the distance to be covered or in other words 
the relation of externality between the other subject and the object. And as the gesture 
is reciprocal, the image returns to the first subject himself. This time, we are dealing 
with the meaning of object, even with its fundamental meaning, its externality to the 
subject. (id., p. 20-21) 
 
According to Thảo, the tendential image could become meaningful only if it is 
performed against the background of social relations of reciprocity. In this way, 
the tendential image produced by the gesture becomes a tendential meaning which 
means the relation of exteriority between the other ego and the object. Simply put, 
human language is simultaneously directed toward the reference as well as toward 
the others. The relation between the knowing subject and the thing cannot be 
reduced to the animal-like relation between two terms: the subject and the object. 
It is necessary to add the role of the others so that the real relation to the real 
external world is embedded in social relations. Pointing, in other words, indicates 
the thing as the external target of common attention. As such, the thing becomes 
the object of several different perspectives at once, that is, the shared ground of 
human discourses (cf. Bimbenet 2011: 308-310; cf. also recent studies concerning 
the development of language in the child: Schaffer 1984: 79; Camaioni 1993: 84; 
Tomasello 1995: 106; Eilan et al. 2005: 5; Morgenstern et al. 2008). 
We should also remark that the gesture would be meaningless if the object was 
absent. The tendential meaning is projected by the gesture on the object within a 
given visual field. The indicative gesture is then eminently context-related in so far 
as it depends upon perception. But we cannot dismiss that the gesture, at the same 
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time, intervenes in the perceptual field by adding some symbolic elements that 
radically change the awareness and gnosiological relation to the sensory data. The 
problem facing Thảo at this juncture is how tendential meaning could be detached 
from the context they are produced. 
 
6.4. The Development of Idealized Meaning 
 
Thảoʼs description of the transition from tendential meaning to idealized 
meaning in the case of indicative gesture is one of the more suggestive topics of the 
RLC. Nonetheless, it is not without difficulties.  
We should previously point out that Thảoʼs description of the development of 
idealized meaning is divided into three parts. First, he showed how the use of 
indicative gesture conditions the transition from sporadic gesturing to the 
systematic use of gestures. Second, Thảo explained how gestural indication 
becomes a means at everyone’s disposal. Third, he analysed how gesturing 
becomes increasingly detached from social practice and is internalised by 
individuals. At the end of this multidimensional process, the tendential meaning is 
internalised and becomes idealized meaning. So Thảo describes how the use of 
signs is transformed in its performance: from the social use to the individual use, 
and from the external behaviour into the inner outline. 
In short, Thảo regarded the emergence of idealized meaning as a slow process of 
desocialization, dematerialization, and decontextualization. Nonetheless, here it is 
important to bear in mind that the idealized meaning is nothing but the 
internalisation of pre-conscious significations of the language of real life. On that 
basis, its origin still remains social, material and context-related.  
Lastly, we have to remember what has been said in Chapter 4. Thảo explained 
material origins of Husserlian noetic-noematic relation in the following way: the 
internalisation of tendential meaning and semiotic intentional relation to mind-
independent thing becomes the noetic act in so far as the real thing becomes the 
intentional noema.  
For a start, the use of gestural indication against the background of social 
relations allows the perception of the external object in its objective externality. As 
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we have seen above, “particular situations arise in which the movement of the sign 
sent by an individual subject is immediately identified with that of the others” (Thảo 
[1973] 1984: 28). In other words, the subject “addresses the sign to himself from the 
others with whom he has just identified himself” (ibid.). Thus, the subject “does 
indeed have the proprioceptive perception of the outlined movement of his hand 
stretching toward the object” (id., p. 22) and then “[tendential] meaning will 
become ideal by detaching itself from the material reality of the signifying act” (id., 
p. 21). As such, “the subject’s act of signifying the real, the material, takes the form 
of an ideal indication or intentional sighting in the informality of lived experience” (id., p. 
22). As is clear from this passage, the origin of Husserlian intentional noetic-
noematic relation as well as the consciousness of the object in its externality has 
been explained thanks to the theory of material and social dynamics conveyed by 
the language of real life. 
And, thus, Thảo stated: 
 
It is only through the transition to consciousness, where [tendential] meaning will 
become ideal by detaching itself from the material reality of the signifying act, that 
the relation of externality will be disengaged as such. The object will then be 
perceived not only as external but also in its objective externality, as existing 
independently of the subject. (id. p. 21) 
 
The pointing must be regarded “as indication to oneself and as the predominant 
form of reciprocal indications” (id., p. 21). Thảo called “objective form of indication” 
(id., p. 7) the signalling behaviour that each one addresses to the others during 
purposive collective cooperative activities. By contrast, the subjective form of 
indication is nothing other than the situation in which the subject addresses the 
gesture to him/herself. In this case, the subject is the actor and the receiver of the 
gesture at once. On that basis, the subject “considers the distance, so to speak, in 
relation to himself” (ibid). 
The inner language develops sophisticated cognitive skills in so far as the 
signifying act is increasingly independent of immediate practical need. In this 
regard, Thảo stated that 
 
It is only through the transition to consciousness, […] And it is precisely in this way 
 244 
that the content of this meaning, that is, the movement toward the object, where 
the distance to be overcome is defined as the relation of externality between the 
subject and the object, is ʻideally presented’ in itself independently of the actual 
motion of the subject’s hand which projected the image of this relation. (id., p. 21-
23) 
 
Since the relation of externality is ideally presented, the meaning of the 
indicative gesture ceases to be a sensory-motor content (tendential image) and 
becomes a proprioceptive content (mental, psychic). Specifically, “the subject’s act 
of signifying the real, the material, takes the form of an ideal indication or intentional 
sighting [visée intentionelle] in the informality of lived experience [intériorité du 
vécu]” (id., p. 22). In this vein, the intentionality becomes a psychic act of 
indication in the “informality” of lived experience. 
Even if traces of bodily-movements are at work in the inner language (see the 
next paragraph for more details), Thảo insisted that the subject “does indeed have 
the proprioceptive perception of the outlined movement of his hand stretching 
toward the object, but this perception is immediately absorbed in this immanent 
environment.” The immanent environment Thảo talked about is the inner experience 
of outlined gestural indication. In the consciousness of the subject, the inner 
language involves a sort of inner exchange of signs which is nothing but the most 
elementary form of inner dialogue. It is the “internal recognition which defines the 
form of lived experience” (id., p. 21). 
The indicative gesture is no more perceived as meaningful in-itself but rather as 
the result of the will of the subject who want to communicate something. The 
signified slowly becomes independent of the signifier because the meaning is now 
at a disposal of the subject. So Thảo wrote that “the ideality of the meaning consists 
in its appearance of being simply carried by the experienced movement of itself, in 
other words, […] ʻindependently’ of the material gesture which, henceforth, seems 
to figure only as ʻdisappearing moment’ ” (id., p. 22). With “disappearing moment” 
Thảo meant the gestural-verbal support of signification that is only outlined or 
sketched-out in the inner language. In the next paragraph, consequently, we 
should take Thảoʼs description of bodily supports of inner language into account in 
great detail. 
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6.5. The Corporeal Components of the Inner Language 
 
Before dealing with Thảoʼs description of bodily supports of inner language, it 
could be useful to remember that he took that issue into account in order to limit 
the pure psychic nature of the idealized meaning. This point must be regarded 
against the background of Thảoʼs criticism of the Saussurean idea of psychic nature 
of signs (see above Chapter 3). 
We must previously note that, as we have seen in the previous paragraph, it 
seems that idealized meaning is partially independent of the movements which 
produce uttered speech. As a consequence, “every meaning, however, once it has 
become conscious can, in principle, be tied to any verbal sign whatsoever” (Thảo 
[1973] 1984: 24). Thus, the idealized meaning could be combined with other signs. 
Thảo made the example of the French word arbre whose signified could be 
combined with the German signifier Baum, the English tree, the Latin arbor, etc. (the 
example is from Saussure [1916] 2011: 65-6632). “The relation of the signifying [le 
signifiant, the signifier] to the signified appears to be a matter of purely arbitrary 
convention” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 24). 
To Thảo, the arbitrary conventions imply the occasional bond between signifier 
and signified. This could be the condition for having perfect word-to-word 
translations, of course. But it means also that all languages share the same 
meanings and all languages are nothing other than nomenclatures. Nevertheless, 
Thảo partially corrected his statement few lines below. To him, “arbitrary 
convention” could concern only verbal linguistic signs in a strict sense. Secondly, a 
careful analysis may show that the relation between signifier and signified is 
tighter than an “arbitrary convention.” To explain the last point, Thảo introduced 
the description of embodied nature of inner speech. 
Firstly, Thảo highlighted that arbitrariness concerns only verbal linguistic signs 
in a strict sense. Once again, Thảo identified systems of arbitrary signs with 
conventional languages (see above Chapter 3). In this case, the conventional nature 
                                                 
32 The example has been extensively discussed: vd. De Mauro in Saussure [1967] 2011: 413-
416. It seems that Thảo regarded the meaning of the fully-fledged language as a 
translinguistic universal concept. Consequently, languages would be nothing but 
nomenclatures. 
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of the bond between signifier and signified is more pronounced than in other cases. 
There are other signs that continue to depend upon some gestural, bodily 
elements: 
 
In reality, however, this is just a specific characteristic of the verbal sign which we 
know does not at all exhaust the material reality of the signifying act. This act 
always includes gestures, which by themselves produce their own tendential 
meaning. The gesture “makes the image,” and in the course of history, it becomes 
more and more representative by taking the operative form of schema, drawing, etc. 
 
Secondly, Thảo suggested that, in the inner speech, the movement usually 
involved in the utterance of verbal signs is merely outlined. To Thảo, the 
materiality of the signifier is still at work even if it is only evoked. And this 
assumption seems to correct Thảo’s previous remark concerning the material 
substrate of signification that in the inner language would be nothing but a 
“disappearing moment”.  In effect, he wrote that “the ideality of consciousness is 
[…] constituted in the actual motion of idealization which immediately implied in 
inner language” and “such an idealization cannot, of course suppress its material 
foundation” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 25). 
To Thảo there is no essential difference between the evoked outline and the 
effective outlined. To support this assumption, he invoked the following 
experiment: 
 
We know that it is possible, by picking up and amplifying the bioelectric currents in 
the forearm, to obtain movements in an artificial hand which result from the 
subject’s mental activity, how own hand remaining motionless. Scientists are 
presently thinking of drawing these currents directly from the motor zone of the 
brain rather than from the effector organs. 
 
On that basis, the evoked outline is limited to nervous system while the effective 
outline involves a slight muscular movement which may also not be externalised. 
As we have seen, what Thảo described in this passage is the so-called phenomenon 
of ideo-motor action (action idéo-motrice). 
To a first approximation, outlined gestures involved in silent pronounced 
speech are the movements of the tongue accompanying inner speech. In this case, 
nonetheless, the outlined movement of the tongue that accompanies the silent 
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pronunciation of a word in the flow of inner language is not enough to determine 
its meaning: “Clearly, when we pronounce a word in inner speech, the outlined 
gesture which accompanies it is not sufficient to determine its meaning as it 
appears to consciousness” (id., p. 24-25). As in uttered speech, the pronunciation of 
words is necessarily accompanied by a wide range of movements of phonic organs 
and other gestures. The movement of the tongue ties with the pronunciation of a 
given word alone cannot convey any kind of meaning in uttered speech. The same 
is true for the inner language.  
The inner speech does not isolate the movement of the tongue from the other 
movements of the phonic organs as well as other bodily gestures that usually 
accompanied the utterance. To Thảo, the verbal silent sign “is itself already 
associated with an ensemble of gestural movements” (id., p. 25). The inner speech 
evokes all these movements even if they are not actually performed. Thảo wrote: 
 
[...] as the gestural component in the material motion of the signifying act of inner 
speech we have not only an actually outlined gesture, but what is more, by virtue of 
an evoked outline, the entire operative system, which allows the definition of the 
meaning of the verbal sign. 
 
As a result, Thảo stated that a verbal sign alone is meaningless without the 
support of the entire operative system of gestural movements. Every utterance is 
meaningful in so far as there is a subconscious system of gestural movements that 
are involved in process of determination of meaning. This subconscious system is 
only evoked or outlined. And the signified cannot be reckoned to be totally 
independent of the material signifier even if this one is only evoked or outlined. 
This assumption explains Thảo’s previous criticism toward the idea of disembodied 
nature of idealized meaning. Nonetheless, we cannot dismiss the fact that both, 
internalisation of tendential meaning and development of idealized meaning, 
entail the consciousness of the ideality of the meaning as an abstract concept 
independent of the support of the body. 
In so far as the inner language entails effective or evoked outlines, it must be 
characterized in terms of the idealized form of effective speech. And given that the 
consciousness is nothing other than “the language that the subject addresses to 
himself” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 16), then the consciousness itself is the idealized form 
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of speech. But attention must be paid. Consciousness “cannot be separated from the 
material movement from which it stands out” (id., p. 27). This material movement 
must be seen, as the same, as the body movement that produces the act of speech. 
So Thảo concluded that consciousness “stands out from the material signifying act 
as a figure ʻstands out’ from its background, without being separated from it” 
(ibid.). 
 
7. Thảo’s Theory of the Inner Language 
 
Thảo’s conception of inner language seems to be one of the main keys to 
describe his theory of language. It could be useful cursory to illustrate this topic 
against the background of both, the history of the notion of “inner language” and 
the epistemological consequences of Thảo’s approach. First, we have to understand 
the core of the issue of inner language beyond the several different ways to 
approach it: thought as dialogue, the silent speech, the link between self-talk and 
self-consciousness, the internalisation/externalisation of language, etc. 
The notion of internal language has been largely debated in the history of 
philosophy (see the bibliography in Puech 2001), at least since Plato’s definition of 
thought as “the talk which the soul has with itself about any subjects which it 
considers” (Theaetetus 189e, English translation by Harold N. Fowler). After him, 
Stoicism introduced the opposition logos endiathetos and logos prophorikos to 
describe the peculiarities of internal and external language. Generally, philosophy 
seems to regard inner language either as the inner form of the external language 
(from Augustin’s sermo interior – which differs from the verbum cordis until Jakobson 
1963) or as the mental language-like structure of thought (from the medieval 
tradition of the gramatica speculativa until Fodor 1975). From this point of view, it 
takes place the alternative between two approaches to the issue: 1) thinking 
presupposes a process of internalisation of external linguistic practices; 2) 
linguistic public practices are the externalisation of inner linguistic structures of 
thought. 
In 1881, the French philosopher Victor Egger (1848–1909) inaugurated the 
treatment of inner language in the field of the new scientific psychology of the 
 249 
19th century (see Egger 1881, Carroy 2001, Bergounioux 2001, and Puech 2001). He 
was in contact with the American psychologist William James and the French 
philosopher Henri Bergson, with whom he largely debated the notion of “stream of 
consciousness” (Roni 2016). Egger insisted that the internal language is not 
subordinated to external language. And to him, the issue of inner language should 
not concern the traditional issues of the relation between language and world, but 
rather the linguistic experience of the speaker. By the way, the term “endophasia” 
(from the Greek endo, in, and phasia, word) was invented in 1892 by the French 
psychologist Georges Saint-Paul (1870–1937; see Saint-Paul 1892).  
In the light of this debate, it seems that the major difficulty – and, at the same 
time, the main fascinating aspect – of the study of inner language lies in the 
contradictory or paradoxical nature of the phenomenon itself. The inner language 
takes place in the confusion between production and reception of speech acts, 
between the speaker and the receiver, where the silent speech evokes a voice 
which has not been emitted, and where the social dimension of speech interacts 
with the individual one. 
Thảo was interested in the genetic origin of thought. His interest is mostly 
philosophical in so far as he described the origin of the concepts, the relation 
between thought and mind-independent reality, the abstract and shared nature of 
reasoning. And then the inner language must be regarded as the material support 
of consciousness and thought. As has been remarked above, to Thảo, inner 
language is nothing but the inner stream of thought and is the result of the 
internalisation of the external and preconscious language of real life.  
To Thảo, the issue of inner language is based on the assumption that the social 
collective activities and the body of the speaker are the preconditions for having 
inner language. As this discussion implies, the inner language is the result of the 
internalisation of the external linguistic practices (the language of real life). It is 
not external language without sounds but rather it is as embodied as the external 
language. To Thảo, inner language depends upon a system of outlined, sketched-
out, and evoked vocalizations and gestures that are the same of external language. 
In inner language, the communicative function of external language still remains – 
even if this function is mostly fictive in the stream of inner language. 
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Consciousness is the point of an iceberg of several psycho-physical phenomena: 
subconscious associations of sketched-out and evoked ideo-motor images, the 
image of the other member of the surrounding environment, and the perceptive 
image of the referential object. 
The topic of the inner speech was largely debated among psychologists. For 
instance, Piaget (1923) wrote that at the developmental level, language as it 
appears at two years is egocentric. This egocentric language then passes through a 
semi-stationary state between 3 and 6 years, to regress after 7 years. The 
egocentric language refers to a language that does not follow the two criteria of 
communication: i) first of all, communication aims to act on the other; ii) 
communication presupposes that each of the two interlocutors distinguishes his 
own point of view from that of the other. To Vygotsky ([1934] 1962), instead, the 
egocentric language would, therefore, be a social tool that the child uses on 
himself. To him, the egocentric language is the verbal form that precedes the inner 
language. Children speak to themselves out loud only because they have already 
been able to speak to others. In this way, the egocentric language and then the 
inner language are the results of the internalisation and refunctionalisation of the 
external language. 
Paradoxically, one could affirm that Thảo’s description of the linguistic skills of 
the child largely depends upon Piaget’s psychology. Like Piaget, Thảo did not 
illustrate the development of language in the child as a kind of internalisation of 
communicative social practices (see below Chapter 9 for more elaborate 
treatment). But Thảoʼs description of the evolution of language seems to be more 
similar to Vygotsky’s approach. But one cannot dismiss the fact that, unlike 
Vygotsky (see Friedrich 2001), Thảo did not consider language and thought as two 
psychological phenomena which have two different origins. 
Before concluding it could be interesting to mention the fact that, recently, the 
Canadian psychologist Alain Morin develops the idea that without internal 
language human beings cannot be conscious. In detail, inner language processes 
information about the mental experience of the self. Interestingly, Morin’s 
hypothesis is that internal language prolongs social exchanges based on languages 
that make the individual aware of existing within a community. So Morin seems to 
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suggest a theory very similar to Thảo’s one since he states:  
 
[…] inner speech makes us aware of what we are experiencing […] our internal 
dialogue is also what makes us aware of our own existence […] Inner speech can 
internalize this mechanism of taking others’ perspective. This means that we can 
engage in self-talk in which we state to real or imaginary persons our motives for 
behaving in a given fashion or for having some personal characteristics. When, in 
response to the expected reactions of others, we explain our actions or describe 
ourselves in self-talk, we take other people’s perspective into consideration and thus 
gain an objective view of ourselves. (Morin 2003: 1-6) 
 
In a more detailed way, Thảo described the inner language as a polyphonic 
dialogue with self and others. But the question arises whether conscious 
experience could be effectively reduced to inner speech and verbal imagery. Now, 
we have to leave that question open. 
For Thảo consciousness does not intervene to determine the signification, at 
least from a genetic standpoint. Consciousness is rather the result of the motion of 
inner language and specifically of the internalisation of the language of the real 
life. In other words, the body of the speaker is the active player and consciousness 
is simply the recognition of the signification produced by the flow of inner 
language. Then, the ideal form of thought becomes conscious even if they continue 
to depend upon the subconscious system of associations of evoked and sketched-
out vocalizations and gestures. But we cannot forget that slowly inner language 
becomes more and more pervasive and influences the external language: “When 
we say that language expresses thought or consciousness, this simply means that 
formulated language expresses generally explicitly and in an externalised way the 
meaning expressed in an outlined and abbreviated manner in internal language” 
(Thảo [1973] 1984: 16). 
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Chapter Seven 
The Origin of our Species and the Evolution of Tool-Making 
 
 
 
[…] the brain of H. habilis had made major advances, 
beyond the more ape-like australopithecine brain. With H. habilis, 
cerebral evolution had progressed beyond the stage of “animal hominids” 
(Australopithecus spp.) to that of “human hominids” (Homo spp.).  
In functional capacity, in particular, its possession of a structural marker  
of the neurological basis of spoken language,  
H. habilis had attained a new evolutionary level of organization.  
(P.V. Tobias) 
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1. Preliminary Remarks 
 
After having described Thảoʼs approach to the study of consciousness, the time 
has come to analyse his own suggestion linking language, consciousness, and 
labour in greater detail. The fact cannot be ignored that Thảo proposed a picture of 
the emergence of consciousness through language and labour which took place in 
the prehistorical past. At this point, therefore, we would like to shift attention to 
Thảoʼs conception of language origins. Thảo did not hesitate to assert that a 
scientific theory of language origins cannot be isolated from investigations into 
material activities of our ancestors. Thảo seems to be convinced that social life and 
material activities evolved at the same time as language. To put it another way, 
Thảoʼs effort was “to think with the help of the concept of praxis, the 
contemporaneous emergence of relations of production and language in the 
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context of action in common, be it the fabrication of tools, hunting, agricultural 
work, or the sexual division of labour” (Lecercle 2006: 146). 
As we have already seen in Chapter 6, language and labour are two aspects of 
the same material behaviour. Thảo gave significant attention to the fact that labour 
is the infrastructure on the basis of which the whole of society is reconstructed. 
The focus on labour implied that material activities should be seen as the 
background against which language emerged. In certain respects, language is 
mainly an instrument of productive activities. Given that labour is immediately 
social, the objectivity of labour in common involves the objective of symbolic 
behaviour. But Thảo did not think of language merely as an instrument of 
communication. Rather it is also the condition of lived experience, as we have 
largely said in previous chapters. And assuming that the immediate reality of 
consciousness is language, it follows that consciousness has material, collective, 
and social origins. As a result, a description of the evolution of practical collective 
activities among our ancestors might allow us suggesting hypotheses on both 
language origins and conscious experience. 
In this connection, we should like to make point of the fact that we have no 
direct evidence of the development of linguistic skills among our ancestors. 
Chapter 9 will be largely devoted to analysing this point. For the time being, suffice 
it to anticipate that, convinced that labour must be regarded as the background 
against which human symbolic behaviour arises, Thảo attempted to work a 
position in which paleoanthropological findings are interpreted as supports for 
describing the development of both symbolic skills and sophisticated forms of 
conscious experience. More exactly, Thảo combined the results of biological or 
physical anthropology, which is the study of biological and behavioural aspects of 
human beings, their related non-human primates and their extinct hominin 
ancestors, and findings of palaeoarchaeology, such as petrified skeletal remains, 
bone fragments, footprints and associated evidence, stone tools, artefacts, and 
settlement localities. To put it another way, Thảoʼs approach did not differ from 
that of current paleoanthropology. Similarly, Thảo had to compare findings which 
come from two different “archives” (Hombert & Lenclud 2014: 254-257). That is, the 
evolution of biological features of human beings whose reconstruction depends 
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upon paleontological archives cannot be confused with the evolution of cultural 
humans whose reconstruction depends upon archaeological evidence. In effect, 
biological innovations do not always correspond to cultural innovations. Put this 
way, the distinction between the two archives should be clear. Unfortunately, 
matters are not quite that simple and, in next paragraphs, we will analyse the way 
Thảo provided an explanation of language origins which was based on the 
comparison between fossils and artefacts. 
In order to understand Thảoʼs theory of language origins, it is then necessary to 
see some of the assumptions on which it was based and proceed to its details, 
including Thảoʼs classification of our ancestors. In the following paragraphs, we 
will first describe the general outlines of Thảoʼs theory. Then we will sketch a 
particular landscape of relationships that have existed between Thảo and some 
paleoanthropologists of the first half of the 20th century. Thus, we will examine 
the scientific background to the ideas espoused by Thảo, along with the analysis of 
Thảoʼs insight into the most recent findings in paleoanthropology at that time. In 
this way, readers are introduced to the main debates of the epoch. Exploring some 
of the most relevant topics concerning our origins will also enable us to 
understand the peculiar way Thảo evaluated the recent findings and hypotheses. 
Doing so will also provide a necessary perspective in order to offer a 
comprehensive analysis of Thảoʼs approach to language origins. 
 
2. The Origins of Language and Consciousness 
 
As mentioned several times before, Thảo was convinced that collective activities 
are the most decisive factor in the evolution of language. In the present paragraph, 
we will introduce the main outlines of Thảoʼs theory of the link between labour and 
language. Some aspects have already been mentioned in previous chapters. Other 
aspects will be taken into account in the following ones. It could look like we repeat 
what we have already said or what we will say later for nothing. Nonetheless, there 
is no question of unnecessary repetition. In fact, the aim of this chapter is to offer 
readers a brief but systematic perspective on Thảoʼs theory of language origins 
which will be useful for appreciating next chapters. We are aware, indeed, that not 
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all readers know the scientific knowledge which was at a disposal of scholars who 
worked in the 1960s. And we know for sure that, as next paragraphs will show, 
Thảoʼs theory largely depended upon that available knowledge. These facts ask us 
to place Thảoʼs theory in the context of the paleoanthropological findings of the 
1960s. This choice should pave the way for understanding Thảoʼs assumptions and 
will also permit us to provide a satisfactory explanation of his conception of 
language origins. Before we address this question, however, we must briefly 
describe the way Thảo emphasised certain aspects of human evolution, along with 
the development of linguistic skills. In order better to understand the peculiar way 
Thảo linked paleoanthropological findings to language evolution, our best advice is 
to take a look at the figure 16. 
As Thảo put it, our most ancient ancestors, i.e. the anthropoids, already used 
natural instrument as objects which satisfy immediate needs. Instruments of this 
kind are the result of the individual work of adaptation (ad hoc instrument-using for 
an immediate purpose). The preparation and use of natural instruments took place 
in front or beside the biological object and finish when the need disappears. 
Similarly, the communication systems of apes and anthropoids, such as cries and 
simple indications, refer to the emotional aspect of the immediate situation. Thảo 
called signs of this kind signs of presentation. In this regard, the evolution of the 
hand considerably changed the living conditions of our ancestors. During the 
recession of tropical forests toward the end of Tertiary Period (2.58 ma; ma: million 
years ago), Thảo wrote, the first examples of Australanthropus (i.e. 
Australopithecus) began to live in groups and to work in coordination to survive 
and adapt themselves to new environmental conditions. The Australanthropus 
prepared and conserved instruments (purposeful instrument-modifying for a future 
eventuality) and got means of subsistence from collective hunting. Those cooperative 
activities required a certain distance between individuals. As a result, 
Australanthropus had to perform guidance gestures.  
By term hominids, it is good to remember, Thảo referred to our species and all 
extinct forms that belonged to the same evolutionary trajectory after the 
appearance of Homo habilis. By the term “pre-hominid”, we refer to species as 
Australopithecus or Australanthropus experienced before the appearance of Homo 
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habilis. 
Prehominids systematically used signs such as guidance gestures and straight-
line gestures. Thảo suggested that “the circular-arc motion […] first appeared in 
phylogenesis” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 5). And that form does not disappear but rather 
“continues to play its role together with the straight-line gesture” (id., p. 5-6). 
Guidance gestures were first referred to objects that were perceptible in the 
surrounding environment. Since the systematic use of guidance gestures had been 
established, those signs began to indicate absent objects of biological needs and 
entailed the cognitive representation of them. To Thảo guidance gestures were 
simultaneously composed of motions of the hand and cries. The qualitative leap 
that marks the emergence of the sign of representation from the simple indication 
depends upon the ability to transcend the limits of present perception. In this 
regard, he stated that “the going beyond the field of presence of present 
perception is already itself objectively given in the social activity of labour, where 
the group broadens its field of action by dividing itself into different sub-groups” 
(id., p. 68).  
During the phylogeny, Thảo stated, the sign of representation emerged at an 
advanced stage of the evolution of our pre-human ancestors (Australanthropus) in 
connection with the Kafuan lithic production (2.6 ma). They began to organize 
collective hunting by dividing the group into two subgroups who followed the 
same game at different distances. They had already at a disposal the simple 
indicative sign (the pointing to the thing itself) to attract the attention of the 
others to the game. But the variation in distances needs that the two subgroups 
exchanged signs which alluded to the game even in the absence of the game within 
the perceptive field of one or another subgroup. The simple indication is not 
enough anymore. The sign of representation was the peculiar way our ancestors 
assured the coordination of their task given the absence of the game. 
Before the emergence of Oldowan industry (2.6–1.7 ka), elaborated instruments of 
Kafuan industry were produced with the systematic help of a second instrument 
(ad hoc instrument-making). The new working situations required a straight-line 
gesture which served to indicate the current work-object as well as everything 
interesting that could function as a possible work object. Thảo’s first purpose was 
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to establish the cognitive function of syncretic words – i.e. the intrinsic signs which 
were simultaneously composed of vocalizations and gestures. Syncretic words, he 
insisted, allowed the most elementary representation of the confused form of the 
object. 
Thảo went on to point out that the functional sentence appeared at the end of the 
Kafuan era. Thảo stated that some contradictions arose between new social 
relations and the older means of communication. Contradictions of this kind take 
the shape of a misunderstanding, “a quid pro quo, in which is reflected the objective 
contradiction between the new relations appearing in collective work, because of 
the development of the instrumental forces and the form of language previously 
acquired” (id., p. 95). As a consequence, under the pressure of practical needs, the 
old form of language is modified. Crucially, the subject was forced to repeat the 
communication in another form. The juxtaposition/association of representative 
signs involved the emergence of first functional sentences. The formation of the 
functional sentence took place during the transition from the Kafuan to the 
Olduvian. Homo habilis was the first human ancestor who performed sentence-like 
vocalizations. 
The development of functional sentences involves the emergence of functional 
names. Thảo’s next step was to describe the transition from the functional name to 
the typical name which took place during the Kafuan era (Lower Palaeolithic: 2.6 
ma–300 ka). To him, the typical name involved a form of representation of the object 
that he calls “typical image” (id., p. 99): this representation could be regarded as a 
prototype of a group of objects and, to be clear, it should not be confused with the 
abstract concept. The typical image served, for instance, as a model for the 
reproduction of instruments. And Thảo highlighted that the palaeoarchaeological 
evidence shows a standardization in the elaboration of instruments during the 
Kafuan (cultural instrument-making). 
After H. habilis, “the transition from the production of the instrument to the 
production of the tool involves the constitution of the sentence, which will be 
realized with the original dialectic of the production forces and the relations of 
production in the development of Homo habilis and his transition to Homo faber” (id., 
p. 141). Thảo largely employed the notion of Pithecanthropus to individuate the 
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first form of the genus Homo after the disappearance of Homo habilis. He wrote that 
“finally the tool which appears at the Chellean, marks the birth, strictly speaking, of 
the genus Homo in the figure of Homo faber (Pithecanthropus).” Chellean industry 
marks the formation of the sentence in the strict sense. And the evolution of 
language is almost over. 
According to Thảo, the signs of the degradation of the technique of stone-
cutting of the early Acheulean industry refer back to social crises provoked by the 
insuffiency of production itself. Before the end of the Lower Palaeolithic, the 
bipedal posture increased the mortality of women (the so-called “Tragedy of 
Women”): the anatomical modification of the pelvis entailed complications during 
childbirth. One of the main consequences of the tragedy of the women was the 
generational asymmetry between men and women in archaic societies until 
Mesolithic (11–8 ka). As a result, tool making was adversely affected by such a 
social crisis. Instead, “the magnificent flowering of tool technique at the late 
Acheulean, which marks the transition from the lower Palaeolithic to the middle 
Palaeolithic, assumes that the social crisis had been resolved” (id., p. 173). As we 
have already said in Chapter 6, at the beginning of the Middle Palaeolithic (300–45 
ka), the gradual emergence of the household industry was the reason for an 
economic development which led to the increase of human longevity. The social 
order corresponding to the first period of Mousterian industry (600–40 ka) is called 
by Thảo proto-gerontocracy. Anthropological data show that H. Neanderthalensis 
disciplined the respect of laws and social order at the End of the Middle 
Palaeolithic and at the beginning of the Upper Pleistocene (126–11.7 ka). In the 
same period, the use of personal pronouns emerged for the first time and speech 
began to be a means to express the own individuality (see above Chapter 6). The 
end of the biological tragedy of women and the stabilization of commercial 
exchanges marks the period called Mesolithic (11–8 ka). When the Upper 
Palaeolithic began (40–10 ka) a new phase began, too, which is the history of our 
species, Homo faber sapiens. 
 
 
 
 259 
3.1. Thảoʼs Theory and Palaeoanthropology Findings 
 
One can ask the extent to which Thảoʼs theory depended upon 
paleoanthropological discoveries taking place in the first half of the 20th century. 
Of course, it is not possible in a limited space to offer a detailed picture of both 
discoveries and debates which had characterized the first century of 
paleoanthropology since its birth in the 19th century. For our purposes, we shall 
skip certain details because we must previously provide the basis for a quick 
examination of Thảoʼs interest in paleoanthropology. Our comments here will 
focus on some dominant traditions in paleoanthropological studies. It is 
remarkable, as we will see, that Thảoʼs theory recovers some elements of the 19th-
century anthropology. Readers who are not at ease with currently available 
knowledge in the field of our origins are invited to take a look at the figure 17. That 
figure allows them to compare Thảoʼs theory and current views on the 
classification of human ancestors, tool-making, and dating. 
To complete this analysis, we will also turn to the main paleoanthropological 
discoveries taking place from 1856 until 1964. Particularly, we should underline the 
great relevance accorded by to the discovery of some fossils dates to 1.75 ma and 
belonging to an early Homo in the Olduvai Gorge (Tanzania) in 1964. 
Needless to say, the precise extent of Thảoʼs interest in paleoanthropology still 
calls for further exploration. It is essential above all to determine the meaning of 
Thảoʼs theory against the background of the 20th-century paleoanthropological 
findings. Locked from the angle of our concerns, the essence of Thảoʼs theory 
comes down to how to link those paleoanthropological findings with Engelsʼ theory 
of the part played by labour in the evolution of our species. And, what is more, we 
shall speak in greater detail of Thảoʼs efforts to suppose the emergence of every 
form of protolanguage on the basis of prehistoric artefacts discovered since the 
middle 19th century. 
We turn now to a closer examination of Thảoʼs conception of modes of tool 
production. As a step toward developing such an overview, we will focus on the 
most relevant findings of the period in question, comparing the corresponding 
suggested labels. As this discussion implies, we can better understand the artefacts 
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the obsolescent names Thảo sometimes employed referred to. After that, we will 
deal mainly with Thảoʼs attempts to demonstrate his own theory of human 
evolution on the basis of artefacts. Then we will go on to look at the reason why 
Thảo had divided the genus Homo into two sub-genera, the man in making (Homo 
habilis) and full-fledged man (from Homo faber primigenius to Homo faber 
sapiens).  
In short, this group of paragraphs is intended only as a preliminary exploration 
of the place of Thảoʼs theory against the background of what is known about our 
origins until the 1960s One can use this as a preliminary means of identifying the 
extent to which Thảoʼs theory of linking of labour with language depended upon 
the available knowledge of his time. Meanwhile, we will be also able to examine the 
way Thảo took sides in the debate on human evolution suggesting hypotheses, 
classifications, and remarks. 
 
3.2. The Missing Link 
 
Thảo largely employed the notion of Pithecanthropus to individuate the first 
form of the genus Homo after the disappearance of Homo habilis. For instance, we 
wrote: “Finally the tool which appears at the Chellean, marks the birth, strictly 
speaking, of the genus Homo in the figure of Homo faber (Pithecanthropus). 
Producing tools presupposes a typical representation of its total shape” (Thảo [1973] 
1984: 47). Some remarks concerning the notion of Pithecanthropus may be useful 
in order better to understand some assumptions of Thảoʼs theory.  
At the end of the 19th century, some scholars largely influenced by Darwinian 
theory, among which we could mention the Dutch paleoanthropologist Eugène 
Dubois (1858–1940), were determined to find the missing link between apes and 
humans, the so-called Pithecanthropus, half-man, half-ape (from the Greek πίθηκος 
and ἄνθρωπος). Remarkably Dubois himself found some fossils in the Island of Java 
which he classified as Pithecanthropus erectus (todayʼs scholars regarded those 
fossils as examples of Homo erectus). In 1912 Charles Dawson (1864–1916) announced 
surprising finds in Sussex near Piltdown (England). He called the fossil Eoanthropus 
dawsoni. The Pithecanthropus was actually discovered. However, we know that it 
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was a paleoanthropological hoax. It was found to have consisted of the altered 
mandible and some teeth of an orang-utan deliberately combined with the cranium 
of a fully developed, though small-brained, modern human. The fraud has been 
uncovered only in 1953! But it is necessary to mention this fact in order better to 
understand the paradigm of the epoch. At the end of the 19th century, scholars 
were convinced that the modern humans were the result of the evolution of apes 
through a half-man and half-ape ancestor. Or, to put it another way, they were 
convinced to find an ancestor with an ape-like body and a human-like brain. 
Like Thảo before us, we know that the bipedal gait has been the precondition for 
having a bigger brain. In his words: “It is essential to note that the fundamental 
change does not consist here in the general acquisition of bipedal gait, but of bipedal 
gait insofar as it liberates the hand” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 204, footnote 12). This 
assumption largely depended upon Engelsʼ theory of evolution:  
 
First, owing to their way of living which meant that the hands had different 
functions than the feet when climbing, these apes began to lose the habit of using 
their hands to walk and adopted a more and more erect posture. This was the decisive 
step in the transition from ape to man. (MEW XX: 444; trans. in Engels 1934) 
 
To Engels and Thảo, bipedal gait is the preconditions for having tool-making as 
stable behaviour. Given that for them, the labour played the leading role in human 
evolution, as a result, they emphasised the role of bipedal gait. They did not reason 
that the missing link between anthropoids and humans should have a great brain. 
They simply affirmed that that intermediary creature should walk with two feet 
and then produce some types of instrument. The core of their proposal did not 
concern the role played by cognition, but rather the role played by tool-making in 
human evolution. What is characteristic of humans is not the brain, but labour. 
Interestingly, that Thảo affirmed that at the end of the Tertiary Period took 
place a recession of tropical forests. As a result, the first examples of 
Australanthropus (i.e. Australopithecus) began to live in groups and to work in 
coordination to survive and adapt themselves to new environmental conditions. If 
we translate Thảoʼs words in a more recent formula, we can state during the 
Pliocene, which is the second and youngest epoch of the Neogene Period (23.03 
ma–2.58 ma), the global climate cooled considerably culminating in a series of 
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continental glaciations in the Quaternary Period that follows. In response to the 
cooler climate, tropical plants lost their leaves and many forests are replaced by 
grasslands. Evidence suggests that early prehominids appeared in Africa near the 
end of the period. Surprisingly Thảoʼs hypothesis is still largely accepted by 
scholars (cf. Manzi 2017: 118). But today we know that earlier species of human 
ancestors had already appeared. 
Thảo did not dismiss the idea that there has been an intermediary form between 
anthropoids and humans. In his words: “Prehominid development, strictly 
speaking, which prepared for the appearance of genus Homo in the form of Homo 
habilis, must be placed in the first part of the lower Pleistocene with perhaps a notch in 
the end of the Pliocene: this is the intermediary stage which leads to the transition 
from ape to man” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 205, footnote 12). To him, however, 
Pithecanthropus was not seen as the intermediary stage between ape and man. 
Thảo regarded Australopithecus as the “missing” link between the anthropoids and 
hominids. In other words, Australopithecus is the first form of the prehominid 
stage (prehominids are extinct humanlike primates, Prehominidae): “Marxist 
anthropological research has established the existence of a prehominid stage, 
notably represented by the remains of Australopithecus” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 4; he 
mentioned Iakimov 1964). Some remarks are needed. Precisely in order to 
understand Thảoʼs theory of intermediate species between anthropoids and 
hominids, it is essential to take issues relating to the history of the findings 
corresponding to Australopithecus into account. 
 
3.3. The Australopithecus 
 
In 1925, the anatomist Raymond Dart (1893–1988) called Australopithecus 
africanus the fossil of a skull he found one year before in South Africa. The fossils 
show the existence of a creature whose skull was similar to those of apes. But, most 
remarkably, that creature walked with two feet. Thảo couldnʼt know that one year 
after the publication of ILC, the American paleoanthropologist Donald Johanson 
(born in 1943) found the fossils of well-known Australopithecus afarensis Lucy in 
Ethiopia (3.2 ma). One year after, in 1975, other 200 fragmented fossils have been 
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found in the same region and in 1976 some footprints belonging to Australopithecus 
afarensis have been discovered in Laetoli (Tanzania) by archaeologist Mary Leakey 
(1913–1996). The discovery of the 1970s allowed scholars to situate the existence of 
forerunner of humanity around 4 ma. 
In any case, Australopithecus bipedal posture and the use of instruments 
allowed Thảo to suggest a new label for those fossils:  
 
The traditional designation of Australopithecus becomes difficult to maintain from 
the moment that this group is separated from the Pongid family in order to connect 
it to that of the Hominids. Bunak suggests Protanthropus and Leroi-Gourhan, 
Australanthropus. In what follows we will generally use the name of Australanthropi 
since they seem to have developed primarily in the southern and western part of 
Africa. (Thảo [1973] 1984: 204, footnote 11) 
 
To Thảo, we can suppose that the first form of indicative gestures and thus the 
first form of consciousness emerged among Australopitheci. In effect, they were 
able to walk with two feet and produced some types of instruments: “It is thus at 
this level that we must look for the original form of consciousness, such as it arose 
in the course of the development of tool-using activity, which, rooted in animal 
evolution, brings about the transition to humanity” (id., p. 4). Or, in other words, 
“with the transition from the anthropoid ancestor to prehominid 
(Australopithecus or Australanthropus) at about the end of the Tertiary or 
Quaternary, we may consider the form of the sign to have become an acquired 
form of behaviour” (id., p. 36). As a consequence of the role played by labour in 
human evolution, the intermediary creature should walk with two feet, produce 
tools, and show an elementary form of language and consciousness. 
Thảoʼs assumption of the existence of a missing link between anthropoids and 
hominids, the so-called prehominid stage, like the previous assumption concerning 
the erect posture, largely depended upon Engelsʼ theory. Engels wrote:  
 
The first operations for which our ancestors gradually learned to adapt their hands 
during the many thousands of years of transition from ape to man could have been 
only very simple ones. The lowest savages, even those in whom regression to a more 
animal-like condition with a simultaneous physical degeneration can be assumed, 
are nevertheless far superior to these transitional beings [Übergangsgeschöpfe]. 
(MEW XX: 445; trans. in Engels 1934). 
 
 264 
In short, Engelsʼ theory largely depended upon some assumptions of the 19th-
century anthropology. In turn, Thảoʼs theory was largely based on those Engelsʼ 
assumptions, for better or for worse. This is one of the reasons why it is not 
surprising that Thảoʼs theory shows some old-fashioned elements which were 
proper of the previous century. Nevertheless, Thảo did not simply embrace those 
positions. Viewed from the perspective of contemporary anthropology, central 
claims of Thảoʼs theory appeared largely debated in the 1950s and 1960s. 
In the 1930s, some scholars such as Ernst Mayr (1904–2005) began to combine 
Mendelian genetics and Darwinian Theory of natural selection. The result has been 
the so-called modern synthetic theory of evolution. The only point we need to note for 
now is that the modern synthesis drew an analogy between the broad-scale 
changes of macroevolution and the small-scale microevolution of local populations 
of living organisms. In this way, gradual changes we can observe within local 
populations may be seen also in macroevolution. As a result, the idea that humans 
evolved gradually gained strength. To minimise confusion, let think about the 
image of the sequence of anthropoids and hominids which we can easily see in 
several handbooks or on t-shirts. Over the course of the period in question, 
scholars largely employed notions such as hominization and sapientization. Those 
notions show very well an approach to human evolution that assumes the dogma 
of the only one species: there is only a species constantly evolving.  
It is remarkable that Thảoʼs theory recovers some elements of the 19th-century 
anthropology. Nonetheless, it is clear, that Thảo largely accepted the idea of the 
gradual and unilineal evolution of the human species which has been suggested 
also in the first half of the 20th century. In the sense, it might be that he had also 
been largely influenced by the 1950s and 1960s theories of evolution. For example, 
the idea of hominization may be said to be a specific factor of Thảoʼs theory. In his 
words: “The major reason for this is that the liberation of the hand resulting from 
the adaptation of the foot to erect posture, constitutes the decisive step which 
opens the way to hominization” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 205, footnote 12). The main 
consequence of such an assumption is the risk of teleology: the belief that purpose 
and design control our evolution. Meanwhile, teleology involves a certain degree of 
anthropocentrism, of course. 
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During the 1950s, another one remarkable trend needs to be highlighted. The 
hundreds of labels employed to classify fossils hominids have been sharply 
criticised (see Mayr 1950; Campbell 1965). They had been replaced by a distinction 
between two genres: Australopithecus and Homo. Put this way, we can also 
understand some remarks set out by Thảo at the end of the chapter devoted to 
syntax: 
 
The genus Homo thus comprises two sub-genera: habilis and faber. Such a division 
enables us at the same time to get rid of the artificial opposition invented by 
philosophers between ‘Homo faber’ and ‘Homo sapiens’. In fact, as sub-genus, Homo 
faber extends from Chellean man, Homo faber primigenius (Pithecanthropus) to man of 
the present type, Homo faber sapiens. (Thảo [1973] 1984: 141) 
 
Today we know that human evolution has been a branched manifold process. 
And todayʼs scholars have identified 20 species at least. But Thảo was convinced 
that the sequence of sub-genera and species was less sophisticated. After 
Australopithecus, we can observe the emergence of the genus Homo. This genus 
can be divided into two sub-genera: Homo habilis and Homo faber. The second one is 
composed of Homo faber primigenius, i.e. an earlier form of our species, and our 
species. Like the German anatomist and physical anthropologist Franz Weidenreich 
(1873–1948) before him in the 1940s, Thảo collected under the same category 
(Homo faber primigenius) the Pithecanthropus and the Sinanthropus (cf. Thảo 
[1973] 9184: 170; Thảo mentioned Weidenreich: cf. Thảo [1973] 1984: 37). We have 
already talked about the Pithecanthropus erectus discovered by Dubois in on the 
island of Java (Indonesia) between 1891 and 1892. Discovered in China between 
1923 and 1927, the Sinanthropus (Homo erectus pekinensis) was probably the author 
of the contiguous findings of animal remains and evidence of fire and tool usage, as 
well as the manufacturing of tools. What interests us is that by Homo faber 
primigenius we should then understand Homo erectus. Instead, Thảo called our 
species Homo faber sapiens, i.e., what today we call H. sapiens. To him, the 
productive activities determine taxonomy. But letʼs step back for a moment and 
focus on Homo habilis. 
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3.4. The Olduvai Gorge and the Discovery of Homo habilis 
 
 Thảoʼs articles of 1960s, which constituted the core of ILC, show very well the 
fact that Thảo was aware of the most recent findings and particularly had 
understood the meaning of cultural remains discovered in the Olduvai Gorge (cf. 
Thảo [1973] 1984: 36, 130, 162, 166, 169, 205-6, 209, 211). Since 1931, Louis (1903–
1972) and Mary Leakey (1913–1996) were searching for traces of human evolution 
in the Olduvai or Olduwai Gorge (Tanzania). At the beginning, they found several 
stone tools associated with the Oldowan lithic industry and eventually also the 
toolmaker was found. In 1960, Mary recovered some fossils dates to 1.75 million 
years old and belonging to an early Homo. In 1964, Phillip Tobias, John Napier, 
Louis Leakey called that group of fossils Homo habilis (see Leakey, Tobias & Napier 
1964; Thảo mentioned this relevant article: cf. Thảo [1973] 1984: 206). Most experts 
assume the intelligence of H. habilis were more sophisticated than 
Australopithecus also because H. habilis brain size was on average 50% larger than 
that of the Australopithecus. Nonetheless, how Thảo highlighted, the brain of H. 
sapiens (or H. faber sapiens – as he called our species) is incomparably bigger and 
more sophisticated of that of H. habilis. This fact implied that “Homo habilis has 
not yet crossed the famous ‘cerebral Rubicon’” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 37). 
According to Thảo, as a result of those studies concerning the “rudimentary 
stone-cutting technique” discovered in Olduvai Gorge, “with the appearance of 
Homo habilis” emerged “the first form of productive labour” (id., p. 36). He was also 
aware of the debate concerning the classification of H. habilis (cf. id, 36-37): since 
the 1960s, there has been a scholarly debate regarding its placement in the genus 
Homo rather than the genus Australopithecus. For Thảo, to solve the conundrum, 
we should explore more to what extent tool-making was sophisticated than 
morphological data. In his words:  
 
Production, however, appears here only in a partial, or, so to speak, embryonic form. 
As a producer, Homo habilis went beyond the intermediary stage of ape to man [the 
stage of the Australopithecus]. But as a producer of instruments, not tools, he still 
remains only a “man in the making”. He, therefore, still belongs to the gestation 
period of which he will be the final stage, and which will end with “fully-fledged 
man”, producer of tools. At the Olduvian stage, man in the making, like a fetus in its 
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mothers’ womb, developed within the limits of natural existence only; he was not 
yet a worker. However, he possessed the ability of the first initiator of the pro-
ductive act, the ability to be a “jack-of-all-trades” of which we can have a pretty fair 
idea, considering the abundance and variety of his kinds of instruments. The creator 
of the Olduvian period thus fully deserves his name of Homo habilis. (id., p. 46) 
 
To explain, Thảo was proposing “to elevate Homo habilis to the rank of a sub-
genus” (id., p. 140). Thus, he had no doubt that H. habilis can be classified as a 
Homo: “the genus Homo thus comprises two sub-genera: habilis and faber” (ibid.). 
To him, H. habilis stone tools “implied the presence of an ideal image representing 
the typical shape to be imposed upon the material” (id., p. 36). On the level of 
consciousness, it means that H. habilis had at a disposal “the representation of the 
absent biological need situation” and “typical representation of the instrumental shape, 
as shape of the useful part of the instrument” (id., p. 48). In other words, a rudiment of 
abstract thinking arose among H. habilis. On the level of language, the stage of H. 
habilis corresponded to that of sentence formation (cf. id., p. 131). We repeat: “the 
transition from the production of the instrument to the production of the tool 
involves the constitution of the sentence, which will be realized with the original 
dialectic of the productive forces and the relations of production in the 
development of Homo habilis and his transition to Homo faber” (id., p. 141). 
Remarkably, Thảo was not the only one, who argued for the existence of 
linguistic capabilities among H. habilis. The same scholar who took part in giving 
its name to that species, the South African palaeoanthropologist Phillip Tobias 
(1925–2012), advanced the view that H. habilis had extreme brain lateralization. To 
him, the left hemisphere of H. habilis endocrania shows the first development of 
Brocaʼs and Wernickeʼs areas, which are notably the areas devoted to language (see 
Tobias 1987). Thus, he “suggested that a structural change of the brain began with A. 
africanus, which exhibited an incipient development of Brocaʼs area, would have 
consolidated with H. habilis” (Cela-Conde & Ayala 2007: 347). A remark is however 
needed. Tobias did not explicitly argue for linguistic capabilities among H. habilis 
until 1991 (cf. Tobias 1991), while Thảo judged that H. habilis was able to perform a 
kind of language already at the end of the 1960s. 
Maybe Thảo set out his hypothesis a bit prematurely. But he was not alone. For 
instance, in 1969, the American physical anthropologist Ralph Leslie Holloway Jr. 
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(born in 1935) suggested the emergence of language among the tool-makers of 
Olduway on the basis of the cognitive skills required to produce choppers. While 
Tobiasʼs analysis depended upon morphological data, Thảo and Holloway chose 
another way of thinking. In Hollowayʼs words:  
 
For my part, I believe that Australopithecus, or whoever made the Oldowan choppers, 
was human and possessed culture. The stone tools will not “tell” us precisely how 
the hominid organized his experience; they “tell” us that he possessed a cognitive 
structure necessary for language, a structure harmonious with language. (Holloway 
1969: 407). 
 
In short, Thảoʼs theory of language origins focused on H. habilis above all. The 
influence of Leakeyʼs family upon Thảoʼs hypothesis was almost immeasurable. 
This could become particularly clear if we compare Thảoʼs sequence of species with 
that suggested by Spirkin, which was one of the main sources of Thảo. It should be 
thus useful to anticipate Spirkinʼs description of human evolution, along with his 
theory of the formation of language (see Chapter 8 for more details): 
 
i. Australopithecus: our pre-human ancestors inherited a set of vocalizations which 
was the support of the development of human verbal language (Spirkin 1966: 
29); imitation and onomatopoeias (cf. id., p. 29, 32-33); vocal signals which 
syncretically meant actions, phenomena, emotions, etc. (cf. id., p. 37). 
ii. Sinanthropus: gestures and unarticulated polysemic vocalizations to 
communicate representations and perceptions concerning the surrounding 
environment during collective cooperative activities (cf. id., p. 39); context-
related communication (cf. id., p. 51). 
iii. H. Neanderthalensis: vocalizations which referred to absent objects (cf. id., p. 
42-43); the paratactic juxtaposition of vocalizations in order to reproduce the 
relations between things (cf. id., p. 54). 
iv. Cro-Magnon: articulated speech, sentences, morphological inflexion (cf. id., p. 
36). 
v. H. sapiens: fully-formed articulated language and general abstract concepts (cf. 
id., p. 63); rational thought (cf. id., p. 63); comparison between the own 
thought with the opinions of the others, emergence of self-consciousness (cf. 
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id., p. 64). 
 
Apparently, Spirkin ignored the discoveries of Olduwai. And the absence of H. 
habilis in the previous sequence led Spirkin to suggest that Neanderthal Man was 
the first human ancestor to develop abstract thought. Simultaneously Spirkin 
regarded Sinanthropus as the immediate follower of Australopithecus. As a 
consequence Neanderthal Man must be reckoned to be at the heart of Spirkinʼs 
theory, while Thảo largely denied every substantial linguistic development in 
Neanderthal Man. 
For our purposes, it is important to emphasise that Thảo mentioned the notion 
of “werdender Mensch” (man in the making). This notion can be well understood if 
one also introduces the corresponding notion of fertiger Mensch (full-fledged man). 
In this case, too, we should mention the influence of Engelsʼ Dialectics of nature 
(MEW XX: 446-447). The concept of werdender Mensch covers a period of human 
evolution which connects our prehominid ancestors to us. During this period, 
according to Engels, our ancestors slowly began to use instruments, speaking, 
collectively hunting, cooperate, and so on. The dialectical law of the transition of 
quantity into quality dominates Engelsʼ insight about evolution. As Graham (1987: 
50) explains, to Engels “in the course of natural selection, different species 
developed from common ancestors; this transition could be considered an example 
of accumulated quantitative changes resulting in a qualitative change, the latter 
change being marked by the moment when the diverging groups could no longer 
interbreed.” In Engelsʼ words: “First labour, after it and then with it speech – these 
were the two most essential stimuli under the influence of which the brain of the 
ape gradually changed into that of man, which, for all its similarity is far larger and 
more perfect” (MEW XX: 448; trans. in Engels 1934). As a result, accumulated 
quantitative changes of this kind involved the emergence of the fertige Mensch, the 
full-fledged man. As we have seen, to Thảo, the accumulation of quantitative 
changes in tool production took place during the development of H. habilis. Like 
Engels before him, Thảo regarded language and instrumental activities as the 
preconditions for cerebral development: 
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It is clear that the soaring cerebral development of Homo faber primigenius came 
essentially not from foetation, but rather from the development of instrumental 
activity, which, at the end of the stage of Homo habilis, tended to reach a qualitatively 
superior form with the transition from the production of the instrument to the 
production of the tool. (Thảo [1973] 1984: 163) 
 
This periodization coincides completely with our own conclusions drawn from the 
analysis of child language, according to which the stage of Homo faber primigenius, 
full-fledged man, corresponds with the child’s fully constituted sentence at age 2. 
(id., p. 150) 
 
In this vein, we understand the reason why Thảo had divided the genus Homo 
into two sub-genera, the man in making (Homo habilis) and full-fledged man (from 
Homo faber primigenius to Homo faber sapiens). The transition from the former to 
the latter is marked by cerebral development (the so-called cerebral Rubicon) as a 
consequence of instrumental activities and language. The main disadvantage of 
this approach is the idea of the slow transition as a unilineal sequence of species. 
Interestingly, according to Engels and Thảo, the link between instrumental 
activities and cerebral development depends upon meat diet: 
 
hunting and fishing presuppose the transition from an exclusively vegetable diet to 
the concomitant use of meat, and this is another important step in the process of 
transition from ape to man. A meat diet contained in an almost ready state the most 
essential ingredients required by the organism for its metabolism. […] The meat diet, 
however, had its greatest effect on the brain, which now received a far richer flow of 
the materials necessary for its nourishment and development, and which, therefore, 
could develop more rapidly and perfectly from generation to generation. (MEW XX: 
449; trans. in Engels 1934) 
 
This assumption is interesting because some todayʼs scholars agree with that 
reasoning (Manzi 2017: 40). Nonetheless, we must underline that, of course, H. 
habilis was a scavenger of the Savannah while Australopithecus still had a 
vegetarian diet. Homo ergaster was probably the first one of our ancestors to apply 
hunting strategies. By contrast, for Thảo Australopithecus already tried to 
collectively hunt. It could be useful to remember that this view was popular in the 
1950s and 1960s. Raymond Dart, who had discovered the fossils of the 
Australopithecus africanus, has been one of the first scholars who associated 
collective hunting with the most ancient phases of our evolution (cf. Dart 1953; for 
more details, cf. Giusti 1994: 75). It may also be useful to remember that, in the 
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same period, many anthropologists worked on peoples of hunter-gatherers who, 
according to their opinions, lived in conditions closer to those of our ancestors. 
The results of those investigations were presented during a symposium organized 
by the Canadian anthropologist Richard Lee (born in 1937) Man the Hunter in 1966 
(for more details, cf. Giusti 1994: 76). 
 
4.1. Tool-making in the Pleistocene: the Kafuan 
 
The time has now come to say a few words about Thảoʼs theory of modes of tool 
production. Readers who are not at ease with currently available knowledge in the 
field are invited to take a look at figure 18. To understand Thảoʼs analysis, it is 
necessary first to see some of the discoveries on which his assumptions were based. 
In 1872, the French archaeologist Louis Laurent Gabriel de Mortillet (1821–1898) 
published a classification of the artefacts discovered in Europe using their dwelling 
place and their associated artefacts: Chellean, Mousterian, Solutrean, Magdalenian, 
Robenhausen. On that basis, the label of the Modes of Palaeolithic refers to the first 
disposal site where those artefacts have been discovered. That does not mean that 
the artefacts discovered first are also the most ancient or the most representative. 
Since we are dealing with documents of human activity, none of the terms 
employed to classify the technologies of Pleistocene is to be confused with 
subdivisions of time. There are, in fact, vast overlaps between the various 
technologies of the Palaeolithic and substantial interregional variability. Above all, 
there is no precise relationship with the different human species. As a matter of 
fact, the production of more elementary tools can survive and coexist with the 
production of more sophisticated instruments. 
Today, the artefacts discovered in Olduvai Gorge give the name of a mode of 
tool-making, the Oldowan or Mode 1. Tools of this kind were produced during the 
Lower Palaeolithic era (2.6 million years ago up until 1.7 ma) by ancient hominids 
across much of Africa, South Asia, the Middle East and Europe. We have largely 
described Thảoʼs fascination with Oldowan artefacts. According to Thảo, before the 
emergence of Oldowan tradition, we should assume a previous stage he called 
Kafuan, i.e. a Lower Pleistocene culture of Uganda typified by crudely chipped 
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pebble tools. In 1919, Edward James Wayland (1888–1966) had discovered a lithic 
industry, in the stone assemblages collected from the terraces of the River Kafu in 
Uganda. Kafuan became established in the archaeological literature during the 
1930s–1950s. After the discovery of Oldowan tradition, by the end of the 1950s, the 
Kafuan had almost disappeared from the literature and had tacitly ceased to exist 
(see de la Torre 2011). To point the fact, some scholars hold that the early stages of 
the Kafuan cannot be regarded as evidence of workmanship (see Clark 1958 and 
Bishop 1959). Meanwhile, the more advanced Kafuan artefacts were understood to 
be very close to the Oldowan. As a result, the Oldowan was becoming central in the 
debate about the earliest cultural evidence in Africa. Thảo was aware of difficulties 
of this kind: “The absence of any typical shape, even on the useful side, makes 
these pieces difficult to distinguish from natural instruments, and some authors 
attribute a purely physical origin to them” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 41). Nonetheless, to 
Thảo, the label of Kafuan should be safeguarded in so far as it serves to define the 
instrumental activities which were characteristic of the transition from ape to 
Homo habilis (Oldowan). In his words: 
 
The elaborated instrument  (Kafuan) characterizes the second phase of the transition 
stage. The work of elaboration presupposes, on the one hand, a representation of the 
absent object of biological need and, on the other hand, a syncretic representation of the 
instrumental shape. (id., p. 47) 
 
We should add that Thảo argued that the existence of a creature corresponding 
to Kafuan is merely hypothetical: “Up to now, we have not yet found any bones 
that would allow us to picture concretely the Australanthropi who evolved from 
the second stage of prehominid development. Prehistoric pieces, however, 
classified as Kafuan […], can serve as proof of their existence” (id., p. 41). In short, 
Thảo had to admit the existence of Kafuan as a peculiar form of instrumental 
production in order to link the evolution of Kafuan stones “to the Olduvian type” 
(id., p. 44). For him, “semi-shaping that we can observe on the edge of the Kafuan” 
(id., p. 78) “was the fundamental condition for the development of the typical 
shape, which marks the first beginnings of productive labour with the transition 
from the Kafuan to the Olduvian” (id., p. 107). And this stage corresponds to 
“genesis of the functional sentence” (id., p. 98). 
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4.2. Tool-making in the Pleistocene: the Chellean 
 
At this point, we would like to shift attention to more sophisticated modes of 
production Thảo regarded as peculiar of Homo faber primigenius 
(Pithecanthropus). To him, “the production of the tool will first appear with the 
Chellean biface. Then only will man actually detach himself from nature, to emerge 
in the world of culture, as Homo faber” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 46). Chellean is a 
currently obsolescent name for a tool tradition which first examples have been 
discovered in Europe during the 19th century. In this connection, we should like to 
make a special point of the history of that label. 
Between 1836 and 1846, further examples of hand-axes had already been 
collected near Abbeville in northern France. The so-called Abbevillian tool 
tradition is now labelled as Olduwan. Similarly, in the town of Chelles, a suburb of 
Paris, some artefacts had been discovered in the same period. They had been called 
Chellean. Given that they are similar to those found at Abbeville, anthropologists 
substituted the label Abbevillian for Chellean. The artefacts discovered in Chelles are 
now grouped with the Acheulean industry, while the label Chellean, in the sense of 
earliest hand-axe culture, has been replaced by Abbevillian industry and then by 
Olduwan industry. 
After the Mode 1 or Olduwan, during the Lower Palaeolithic, another mode of 
tool production emerged across Africa and much of West Asia, South Asia, and 
Europe: the so-called Acheulean or Mode 2 (since 1.5 ma). Contrarily to Olduwian 
tools (or chopping-tools), which continued to be produced largely after 1.5 ma, 
Acheulean tools were worked symmetrically and on both sides. But before the 
discoveries of Olduvai Gorge, Acheulean artefacts discovered in Europe were seen 
as the most ancient ones. As we have already had occasion to note, De Mortilletʼs 
classification depended upon 19th-century European findings. Those European 
artefacts were found in 1859 near Saint-Acheul, a suburb of Amiens (France) and 
have been labelled as Acheulean. Those artefacts are seen as the oldest occurrence 
in Europe of a bifacial (hand axe) technology. In effect, today we know that the 
earliest user of Acheulean tools was Homo ergaster or Homo erectus, who first 
appeared about 1.8 ma so that we know that Acheulean originated in Africa and 
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spread to Asian, Middle Eastern, and European areas. Instead, the European 
Acheulean artefacts are more recent of those found in Africa. 
According to Thảo, Chellean industry preceded the Acheulean one: “during the 
Chellean period we notice that a perfecting of bifaces takes place. At the end of the 
Chellean, the first improvements in flake tools appear. With the transition to the 
Acheulean period the oval bifaces, the first pointed implements, and scrapers 
appear” (id., p. 169). In other words, the Chellean culture replaced the Olduvai (pre-
Chellean) culture and was in turn replaced by Acheulean culture. It is also 
instructive to note that for Thảo Chellean period began at the beginning of the 
Middle Pleistocene (cf. id., p. 169). As a result, the Mode 2 or Acheulean was not a 
mode of tool production which first appeared during the Lower Pleistocene, as we 
know nowadays. As far as Thảoʼs classification of modes of tool production is 
concerned, it is worth pointing out, quite apart from the fact that his classification 
largely depended upon the findings of his epoch, his classifications shed light on 
universal stages following a unilineal evolution. He absolutely did not understand 
that each culture can overlap in time with others, not necessarily linearly related. 
This fact depended upon Thảoʼs belief of the dialectical evolution by stages of the 
genus Homo. And he ignored the fact that the production of more elementary tools 
can survive and thus there are vast overlaps between the various technologies of 
the Palaeolithic. We repeat: there is no precise relationship with the different 
human species. 
 
4.3. Tool-making in the Pleistocene: the Acheulean 
 
Mode 3 technology (160 ka–40 ka) emerged towards the end of Acheulean 
dominance and involved the Levallois technique, most famously exploited by the 
Mousterian industry associated primarily with Neanderthals. The Levallois 
technique, from the French site where it was first identified, is a very complex 
method of tool production that gives the object a predetermined form. The label 
Mousterian depended upon the site of Le Moustier, a rock shelter in the Dordogne 
region of France. Mousterian artefacts show a certain degree of predetermination 
of the end result. In 1856, in the German Neander Valley (in German Neanderthal) 
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near Düsseldorf, fossils of an archaic human were discovered the binomial label 
Homo Neanderthalensis was first proposed by the Anglo-Irish geologist William King 
in 1864. It was evident, however, that Homo Neanderthalensis cannot be 
considered the missing link between apes and humans. Homo Neanderthalensis 
skull was too similar to that of humans. 
In 1907 in Germany, a jew of a more ancient ancestor had been found. The fossil 
had been called Homo heidelbergensis (500 ka). Nonetheless, the vast majority of 
Homo heidelbergensis fossils have been found for the past 30 years. It is thus not 
surprising that Thảo did not mention this extinct species of the genus Homo that 
lived in Africa, Europe and western Asia between 600 ka and 200 ka. This point 
becomes particularly relevant when we consider that, according to Thảo, we 
should have the following sequence of species: Sinanthropus (early Acheulean), 
Acheulean Man, Neanderthal Man. Who was the Acheulean Man? Nowadays we 
might suppose that Homo heidelbergensis produced tools of the Mode 2 and 
probably exported the Mode 2 to Europe around 600 ka (cf. Manzi 2017: 86-87). To 
put it another way, Homo heidelbergensis could have been a good candidate for the 
role of Acheulean Man. But the matter is not quite that simple. Here too, we should 
remember that Thảoʼs classifications were based upon dating different from our 
own.  
Additionally, we propose to consider Homo ergaster as a better candidate for the 
role of Acheulean Man. H. ergaster lived in eastern and southern Africa during the 
early Pleistocene (1.9 ma–1.4 ma). Remarkably the existence of this species has 
been emphasised only in the 1970s when the binomial name was published in 1975 
by Colin Groves (born in 1942) and Vratislav Mazák (1937–1987). The specific 
epithet, ergaster, is derived from the Ancient Greek ἐργαστήρ ergastḗr – workman, 
in reference to the advanced lithic technology developed by the species, i.e. the 
Acheulean industry. Thảo could not have any knowledge of H. ergaster in the 
1960s, of course.  
We can now mention another one fact that shows to what extent Thảoʼs was 
largely oriented by available knowledge. The fossils of Sinanthropus Thảo referred 
to had been discovered between 1923 and 1927 during excavations at Zhoukoudian 
(Chou Kʼou-tien or Choukoutien) near Beijing. In 2009, this group of fossil 
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specimens were dated from roughly 750 ka (see Shen et alii 2009). For Thảo, 
however, those fossils were dated from 400 ka (cf. Thảo [1973] 1984: 170). For this 
reason, to him, Acheulean is a relatively recent mode of production. Once again, we 
know that the production of more elementary tools can be a common practice of 
more than one species and can survive and coexist with the production of more 
sophisticated instruments. But in Thảoʼs time, this fact was not quite evident yet. 
Anyhow, Thảoʼs goal was to demonstrate that the signs of the degradation of 
stone-cutting techniques of the early Acheulean Man refer back to a social crisis 
provoked by the increase of production itself. In his words: “The undifferentiated 
structure of the original community began to be a fetter to the development of the 
productive forces” (ibid.). To him, “the use of fire and of little flaked tools had led 
to the formation of a household industry” and consequently 
 
The damages caused to the community by the seduction of the housewives entailed 
violent reactions against the guilty, which created on the whole a permanently 
strained atmosphere, with frequent quarrels; this is where we can find the 
explanation for the astonishing loss of quality in lithic tools observed in many 
camps of the early Acheulean. 
 
Instead, “the magnificent flowering of tool technique at the late Acheulean, 
which marks the transition from the lower Paleolithic to the middle Paleolithic, 
assumes that the social crisis had been resolved” (id., p. 173; see Chapter 6 for more 
elaborate treatment). In short, Thảo suggested an anthropological hypothesis on 
Acheulean Manʼs form of life which was not based upon fossils but rather upon 
artefacts and other evidence such as fire use. By the way, it should be remembered, 
however, that at Zhoukoudian, where it was thought that there was the oldest 
evidence of man-made fire, recent research has shown that the burnt material was 
deposited around the area by natural agents after natural flames (cf. Weiner et al. 
1998). Evidence for the use of fire date only around 10 ka. 
Before concluding, we should spend only a few words to illustrate what seems to 
us a peculiar way of interpreting fossils of Neanderthal Man. Thảo took for granted 
that H. Neanderthalensis was our direct ancestor. Although the English biologist 
Thomas H. Huxley (1825–1895), the Scottish anatomist and anthropologist Arthur 
Keith (1866–1955), and the French palaeontologist Marcellin Boule (1861–1942) had 
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already reasoned that the primitive traits of the skeleton of the Neanderthal Man 
show that it cannot be considered as a direct ancestor of Homo sapiens, in the 
1950s some scholars such as Mayr regarded the unbroken succession of fossil sites 
of both Homo Neanderthalensis and Homo sapiens in Europe as evidence of a slow, 
gradual evolutionary transition from Neanderthals to modern humans. As we have 
seen, both Thảo and Spirkin had been largely influenced by this view. Today, 
however, we know that Neanderthals and humans are two distinct species. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
Thảo’s theory posed a challenge to Marxism: could dialectic materialism 
successfully explain the origins of language? So Thảo rigorously pursued the 
implications of dialectical materialism to focus on the heuristic potentialities of 
that insight. To him, dialectical materialism gave the best explanation for the social 
origins of language without transcending the natural dimension. To him, language 
faculty is located in the brain and depends upon some bodily predispositions. But 
this does not mean that language faculty evolved in the brain alone. The fact is that 
language is first and foremost a part of social praxis. So, it is shared by a group 
within the concrete and material horizon of labour. Thảo meant by labour the 
process encompassing all the cooperative activities necessary for the production of 
the means of subsistence. And the language of real life was indissolubly bound to 
labour. The main aim of this chapter has been to explore to what extent Thảo 
assumption of the primacy of labour oriented his hypothesis on language origins. 
At this point, it might be useful to remind the reader of some Soviet works 
devoted to social life in early palaeolithic man (see Debotz 1961 especially for the 
works of A.N. Severzov, P.P. Efimenko, J.I. Semenov, A.M. Zolotiv, V.K. Nikolskii, 
B.F. Porshnev, S.P. Tolstov, P.I. Boriskovskii, V.V. Bounak). Some features emerge 
from the Soviet debates on the origin of humanity that deserve to be noticed. First, 
in the 1930s, many Soviet anthropologists devoted the attention to the question of 
the role of the geographical environment and of hunting in the process of 
hominization. Morphology was not enough to explain the evolution of physical 
type. By contrast, the level of development of productive forces and the 
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modifications in the geographical environment played a relevant role in our 
evolution. Secondly, evolution is a process in which the quantitative modifications, 
in accumulating, bring about the formation of a new characteristic. Thus, Soviet 
anthropologists suggested the theory of the two jumps in the evolution. The first 
jump led to the separation from the animal world (Australopithecus stage). The 
second one led to Homo sapiens. The history of society begins at the moment when 
tools have begun to be made by the Australopithecus. This fact marks the 
separation from animal world. Then, Soviet scholars suggested that the transition 
from the earliest human ancestor (Pithecanthropus erectus) and the modern 
human (Homo sapiens) is the Neanderthal stage. As the reader can see, many 
similarities between the main theoretical assumptions of the Soviet debate on the 
origins of humanity – which were largely based on dialectic materialism – and 
Thảo’s theory are not lacking. 
For our purposes, it could be now useful to remember that some evidence 
confirmed Thảoʼs hypothesis. In effect, the idea of the primacy of labour in a wide 
sense might not be said to be a specific characteristic of Thảo’s theory. We can now 
mention other scholars who, in the same period, are largely interested in the 
evolution of social practices. Semënov (1959: 37-39) and Yakimov (1973: 8) 
described the connection between tool-making and cognitive skills. Other scholars 
dealt with the connection between glottogenesis and tool-making in several 
different ways (cf. Oakley 1951: 72; Leroi-Gourhan 1964 and 1965: 41; Bronowski 
1967; Critchley 1967: 72-73; Clark 1970: 143-147; Masters 1970: 309). These scholars 
widely discussed the primacy of tool-making over linguistic skills or vice versa. The 
relation between language and hunting, too, was largely debated (see De Laguna 
1963; cf. also Lancaster 1968: 456; Clark 1970: 71-72, 102-103). Generally, what 
stands out when one read this literature is the fact that a language system provided 
for environmental reference and enhanced hominid exploitation for food 
resources in a given territory (cf. Hewes 1978: 35-37). And, interestingly, Hewes 
(1978: 38) highlighted “the utility of arm or hand pointing in spotting game” 
especially “when the potential prey is at a considerable distance.” Now we have the 
very same hypothesis already suggested by Thảo. 
It is clear, from the very start, that Thảo was largely influenced by Mayerʼs 
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modern synthesis and in particular by his suggestions concerning human 
evolution. Thảo, too, could be considered to be a “lumper” rather than a “splitter”. 
As we have seen, he argued for the existence of three great genera: anthropoids, 
prehominids (Australopithecus or Australanthropus), and Homo. In turn, Homo is 
divided into two sub-genera: Homo habilis and Homo faber – which is composed of 
Homo faber primigenius (Pithecanthropus), Sinanthropus, Acheulean Man, 
Neanderthal Man, and Homo faber sapiens (our species). The idea of a great chain 
of a few species in unilinear succession was largely popular in those years. What 
seems to be the most relevant point we must stress on is Thảoʼs theory of unilinear 
development through dialectical shifts. 
The idea species evolves through dialectical shifts obviously depends upon one 
of the main assumption of dialectical materialism (see below Chapter 9). But what 
is more relevant is the fact that for Thảo the development of material activities 
(collective hunting and tool making) determined the evolution of species. To him, 
material activities interact with the physical environment and thus create a new 
niche in which our ancestors lived. It means that cultural evolution provides our 
ancestors with the means to survive and evolve. Additionally, practical needs, 
indeed, stimulated the emergence of new behavioural traits. Thus, it has been 
interesting to highlight the way Thảo integrated paleoanthropological findings 
with his own view. 
Did not only Thảo combine paleoanthropological findings with dialectical 
materialism and then with the idea of development by stages, he also introduced 
the central role assigned to labour by historical materialism in his own 
reconstruction. As we have already seen, historical materialism saw labour as the 
engine of human history. Interestingly, Thảo adopted a historical perspective to 
describe human evolution. This fact could be explained in so far as we assume that 
what interests Thảo is to suggest a theory of language origins. And to him, 
language is not a mere biological fact. Rather language must be regarded as 
interwoven with the development of material activities from the start. As such its 
evolution can be described by way of the categories of historical materialism. Given 
that our ancestors show a certain degree of social material activities, historical 
materialism could be successfully applied to the study of language evolution. 
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Nevertheless, this approach is not free of problems. 
As we have seen, for Thảo artefacts are the starting point to suggest what kind 
of cognitive abilities are required to produce them. Given a certain degree of 
cognitive development, Thảo tried to show what kind of linguistic skills could 
correspond to those cognitive abilities. To put it another way, the development of 
both, cognition and language, is only one. In turn, both are interwoven with labour. 
More specifically, language and labour are two aspects of the main material 
behaviour. Assuming that the emergence of new practical needs involves material 
activities of a new kind, in a similar way, new practical needs involve a linguistic 
behaviour of a new kind. In turn, a new linguistic behaviour is the support of new 
cognitive skills. The circle has been closed: new material needs determine the 
emergence of new linguistic, practical, and cognitive skills. What is interesting to 
highlight is the central role played by both labour and language. They are the 
adaptive response to practical needs. As this discussion implies, the development 
of practical activities necessarily tells us something about language origins. 
However, we shall take note of the fact that paleoanthropology is based on rare, 
partial and fragmentary evidence. This evidence serves to confirm or refute 
working hypotheses. And the competition of different disciplines (geology, physics, 
chemistry, botany, archaeology, biology, and so on) allows scholars to achieve a 
reckless reconstruction of the past. This alone makes Thảoʼs purposes too hard to 
reach. Nonetheless, he was aware of the weakness of his own hypothesis: 
 
Naturally, what I present is only a set of working hypotheses intended, according to 
the rule, to be criticised and surpassed. Some points may seem adventurous: I 
thought that when certainty is not gained, it is always better to propose a solution 
that may be eliminated than to say nothing at all. For the very fact of refuting it will 
already be a step towards the true solution. [Naturellement, ce que je présente n’est 
qu’un ensemble d’hypothèses de travail destinées, selon la règle, à être critiquées et 
dépassées. Certains points peuvent sembler aventureux : j’ai pensé que quand la 
certitude n’est pas acquise, il vaut toujours mieux proposer une solution qui sera 
peut-être éliminée, que ne rien dire du tout. Car le fait même de la réfuter sera déjà 
un progrès vers la solution véritable.] (Letter to Lucien Sève, 14 June 1971; see figure 
19) 
 
But there is more. What makes hypotheses about language origins even weaker 
is the fact that we have no direct evidence of language evolution. As we have 
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already noted, there is no direct correlation between biological and cultural 
evolution. What is untenable above all is the naturalization of cultural 
development. Assuming that every species corresponds to a given stage of cultural 
evolution seems to be dangerous. One of the main consequences of this choice is 
the correlation between the development of the lithic production (Kafuan, 
Olduvian, Chellean, and so on) and the evolution of species set out by Thảo. 
Maybe this is not the right way to evaluate Thảoʼs theory. As Lecercle (2006: 49) 
states: 
 
We have here a very attractive myth. But a myth none the less: the latest 
developments in anthropology, genetics, and primatology probably preclude us 
from considering this description of the origin of language as corresponding to the 
facts. […] But a myth does not need to be “true” in the sense of positive science to be 
effective […] It is enough for it to be relevant to our philosophical concerns and, so 
far as possible, correct. [...] 
 
We cannot underestimate that Thảo was convinced he was doing scientific 
research. In his words: “As you know, I am a simple scientific worker, devoted to 
the search for truth for herself. I can say, at the age of 54, that I never had any 
other ambition than to serve science [Comme vous le savez, je suis un simple 
travailleur scientifique, dévoué à la recherche de la vérité pour elle-même. Je puis 
dire, à l’âge de 54 ans, que je n’ai jamais eu d’autre ambition que de servir la 
science]” (Letter to Rossi-Landi, Hanoi, 8 September 1971 ; see fig. 11). Quite apart 
from that fact, what Lecerlce tell us is the correctness of Thảoʼs theory should be 
sought in his approach to language. Assuming language as material praxis which is 
interwoven with labour and social life, Thảo admitted that language is not only the 
agent of a social praxis but also the product of the processes that constitute this 
praxis. Language and labour “as attributes of the social body, they presuppose one 
another.” (Lecercle 2006: 182). Of course, “one speaks a language only as a member 
of a linguistic community” (id., p. 185). To ensure that this sentence would be 
perceived as obvious, we must add that for Thảo “language is at once the 
expression and form of constitution of the human collectivity” (id., p. 195) exactly 
because language is essentially interwoven with social practical life, it is “the 
umbilical cord, which is also the social bond, uniting the individual to the socius” 
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(ibid.). On that basis, language is simultaneously the condition, expression, means, 
and product of labour. That is what Thảoʼs myth still tells us. 
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Chapter Eight 
How Did Language Begin? 
 
 
 
Die Sprache ist so alt wie das Bewußtsein - die Sprache ist  
das praktische, auch für andre Menschen existierende, 
also auch für mich selbst erst existierende wirkliche Bewußtsein, 
und die Sprache entsteht, wie das Bewußtsein, erst aus  
dem Bedürfnis, der Notdurft des Verkehrs mit andern Menschen. 
(K. Marx) 
 
 
 
1. Preliminary Remarks. - 2. Marx’s and Engels’ Theory of Language and 
Consciousness. - 3.1. Spirkin’s Theory: Introduction. - 3.2. Spirkin’s Theory of 
The Formation of Language. - 3.3. A Historical Overview of Psycho-Motor 
Theories of Language. - 3.4. From Unarticulated to Articulate Speech in Soviet 
Debates on Language Origins. - 3.5. Linguistics in the USSR during the 1960s 
and 1970s: the case of Abaev. - 4.1. The Debate on Gestural Origins of Speech: A 
Brief Overview. - 4.2. Anthropoid ape communication. - 4.3. Gestural Origins of 
Human Language. - 4.4. Glottogenesis, Tool-making, and Hunting. - 4.5. 
Language, Cognition, and Brain. 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Preliminary Remarks 
 
To Thảo the question of formation of consciousness was the same of the origins 
of language. As we have already said, Thảo’s conception of social labour is the 
precondition of a more general theory of language and consciousness. Through 
social collective activities, language and consciousness emerged as human-specific 
bio-social facts. As this discussion implies, glottogenesis and anthropogenesis are 
two connected processes. We need to repeat that Thảo justified his hypothesis by 
accepting some assumptions of Marxism and seeking to link the results of 
empirical sciences such as psychology and anthropology. In the next pages, we will 
focus on the specificity of Thảo’s approach against the background of the main 
trends of the anthropological research of the time. Given this scenario, Thảo’s 
insight seems to be one of the most radical in so far as he assigned to gestures and 
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multi-modality a key role to explain the formation of language and thought. 
Firstly, Thảo’s theory will be compared with some trends of Soviet 
anthropology. A comparison between Spirkin and Thảo seems to be necessary and 
really useful to understand Thảo’s approach. The two scholars, Spirkin and Thảo, 
were similar by age, cultural world, philosophical education, political ideas, and 
scientific interests. And, in the same period, as we have already seen in Chapter 5, 
Spirkin tackled the issue of the nature and origin of consciousness. As has been 
seen, Thảo’s theory deeply depended upon the classics of Marxism. And the same 
goes for Spirkin as well. But, they offered two different interpretations of the same 
assumptions of Marxism-Leninism. As we will see, they answered the same 
question concerning the origins of language and consciousness in two different 
ways. 
It is clear (see Chapter 5), that to Thảo ([1974: 38] 2009: 299-300) the works of 
Spirkin is part of a broader debate on the nature of consciousness which took place 
in the USSR in the late 1950s. “Toward the end of the fifties, a riveting and 
impassioned general discussion on the nature of consciousness was beginning in 
the Soviet Union. […] the classics of Marxism-Leninism had not yet specifically 
pursued a concrete science of consciousness.” In his own way, Thảo’s theory, too, 
must be regarded as a contribution to this kind of debates which took place in the 
Eastern Countries. Consequently, it could be useful to compare Thảo’s theory with 
some Soviet anthropological, linguistic, and neurophysiologic evolutionary 
explanation of the formation of language. 
But nobody can dismiss the fact that the main target of Thảo’s ILC was the 
French public. For this reason, a brief overview of the main trends of Western 
anthropological research will be summarised in order to evaluate the pertinence, 
relevance and consistency of Thảo’s theory compared to the proposals of the 
Western anthropology of the 1960s and 1970s. This comparison will allow us to 
recapitulate and historically evaluate the main arguments of Thảo’s theory of 
language evolution. 
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2. Marx’s and Engels’ Theory of Language and Consciousness 
 
As has already been said, Marx and Engels did not suggest a systematic theory of 
the origins of language and consciousness. They merely offer some elements to 
approach the issue from their philosophical point of view. In the following lines, a 
brief schematic overview of their main assumptions concerning language and 
consciousness will be put in place. In this vein, the starting point of Thảo’s theory 
will be clarified it and will be easier to establish a comparison with other Marxist 
theories of the origins of language. 
 
1. Consciousness is a peculiar way of existence of matter. 
A. Marx argued that the subject of knowledge, or of practices, is matter (cf. MEW 
III: 533). The material essence which defines the human knowing subject is nothing 
other than the practical life, labour. 
B. Labour is a process in which both human beings and Nature participate. It is 
the starting point of the peculiar way human beings start, regulate, produce, 
reproduce, transform, and control the material re-actions between themselves and 
nature (cf. MEW XXIII: 192-195).  
C. To Engels, dialectics reduced itself to the science of the general laws of 
motion of both the external world and human thought. They are two sets of laws 
which are identical in substance, but differ in their expression in so far as the 
human mind can apply them consciously, while in nature and also up to now for 
the most part in human history, these laws assert themselves unconsciously, in the 
form of external necessity, in the midst of an endless series of seeming accidents 
(cf. MEW XXI: 293). 
 
2. Consciousness is to be conscious of the own material existence. 
A. Consciousness is conscious existence, consciousness of the actual life-process 
(cf. MEW III: 26). 
B. Consciousness is at first consciousness concerning the immediate sensuous 
environment, i.e. the limited connection with other persons and things outside the 
individual who is growing self-conscious (cf. MEW III: 31).  
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C. Self-consciousness arose as a result of social interactions (cf. MEW XXIII: 67, 
footnote 18). 
 
3. The language of real life (cf. MEW III: 26, 30-31). 
A. “Language is as old as consciousness.” They arose together from the need to 
of intercourse with other individuals.  
B. Both language and consciousness are social products. To Marx and Engels, 
ideas and conceptions arise from concrete social relations and practices. 
C. The mind is not a separate substance independent of matter but rather the 
embodied capability of producing representations. More specifically, the mind 
obtains the contents of its representations from interactions with the surrounding 
environment and the intercourse with the other individuals. Consequently, there 
are not a priori concepts. In the same way, representations are never totally 
disconnected from social practice. Furthermore, representations always require 
the support of signs. And linguistic signs essentially take the shape of material 
sounds. As a result, human symbolic cognition arises from real intercourse among 
human beings and takes place because of the materiality of sounds. 
D. “language is practical consciousness” (MEW III: 30). Language is a tool to solve 
practical needs. 
 
4. Engels explained, “the origin of language from and in the process of labour” 
(cf. MEW XX: 444). 
A. To him, the erect posture is the decisive step in the transition from ape to man. 
The erect posture freed hands from the task of walking. Our pre-human ancestors – 
a particular highly-developed race of anthropoid apes – began use hands to make 
tools. Engels called labour the skill of consciously mastering the environment with 
tools.  
B. Labour and social life brought out the necessity to communicate with others: 
humans in the making arrived at the point where they had something to say to each 
other. 
 
5. The mind reflects the material world. 
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A. Marx wrote: “the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by 
the human mind, and translated into forms of thought” (Marx 1887: 14; cf. MEW 
XXIII: 27). And Engels wrote “we again took a materialistic view of the thoughts in 
our heads, regarding them as images [Abbilder] of real things instead of regarding 
real things as images of this or that stage of the absolute concept. [...] Thereby the 
dialectic of concepts itself became merely the conscious reflex of the dialectical 
motion of the real world” (Engels 1946: Part IV; cf. MEW XXI: 293). 
B. Consciousness arose as a result of the relationship between material 
conditions of life (economic base) and the intellectual or spiritual world (culture, 
philosophy, art, etc.) (cf. MEW XIII: 1-11). 
 
3.1. Spirkin’s Theory: Introduction 
 
According to the previous recapitulation of the main assumptions concerning 
language and consciousness in Marxʼs and Engelsʼ writings, we should now pay 
special attention to Spirkinʼs conception of the relationship between language and 
consciousness. In addition to this, Spirkin’s comparison between animal 
communication systems and human language will be analysed before we say a few 
words concerning his theory of the formation of human speech and the role played 
by labour in that process. Then, a brief historical overview of psycho-motor 
theories of language will be useful to understand Spirkin’s conception of the 
transition from unarticulated to articulated speech. 
Letʼs start with the remark that Spirkin’s theory made extensive use of Engels’ 
theory on the part of labour in the origins of speech. So conceived, Spirkin 
consequently, explained, language gradually arose from vocal and motor reactions 
of animals but slowly became a means to outperform the efficacy of collective 
cooperative activities. Particularly interesting is the fact that, according to Spirkin, 
the gestural moment in prehistorical languages had only been a support for the 
association between sounds and images of states of affairs. Accordingly, the core of 
human speech is the ability to designate things and notions through vocalizations. 
To put it another way, there is no genetic relation between gestures and fully-
developed languages. The development of both the brain and organs of speech lead 
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language from the diffused polysemic sounds towards articulated speech. To 
Spirkin, language is old as consciousness, of course, but consciousness immediately 
reflects reality while language could refer to reality by way of consciousness. He 
consequently declared that consciousness is the direct result of the physical and 
practical interactions with the surrounding environment while language is a 
means to designate already perceived things and direct the attention of the fellows 
to those things. The designative function of language depends upon the 
mechanism of conditioned reflex. In this way, language is the material support of 
thought and consciousness merely. 
Like Spirkin, Thảo asserted that consciousness is a social product and arises 
during collective cooperative activities. In this vein, consciousness is the subjective 
lived experience of the social milieu. The prehistorical language of real life is a 
collective non-conscious multimodal system of non-wholly arbitrary vocalizations 
and gestures. It is the condition for having the transition from the physiological 
and neurological preconditions of thought to consciousness. But Thảo’s conception 
of the language of real life, in general, leads him far away from Spirkin’s 
hypothesis. In fact, consciousness is nothing but the idealized form of inner 
language in so far as the subject addresses to the self the signs employed during 
collective cooperative activities. In the flow of inner language, the gestural 
moment is still at work in the form of evoked, sketched-out, and outlined nervous 
stimuli. So, it is the fundamental support of vocalizations, arbitrary signs, and 
thinking. This is the peculiar way Thảo developed Marx’s assumption of the 
materiality of signs as the sensuous base of thought. 
Despite Thảo invoked Spirkin’s theory of indicative gestures as the fundamental 
key to explaining the formation of speech, there are essential divergences 
concerning the linguistic development of consciousness and the role played by the 
gestural moment in the formation of language. It seems thus quite relevant that 
Thảo’s materialistic insight leads him to support the idea that systems of arbitrary 
signs (i.e. a part of fully-fledged languages), too, deeply depended upon a 
subconscious and fundamental system of evoked, outlined, and sketched-out 
gestures and vocalizations. Then, Thảo rejected Spirkin’s theory of associations 
between sounds and images. To Thảo, language produces tendential images and 
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idealized meanings. In the same way, he did not consider the language as a result of 
conditioned stimuli. Assuming that, the language of real life is a system of 
motivated signs in which the signifier produced the signified. As a consequence, 
consciousness cannot exist without the language of real life – and consequently, it 
cannot reflect mind-independent reality. To Thảo language of real life takes 
precedence over consciousness in so far as it conveys still unconscious meanings. 
 
3.2. Spirkin’s Theory of the Formation of Language 
 
As we have already mentioned in Chapter 5, according to Spirkin (1984: 112), 
“consciousness could only emerge as a function of a highly organized brain which 
evolved through labour and speech.” Thus, consciousness has a “pre-history” as 
well as a “social history” (id., p. 110). It is the product of natural evolution and “the 
sum total of the practical and cognitive activity of countless generations 
throughout the centuries.” The development of labour “promoted close cohesion 
among the members of society, increasing the incidence of mutual support and 
joint activity” (id., p. 115). Simultaneously, “the facial expressions, gestures, and 
sounds used as instrument of communication, in the first place among the higher 
animals, served as the biological need for the formation of human speech.” In this 
instance, language originally served as an instrument of communication during 
collective cooperative activities: “human beings now had something to say to one 
another.” Specifically, “language ensured uniform formation of ideal phenomena 
in all the individuals engaged in communication, which was a pressing need of 
joint production activity” (ibid.).  
Then, language slowly became an instrument of thought. Indeed, “language is 
instrumental in the transition from perceptions and representations to concept” 
(id., p. 117). The main function of language is indeed to designate things and 
concepts. For this reason, Spirkin suggested that language arose from the 
physiological mechanism of conditioned reflex: sounds pronounced in a given 
situation were associated in the brain with the corresponding object. As this 
discussion implies, language slowly became a set of sounds associated with 
concepts, the ideal phenomena of consciousness which, in turn, reflect the reality. 
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Only in this case, we can affirm that “language reflects, in the final analysis, the 
structure of being.” In detail, Spirkin adopted the theory of the triangle of 
reference (see Ogden & Richards 1923; the triangle can be traced back to the 4th 
century BC, in Aristotle’s De Interpretatione: in this regard cf. Coseriu 2010: 100-108). 
The triangle describes a simplified form of relationship between the concept 
(reference), an object or referent, and its designation (sign, signans). In this 
manner, the relation between language and reality would be mediated by thought. 
As a result, language is nothing other than a nomenclature and it does not coincide 
with consciousness in so far as it is only a support of rational thought. 
To Spirkin (1966: 9) rational thought is the human-specific form of reflection of 
reality. And language is the main support of that form of reflection. Essentially, 
language is “a procedure or mechanism to establish relationships between sounds 
and the images of the objects” (ibid.). Before being a historical and social product, 
human language has had a natural prehistory. So Spirkin described how the 
instinctive sounds of animals became articulated human language.  
Among animals, one could already observe the mechanism of conditioned 
reflex: some movements become conditioned stimuli, signals of some 
unconditioned stimuli. In this way, signals of animals may be an instrument to 
induce the reaction of the others. In other words, the sounds and movements 
instinctively produced by animals simultaneously appear with given actions. The 
sounds and movements link together in the brain of the animals (id., p. 25-26). 
Among apes, one could observe vocal signals (sexual vocalizations, defence-
vocalizations, vocalizations of mothers, etc.) and motor signals (call-gesture, 
indicative gesture, threat-gesture, rejection-gesture, etc.). Animal signals, however, 
“did not constitute a language” (id., p. 27) because they have not the same 
structure and the same function of human language. In fact, this one is an 
intentional means of communication which reflects the reality by means of a 
shared system of associations between sounds and collective experiences (id., p. 
27). By contrast, the sounds of animals are instinctual and involuntary uttered as a 
consequence of some biological needs or events without the intention to 
communicate with the others. Conversely, among our pre-human ancestorsʼ 
collective cooperative activities had been the condition for having the transition 
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from spontaneous and emotive utterances to language as a means to “intentionally 
designate things” (id., p. 31). 
According to Spirkin, the indicative gesture supported the emergence of the 
designative function of vocalizations. In effect, indicative gesture allowed making 
more precise the referent of emotional sounds. In this vein, vocalizations became 
signs of things and stopped being emotional utterances (id., p. 31). Thus, 
vocalizations and gestures were matched together to communicate perceptions 
and representations concerning the mind-independent world. Gestures were an 
essential part of the process of communication (id., p. 39). After that, indicative 
gestures were subordinated to vocalizations. 
It could be useful to have a glance at Spirkinʼs description of human evolution in 
Chapter 7 before we illustrate his theory of the formation of language. Spirkin 
(1959: 294) stated that “labour” is the “key form of man’s activity”. And the “key 
factor of the realisation of labour” is man’s social environment. The urge to 
communicate with the others depends upon the objective conditions of collective 
labour: to satisfy material needs (cf. id., p. 295). On that basis, language arose “from 
collective labour and together with labour” (ibid.). Or, to put it another way, 
language “appeared as an indispensable medium in the relationship between men 
and nature.” Our ancestors manufactured tools and made regular use of them33. 
Activities of this kind needed a closer contact with the fellows, a more regular 
control of collective activities, and an increasing shared knowledge of skills and 
experience. In this way, language met this urge. 
To Spirkin, “the formation of speech was preceded by a long progress in the 
development of vocal and motor reactions in animals, genetically close to man” 
(id., p. 295). Spirkin described the two basic stages in the formation of speech: i) 
“the period when there was no proper articulated speech” and ii) “the period after 
it emerged” (id., p. 299). During the first period “in the course of labour the 
gestures of apes were transformed into the fairly elaborate generalised gestures of 
                                                 
33 In this regard, Spirkin invoked the Russian translation of Noiré 1880 (Nuare [1880] 1925) 
and Morgan 1877. Engels’ The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State (1884) was 
deeply influenced by Morgan’s theory of progress. To Morgan, the formation of the 
fully-fledged languages needs three stages: i) gesture language using natural symbols; 
ii) the monosyllabical language, the first phase of the articulate language; iii) syllabical 
language. 
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men” (id., p. 296). And our ancestors received the heritage of phonatory abilities of 
the animals closed to them. Thus, they could imitate the sounds of nature and utter 
their emotions. Gestures, mimetic expressions, and emotional utterances have 
been, however, a mere support of the formation of human-specific speech. In 
effect, the key factor in the evolution of language was the development of both the 
phonatory organs and the cognitive abilities to associate sounds and images. 
According to Spirkin, the turn from animal signals to linguistic sounds 
“occurred when the still unarticulated sounds had ceased to be connected with 
emotions and became associated with real objects or rather with the images of 
these objects” (id., p. 297). On that basis, sound imitation did have “a very limited 
part” in the formation of language (id., p. 298). In the same way, gestures merely 
supported the designation: “gestures would determine the direction of a sound and 
fix it upon an object” (id., p. 297). In this manner, Spirkin established on what 
material basis speech became capable of meeting the urge to communicate during 
collective cooperative activities in a better way. 
Interestingly, Thảo set out a theory of indicative gesture as the fundamental key 
to explaining the formation of human language which is very similar to Spirkin’s 
one. In the following lines, the main common assumptions of the two theories will 
be listed. 
Thảo’s theory of language origins started with the assumption that “the apes we 
know, strictly speaking, have no language” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 4). To him, “the 
anthropoids lack the most elementary linguistic sign: the indicative gesture.” The 
various expression in animals (gestures, cries, etc.) “can also serve as signals for 
determinate behaviours, but, taken strictly, they have not any meaning signifying 
an object” (ibid.). In other words, the most elementary linguistic sign is the 
indicative gesture which tends to an object and, in this way, means the object. 
As Spirkin, then, Thảo did not dismiss the idea that language refers to reality. 
And, along with the Soviet anthropologist, Thảo asserted that our pre-human 
ancestors had at a disposal the indicative gesture as powerful means to signify 
things and join their common attention. As a matter of fact, “the original form of 
the indicative movement thus can be defined as guidance at a distance” (id., p. 6). 
The guidance at a distance “obviously derived from the contiguous guidance used 
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by the anthropoids” but the guidance at a distance differs from the contiguous 
guidance because it arose in a new social context. As Thảo put it, “the development 
of adaptive labour played a determining role here” (ibid.). The same applied to 
Spirkin. 
Given the needs to coordinate collective efforts, “the guidance movement does 
not consist in simply tracing a direction, it has essentially the function of a call” 
(id., p. 9). Indeed, “the indicative gesture thus contains two moments, the gestural 
moment and the exclamatory moment.” And “at the prehominid stage, when the 
cry [which was emotional merely] accompanies the indicative gesture, it takes, 
thereby, the meaning of object.” In this vein, the cry “becomes the exclamation 
that defines the original form of verbal language and indicates the object as an 
object of work: the ‘this here!’.” Thus, as Spirkin before him, Thảo, too, suggested 
that the indicative gesture had been an essential support of vocalizations and 
allowed vocalizations becoming meaningful. The similarities between Spirkin’s and 
Thảo’s theories of gestural indication as support of vocalizations could lead us to 
suggest that Thảo had been influenced by Spirkin. But it is not right. In effect, Thảo 
assigned to gestures a more relevant role than Spirkin. 
 
3.3. A Historical Overview of Psycho-Motor Theories of Language 
 
As has been said, for Spirkin the core of the human-specific language is the 
ability to associate sounds with images of things. To Spirkin, human-specific 
speech results from the following development of i) sounds of nature are heard; ii) 
those sounds are reproduced in front of the thing; iii) the reproduction of sounds 
entails certain movements of muscles; iv) these movements of muscles are 
associated with the image of the things that causes the sounds reaction; v) the 
repetition of the same experience fixes the association of sounds, the movement of 
muscles, and images of things (cf. Spirkin 1959: 297). As this discussion implies, first 
linguistic sounds were onomatopoeias and interjections whose function was to 
designate things in so far as they were associated with the images of the things. 
Darwin had already underlined the ability of our ancestors to associate sounds 
with ideas. In The Descent of Man (1871), Darwin suggested the continuity between 
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animal communication systems and human language. The difference between 
human language and animal communication does not concern semantics – 
expression of desires and needs – or articulation of sounds – proper of a wide range 
of species of birds, but rather human “almost infinitely larger power of associating 
together the most diversified sounds and ideas” (Darwin 1874: 85-86). One must 
also remember Darwin’s principle of the acquisition of associated serviceable 
habits – which are then inherited by offspring:  
 
certain complex actions are of direct or indirect service under certain states of the 
mind, in order to relieve or gratify certain sensations, desires, &c.; and whenever the 
same state of mind is induced, however feebly, there is a tendency through the force 
of habit and association for the same movements to be performed, though they may 
not then be of the least use. (Darwin 1872: 1) 
 
This principle played a relevant role in Spirkin’s theory (cf. Spirkin 1966: 25-26) 
In the 1870s, in Germany, naturalistic approaches to language began to assume a 
psycho-motor theory of speech (see Formigari 2010). The most relevant precursor 
of this theory was the German philosopher Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776–1841). 
Contrary to idealism, some scholars suggested that speech was originally non-
communicative. For instance, Steinthal (1881: 361) admitted that vocal reflexes are 
the precursors of speech and articulated sounds. According to Hermann Paul 
(1846–1921; see Paul 1886), Hermann Lotze (1817–1881; see Lotze 1852), Berthold 
Delbrück (1842–1922; see Delbrück 1901), and other German scholars, every 
psychical excitation corresponds to reflected corporeal movement. On that basis, 
the speech was originally a mechanical reflex-action (Reflexbewegungen). According 
to the supporter of psycho-motor theories, voice has principally the function of 
motor and mechanical externalization of perceptions and experiences. For this 
reason, vocalizations have been called “reflex-sound” (Reflexlaut). And the Russian 
linguist Aleksandr Potebnja (1835–1891) stated that the human-specific power to 
designate things depends upon the ability to associate reflex-sounds to past 
experiences (see Potebnja 1862 and Fontaine 1995). Remarkably, Potebnja had been 
explicitly invoked by Spirkin (1966). 
To Spirkin, the association of sounds to experiences entails the turning of 
emotional sound into symbols of things. To him, the formation of language 
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depends upon the mechanism of conditioned reflex suggested by Pavlov. 
Specifically, Pavlov learned from his masters – especially Karl Ludwig (1816–1895), 
Claude Bernard (1813–1878), and Ilya Faddeyevich Cyon (1842–1912) – that 
organism is a self-regulating system. More specifically, Pavlov’s psychological 
theory was based on the notion of “conditional reflex.” Under given experimental 
condition, the conditional reflex is the response of a given subject after the 
presentation of a given conditioning stimulus. 
Pavlov noted that dogs systematically drooled while he entered the room 
because they associated Pavlov’s presence (conditioned stimulus) to the food 
(unconditioned stimulus: the food usually causes salivation). Thus, one could define 
conditioning as the basic mechanism of learning by which a stimulus (called 
conditioned) may be associated with another stimulus (unconditioned) following 
repeated associations between the presentation of one and another stimulus34. 
Interestingly, Bexterew in his Objective Psychology generalized the mechanism of 
reflex and employed it also for explaining the more complex processes of thought 
and language (cf. Bechterew 1913: Chap. VIII-X). On that basis, he called symbolic 
reflexes reactions that fix some conventional links between the state of affairs and 
words, gestures or pantomimes (id., p. 371). To Bexterew, language learning is the 
result of some associations and dissociations of cerebral traces under 
environmental influences that imply verbal-motor reactions. Gestures and 
pantomime are for him the direct completion of speech exactly because they 
reinforce the effects of speech (cf. id., p. 384). 
The main conundrum of psycho-motor approach to language origins is that we 
cannot explain three facts at least: i) psycho-motor approach cannot explain is the 
gradual development of human cognitive skills because it takes for grant the ability 
to associate sounds with sensations, images and so forth, and limits itself to 
                                                 
34 The work of Pavlov was well known in the Western countries thanks to the writings of 
John B. Watson. Remarkably, Pavlovian term “conditional reflex” (условный рефлекс) 
had been mistranslated from the Russian as “conditioned reflex”. Consequently, other 
scientists read Pavolv’s theory as he had reasoned that reflexes are conditioned and 
have been produced by virtue of a process called conditioning. Instead, Pavlov said that 
the reflex is conditional because it may be involved by way of given experimental 
conditions. But the idea of “conditioning” as an automatic form of learning became a 
key concept in comparative psychology. 
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describe the development of articulate speech; ii) then it cannot explain the shared 
nature of signs within a community because the first producer of signs seems to be 
alone; iii) the psycho-motor approach to language seems to describe the conditions 
of language learning within an already established community of speakers. But we 
should rule out the possibility of language learning given the phylogenetic 
scenario. We can now appreciate Spirkinʼs own contribution to the debate. 
Crucially, introducing gestural indication, Spirkin offered a better support for 
associationism. In fact, the gestural indication established a fixed referent of 
vocalizations among our pre-human ancestors. 
 
3.4. From Unarticulated to Articulate Speech in Soviet Debates on Language 
Origins 
 
Thảo’s invoked Spirkin’s writings in a very interesting page which was devoted 
to the evolution of vocal cords: 
 
We must, of course, take into account here a considerable difference: the child 
comes into the world with the anatomy of Homo sapiens, and he has been brought up 
in a civilized society. Even though his cortex has not completely matured, his first 
words, at the prehominid age, already display the beginnings of articulation, of which 
Australanthropus was undoubtedly incapable. It is true that the transition to erect 
posture had to bring about a thickening and rounding of the vocal cords, with a 
certain softening of the lower jaw, so that Australanthropus probably could emit 
more varied sounds than the anthropoid [in the footnote, Thảo invoked Spirkin 
1966]. (Thảo [1973] 1984: 55) 
 
According to Spirkin (1959: 299), generally, “a historical approach will show that 
all development takes place through transition from a less to a more differentiated 
state.” It means that language arose from unarticulated speech, the juxtaposition 
of entire sound units. This unarticulated speech was at a disposal of the 
Pithecanthropus. Unarticulated speech “had neither phonemes nor a more or less 
clearly differentiated vocabulary” (id., p. 307). It was an undifferentiated sound 
complex. And the formation of language “leads from undifferentiated, syncretically 
combined formations towards individual, relatively monosemantic components 
designating notions” (id., p. 307-308). 
In the Russian tradition, the theory of the development of language from 
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syncretic to analytical components was largely debated. For instance, it was the 
essential principle of Marr’s glottogenetic theory: a language develops apart from a 
diffuse and syncretic state towards a more differentiated one (Chown 2005). Marr 
argued for the diffuse nature of sounds and syntax and the polysemic nature of 
words during the prehistory. The Russian philologist Aleksandr N. Veselovskij 
(1838–1906) had already employed the term “syncretism” in a similar way. And, for 
this reason, Chown (2005) insisted that it seems quite possible that Marr’s term 
“diffuznost’,” which gradually became an integral part of his works, corresponds to 
the term already employed by Veselovskij. Chown (2005) also remarked the 
relevance of Levy-Bruhl’s anthropological approach and his idea of homogeneity 
which dominates the souls of primitives. In 1935, the Soviet linguist Lev 
Vladimirovič Ščerba (1880-1944) who spoke of interjections as very old “diffused 
sounds” (Velmezova 2008). Like his master I.A. Baudouin of Courtenay (1846–1929), 
Ščerba considered the diffuse sounds to be older than the sounds forming the 
modern linguistic systems. Notably, Ščerba was invoked several times by Spirkin 
(1966: 35; id. 1959: 300). 
To Spirkin (1959: 304) “the rudiments of articulate speech among the 
Neanderthalers were further developed with the advent of Cro-Magnon man at the 
beginning of the Late Paleolithic.” That is to say, the Cro-Magnon man began to 
develop human-specific phonetic abilities and to differentiate individual 
articulated sounds. To Spirkin, however, “the word is not the beginning of speech” 
(id., p. 307). The sentence is rather “the real speech unit.” It means that prehistoric 
diffused sounds became sentences composed of articulated sound-units. 
Spirkin’s (1966) assumption that the formation of speech must be regarded as 
the transition from inarticulate to articulate speech seriously depended upon the 
theory of the Russian anthropologist of Viktor Valerianovich Bunak (1891–1978) – 
who had been the director Department of Anthropology of Moscow since 1923 (cf. 
Bertrand 2002: 314). In turn, Spirkin (1966) was invoked by Thảo ([1973] 1984: 55). 
Bunak had been dealing with the anatomy-physiological development of vocal 
organs for a very long time. To him, articulated language arose among our human 
ancestors and not before. Before the emergence of humankind, one could 
hypothesize a stage in which our pre-human ancestors employed isolated 
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monosyllabic inarticulate polysemic words. After that, our human ancestors began 
to associate words with different meanings. 
Bunak, like Spirkin after him, set out that “neither of the enumerated kinds of 
gestures is the basis for the development of abstraction and it cannot substitute the 
activity of vocal organs” (Bunak 1959: 321; see also Bunak 1951). In effect, both of 
them considered the gestural moment as a contingent and disappearing moment in 
the formation of language. Against that, Thảo assigned to gesture a great value in 
the evolution and functioning of language. But Thảo and Bunak disagreed also in 
considering the formation of thought. The primacy of gestures leads Thảo to assign 
a relevant role to gestures in the formation of abstract notions. Instead, Bunak 
assigned the same function to articulate speech. 
Like other anthropologists of the epoch, Bunak (1959: 313) regarded “the 
consistently growing use of outside objects (stones, sticks) for getting food, for 
defence and attack” as the leading factor that directed the evolution of ancient 
hominids. Regarding language, “speech develops in close connection with the 
development of thinking” (id., p. 310). But the formation of thought and the 
formation of speech are the results of two different processes which, at a certain 
point of human evolution, converged (for a similar assumption see the paragraph 
devoted to Vygotsky in Chapter 6). In detail, Bunak stated that 
 
the development of speech in its initial stage can be characterized as the process of 
fixing for each sound a definite logical meaning based on the delimitation and 
generalization of perceptions. At the same time, this logical meaning can be referred 
only to the sounds pronounced with a more definite position of vocal organs than 
the diffusive sounds of animals. (id., p. 311) 
 
Thus, Bunak regarded speech as “voiced sounds with a definite logical meaning” 
(id., p. 310). According to him, sophisticated vocal organs are the preconditions for 
having abstract thought. Sounds fixed the first perceptive generalization and 
allowed to develop more complicated forms of thought. The peculiar quality of 
sounds to allow rational thought depends upon the ability to articulate and 
differentiate sounds: “The faculty of abstraction was fixed in coordination with the 
perfection of the vocal activity” (id., p. 316). 
Against that, Thảo regarded the development of gestures and their 
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internalization as the main key to explaining the evolution of thinking. To him, 
this process began indeed when “emission took on an objective, or linguistic 
meaning for the first time by being linked to the original indicative gesture” (Thảo 
[1973] 1984: 56). In this way, the gestural moment had a primacy over the vocal one 
and it was sufficient to allow the development of abstract thought by way of the 
evoked movements of the body (see his theory of the sign of representation: 
Chapter 10). More in detail, Thảo believed that the gesture is sufficient to allow the 
formation of first notions – even if they were confused. As a matter of fact, gestures 
radically changed the perception of the world already among our pre-human 
ancestors (see above Chapter 5). 
By contrast, Bunak (1959) insisted that the labour alone could explain the 
emergence of first general notions and speech intervened only in a second moment 
to fix those notions: “the connection of certain manual movements with 
primordial notions promoted the fixation of the connection between the latter and 
more or less vocal sounds” (id., p. 316). In other words, unlike Thảo, Bunak did not 
see language as the necessary condition of the social life of our ancestors. To him, 
speech intervened from the outside as a support of memory. Then, articulate 
speech allowed creating more and more sophisticated notions. 
Thus Bunak (1951 [= The Origin of Speech on the Basis of Anthropology. 
Symposium on the Origin of Man and Ancient Distribution of Mankind (in Russian), 
Moscow]; 1959) described the anatomical modifications which had been the 
preconditions of articulate speech. Descending of larynx, differentiation of certain 
laryngeal muscles, the thickening of the free border of the vocal cords and other 
structural changes, necessary for exact articulation, are morphologically 
connected with the formation of the cervical vertebrae curve, with the erection of 
the body, the diminution of the masticatory muscles, and the relative dimensions 
of the low jaw, etc. In a similar way, but in the English-speaking world, this point of 
view was also suggested by Lieberman (1972, 1973, 1975) and Lieberman, Crelin and 
Klatt (1972). 
Quite differently, Thảo ([1973] 1984: 56) focused on the evolution of the brain to 
explain the development of articulate speech, rather than, like Bunak, on the 
development of vocal organs. Thảo highlighted that “Australanthropus did not yet 
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exhibit this phenomenon of vocal inhibition [i.e. the motor mechanism of 
articulate speech in present-day man, which essentially involves the inhibition of 
sounds immediately after their emission and allows one to differentiate them by 
passing distinctly from one to the other].” In fact, the whole structure of the brain 
was too similar to that of the anthropoid – even if the brain of the 
Australanthropus was larger than the brain of the anthropoid. 
Contrarily to Thảo, Bunak neglected the gestural connection as a key factor to 
explain the polysemic but coherent value of first vocalizations among our pre-
human ancestors (in this regard see below Chapter 11). This led him to argue for a 
stage of polysemantic unconnected words-sentences in a small number: “The 
speech at that stage consisted of monosyllabic, invariable, unconnected, 
polysemantic words. […] this form of speech can be called the stage of isolated, 
unconnected utterances” (Bunak 1959: 318). On that basis, even if like Thảo Bunak 
insisted that “the original notions were polysemantic, included the idea of action, 
an acting subject, the object of an action, of the aim of an action and its means,” 
however, he did not hypothesize the existence of the functional sentence as 
juxtaposition and association of vocalizations by way of gestural connections (see 
below Chapter 11). 
 
3.5. Linguistics in the USSR during the 1960s and 1970s: the case of Abaev 
 
According to Sériot (1986: 147), the Soviet linguistics between the 1960s and 
1970s tried to present itself as Marxist-Leninist, sociological, and historical. Soviet 
linguists thus shared with anthropologists like Spirkin and Bunak and philosophers 
like Thảo the same theoretical framework. Linguists and anthropologists shared 
some field of research, too. In detail, the question of the origins of language was 
largely debated also among linguists. For instance, the Soviet linguist Vaso (Vasily) 
Ivanovich Abaev (1900–2001) insisted that “no general theory of language can be 
considered complete if it does not include a conception of the origin of language” 
(Abaev: 1970: 234, from Sériot 1986: 150). This interest in the question of the origins 
of language is really fascinating since one considers that this issue was considered 
to be a philosophical one among Western linguists of the same epoch (cf. Sériot 
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1986: 150 – even if there were some exceptions). 
From this point of view, one could summarise some affinities between Spirkin’s 
theory of the origins of language and Abaev’s conception of the formation of 
speech. In this vein, it could also possible to appreciate Thảo’s insight. In effect, the 
three authors shared the idea that the essence of phenomena must be found in 
their genesis. And they suggested three theories of the evolution of language which 
have the same materialist assumptions in common. But there are also some 
divergences that showed the originality of each of them. 
Spirkin, Abaev, and Thảo asserted that the evolution of language is parallel to 
the progress of humanity (cf. Sériot 1986: 161-162). The three authors believed that 
language arose during collective cooperative activities. And they agreed that the 
development of brain and intelligence is not apart from the socio-productive 
organization (cf. Abaev 1970: 237, from Sériot 1986: 159). At the same time, an 
optimal glottogenetic theory must discover the reasons for the development of 
language in the very sources of language (cf. Abaev 1970: 243, from Sériot 1986: 
159). Simply put, language has in itself the potentiality of its development. The 
causality of linguistic changes is therefore both external (the socio-political 
conditions) and internal (Sériot 1986: 163). But the external conditions influenced 
the inner development of language. 
The thesis of the progress of language is based on the idea of the gradual 
improvement of the autonomy of words over time: in ancient languages, words 
depended on context much more than in modern languages. And the progress in 
language is thus assimilated to a continuous movement towards monosemy. 
Spirkin, Abaev, and Thảo argued for the idea of an increasing specialization of the 
lexicon. But Spirkin and Thảo did not agree with Abaev who set out that the 
formation of the lexicon is more important than the syntax (cf. Abaev 1970: 235 
from Sériot 1986: 165). In fact, both Spirkin and Thảo suggested that language 
evolution must be regarded as the process that leads a holistic multimodal system 
of syncretic signs to fully-developed sentences as sequences of words. And they 
also suggested that syntax plays a relevant role to determine the power of rational 
thought. But Thảo’s antisaussurism led him to accept the idea the language is 
composed of parts (the words) whose value does not entirely depend upon 
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syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations with other signs. There is a system of non-
wholly arbitrary signs that constitutes a set of fundamental motivated signs whose 
meaning is rooted in their material form. 
Spirkin, Abaev, and Thảo suggested a substantialist conception of language. 
Language is an empirical, factual, and substantial phenomenon that exists outside 
the subject and independently of him (cf. Sériot 1986: 169). As a consequence, to 
Spirkin, Abaev, and Thảo, a theory of language does not construct its object, but it 
rather finds its object in nature. In effect, Thảo ([1973] 1984: 17) admitted that the 
“language of real life is thus prior to consciousness” and “the existence of a 
language belonging to reality itself, prior to consciousness, from which 
consciousness draws its meaning.” Thus, it precedes the observations of 
researchers. 
To Spirkin and Abaev, the lexical forms are not motivated, and therefore have 
no meaning in themselves. Abaev (1970: 235; in Sériot 1986: 151), in detail, rejected 
Noiré’s theory because he did not agree with the idea that some working cries 
would have been identical for all the primitive hordes. Spirkin, instead, asserted 
that motivated signs were merely a support for arbitrary signs. Against that, Thảo 
asserted that language essentially depends upon a system of non-wholly arbitrary 
signs, nowadays too. And it depends upon the primacy of gestures. From Thảo’s 
perspective, instead, Abaev and Spirkin seem to overvalue the role of the voice. 
Spirkin, Abaev, and Thảo regarded language as a reflection of the world as well 
as an instrument to name things (Abaev 1970: 256, 260, from Sériot 1986: 154). To 
them, the formation of language is a gnoseological process in which language tends 
to be more and more adequate to reality. To Spirkin and Abaev, if we assume the 
point of view of the subject, the reality is already structured, before language 
organizes a conceptual organization of contents of thought. Language is a stock of 
names, a nomenclature. By contrast, Thảo insisted that language of real life entails 
a peculiar way of perceiving mind-independent things. Once again, the originality 
of Thảo’s dialectical-materialist glottogenetic semiology was the fact that he 
regarded non-wholly arbitrary signs as the origins of consciousness, human-
specific perception of reality, rational thought, and fully-fledged languages. Those 
signs produced their tendential image whose internalisation involves the most 
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elementary forms of meaning. As this discussion implies, Thảo totally refused 
every kind of associationism. Those signs also change individualʼs attitude towards 
the mind-independent world. As a result, fundamental signs are the preconditions 
for having rational thinking in so far as it is based on the assumption of the mind-
independent existence of external things. 
 
4.1. The Debate on Gestural Origins of Speech: A Brief Overview 
 
As has been seen in previous paragraphs, Thảo’s conception of the origins of 
language deeply differed from other dialectic-materialist theories set out in 
Eastern Countries throughout the same period. The main peculiarities of his 
conception must be seen in the role assigned to gestures. To put Thảo’s theory in 
historical perspective, a brief panorama of the Western debate on the gestural 
origins of language from the publication of PDM (1951) to Thảo’s articles on the 
semiology of real life (1974, 1975) could be useful. 
According to Hewes (1978: 46-56), the question facing the role of gestures in 
origin, development, and nature of human language was largely debated during the 
period considered (at least 200 papers and books). One could, however, lay down 
the general outlines which had been followed by the contributors. Taking the cue 
from Hewes (1978), it seems that the debate on the phylogeny of sign language in 
Western countries revolved around nine main issues: i) anthropoid ape 
communication; ii) gestural origin of human language; iii) the interconnected 
development of gestural and vocal languages; iv) glottogenesis and tools; v) 
hunting and glottogenesis; vi) language and thought; vii) cognitive demands on 
human brain; viii) the antiquity of spoken language; ix) sign languages and writings 
after the shift to speech. From this point of view, it seems quite clear that Thảo’s 
theory dealt with almost every one of those issues in a more or less detailed way. 
Leaving aside both the sceptical attitude towards the topic of the origins of 
language (see for instance Viertel 1966 and Vetter 1969) and the efforts to 
legitimate this field of research (cf. Mounin 1967: 22; Olschewsky 1969: 734; 
Jakobson 1970: 444-445; Fillenbaum 1971: 256-262; Wescott 1967 and 1974), it could 
be quite interesting to briefly recapitulate the main trends of the debate on the 
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origins and development of non-verbal linguistic skills. 
 
4.2. Anthropoid Ape Communication 
 
The question of language origins firstly faced the assumption of the purely vocal 
nature of language or the possibility to detach language from the vocal support (cf. 
Mead 1956: 175; Jakobson 1964: 217). To Thảo language slowly arose from a set of 
fundamental signs. The main feature of the fundamental signs is to be non-wholly 
arbitrary. The signs our pre-human ancestors employed were indicative gestures 
and vocalizations which were meaningful in themselves. So the bond between 
signifier and signified was not totally arbitrary. The human articulate and fully-
developed speech cannot be possible if it is not preliminary based on some 
fundamental signs. To be efficacious, Thảo added, also ordinary languages require 
the support for some motivated signs: facial movements, onomatopoeias, 
inflexions, stress, syntactic reversal of the normal order of words and phrases, 
indexicals, pointing, etc. 
Since one assumes that linguistic skills transcend the limits of vocal 
productions, a comparison between the communication of anthropoid apes and 
humans becomes useful. Vocal abilities of anthropoid apes seemed to be too 
rudimentary. But as soon as some scholars (cf. for instance Kainz 1961: 102-107, 
193; see also Kortlandt 1967, Altmann 1968, Diebold 1968, Goodall 1968: 291; 
Bertrand 1971, Ploog 1972; Kortlandt 1973; Stokoe 1974 in Harnad et al., 1976: 505-
513) had been regarded verbal skills of apes as part of more sophisticated and 
multimodal system of communication (facial expressions, movements of the lips, 
hand and arm signals, body postures, olfactory signals, etc.), primateʼs gesture-
based communicative systems could be seen as capable to offer some elements to 
explain the transition from animal semiotic skills to those of humans (see Hinde 
1972; cf. also Goodall, 1973; 163, 166-167; Stephenson 1973: 201-202).  
But “all of these studies stress the overwhelming affective or emotional nature 
of primate signalling, and the minimal amount of environmental referential 
information which is transmitted” (Hewes 1978: 15; cf. Andrew 1963: 1040; 
Reynolds 1968: 388-389; Wind 1970: 79-80). Among apes, hand gestures are few and 
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the use of the hand is reduced to the contiguous perceptive field. Interestingly, 
some experiments of Rumbaugh, Gill, and Wright (1973) offered a support to 
suggest that “life in open-country environments may have been involved in 
hominid use of gestures made beyond the usual close range of pongid arm and 
hand signalling” (Hewes 1978: 18). Another really important point is the question if 
apes could be self-conscious (see Gallup, McClure, Hill, & Bundy 1971) or they do 
not (cf. Mead 1956: 168; Eccles 1973). 
Thảo ([1973] 1984: 19) admitted that primates could recognize indicative 
gestures as such: “when the finger is pointed in order to indicate an object to an 
ape, his look follows the extension of the experimenter’s hand gesture to the 
indicated object.” But “gestural activity of apes denotes feeling and action” (id., p. 
20) rather than “meaning of the object” (ibid.). On that basis, apes cannot employ 
indicative gestures even if they do it in a less “intellectual” way than humans. 
According to Thảo, “the indicative gesture marks the most elementary relation of 
consciousness to the object as external object” (id., p. 5). The animal perceives the 
object as part of the own behaviour: “the object is not detached from his own 
sensory-motor organization” (ibid.). The transition from animal communication to 
that of the hominid occurred during the prehistory of humankind when our pre-
human ancestors began to collaborate and cooperate. More specifically, the use of 
instruments during purposive cooperative collective activities required the employ 
of gestures displayed at a distance. Thus, although anthropoids, too, live in society 
and collaborate, the use of instrument marks an essential difference between 
hominids and animals in so far as it entails the need to communicate at a distance. 
And this kind of communication implies the awareness of the object as an external 
thing. 
 
4.3. Gestural Origins of Human Language 
 
Some scholars suggested that gestures preceded the speech (cf. Critchley 1967: 
36; Wind 1970: 80; see also Hewes 1973a, 1973b; Hewes 1978). But not everyone was 
in agreement with this option (see for instance Pätsch 1955, Bunak 1959; Révesz 
1959; cf. also Kainz 1962: II, 580; Salzinger & Salzinger 1967: 31; Lenneberg 1967; 
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Bateson 1968: 618-619; Kristeva 1968: 53; Zhinkin 1971: 88; Fischer 1973). According 
to other scholars, inarticulate vocalizations were originally subordinated to 
gestures or to pantomimic and mimetic activities (cf. Drexel 1951: 63-64; Diamond 
1960: 265-269; Kainz 1962: II, 580; De Laguna 1963: 6; Collinder 1965: 22; Goggin 
1973: 175). Thảo accepted that imitative skills are the condition for having a more 
sophisticated semiotic behaviour. The developed indicative sign is composed of a 
signifier that evokes a motor schema or tendential image which constitutes the 
meaning of that sign (see below Chapter 10 for more details). 
Thảo called the verbal moment of the developed indicative sign syncretic word: it 
totally depends upon gestures and as gestures convey a condensation of aspects. 
And contrary to fully-fledged sentences, the developed indicative sign remains 
context-related essentially. One cannot deny that Thảo argued for a multimodal 
theory of language. To him, the nature of first vocalizations cannot allow us to 
regard them as sentences or sentence-like utterance in so far as those vocalizations 
do not essentially differ from emotional cries (see below Chapter 9). Thảo ([1973] 
1984) called that vocalization (or words, in a wide sense) diffuse sounds. Those 
sounds could be considered as words, in a wide sense, in so far as they are 
accompanied by gestures: “The gestural sign developed in this way is reinforced 
each time by a diffuse sound, of emotional origin, but which is now related to the 
tendential image projected by the gesture, and in this way, obtains value as a word 
with an objective meaning” (id., p. 56). In support of his position, Thảo set out a 
theory of the primacy of gestures over vocalizations among our pre-human 
ancestors, without dismissing the multimodal nature of proto-language. 
 
4.4. Glottogenesis, Tool-making, and Hunting 
 
According to Thảo, during goal-oriented cooperative activities, the fellows 
exchanged to each other indications at a distance. During the recession of tropical 
forests toward the end of Tertiary Period (2.58 ma), Thảo wrote, the first examples 
of Australanthropus began to live in groups, working in coordination to survive 
and adapt themselves to new environmental conditions. The Australanthropus 
prepared and conserved instruments and got means of subsistence from collective 
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hunting. Those cooperative activities required a certain distance between 
individuals and, as a result, the Australanthropus displayed guidance gestures. 
Guidance gestures were first referred to objects that were perceptible in the 
environment. Since the systematic use of guidance gestures had been established, 
those signs began to indicate absent objects of biological needs and entailed the 
cognitive representation of them. 
As we have already made in Chapter 7, once again, we should mention other 
scholars who, in the same period, are seriously interested in the evolution of social 
practices. Semënov (1959: 37-39) and Yakimov (1973: 8) described the connection 
between tool-making and cognitive skills. Other scholars dealt with the connection 
between glottogenesis and tool-making in several different ways (cf. Oakley 1951: 
72; Leroi-Gourhan 1964 and 1965: 41; Bronowski1967; Critchley 1967: 72-73; Clark 
1970: 143-147; Masters 1970: 309). These scholars largely discussed the primacy of 
tool-making over linguistic skills or vice versa. The relation between language and 
hunting, too, was largely debated (see De Laguna 1963; cf. also Lancaster 1968: 456; 
Clark 1970: 71-72, 102-103). Generally, what stands out when one read this 
literature is the fact that a language system provided for environmental reference 
and enhanced hominid exploitation for food resources in a given territory (cf. 
Hewes 1978: 35-37). And, interestingly, Hewes (1978: 38) highlighted “the utility of 
arm or hand pointing in spotting game” especially “when the potential prey is at a 
considerable distance.” Now we have the very same hypothesis of Thảo again. 
 
4.5. Language, Cognition, and Brain 
 
Thảo refused the assumption that linguistic phenomena can be explained by 
physiological correlates and neural basis. The prehistorical language of real life – 
and especially indicative gestures – “effects the fundamental mediation between 
social practice and lived knowledge” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 35). Consciousness is 
always consciousness of both, the object a sign tends to and the act of signifying. So 
Thảo seems to suggest a theory of the co-evolution of material activities and 
cognition. And language would be the intermediary that allows the bi-directional 
interactions between mind and material activities. 
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Thảo ([1973] 1984: 17) admitted that “the language of real life is thus prior to 
consciousness” because “the existence of a language belonging to reality itself, prior 
to consciousness, from which consciousness draws its meaning.” “On the one 
hand” consciousness “stands out from the material movement which produces it” 
(id., p. 27). On the other hand, consciousness “cannot be separated from that 
material movement from which it stands out.” The material component of 
consciousness is, however, only one aspect of consciousness. Consciousness is a 
certain form of motion of matter. But consciousness is not a mere material motion. 
Thảo did not neglect that “consciousness, in so far as it actually exists must have 
something material in itself” (id., p. 26). That is the “idealized form of the motion of 
inner language” (id., p. 29). To Thảo, then, “the subject is conscious of what he thinks, 
thanks to the internal perception, starting from the kinesthesia, and visual and 
auditory associations of the outlined motion of his gestures and of his voice” (id., p. 
16). 
During the period considered (1951-1975), scholars discussed another very 
important aspect of the gestural origins of language: it is the connection between 
language and both, neuro-anatomical prerequisites and its cognitive effects. To 
Von Eickstedt (1963: III, 2040) – who adopted the gestural hypothesis – the inner 
speech and its sophisticated cognitive consequence, appeared after the emergence 
of the fully-developed speech. Hewes (1978: 40) regretted that “more experimental 
data are needed to determine if internalized manual gesture is less effective than 
internalized vocal language with highly complex manual activity related to crafts, 
tool using, etc.” 
In this regard, Thảo explained the way in which a bodily-displayed gestural-
verbal sign could be internalized and idealized by the ego. The pre-conscious, 
collective, and semiotic structure of social practices involves the development of 
individual cognitive skills. In this way, to Thảo, Husserl’s noesis could be 
understood as the sub-conscious system of sketched-out and evoked bodily 
vocalizations and gestures. In the same way, Husserl’s noema may be reckoned to be 
the tendential meaning after its intellectual internalization and conceptualization. 
For this reason, Thảo stated that, in inner language, “subject’s act of signifying the 
real, the material, takes the form of an ideal indication or intentional sighting [visée 
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intentionelle] in the informality of lived experience [intériorité du vécu]” (id., p. 22). 
The intentionality (noesis), in this instance, is the psychic act of signifying whose 
co-product is the idealized meaning (noema). On that basis, one could say that the 
intentionality tends to reveal the pre-conscious meaning to consciousness. 
We are back to where we started. The main aim of Thảo was to suggest a theory 
of the origins of consciousness which rooted human cognition in natural evolution 
as well as in the human social history. His main effort was to show how it could be 
possible a dialectic-materialist theory of consciousness which did not reduce 
consciousness to material motion and neuro-physiological mechanism: “such a 
definition would, in fact, equate consciousness with mere physical movement […]. 
It remains, nonetheless, that consciousness displays an incontestably ideal 
character […]” (Thảo [1974: 38] 2009: 300-301). A new semiotic model and a very 
interesting conception of inner language as based on a subconscious system of 
outlined gestures and vocalizations which are the internalized version of the 
language of real life allowed him to emphasize how consciousness and thought 
cannot be reduced to mere passive matter. At the end of his ILC, Thảo summarised 
his approach in the following way: 
 
Thus in its human sense, the psychic cannot be directly understood in terms of the 
biological. It implies the mediation of social determining factors, based on the 
historical dialectic of production forces and productive relations, and developed in 
language. (Thảo [1973] 1984: 194) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 310 
Chapter Nine 
 Language Development in Children and Some Epistemological Remarks 
on Thảo’s Approach 
 
 
 
Naturellement, ce que je présente n’est qu’un ensemble 
d’hypothèses de travail destinées, selon la règle, à être 
critiquées et dépassées. Certains points pouvent sembler aventureux: 
j’ai pensé que quand la certitude n’est pas acquise, il vaut 
toujours mieux proposer une solution qui sera peut-être eliminée, que 
ne rien dire du tout. Car le fait même de la réfuter  
sera déjà un progès vers la solution véritable. 
(T.D. Thảo) 
 
 
 
1. The Empirical Foundation of Thảo’s Theory. - 2. Thảo’s Approach and the 
Nativism. - 3.1. The Developed Indicative Sign in the Ontogeny. - 3.2. The 
Developed Indicative Sign in the Phylogeny. - 3.3. The Deductive Method. - 4.1. 
The Semiotic of the Developed Indicative Sign (I). - 4.2. The Semiotic of the 
Developed Indicative Sign (II). - 4.3. The Language of the Child / The Language 
of the Adult. - 5. The Experimental Data. - 6. Thảo’s Scientism. - 7. Thảo’s 
Representation of Language. 
 
 
 
 
 
1. The Empirical Foundation of Thảo’s Theory 
 
As every other scholar who tackles language origins, the problem Thảo faced 
concerned the absence of direct empirical data that could confirm or infirm his 
hypothesis. He was thus forced to base his own hypothesis on indirect data: 
archaeology and psychology offered Thảo some evidence that he assumed as the 
empirical starting point to suggest his own hypothesis. 
Thảo ([1973] 1984: 48-49) described the birth of language by assuming as a 
working hypothesis the biogenetic fundamental law set out by Haeckel ([1899] 1900: 
80): 
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I established the opposite view, that this history of the embryo (ontogeny) must be 
completed by a second, equally valuable, and closely connected branch of thought - 
the history of race (phylogeny). Both of these branches of evolutionary science are, 
in my opinion, in the closest causal connection; this arises from the reciprocal action 
of the laws of heredity and adaptation... ‘ontogenesis is a brief and rapid 
recapitulation of phylogenesis, determined by the physiological functions of 
heredity (generation) and adaptation (maintenance). 
 
Remarkably the same theory was also set out by Engels (MEW XX: 452) as well: 
 
For, just as the developmental history of the human embryo in the mother’s womb is 
only an abbreviated repetition of the history, extending over millions of years, of 
the bodily evolution of our animal ancestors, beginning from the worm, so the 
mental development of the human child is only a still more abbreviated repetition of 
the intellectual development of these same ancestors, at least of the later ones. 
(trans. from Engels 1987: 460) 
 
Thus, Thảo regarded the child between 14 and 20 months as the touchstone to 
suggest a plausible description of the formation of language (see fig. 16 for more 
elaborate treatment). Thảo called this period of the life of the child the age of the 
prehominid. To him, for instance, the child at about 14 months shows the first 
attempts to perform indicative gestures. To make another example, at about 19 
months, the child shows the ability to abstract from the present situation and thus 
has at a disposal the representation of the absent situation. In this regard, Thảo 
invoked the works, among others, of Pichon (1936: 59), Piaget (1950: 70-72), and 
Gouin-Décarie (1962: 148-150). 
As we have said in previous chapters, the most ancient prehominid ancestor is 
called by Thảo Australanthropus although today one called that species 
Australopithecus. At the time, the findings of archaeology and anthropology seemed 
indeed to suggest that the Australanthropus was the transition from the 
anthropoid and the genus homo: the member of this species lived in group and 
began to systematically use instruments (Thảo invoked the works of T. E. 
Konnikova, Spirkin, S. L. Washburn, Henri V. Vallois, A. C. Blanc, V. I. Kotchetkova, 
L. S. B. Leakey, P. V. Tobias, J. R. Napier, etc.; for more details, see fig. 20 and 
Chapter 7). For this reason, Thảo suggested that they also began to employ 
indicative gestures. 
The question facing Thảo at this juncture is the way to describe the nature and 
 312 
function of those indicative gestures and their development given that there is no 
direct proves of that symbolic behaviour. The solution he proposed was to study 
the formation of language in the child and thus to suggest analogies between the 
language of the child and the symbolic behaviour of our ancestors. In other words, 
Thảo established the following analogy to guide and confirm his theory: the child is 
to a symbolic behaviour as our ancestors were to a similar symbolic behaviour. 
Thus, Thảo proceeded from the more known data of psychology to the less known 
hypothesis on the symbolic behaviour of our ancestors. And the findings of 
archaeology offer some elements to confirm or infirm those analogies. In effect, as 
we have seen in previous chapters, Thảo developed the findings of archaeology to 
abduct some hypotheses on both, the social relations of our ancestors and their 
symbolic behaviour. 
 
2. Thảo’s Approach and the Nativism 
 
The analogy between the development of language in the child and the symbolic 
skills of our ancestors is based, according to Thảo, upon the innateness of some of 
modern human symbolic abilities. Thảo stated that the child reactivates the 
symbolic predispositions already acquired by the species in the past ages. More 
specifically, the anatomical, physiological and cognitive development of the brain 
entails the slow formation of some native symbolic abilities. Here are some 
examples: 
 
such a structure [the pointing] is stabilized in the hereditary form of the prehominid 
ancestor’s nerve synapses toward the end of the stage of his development, and it is 
their reactivation in ontogenesis that we have witnessed in the observation of the 
child who pointed the finger. (Thảo ([1973] 1984: 67). 
 
the early drawings of the child of 16-17 months, or about the middle of the 
prehominid age, appear as a reactivation of the syncretic sign of representation of the 
instrumental form. (id., p. 75) 
 
It is there, in all likelihood, that we must search for the origin of the functional 
sentence [see below Chapter 11], whose reactivation is seen in the child in the second 
stage of the prehominid age. (id., p. 92) 
 
Such a structure [the enumerative functional sentence: see below Chapter 11] is 
reactivated in the sentence of little Génia […]. (id., p. 103) 
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The gesture is reinforced by speech, and there results by juxtaposition and synthesis 
of the two elementary sentences, the correlative functional sentence […] whose 
reactivation was observed in the child’s utterance. (id., p. 104; see below Chapter 11) 
 
[…] a gesture which we have interpreted as a reactivation of the insistent syncretic 
representation of the instrumental form, […]. (id., p. 108; see below Chapters 10) 
 
The progress of the child’s drawing, from 16 to 19 months, thus appears as a 
reactivation of the development of the sign of representation of the instrumental 
form […]. (id., p. 109; see below Chapter 10) 
 
the child is only trying to master a structure [the structure of the questioning: see 
below Chapter 11] inherited from the ancestral past [l’enfant ne fait que s’exercer à 
maîtriser une structure héritée du passé ancestral] (id., p. 118) 
 
And the list goes on. According to Thảo, the most fundamental symbolic skills 
are inherited structures which are a priori for the child and a posteriori for the 
species. These structures gradually arise during the ontogeny. Thus, language 
acquisition is not totally explained as the result of learning as the Behaviourism 
claimed. Another way of saying this is that the child is not a passive learner who 
responds to environmental stimuli. The child rather reactivates certain skills 
which depend upon a genetically predetermined maturational process.  
To Thảo, the development of the brain determines the stages of the formation of 
symbolic abilities. Thus, the child has not at a disposal at birth the knowledge of 
the same linguistic structures of the adult. In support of his position, Thảo 
defended the idea of the discontinuity and peculiarity of symbolic skills in the 
child. In effect, according to him, symbolic skills of the child are structured on 
different lines to those of the adult. 
According to the examples, the inherited symbolic skills of the child cannot be 
reduced to communicative and linguistic ones. Thảo described, for instance, the 
child’s drawing and play to explain the formation of some symbolic structures. This 
means that the inherited symbolic structures are not restricted to a kind of a 
language-specific module. It seems that Thảo was suggesting that the formation of 
language in the child depends upon more general cognitive skills. In this vein, he 
agreed with the theory of general intelligence and general symbolic function set 
out by Piaget. To both, Thảo and Piaget, the symbolic abilities are a part of a more 
general development of cognitive skills from the most simple and concrete abilities 
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to the most general and abstract reasoning. 
To Thảo, the inherited symbolic structures could be considered to be a kind of 
operational and procedural knowledge. The child is not aware of those structures 
but shows symbolic-structured actions. They symbolically act in the physical 
environment and manipulates signs they find in the social environment. On that 
basis, the experience triggers the formation of the most fundamental symbolic 
structures but not determinates them. 
One could suggest that Thảo and Piaget have something more in common. As a 
matter of fact, both stated that symbolic skills arise through stages. And these 
stages are the same for all children in the world. But this assumption implies the 
need to explain why and how all children in the world show the same development 
by stages. Thảo’s answer was that all children share the same phylogeny. The same 
nativist predeterminism has been suggested also by some neo-Piagetian 
psychologists (Pascual-Leone 1970; Case 1985; Karmiloff-Smith 1993).  
Even if he did not tackle the issue explicitly, Thảo resolved the problem of 
Piaget’s theory – namely, the explanation of the universal nature of the stages of 
development of the child – through the predeterminism. This solution does not 
allow explaining how language effectively emerges in the child. But Thảo had not 
to explain how the development of symbolic abilities takes place in the child. He 
simply assumed the predeterminism and the existence of inherited structures as a 
starting point to describe the symbolic skills of our ancestors. 
In next paragraphs, we will illustrate the results of the application of this 
approach. 
 
3.1. The Developed Indicative Sign in the Ontogeny 
 
The first observable form of the indicative sign is the pointing. But the child at 
about 14 months already shows the so-called developed indicative sign [signe de 
l’indication développée]. To Thảo, it is not a simple indicative gesture because it 
could also imitate and reproduce objects in motion: it consists in the agitation of 
the hand which is alternately raised and lowered while being directed toward the 
thing going away. This gesture is obviously accompanied by vocalizations even if 
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their function is very weak to determine the meaning of the sign. 
According to Thảo, indicative gesture produces a tendential image that must be 
regarded as the meaning they convey. In the case of developed indicative gesture, 
the tendential image this sign produces is nothing but the reproduction of the 
movement of the object. In detail, Thảo ([1973] 1984: 50) stated that this image is 
composed of three moments or three parts which are too confused each other: 
1. The moment “of the object, produced by the tension of the hand and of the 
look toward the person going away”: this moment coincides with the gesture 
of the pointing that intends the object as external reality independent of the 
subject; 
2. The moment “of the motion of this object or person”: this is the image 
“projected by the agitation of the outstretched hand”; 
3. The moment “of the form as form of the motion of the object”: in other 
words, this moment represents the peculiar way the object is in motion. 
As a result, Thảo assigns a letter to each one of those moments: 
1. The moment of the object is “T” (in French text it is C): the “this here” (in 
French ceci) indicated by the pointing; 
2. The moment of the motion is “M” (in French M): the motion (Fr. 
mouvement) represented by the motion of the hand; 
3. The moment of the form is “F” (in French F, forme): this is the peculiar way 
the hand is in motion and represents the way the object is in motion. 
Eventually, Thảo suggested the following general formula to summarise the 
signification of the developed indicative gesture, viz. the tendential image the 
gesture produces: “TMF”. This formula could be explained as “this here (T) in a 
motion (M) in some form (F).” 
Interestingly, Thảo admitted that the situation in which the developed 
indicative sign is performed could determine the way to produce it: “According to 
the characteristic and needs of the situation, the developed indicative gesture will 
place stress more on one or another part of its structure” ([1973] 1984: 50). The 
three moments of the image produced by the developed indicative gesture could be 
more or less stressed according to the needs of the situation. In this way, from the 
general formula TMF, Thảo deduced six variations: 
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(1) The general formula that represents the stress on the moments of the 
object and its motion: TMF. 
(2) The formula of the stress on the moments of the object and the form of 
motion: TFM. 
(3) The formula of the stress on the moments of the motion and the form 
of motion: MFT. 
(4) The formula of the stress on the moments of the motion and the object 
of motion: MTF. 
(5) The formula of the stress on the moments of the form of motion and 
the object of motion: FTM. 
(6) The formula of the stress on the moments of the form of motion and 
the motion itself: FMT. 
Hence, the polysemy (polysémie) usually attributed to the language of the child. 
This is particularly true in the case of the vocal moment. The presumed polysemy of 
the language of the child depends upon the judgement of the adult who considers 
the vocal moment alone. In effect, Thảo remarked that the language of the child 
has been regarded by common sense as polysemic exactly because the vocalization 
is subordinated to the developed indicative gesture. This one shows modulations 
and shades of three moments. Thus, the polysemy of the vocal moment does not 
exclude the possibility to understand the sign exactly because as a whole it shows 
modulations and shades since the child stresses on one or the other moment of the 
gesture. 
Piaget (1936) had already suggested that the sensorimotor schema is a totality 
that does not result from the association or synthesis of elements; it might be also 
clear why Thảo wrote that the signification of the developed indicative sign is a 
unity. The developed indicative gesture is a whole movement which can be dived 
into three moments. The child is also able to stress on one or another moment of 
the gesture without leading to a segmentation of the gesture into minimal parts. 
The signification of the developed indicative gesture is a closed system, a whole 
sensorimotor schema composed of three moments. 
The gesture is a meaningful unity that always conserves the same shape and the 
same meaning. On that basis, the unity of the signifier is the condition for having 
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the unity of signified. Thus, there is no segmentation of the signified but rather a 
condensation of aspects within the same image. 
The gesture could be modulated by the performer who stresses on one or 
another moment of the gesture. Specifically, Thảo argued that the moment which 
is less stressed correspond to a movement of the hand that is cut short. For 
instance, in the case of (2) TFM, Thảo ([1973] 1984: 53) wrote: “the motion of the 
hand which develops from its tension [i.e. the pointing: T] is cut short in such a 
manner that the emphasis of the gesture is shifted to second place to the moment 
of the form [the form of motion: F].” 
 
3.2. The Developed Indicative Sign in the Phylogeny 
 
After having described the structure of the developed indicative gesture in the 
child, Thảo applied his working hypothesis to phylogeny. To him, the indicative 
gesture (geste de l’indication) had probably marked the transition from anthropoids 
to hominids. Then the passage from the circular-arc motion (geste en arc de cercle) to 
the straight-line gesture (forme en ligne droite) took place because of needs which 
arose beyond urgent work situations (see below Ch. 10). 
To Thảo, indicative gestures were at first realized as circular-arc movements 
among first prehominids. The motion of the hand in a circular-arc was employed to 
carry the whole group in the same direction. For instance, it was the sign employed 
during collective hunts. This original form of indication had a structural 
disadvantage because “it actually implies an urgent work situation” (Thảo [1973] 
1984: 11). In particular, “such a sign would have been much too strong in everyday 
life, when it was just a matter of the prehominids drawing each others’ attention to 
a more or less interesting object and not preparing themselves for an attach” (id., 
p. 12). And, for this reason, the circular-arc form was “of rather limited use” (id., p 
11). 
To explain the development of circular-arc movements, Thảo argued for some 
hypotheses which can be made on the basis of archaeological data. The need to 
employ a weaker indicative gesture in everyday life led our ancestors to perform 
the straight-line gesture (the pointing). It could be considered to be the attenuated 
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form of the circular-arc movement. Before the emergence of Oldowan industry 
(2.6–1.7 ma), elaborated instruments (Kafuan instrument) produced with the 
systematic help of a second instrument required the straight-line gesture. This one 
directs the glance of the receiver “which follows the extension of the hand gesture 
stretched toward the object” (id., p. 12). Not only did the straight-line gesture refer 
to the current work-object, it was also employed to indicate “everything 
interesting that may be a possible work-object.” In this way, straight-line gestures 
developed even more sophisticated cognitive skills among our ancestors. In detail, 
the straight-line gesture is nothing other than that pointing that, as has been seen, 
marks the most elementary form of consciousness of self and of the object (see 
above Chapter 5). As we have shown above, “the cognizance of the developed 
indicative sign is produced only when the subject addresses it to himself” (id., p. 57). 
Then Thảo suggested that “if, by virtue of the excitation of collective work, the 
straight line indicative gesture is prolonged for an instant, the prehominid necessarily 
follows the object in its motion” (id., p. 56). This is the developed indicative gesture 
whose main practical function was to support the collective cooperative hunting. If 
one assumes that that gesture was accompanied by vocalization, to Thảo, one could 
then reason that “the developed indicative sign has thus been constituted in its 
fundamental formula, TMF (1).” In so far as the circular-arc motion gesture simply 
allowed “the concentration of the forces of the group on the object as the ʻthis 
here!’,” the development of straight-line gesture led our ancestors to focus their 
attention on some properties of the object (T), i.e., the motion (M), and the form of 
motion (F). 
 
3.3. The Deductive Method 
 
Thảo’s theory of the evolution of language depended upon observations and 
experimental data concerning the development of the language in the child. 
Interestingly, he assumed that the language of our ancestors, as well as the 
language of the child, reflects the reality in some way. If, essentially, reality is 
matter in motion, the structure of the most fundamental forms of language must 
correspond to the reality, that is matter in motion. In effect, Thảo’s theory implies 
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at least three assumptions: i) the ontological insight of dialectical materialism 
according to which the reality is matter in motion in a certain form; ii) the 
language of real life is a useful means of production and problem-solving in so far 
as it evokes the elements of a scene; iii) language evolves through stages. 
Thảo stated that the developed indicative gesture in its most elementary form 
could be translated in the formula TMF, this here (T) in a motion (M) in some form 
(F). Then, he listed six possible variations of that formula. Those variations 
exhausted the forms of the most elementary symbolic productions as far as every 
variation marks a stage in the development and evolution of language. Or, the 
evolution and development of linguistic skills is nothing but the slow and gradual 
transformation of each variation into the following one. In this vein, it seems that 
the evolution and development of language are summarised in the formula TFM 
and its six possible variations. One may well wonder, then, if Thảo’s theory of 
language depended upon a deductive method of description.  
To him, the analysis of experimental data – which was seriously influenced by 
some ontological and linguistic assumptions – involves the confirmation of the fact 
that the general formula of developed indicative signs slowly appeared during both 
the ontogeny and phylogeny through its six variations. In other words, the entire 
evolution and development of language are potentially contained in the general 
formula TMF, at least the most elementary stages of its evolution and development. 
The main task of the researcher is thus to clearly, chronologically arrange the 
gradual emergence of the six variations. Secondly, the researcher must describe 
the socio-historical conditions for the transition from one to another variation of 
the general formula of the developed indicative sign. 
To Thảo, few examples are enough to describe the general structure of the 
language of the child. For this reason, one calls into question the fact that Thảo 
stretched the interpretation of the experimental data to highlight some structures 
which correspond to his ontological and linguistic assumptions. In any case, the 
inductive moment seems to have a subordinated role compared to the 
assumptions. Simply put, the experimental data concerning the linguistic 
development of the child seems to have a mere illustrative value. On that basis, it 
seems that the three assumptions of his theory and the general formula of the 
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developed indicative sign led Thảo to affect the reliability of the data, to restrict 
the field of appropriate examples, and to adapt them to a previous categorisation 
of phenomena. Then, it seems that Thảo described the evolution and development 
of language through a deductive approach in which he started from theoretical 
assumptions and verify them with data. Or, at least, he seems to prefer a deductive 
method to explain and illustrate his own hypothesis. 
Thảo established a finite set of formulas (six) that can generate all the infinite 
occurrences. This set of formulas does not allow discriminating the truth or falsity 
of linguistic productions. And it does not allow determining the grammaticality of 
a linguistic production. It is rather an explanatory principle that marks the 
development and evolution of the fundamental linguistic practices. For this reason, 
Thảo’s generativism had more to do with Hegel’s conception of the Absolute than 
with Chomsky’s linguistic generativism. Hegelian Absolute is the whole movement 
through various relative stages, the process of development with all its stages and 
transitions; it is the unity of thinking and practices, the dialectical set of figures in 
the becoming and the multiplicity. The Hegelian Absolute is no longer something 
static, which is already in and of itself, but it is a becoming, a being for itself, whose 
truth springs from a dialectical process, instead of being placed with original 
intuition. 
In the same way, even if it is not the auto-sufficient totality of the real, the 
developed indicative sign coincides with the dialectical becoming of its own 
manifestations and variations. And, even if Thảo largely described the contingent 
practical needs that led our ancestors to employ new forms of the developed 
indicative sign, the historical development of the developed indicative gestures, 
however, seems to imply some kind of finality or teleology. Before concluding, we 
must also add that the study of the set of formulas was also conduced by Thảo 
against the background of a deep analysis of the objective social conditions of 
ancient societies in which those arose. This fact leads us to conclude that Thảo does 
not seem solve that tension between inductive and deductive method. 
 
4.1. The Semiotic of the Developed Indicative Sign (I) 
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Remarkably, Thảo devoted a great amount of space to the semiotic structure of 
developed indicative sign. When Thảo introduced his own working hypothesis – 
the linguistic skills of the child at about 14–20 months may be assumed as the 
starting point to suggest a plausible theory of the evolution of human language – 
he stated that “we must first of all interpret the child’s language by itself” ([1973] 
1984: 50). With this statement, Thảo claimed the right to study child’s language by 
its own features without regarding it as an imperfect form of the language of the 
adult. This assumption led Thảo to describe the own code (code) of child’s language. 
The vocalizations of the child at about 14 months, Thảo stated, are usually called 
word-sentences. In other words, the adults consider those utterances used in 
isolation as vocalizations whose meaning is the same of a fully-developed sentence. 
A sentence “expresses a complete meaning,” an articulated judgement (jugement), a 
predicative association of words. From the point of view of the child, however, it is 
impossible that the word-sentence has the meaning of a sentence: “for if, at this 
stage, the child could give to his word the meaning of a sentence, it is difficult to 
see why he would not form the sentence itself.” The child does not distinguish the 
elements – such as the subject, the verb, and the object – that constitute the 
meaning as a whole. 
Then, Thảo reasoned, the so-called word-sentence should not be taken as an 
equivalent of sentences uttered by the adult. Without reducing the language of the 
child to the fully-fledged language, it may be more useful to consider the isolated 
words of the child in their own semantic structure “which is not immediately 
evident to the adult.” As this discussion implies, Thảo refused to superimpose the 
structure of the sentence of the adult to the word of the child.  
Thus, Thảo stated that the word of the child is perceived as polysemic by the 
adult: it means that the same word could be used to refer to several different 
situations. “We know that each of these words is applied to diverse situations with 
different meanings” ([1973] 1984: 49). The meaning of the words in child language 
cannot be reduced to the meaning of a sentence. In effect, the language of the child 
“is characterized by the appearance of a certain number of gestural signs with 
words used in isolation” (id., p. 49). For this reason, to Thảo, that language of the 
child “appears in two stages, one gestural and the other verbal, the gestural being 
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clearer than the verbal” (id., p. 50). For this reason, the verbal stage of the language 
of the child remains the same and then it conveys an inarticulate meaning. The 
situation radically changes since one describes the modulations of the gestural 
stage of the language of the child.  
The vocalization has the function of reinforcing the meaning conveyed by the 
gesture rather than to determine it. In this instance, the gestural moment is more 
crucial than the vocal one to determine the meaning of the signs of the child: “the 
gestural being clearer than the verbal.” The gestural stage allows us to explain why 
the same vocalization could be applied to several different situations: the formula 
of developed indicative gesture “contains a certain number of possible 
transformations which will allow us to understand the polysemy of the word which 
reinforces the gesture” (ibid.).  
As a consequence, “the gesture directly produces the meaning of the words 
[vocalization]” (id., p. 51). And the tendential image (signified) conveyed by the 
gesture (signifier) is a closed system, a whole sensorimotor schema composed of 
three moments. In other words, the three moments are reciprocally confused. For 
this reason, the meaning of the sign is polysemic, as has been seen, or “syncretic”. 
And one cannot forget that the context in which the sign is performed plays a 
decisive role to determine the signification of the gesture. The meaning of the 
vocalizations, in other words, required the gestural stage as well the extra-
linguistic context of the speech act to be determined. In the case of sentences, 
instead, the syntagmatic sequence of words is theoretically enough to determine 
the meaning (but Thảo did not totally agree with this assumption: see the 
discussion of ordinary language in Chapter 3). 
The nature of first vocalizations cannot allow us to regard them as sentences or 
sentence-like utterance. Those vocalizations do not essentially differ from 
emotional cries. Thảo called that vocalization (or words, in a wide sense) diffuse 
sounds. Those sounds could be considered as words, in a wide sense, in so far as 
they are accompanied by gestures. “The gestural sign developed in this way is 
reinforced each time by a diffuse sound, of emotional origin, but which is now 
related to the tendential image projected by the gesture, and in this way obtains 
value as a word with an objective meaning” (id., p. 56). 
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Those sounds are diffuse because of the rudimentary anatomy of vocal organs of 
the child. And especially of our ancestors who also did not have some cerebral 
areas that the child rather has. In short, children and prehominids are not able to 
clearly articulate sounds: 
 
Even though his cortex [of the child] has not completely matured, his first words, at 
the prehominid age, already display the beginnings of articulation, of which 
Australanthropus was undoubtedly incapable. […] Australanthropus did not yet 
exhibit this phenomenon of vocal inhibition, so that each sound he emitted was 
more or less prolonged in a diffuse form. 
Articulation was thus impossible, and the vocal emissions of Australanthropus must 
have been comparable to those of the anthropoid, although undoubtedly more 
varied. (id., p. 55-56) 
 
On that basis, Thảo reasoned that “if we consider more particularly the verbal 
moment [of the developed indicative sign], we can say that the word appears at 
this level as diffuse on the plane of the signifier and syncretic on the plane of the 
signified” (id., p. 57). Assuming that the verbal moment is a “diffuse-syncretic 
word”, it cannot be described as a sentence-like linguistic phenomenon. 
In conclusion, the developed indicative sign is a gestural-verbal sign composed 
of a gestural stage – which mainly conveys the meaning of the sign by modelling 
the signifier in six different ways – and by prolonged unarticulate vocalizations – 
which reinforces the gestural stage. That sign produces its own syncretic meaning 
– which is a tendential image resulting from the context-related performance of 
the sign. 
 
4.2. The Semiotic of the Developed Indicative Sign (II) 
 
Sometimes, the description of the gestural moment of the developed indicative 
gesture seems to contradict Thảo’s methodological assumption. The structure of 
the developed indicative sign seems to reproduce the structure of a sentence. T 
could be seen as the subject of an action (M) in a certain way (F). In other words, 
the three moments of the developed indicative signs seem to correspond to the 
three elements of a sentence: in detail, T could correspond to the subject, M to the 
verb, and F to the (ad)verb. Moreover, the different stress on each one of those 
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moments could involve a sophisticated way to express the imperative mood (mode 
impératif) – when the stress on the motion precedes the one on the form: MFT – or 
the indicative mode (mode indicatif) – when the stress on the thing precedes the one 
on the motion: MTF. 
Thảo ([1973] 1984: 54) himself suggested this consequence when wrote: 
 
We can thus say in general that we have a meaning of action in the imperative mood 
when the developed indicative gesture strongly supports a motion of a certain form 
so as to project the image of a motion (M) of form (F) entailing the “this here” (T): 
MFT (3). Inversely the meaning of action appears in the indicative mood when the 
mimicking motion is cut short so as to lessen the tension of the hand immediately. 
The moment of the “this here” then comes to the second level of the projected 
image and the meaning is then defined as “the motion of the this here in the form 
(F)”: MTF (4). 
 
But, as we have noted above, the meaning of indicative gestures is produced by 
the movement of the body itself and does not depend upon syntagmatic relations 
of signs. In this way, the gesture is a meaningful unity that always conserves the 
same shape and the same meaning. It could be, however, modulated by the child 
who stresses on one or another moment of the gesture. In any case, the meaning 
the developed indicative gesture cannot be regarded as the sum of components. 
According to Thảo, this would be the structure of the sentence in so far as it is the 
sum of signs. Instead, the developed indicative gesture is a meaningful sign in 
itself. 
And one cannot forget that the tendential image (signified) conveyed by the 
gesture (signifier) is a closed system, a whole motor schema composed of three 
moments. The three moments are reciprocally confused. And for this reason, the 
context in which the sign is performed plays a decisive role to determine the 
signification of the gesture. As this discussion implies, Thảo wrote that the six 
modulations of the developed indicative gesture “are thus more or less confused in 
a syncretic ensemble which cannot be differentiated except according to the 
situation” (id., p. 57). By contrast, the signification of a fully-developed sentence 
could be analysed in its components in a clearer way. And the meaning of a 
sentence depends upon the linear syntagmatic sequence of words while the 
meaning of the developed indicative sign depends upon the simultaneity of body 
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movements and vocalizations.  
 The gestural moment involves a “modelling of the signifier [modelage du 
signifiant; in the English translation, this syntagm is “modelling of the signifying 
act”].” In this way, it differs from sentences which are a sum of signs, and thus a 
sum of signifiers rather being a modulation of a signifier alone. Nonetheless, the 
gestural stage of the developed indicative sign seems to anticipate some features of 
fully-developed sentences. Though Thảo took the necessary precautions – and said 
that the gesture is a sign and it cannot be understood to be a sum of signs, the 
structure of the sentence seems to remain the starting point of his description. 
 
4.3. The Language of the Child / The Language of the Adult 
 
If we now consider the debate on the acquisition of language during the 1960s 
and 1970s (see for instance Slobin 1966, Coyaud 1967, Berthoz-Proux 1975), we 
could remark that Thảo was quite indifferent towards the main epistemological 
issues of that debate (the topic-comment theory, the pivot grammar, etc.). He 
simply regarded some psychological works as the starting points to develop his 
own theory. More specifically, his theory had drawn on some sources which 
offered him a corpus of examples of language development in the child. 
But Thảo does not abandon to take a position on two topics which were 
extensively debated at that time: i) the theory of holophrasis (discussed, for 
instance, by Bloom 1970: 10) and ii) the continuity between the language of the 
child and the language of the adult. First, Thảo refused to reduce child language to 
the adult language. Second, he did not dismiss the assumption that the language of 
the adult is the result of the development of the language of the child. In the next 
lines, we will try to understand how Thảo conciliated these two ideas and dealt 
with the question of holophrasis. 
The holophrasis is the use of a single word which seems to have the same value 
of a sentence. To Thảo one of the problems of this notion is the fact that one must 
presuppose that the child has a sentence-like structured thought, but they lack the 
grammatical tools to express it. Thus, he refused to admit that the child recognizes 
several aspects of the referent of the holophrasis without expressing them 
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syntactically. There are no underlying grammatical relations or deep structures 
beyond the so-called surface. 
According to Thảo, the child does not dispose of the same linguistic system of 
the adult. On that basis, the language of the child cannot be considered to be a 
simplified version of the language of the adult. By contrast, Brown and Fraser 
(1964) regarded the language of the child as a telegraphese or telegraphic speech. 
According to this theory, the child performs vocalizations that are a simplified 
version of the language of the adult. In other words, the language of the child lacks 
some syntactical elements which are instead at work in the sentences of the adult. 
This theory, then, presupposes the point of view the fully-developed language to 
analyse the language of the child. At the same time, the authors neglect the 
peculiar nature of the language of the child. 
To Thảo, the language of the child coincides with the movement of the thought 
of the child. The sequence of signs, as well as the stress on one or other moments of 
the sign, correspond to the attentional frame of the child. Simply put, the child 
highlights the aspects of the state of affairs which are considered more interesting. 
In this vein, Thảo set out that the reasoning and the language of the child entirely 
coincide. Thus, the use of a single sign does not mean a structured sentence. This 
one would be in fact a kind of mentalese. 
Another problematic aspect of the notion of “holophrasis” concerned the 
primacy accorded to the vocal moment of the sign. The French Dictionary of 
Foulquié and Saint-Jean (1962) regarded the holophrasis as a “multisyllabic word”. 
To Thảo, instead, the language of the child combined vocalizations with body 
language, context, regards, etc. In this way, the language of the child must be 
analysed from a perspective that highlights its gestural-verbal nature. In effect, as 
the signifier is a diffused sound matched with a whole gesture, the signified is a 
confused syncretic image. On that basis, the signifier and the signified cannot be 
segmented: the language of the child cannot be understood to be a combination of 
ideal unities or discrete elements. 
As a result, Thảo totally disagreed with Merleau-Ponty’s conception of linguistic 
development in the child. To Merleau-Ponty ([1960] 1964: 39), “language is made of 
differences without terms.” As Saussure before him, Merleau-Ponty ([1960] 1964) 
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refused to consider linguistic signs as meaningful in themselves. In other words, 
language is a system of signs. But he also recognized that “language is learned, and 
in this sense one is certainly obliged to go from the part to whole” (ibid.). To solve 
this conundrum, Merleau-Ponty asserted that “the learned parts of a language 
have an immediate value as a whole” (id., p. 39-40). Another way of saying this is 
that two discreet sounds are enough to have a system of relations and oppositions:  
 
these first phonemic oppositions [of the language of the child] may well have gaps 
and be enriched subsequently by new dimensions […] the important point is that the 
phonemes are from the beginning variations of a unique speech apparatus, and that 
with them the child seems to have “caught” the principle of a mutual differentiation 
of signs and at the same time to have acquired the meaning of the sign. (id., p. 40) 
 
Clearly, Merleau-Ponty did not highlight the role of gestures in the language of 
the child and he also dismissed the role of diffused sounds. To him, the diffused 
sounds have actually no genetic relations with the fully-fledged language: “his 
babbling is often repressed by the opposition, and in any case retains only a 
marginal existence without its materials being integrated to the new system of true 
speech” (ibid.). 
By contrast, to Thảo, the signs employed by the child are meaningful in 
themselves and they do not depend upon relations with other signs. They cannot 
be reduced to the verbal moments and they have a genetic link with the language 
of the adult. Merleau-Ponty rather considered the system of arbitrary signs as 
independent of motivated signs. To him, the babbling of the child depends upon 
rules that have nothing in common with the system motivated signs. As this 
discussion implies, the language of the adult does not develop from the language of 
the child.  
To Thảo, the development of language may be described as a process of 
accumulation and qualitative shifts which depends upon the more general 
physiological and anatomical development of the body. Specifically, Thảo 
described a process of a slow sequence of refunctionalizations of a set of motivated 
signs whose use becomes more and more abstract and arbitrary. It does not mean 
that the motivated signs disappear or are totally integrated to a new system of 
signs. They continue to be at work and simultaneously they can also be employed 
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in new ways. Thus, Thảo preserves the peculiarity of each stage of linguistic 
development of the child – each stage is marked by a peculiar use of signs – 
without neglecting the continuity between the language of the child and the 
language of the adult. 
 
5. The Experimental Data 
 
Nativism led Thảo to regard the issue of mother-language acquisition as 
secondary to the process by which the function language is actuated. Interestingly, 
and despite all the differences, in the same period, Chomsky (1972), too, suggested 
something similar. But Thảo described how in-born semiotic skills gradually 
appear in the behaviour of the child during the ontogeny without taking into 
account communicative behaviour alone. He also analysed semiotic phenomena 
such as play, out loud monologues, imitation, painting, etc. To Thảo, the function 
language is the ability to perform a behaviour which produces its own meaning by 
way of gestures and vocalizations independently of the need to communicate. 
As a result, the examples of linguistic skills in the child Thảo listed were 
extensively heterogeneous (play, the language in a strict sense, imitation, painting, 
etc.). He was obliged to reduce data to formal structures. As Trognon (1975: 344-
345) has already noticed, Thảo suggested a code to translate the behaviour of the 
child into a formal system of semantic structures. In other words, Thảo argued for 
a symbolism which fulfils the function of interpretant of the behaviour of the child. 
But Trognon is wrong to reduce Thảo’s formalism to Jakobson’s theory of 
communication.  Every sign could be interpreted by other signs. To Thảo, instead, 
the formalism was needed to make data homogeneous and comparable without 
assuming that the meaning of the behaviour of the child must be understood by 
way of that formalism. Simply put, the formalism is a heuristic device that does not 
prevent the behaviour of the child to be meaningful in itself. 
Surely, the postulate of Thảo’s theory is the assumption that ontogeny 
recapitulates the phylogeny. He described the behaviour of the child over a period 
of time and compared that behaviour with a hypothetical stage of human 
development. The fact that the essential condition that determines the emergence 
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of symbolic behaviour in the child should be sought in the phylogeny justified 
Thảo’s choice to analyse a limited number of examples. As a matter of fact, the 
inductive generalization of a peculiar symbolic behaviour started from a few 
examples. To Thảo, indeed, every child shows the same symbolic development by 
stages. Another way of phrasing this is that listing a lot of observations is not 
needed. 
His methodological approach led Thảo to interpret the semantic intention of the 
behaviour of the child to identify the inherent semantic structure. For this reason, 
Thảo took some examples to show the genesis of particular symbolic structures 
into account. He analysed a limited number of examples to explain the underlying 
symbolic structure of the behaviour of the child rather than constantly invoking 
the whole symbolic production of the child. Thảo isolated the context marked by 
the appearance and functioning of a given symbolic structure so as to describe its 
emergence. 
To Thảo, symbolic skills in the child are intimately related to the development 
of the conceptual and cognitive skills that enable the child to organize his/her 
experience of the world. In the same period, this was the insight of the 
psychologist Sinclair de Zwart (1967), for instance. But ultimately, this was one of 
the main assumptions of Piaget’s development psychology – for whom Sinclair de 
Zwart and Thảo developed a great admiration. On that basis, the same criticism of 
Piaget’s approach could be addressed towards Thảo’s theory, too (for instance 
Marion et al. 1974).  
As Drévillon (1973: 281) remarked, Thảo’s hypothesis lacked a solid basis of 
experimental data. Methodologically, Thảo mentioned observations concerning a 
few toddlers who are observed regularly every day for a few years. In effect, we 
have noted previously that the fast development of linguistic skills of children 
entails the impossibility of obtaining a sufficiently large number of observations 
concerning a given symbolic behaviour from the observation of a single child. For 
this reason, Thảo analysed the symbolic behaviour of some children who were the 
same age. This method had been employed by a wide range of scholars (for 
instance: Bloch 1913; Cohen 1925; Grégoire 1937; Leopold 1939-1949; Piaget 1923: 
1024; id. 1936 and 1945). However, Thảo’s sources took a few individuals into 
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account. At least, three problems seem to emerge in connection with the age-
classification. 
The age classification of the linguistic skills in the child is not without certain 
difficulties. As Cohen (1925) had already remarked, a child language that could be 
classified by age does not exist because one could observe a quick development and 
the coexistence of several skills that theoretically belong to different stages. Thus, 
it is not always simple to describe a system in progress and trying to isolate 
synchronic stages. As a consequence, Thảo’s description of the development of the 
child seems to be confused. On the one side, in his descriptions, at about the same 
age, the child shows several different degrees of symbolic skills. On the other side, 
Thảo focused on every symbolic skill alone, from the simplest to the most 
sophisticated. 
A second problem related to the age classification of the linguistic skills in the 
child concerns the teleological description of the stages of linguistic development. 
Certainly, Thảo repeatedly told us that the linguistic function of the child must be 
analysed independently of the language of the adult. But we cannot deny the fact 
that the language of the adult is the culmination of the process of linguistic 
development of the child. The two poles of that antinomy – autonomy of the 
language of the child and adults’ language-oriented description – is maybe a 
conundrum relating to any other investigation into the language of the child. 
The third conundrum of the age classification is the fact that the choice of the 
subject is made on the basis of the age independently of the social and cultural 
milieu of origin. This lack is interesting especially since, in the same period, 
sociolinguistics took its first steps in Western countries (see Hymes 1962, 1964, 
1974; Labov 1966, 1969; Fishman 1970; Gumperz 1971; Haugen 1972;) after having 
had a great success in the USSR in the 1920s and 1930s (for more elaborate 
treatment, see Brandist 2003, 2006; Simonato 2014). 
 
6. Thảo’s Scientism 
 
Since the publication of PDM, Thảo developed his own approach in accordance 
with scientific data. The empirical data of anthropology and psychology were 
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considered as the starting points to speculate on the origins of language and 
consciousness. So he reasoned in PDM:  
 
The absorption of the point of view of consciousness in natural reality is the sole 
conceivable way to escape from the phenomenological impasse. The fact is that the 
descriptions of antepredicative experience on which the whole edifice of the 
Weltkonstitution had to rest, have not given any really satisfactory result [...] (Thảo 
[1951] 1986: 124) 
 
Thảo’s aim was to outline “a scientific study of human existence” (id., p. 123-
124). In the same way, Thảo stated that “it is no longer a question of setting aside 
the world in order to return to consciousness but rather of understanding the real 
movement by which nature becomes human by constituting itself as spirit” (id., p. 
124). In other words, Husserl’s phenomenological analysis of lived experience had 
showed how the subjective experience of the world depends upon the objective 
reality of mind-independent material world. So Thảo rejected the ontological gulf 
between the subject and the world and he illustrated how the lived experience is a 
product of natural and social history. 
The same dissatisfaction was at work in ILC (see above Chapter 4). The 
Husserlian phenomenology assumed the task to describe what kind of subjective 
acts allow the emergence of a certain field of objects (the phenomena). So those 
subjective acts are the preconditions, without which a certain field of objects 
cannot be accessible to consciousness. For this reason, according to Husserl, the 
phenomena which appear to consciousness are unquestionable, while the existence 
of the mind-independent world is not apodictic. And the epoché is the operation 
which suspends the assumption that regards the mind-independent world as 
existent in itself. In support of his position, Husserl described the way in which 
everything we assume as real is something constituted by the consciousness. On 
that basis, Husserl took position against every kind of naturalization of 
consciousness because this approach uncritically accepts the point of view of 
science. Scientific concepts arise from our experience of the world, they are a way 
the subject interprets the own experience. The task of phenomenology is instead to 
describe the processes and operations which are the preconditions of the concepts 
of sciences. 
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Thảo’s approach took it for granted that the results of life sciences are the best 
starting point to speculate on the origins of consciousness. That is to say, his point 
of view transcends the epoché and does not doubt the validity of scientific data – 
even if he was aware of their historicity, of course. Seemingly, to Thảo, the task of 
phenomenology runs out after having suspended the assumption of the existence 
of mind-independent world and having described the structures of consciousness. 
For this reason, dialectical materialism could integrate phenomenological 
descriptions and reveals the material origin of consciousness.  
Ricœur (2004: 174) had already distanced himself from Thảo’s theory and, in 
particular, he had regarded Thảo’s approach as a return to the naïve attitude which 
takes for granted both the results of natural sciences and the existence of mind-
independent world. In the same way, Derrida (1990: 32) had considered Thảo’s 
theory as an attempt to bring transcendental philosophy back to the empirical 
world. Against that interpretations of Thảo’s works, Lyotard (1954: 111) shared 
with Thảo the view that “the ‘natural reality’ that is discovered in the depths of 
lived experience, is no longer that which was presented to spontaneous consciousness 
before the reduction [the epoché]” (Thảo [1951] 1986: 128). 
Since phenomenology had described how science and objective world are the 
results of operations of consciousness, Thảo rehabilitated the standpoint of 
sciences and assumed it as the starting point of his investigations. To Thảo, the 
mind-independent world cannot be reduced to conscious contents but rather the 
consciousness adapts to the material world. In this way, Thảo conducted a new 
kind of research that concerns the meaning, the validity, and the limits of both, the 
operations of consciousness and the concepts it produces. To explain the nature of 
consciousness, the epoché is not enough any more. The most elementary forms of 
consciousness cannot be explained without assuming that subjective lived 
experience of mind-independent world. 
So Thảo could assume the findings of anthropology and psychology as empirical 
foundations of his own hypothesis on the origins of consciousness. It does not 
mean that he employed the methods of sciences to develop his theory. To him, the 
dialectical materialism alone could offer the methodological tools to correctly 
speculate about that field. But the dialectical materialism offers neither immediate 
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results nor empirical starting point to make detailed hypothesisis on the origins of 
consciousness. 
In other words, Thảo did not apply the methods of anthropology and psychology 
to his philosophical research. He rather employed the findings of those sciences to 
empirically justify and check his own hypothesis. Scientific methods cannot be the 
only appropriate base of philosophy. Instead, dialectical materialism is the method 
that compensates the lacunae of anthropology and psychology. Philosophy allows 
taking a further step forward in the field of research about the origins of thought 
and language. But the knowledge, which may be reached in that field, must be 
ultimately tested by sciences. 
One could affirm that Thảo was a supporter of a moderate scientism – the belief 
that sciences alone can yield true knowledge about natural world, human being, 
and society. But one must also remark that Thảo took dialectical materialism more 
for granted than scientific findings. To him, dialectical materialism is the only 
source of genuine knowledge. For this reason, Thảo led his investigations in 
contexts to which science might not apply and where there is insufficient 
empirical evidence. And dialectical materialist assumption of the historical-related 
value of conceptions must be reckoned to be the most relevant factor that does not 
allow us to affirm that Thảo believed that science describes the world as it is in 
itself and is the only true way to acquire knowledge about reality. Nonetheless, it 
cannot be denied that Thảo demonstrated a certain naïve faith in scientific 
findings. 
 
7. Thảo’s Representation of Language 
 
One could ask, now, what kind of representation of the object language Thảo’s 
theory of the formation of speech conveyed. According to Thảo, the language of 
real life is matter in motion. And it exists as the social matter outside the 
consciousness of the subject. And it is composed of material gestural and verbal 
signs whose performance produces their meaning. Thus, human language is 
essentially a substance, an empirical phenomenon. Simply put, language is not the 
result of the representation of the researcher; it is not the product of the point of 
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view of knowledge. It is rather something that the researcher finds in the reality.  
And, given the empirical nature of the fact language, Thảo accepted the results of 
empirical sciences with confidence. As an empirical fact, language must be 
regarded as a biological fact. As this discussion implies, anatomy, biology, 
physiology, and psychology offered some elements to investigate the nature of 
language. Language is based on some subconscious physiological mechanisms of 
motor memory. Given the objective bodily pre-subjective nature of the language of 
real life, Thảo set out that the subject is not aware of the system of evoked, 
sketched-out and outlined gestural movements which entail the idealized meaning 
of words and the content of rational thought. It does not matter here what is the 
point of view of the speaker. 
But language is a social fact as well. As such, language seriously depends upon 
the development of social forces. It is indeed, first of all, an instrument of the 
reproduction of the society, a mean of production. In other words, language is part 
of social life. For this reason, the history of language cannot be separated from the 
history of societies and speakers.  
To Thảo, language is also a gnoseological medium to have access to reality-in-
itself as matter in motion. The history of language is the history of the 
development of the knowledge of the reality. For the same reason, language 
essentially tends better to represent the reality and the relations among mind-
independent things.  
Language also fulfils the function of a mean of communication. But it does not 
mean that the subject freely decides to communicate the own pre-linguistic 
thoughts to the others by means of language. Thảo rather insisted that 
communicative relationships among humans are a form of social relations and 
dismissed the idea that communication could determine social relations from the 
outside. The language of real life is an objective social entity that rather 
determines the emergence of individual consciousness. Indeed, consciousness is 
nothing other than the attention that each person pays to the own experience by 
way of the internalisation of the language of real life. In this manner, inner 
language is the inner subjective experience of the language of real life. 
To Thảo, the essence of language coincides with the genesis of language. One 
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cannot forget that Thảo was interested in the material origin of consciousness and 
thought. For this reason, he introduced the question of the origins of language. On 
that basis, he dismissed any kind of investigations into the origins and nature of 
languages. Instead, the origins of human language allowed him to focus on some 
universal aspects of language which transcend the differences of languages. In this 
vein, the study of the formation of speech shows the core and essence of language. 
Indeed, the chronological sequence of linguistic abilities of our ancestors largely 
coincides with the development of linguistic skills in the child. These most ancient 
and most fundamental elements of human language are genetically inherited. As a 
matter of fact, Thảo regarded the development of language in the child as a process 
of reactivation of some symbolic skills acquired during the phylogeny. And, in the 
same way, the most ancient symbolic skills are the most fundamental elements of 
human language, nowadays too. 
Not only do fully-fledged languages depend upon the phylogeny and ontogeny 
of linguistic skills, they also seriously depend upon a system of non-wholly 
arbitrary signs. The system of non-wholly arbitrary signs is the support for systems 
of arbitrary and conventional signs. As a consequence, according to Thảo, the 
linguistic study of language as a self-regulating system of arbitrary signs which 
depends upon the differential relations among them is too reductive. The essence 
of language transcends the narrow limits of linguistics and should be studied by 
other disciplines such as psychology, anthropology, sociology, and physiology. But 
Thảo’s theory of language has probably been more radical in so far as he insisted 
that the system of arbitrary signs seriously depends upon the system of non-wholly 
arbitrary signs. In this way, the autonomy of the subject matter of linguistics is 
radically in question.  
As a matter of fact, to Thảo, the scientific study of language must be conducted 
by a dialectic-materialist semiotics. This task is assigned to the philosophy, which 
reformulates the results of linguistics, psychology, anthropology, etc., so as to 
adapt them to the main assumptions of Marxism-Leninism. In other words, Thảo 
did not suggest the need of a dialectic-materialist linguistics but he rather 
advocated the need of a dialectic-materialist use of the results of linguistics as well 
as of other sciences which deal with language faculty. 
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Chapter Ten 
The Dialectical Evolution of Language 
 
 
 
Dans le développment du signe de lʼindication,  
le sujet suit le “ceci” dans son movuement, ce qui lui permet de  
se constituer une première image de la matière en mouvement. 
Et les diverses transformations de la formule fondamentale 
de lʼindication dévéloppée reflètent à grands traits, au niveau même 
du syncrétisme originel, la dialectique de ce mouvement de la matière. 
(T.D. Thảo) 
 
 
 
1. Preliminary Remarks. - 2.1. The Dialectic of the Straight-Line Gesture. - 2.2. 
The Dialectic of Cognizance. - 3.1. The Subjective Experience of the Developed 
Indicative Sign. - 3.2. The Dialectic of the Developed Indicative Sign. - 3.3. The 
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Instrumental Form (9). - 5.4. The Sign of The Syncretic Representation of the 
Instrumental Form (10). - 5.5. The Differed Imitation (11). - 6. The 
Contradictions of the Sign of Representation. 
 
 
 
1. Preliminary Remarks 
 
The dialectic materialism – and especially its main sub-thesis, historical 
materialism – must be understood, inter alia, as the theory that argued that 
material conditions of society somehow determine its organization, development, 
institutions, and ways of thinking. With material conditions, one has to mean the 
given way of producing and reproducing the means of human existence. Thus, the 
study of the brain does not yield sufficient information on the activity of the mind. 
The role of social intercourse between humans cannot be dismissed. In this way, 
Marx stated thought (e.g. ideas, philosophies, religions, laws, etc.) is nothing but 
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“the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of 
thought” (Marx 1887: 14; MEW XXIII: 27). 
But caution should be exercised when taking the interpretation of Thảo’s 
conception of language into account. Inner language is the result of the 
internalisation of language of real life – which, in turn, is part of material 
conditions of existence. As a further consideration, Thảo ([1973] 1984: 29) 
highlighted that both consciousness and inner language are subjective events. Each 
person assimilates the social experience in an individual way and on the basis of 
the own specific position in society (see above Chapter 5). Indeed, the thought 
arose from the inner dialogue that everyone engages with the image(s) of the 
others. The others could be the members of the own social group (e.g. family, 
fellows, etc.) as well as members of other social groups. In any case, consciousness 
is substantially based on existing social roles. It is instructive to note that Thảo was 
not interested in the analysis of the role of subjectivity in language but rather in 
the objective foundation of the subjective forms of language. For this reason, he 
preferred to investigate the ways language of real life as an objective form of 
language is the condition for having the dimension of subjectivity. 
The dialectic materialism is not restricted to a deterministic description of the 
influence of social relations over thought. This is only the materialistic assumption 
of that doctrine. The dialectic materialism also explains how social relations – 
which remain the starting point of every analysis – dialectically evolve through 
stages. According to Thảo, the evolution of language is not simply the reflex of the 
dialectic of social relations. In so far as the language of real life is part of social 
relations, the formation and development of the language of real life show a 
dialectical structure like any other social phenomenon. In this vein, not only did 
Thảo suggest a materialistic theory of language evolution and set out that language 
depends upon social cooperative collective activities, but he also insisted that 
language dialectically evolves like any other mean of production. 
Crucially, Thảo described the most ancient forms of language of real life – 
circular-arc gestures and straight-line gestures – and analysed the development of 
corresponding conscious cognitive skills. The precise extent of Thảoʼs perspective 
still calls for further exploration. For the time being, we shall stress on the fact 
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that, in the following pages, the two descriptions – the one concerning the 
development of language and the other concerning consciousness – will be taken 
into account separately. However, we cannot neglect that they are two interacting 
phenomena. The only point we need to note for now is that both consciousness and 
language emerged by stages. To Thảo, indeed, language and consciousness did not 
arise suddenly but rather they emerged through three stages: sporadic, collective 
habitus and individual competence. That is, the language of real life and the 
corresponding forms of consciousness originally appear as sporadic events. Then, 
they are grasped as social stable phenomena and finally they become an available 
experience for the individual. 
According to Thảo, the dialectic of language begins with the contingent and 
sporadic experience of the collective use of signs such as pointing. In this case lived 
experience of the target-object of pointing is too weak and undetermined to 
become a stable experience for the individual. The lived experience of the 
individual remains an epiphenomenon of the collective experience of the world. 
On that basis, the first real concrete lived experience of conscious contents such as 
the image of the target-object of pointing could be realized by the group as a 
whole. Only after this stage, the subject could internalise the collective lived 
experience and begins to perceive it as something that concerns him/her as an ego 
(individual cognizance). In this way, the subject realizes the undetermined 
experience of the first stage – the sporadic cognizance – in a more sophisticated 
way. And this is so because the subject went through the collective experience 
(collective cognizance). 
On this issue, it could be useful to note that this description of the evolution in 
three stages of both language and consciousness represents only one side of the 
whole history. In effect, Thảo added a description of the evolution of language and 
consciousness resulting from the dialectic interactions with the physical and social 
environment. To him, the language of real life is a social behaviour. As such it also 
interacts with the physical environment. An interaction of this kind required 
permanent adjustments to the reality. In this instance, the language of real life 
evolved to represent mind-independent things in a more efficacious way. The 
language of real life became increasingly sophisticated because our ancestors tried 
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better to realize the relation of acquaintance between language and reality. So 
Thảo described this evolution as a dialectic marked by contradictions and 
improvements. 
To avoid misunderstanding, let us take note of the basic purpose of Thảoʼs 
hypothesis on language origins. The central claim of Thảoʼs hypothesis is the 
description of the emergence of the most abstract contents of consciousness. It was 
the same problem tackled by the Husserlian genetic phenomenology (see for 
instance Hua VI). But Thảoʼs aim was exactly to explain what the Husserlian 
phenomenological analysis of the contents of consciousness must necessarily 
assume (see Chapter 4 for more details). Faced with this problem, Thảo seems to 
assert that the description of the evolution of language could be seen as the 
infrastructure of a phenomenology of consciousness. In stressing that, Thảo clearly 
implies that the description of language origins allows us to describe the forms 
through which consciousness and abstract thinking arise – from the simplest kind 
of knowledge to the more sophisticated ones. 
Viewed from the perspective of Thảo, the language of real life appears to be the 
key to explaining the genesis of abstract thinking. Little wonder that every stage of 
language evolution corresponds to a stage of development of some cognitive skills. 
Or, to put it another way, the evolution of language shows the path that our 
ancestors had made, starting from animal dimension, to transcend the immediate 
experience of reality through more and more sophisticated forms of language. We 
shall recall what has been said in Chapter 3. One property belongs to the language 
of real life that is of the highest order of importance in this regard. The fact that 
language of real life reflects the real interactions with reality is what makes it the 
medium between practical life and consciousness. Every more developed stage of 
productive relations and interactions with the physical environment corresponds 
to a more abstract conscious content exactly because language of real life mediates 
between the two dimensions. Thus, the evolution of language must be regarded as 
the litmus test for determining the genesis of abstract thinking. 
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2.1. The Dialectic of The Straight-Line Gesture 
 
To Thảo, first, indicative gestures were realized as circular-arc movements. The 
motion of the hand in a circular-arc was employed to carry the whole group in the 
same direction. For instance, it was the sign employed during collective hunts. This 
original form of indication had a structural disadvantage because “it actually 
implies an urgent work situation” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 11). And “such a sign would 
have been much too strong in everyday life, when it was just a matter of the 
prehominids drawing each others’ attention to a more or less interesting object 
and not preparing themselves for an attack” (id., p. 12). And, for this reason, the 
circular-arc form was “of rather limited use” (id., p. 11). 
The need to employ a weaker indicative gesture in everyday life led our 
ancestors to perform the straight-line gesture (the pointing). It could be reckoned to 
be the attenuated form of the circular-arc movement. The straight-line sign directs 
the glance of the receiver “which follows the extension of the hand gesture 
stretched toward the object” (id., p. 12). Not only did the straight-line gesture refer 
to the current work-object, it was also employed to indicate “everything 
interesting that may be a possible work-object.” In this way, straight-line gestures 
developed even more sophisticated cognitive skills among our ancestors. 
The sporadic cognizance. Simultaneously to the dialectical development of 
gestures, according to Thảo, the cognizance, too, evolved. With cognizance (prise de 
conscience), one must mean the lived experience which accompanied the use of 
signs. The development of such a cognizance is composed of three moments and 
depends upon the development of gestural-verbal signs. To Thảo this most 
elementary awareness appeared sporadically. In detail, the sporadic cognizance is a 
psychical phenomenon that regards someone who is momentarily alone or is not 
seen by the others. Thảo made the following example: 
 
If, for example, in a hunt one of the hunters lags behind the others, and the others 
call him by indicating the game with a gesture of the hand in a circular arc, it is 
evident that he does not have to call them in the same manner, since he is indeed 
lagging behind. (Thảo [1973] 1984: 10) 
 
In this vein, individuals did not merely return the sign to the others, but they 
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address the sign to themselves.  
To Thảo, the pointing “goes directly from the subject to the object” (id., p. 12). 
The circular-arc gesture, on the contrary, went from the others to the work-object. 
On that basis, it was meaningful for the group as a whole. By contrast, the straight-
line gesture is “meaningful for others as well as for himself.” Thảo then reasoned: 
“it is equally for himself that he [the subject] takes up again the sign sent by the 
others.” More frequently, the straight-line gesture is employed during that 
activity. And in this case, the straight-line gesture could indirectly support a more 
stable form of individual consciousness. So Thảo insisted that the pointing could 
initially support the rising of self-consciousness only in a sporadic way. In effect, 
rarely the subject symbolically interacts with the physical environment outside of 
collective cooperative activities: “consciousness, which thus arose in a rather 
particular situation, still presents itself only in a sporadic manner as a flash of 
consciousness” (id., p. 11).  
The collective cognizance. At the same time, “all the individuals of the group 
recognize each other in the others, since they at the same time address each to himself 
the sign which they return to one another, so that all merge in one and the same 
gesture where each sees himself in the others as in himself” (id., p. 12-13). This is 
the core of collective cognizance of the movement of indication. To Thảo, as a matter 
of fact, the straight-line gesture “has been internalized by the group” (id., p. 13). 
Thus, the collective exchange of signs involves the experience of signs as available 
tools for the group as a whole. And the straight-line gesture becomes an acquis 
disponible (available benefit, knowledge rather than experience as in the English 
translation of Thảo [1973] 1984): the group can use signs at will. In other words, the 
collective cognizance of the sign “permits a first generalization of the sign by 
making it available to the group outside of urgent work situations” (id., p. 14). 
The individual cognizance. After that, the individual slowly produces and keeps 
within him/herself the stylized image (the record) of “a multitude of indicative 
gestures which always seem to call him in chorus to work on the object” (id., p. 13; 
the same happens with the inner language: see above Chapters 5 and 6). Another 
way of saying this is that the stylised image of the group is internalized by the 
individual and must be understood to be the record of semiotic collective exchange 
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of signs during collective cooperative activities which unconsciously influenced 
the individual behaviour. This psychic phenomenon is nothing but the 
internalisation of social relations. 
Simultaneously to the internalisation of the image of the group, the signs 
employed by the group are internalised by the ego as well. So the sign “becomes 
for the individual available experience [knowledge, acquis]” ([1973] 1984: 14). As the 
subject has at a disposal the practical knowledge of the general function of the 
sign, they tend to apply it to every perceived object in general. This is the individual 
cognizance of signs as the internalization of the collective one. In this way, Thảo 
stated, “the generalization of the sign is completed.” Once the generalization of the 
sign is completed, the sign could be employed outside of urgent social practices. As 
a result, Thảo reasoned that 
 
From now on the subject can systematically utilize this sign, of which he has become 
conscious in himself, in order to act on himself and others, to mobilize and direct 
the energies of the group for the appropriation of the object. From the very 
beginning this is obviously the foundation of the practical role of consciousness which 
will greatly expand throughout the history of hominid family. (id., p. 14) 
 
Thảo introduced the practical role of consciousness, i.e. the conscious use of 
signs in order to act on him/herself and others. Conscious use of signs, in other 
words, provides a practical solution to real and concrete problems. On that basis, 
the conscious use of sign cannot be reduced to the expression of thought, but it 
rather plays a more fundamental role. But, unfortunately, Thảo did not say 
anything more about this distinction between the practical and theoretical role of 
consciousness. 
 
2.2. The Dialectic of Cognizance 
 
As has been seen above, “consciousness appears identically as consciousness of the 
object and consciousness of self” ([1973] 1984: 11). To Thảo, the self-awareness is 
supported by gestural-verbal signs which refer to objects and are exchanged 
during purposive collective activities. In this vein, the work-object is perceived in 
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itself and considered to be a mind-independent thing35. As a matter of fact, the 
pointing supports the emergence of the most fundamental subject-object relation. 
It involves the image of the object posited as external to consciousness (see above 
Chapter 4)36. Simultaneously to the emergence of the consciousness of the object as 
a mind-independent thing, the consciousness of self is produced. It is the “the 
image of that image, or the image of itself in itself” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 11). Thảo 
probably suggested that the perceptive image of the object is accompanied by the 
image of the own self during the act of pointing to the object. 
In this way, to Thảo the pointing – which involves the awareness of the object as 
independent thing – becomes the support for having the image of the self who is 
pointing to the object. Given the primacy of social relations, firstly, the subject sees 
the others who are pointing, then the subject sees the other as similar to self and, 
consequently, becomes aware of his/her self as the actor who is pointing to the 
object: “this image of himself, which the subject finds in the others, presents itself 
as within himself.” And, for this reason, Thảo highlighted that “the relation to the 
self arises as a result of the relation with the other.” 
The sporadic cognizance. According to Thảo “the cognizance of the indicative 
gesture began sporadically” (id., p. 12). In effect, consciousness “arose in a rather 
particular situation.” For instance, when the subject finds him/herself isolated 
                                                 
35 More specifically, with the statement “consciousness appears identically as 
consciousness of the object and consciousness of self” Thảo totally agreed with Hegel’s 
assumptions. To the German philosopher “for consciousness is, on the one hand, 
consciousness of the object, and on the other, consciousness of itself; consciousness of 
what for it is the True, and consciousness of its knowledge of the truth” (Hegel [1807] 
1977: 58). To both, Hegel and Thảo, consciousness is not only relation-to-self but also 
relation to something else. But Thảo insisted on to the description of the formation of 
consciousness also the relation with other egos. 
36 Thảo seems to agree with Hegel who stated: “Consciousness simultaneously distinguishes 
itself from something, and at the same time relates itself to it, or, as it is said, this 
something exists for consciousness; and the determinate aspect of this relating or of the 
being of something for a consciousness, is knowing. But we distinguish this being-for-
another from being-in-itself; whatever is related to knowledge or knowing is also 
distinguished from it and posited as existing outside of this relationship; this being-in-
itself is called truth” (Hegel [1807] 1977: 53-54). One must absolutely add that to Thảo the 
consciousness of the object does not become consciousness of the object as produced by 
the consciousness itself as Hegel affirmed. In fact, Thảo insisted that mind-independent 
things remain external independent entities even if they become the object of thought. 
The process of knowledge separates the subject and the object of knowledge even if 
they ontologically shared the same reality. So Thảo separated the question of 
epistemological realism from that of ontological monism (see above Ch. 4). 
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from the rest of the group, self-awareness first appears. But this kind of 
consciousness is not a stable state of mind yet. It “still presents itself only in a 
sporadic manner as a flash of consciousness.” More fundamentally, the origin of 
cognizance needs to be seen in the collective cognizance which is produced by the 
collective exchange of gestural-verbal signs during collective cooperative 
activities. In this regard, Thảo wrote: 
 
Cognizance now develops into a collective cognizance where all the individuals of 
the group recognize each other in the other, since they at the same time address 
each to himself the sign which they return to one another, so that all merge in one 
and the same gesture where each sees himself in the others as in himself (id., p. 12-
13). 
 
The collective cognizance. In this context, the sign could be internalized by the 
group and became an available experience for the group. To Thảo, the exchange of 
gestural-verbal signs among prehominids left the traces in the subject. “The 
prehominid keeps within himself this stylized image of a multitude of indicative 
gestures which always seem to call him in chorus to work on the object,” Thảo said 
(id., p. 13). Such an exchange produces in the mind of the subject a sort of model 
(see above Chapters 5 and 6). Thảo made the following example: 
 
It is a fact of common experience that we constantly feel around us the presence of 
our social environment, and this image essentially implies the typical form of 
gestures and words of people we know. 
 
The individual cognizance. Slowly, the stylized image of the others – which 
accompanied the life of the subject – involves self-awareness. The subject 
addressed to him/herself gestural-verbal signs as if he/she addressed them to the 
others and received those signs by the others. In this way, self-awareness appears 
as individual cognizance: the gestural-verbal sign “has been internalized not only for the 
group but for the individual as well” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 14). The sign becomes available 
for the individual also when they are far from the pressure of biological needs and 
thus they begin to be aware of themselves as the same actor that points to several 
different objects in several different moments at various times. 
Before concluding, one must insist that to Thảo the awareness of self and the 
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awareness of the “I” are absolutely not the same: 
 
Consciousness, as it has just arisen, already implies the individual form of the self 
[soi]. If we consider its content, however, it still remains simply collective. Thus, it 
does not in any way contain the form of the “I” [moi]. (id., p. 15) 
 
As we have shown above (Chapter 6 and especially paragraph 5), the use of 
personal pronouns and the awareness of the self-identity arose later in the history 
of the genus homo. Indeed, to Thảo, individual cognizance is still anonymous. It is 
still a sort of “mere herd consciousness or sheep-like consciousness.” Thảo was 
invoking the following passage of Marx’s and Engels’ German Ideology: 
 
man’s consciousness of the necessity of associating with the individuals around him 
is the beginning of the consciousness that he is living in society at all. This 
beginning is as animal as social life itself at this stage. It is mere herd-consciousness, 
and at this point man is only distinguished from sheep by the fact that with him 
consciousness takes the place of instinct or that his instinct is a conscious one. This 
sheep-like or tribal consciousness receives its further development and extension 
through increased productivity, the increase of needs, and, what is fundamental to 
both of these, the increase of population. (MEW III: 30; English translation from 
Marx & Engels 1998) 
 
To summarise, according to Thảo, the language of real life is an essential part of 
social practical relations. And the development of semiotic skills involves the 
formation of consciousness. The two processes go hand in hand. By way of 
language, consciousness arises as an epiphenomenon of social relations. 
Consciousness is not the subject of knowledge but rather the result of both, the 
dialectic of social relations and language of real life. As this discussion implies, 
Thảo partially agreed with Hegel’s theory of the relational nature of consciousness 
– which would be grasped by Husserl (see above Chapter 1 and especially 
paragraph 8) – but, against Hegel, to Thảo consciousness is nothing other than an 
epiphenomenon of the concrete experience. 
Every subject carries within him/her the image of the symbolic behaviour of the 
others. In this instance, consciousness is nothing but the conscious lived 
experience of already socially established signs. At the same time, being aware of 
already socially established signs involves the awareness of both, the referent as 
mind-independent object – viz. the image of the referent – and the act of signifying 
 346 
– the image of the act. Thus, it does not matter here of consciousness as pure self-
consciousness of the own self as the actor of knowledge. At least, the subject has a 
sheep-like consciousness but is far from having something like subjectivity and 
individuality. The subject is merely aware of the self as a member of a group like 
everyone else. 
The ego has no access to the self beyond the language of real life, semiotic 
interactions with the physical environment, and social relations. In other words, 
consciousness is not a pure substance but rather a result of the internalisation of 
language of real life as social fact. Consciousness is the result of the relation with 
both the others and the environment. For this reason, the most important 
achievement at this stage of the evolution of language is the fact that 
consciousness could play a practical role: it is the conscious use of signs to act on 
him/herself, on the others, and on the objects. 
 
3.1. The Subjective Experience of the Developed Indicative Sign 
 
After having described the objective structure of the developed indicative sign 
(see above Chapter 7), Thảo introduced some remarks on the lived experience 
involved in the use of that kind of signs. The developed indicative sign firstly 
unconsciously arises “on the objective plane of the language of real life” (Thảo [1973] 
1984: 57). The developed indicative sign objectively communicates the two 
moments of the motion (M) and the form of motion (F), but the subject is merely 
aware of the moment of the thing (T). In other words, the subject is not aware of 
the sophisticated image conveyed by the developed indicative sign – i.e. the thing 
in motion in a certain form. In effect, the subject does not originally perform the 
developed indicative sign to represent the movement of the thing. The subject is 
simply aware of the fact that the gesture allows him/her to focus the attention of 
the partners to a certain object. 
In the case of our ancestors, the interesting object is a prey because, according 
to Thảo, the developed indicative sign was a successful means to coordinate 
collective efforts during the hunting. In any case, the subject simply follows the 
object in motion and unconsciously performs a gesture that reflects the movement 
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of that object. On that basis, the material conditions of collective labour and the 
specific feature of the object – that is the fact that it is in motion – entail the rising 
of the developed indicative sign although the subject is not aware of it. 
As a result, the developed indicative sign reflects the object in motion in a 
certain form even if the subject is merely aware of the moment of the object. Thus, 
the objective structure of the developed indicative sign does not still coincide with 
the subjective experience of its meaning. Thảo wrote that  
 
the signified, or the tendential image thus projected [by the hand the follows the 
object in its motion], reflects the object no longer simply as a “this here” as such, but 
also in a motion of a certain form, as it appears in the material activity and the 
material relations of the prehominids. On the plane of consciousness, however, we 
still gave only the original intentionality of sense certainty as immediate intention 
of the “this here”. (id., p. 57) 
 
The subject has not originally at a disposal the conscious sophisticated meaning 
of both the developed indicative sign and its three moments. Thus, Thảo stated: 
 
The moments of the motion and of the form still appear in the signified image only 
as tendential moments which are objectively communicated by the subjects to one 
another in social practice, but still do not imply any consciousness: consequently 
they appear only by virtue of the situation, so that the subject cannot avail himself 
of them in himself. 
 
Interestingly, the context in which the sign is performed determines the specific 
features of both, the signifier and the signified. The developed indicative sign is 
originally meaningful because it follows the motion of an object within the actual 
perceptive field and during collective activities. The developed indicative sign is 
neither meaningful because it would be the expression of a pre-existing meaning in 
the head of the subject nor because it would be determined by the relation to other 
signs. The meaning of the developed indicative sign is eminently context-related. 
From the point of view of the phylogeny, the cooperative collective hunting 
involves the unconscious birth of the developed indicative sign: “the prehominid 
workers sent one another the same developed indication of the object according to 
a motion of form (F)” (id., p. 58). In this way, the individual is in the habit of using 
the developed indicative sign also when they are alone in front of an interesting 
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object. In other words, collective cooperative activities entail a sort of automatism 
that consists in the use of a sign whose meaning is only partially conscious. Firstly, 
this automatism appears sporadically. After that, the sign is no more addressed to 
the others and, thus, it becomes a sign addressed to oneself. So, Thảo wrote that 
“the sign automatically repeated necessarily returned to himself [the subject]” (id., 
p. 58). 
As has been seen above, the subject becomes aware of the meaning of the sign 
by addressing the sign to the one’s own self: “the cognizance of the developed 
indicative sign is produced only when the subject addresses it to himself.” And the 
internalisation of the developed indicative sign is marked by the three stages of 
sporadic, collective, and individual cognizance. Then “once the various individuals 
have occasionally experienced this relation to the self, […] the new structure [of 
consciousness] becomes generalized in a collective cognizance” (id., p. 58-59). The 
collective cognizance is supported by the reciprocal exchange of developed 
indicative signs. Therefore, the developed indicative sign “becomes available to the 
group itself, independently of any immediate task” (id., p. 59). Eventually, the sign 
“is reactivated” by the subject in the flow of inner language. Remarkably, Thảo 
highlighted that the subject reactivates the sign “as soon as an object elicits, in the 
dynamic field of perception, a tendential figure which re-enters one of the possible 
variations of the meaning already acquired.” On that basis, the perceptive field still 
plays the most relevant role to determine the meaning of the developed indicative 
sign. 
From the point of view of ontogeny, Thảo insisted that the play must be 
regarded as the first example of the developed indicative sign in the child. In the 
case of the play, the child displays some movements and utters some vocalizations 
that he/she addresses to him/herself. As we have shown above, the vocalization 
gets its meaning from the movement of the arm. This one does not have to be an 
indicative gesture in a strict sense. What it is needed is a movement of the arm that 
produces the corresponding motion of the toy. As this discussion implies, the 
movement of the arm determines the signification of the verbal moment. In effect, 
Thảo stated that “play is a signifier [signifiant, signifying act] which realizes its own 
signified [signifié, significance]” (id., p. 58).  
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The fact that the child employs the same gestural and vocal ensemble by playing 
which several different toys, shows the way the sign is “an available acquisition” 
and the child extends “its field of application by continuing to focus only upon the 
general form of motion (F)” (id., p. 59). Thus, the play – i.e. a sequence of 
manipulations of the toy within the perceptive field – fulfils the role of developed 
indicative gesture that makes meaningful the vocalizations that accompanies it. 
 
3.2. The Dialectic of the Developed Indicative Sign 
 
Thảo ([1973] 1984: 136) had suggested that the indicative sign “is integrated in 
the very functioning of our sense organs.” That is to say, the indicative gesture 
marks the transition from animal to human perception (see above Chapter 4 and 5). 
In effect, indicative gestural-verbal signs show things as “external reality 
independent of the subject” and constitute “a first image of matter in motion” (see 
above Chapter 5). According to Thảo ([1973] 1984: 136), the six forms of developed 
indicative gesture reflect some configurations of the motion the matter itself 
involves: “at the very beginning of knowledge, the developed indicative sign gives 
a confused but effective image of objective reality in its most fundamental 
structure, as matter in motion or motion of matter.” 
So Thảo explained the peculiar way each transformation of the developed 
indicative signs reflects the dialectical motion of matter: 
 
() “TMF presents matter in a motion of a certain form”; 
() “TFM presents it [the matter] in that very form as objectified into ʻa 
property at rest’ where previous motion is temporarily stabilized into a 
determinate configuration ʻin the form of being’ [Thảo invoked here a 
sentence of Marx’s Capital]”; 
() “MFT presents the motion of matter in its transmission from the subject of 
the action to its object”; 
() “MTF presents it [the motion of matter in its transmission from the subject 
of the action to its object] as accomplished in the object itself”; 
() “FTM presents the objective form of the object as objectified form of the 
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motion implied in it”; 
() “FMT presents the form of motion in relation to the object”. 
 
From the point of view of knowledge, the six forms of developed indicative sign 
convey several different meanings that must be understood to be “the ideal 
reproduction of the dialectic of things.” Thảo suggested that the six forms of 
developed indicative sign slowly arose during the phylogeny and every one of 
them represented in a more sophisticated way the motion of things: 
 
the original semiological [semiotical in the English translation, sémiologique in the 
French version] structure is enriched each time with new linguistic gestures modelled 
on the material activity and the material relations of the workers, which, with the 
support of verbal symbolism, project a more and more encompassing and precise 
image of the external world. 
 
The interactions with the social and physical environment are the main reasons 
for the slow emergence of new forms of signs. Every sign reveals some 
inadequacies, and, for this reason, it could be transcended by a more sophisticated 
one. Thảo called those inadequacies contradictions (contradictions). 
For instance, the first four forms of the developed indicative sign show a 
contradiction between the moment of the object and the moment of motion. Since 
our ancestors began to develop a more sophisticated form of collective hunting 
they needed a sign that represents an absent thing. In effect, the motion of the 
thing “ends up by making it disappear” (id. p. 137). In this way, the moment of the 
object contradicts the moment of motion because the motion implies the absence 
of the object. In short, the developed indicative sign represents neither the object 
as absent nor the motion that makes the object disappear. Thus, the developed 
indicative sign had been transcended by the sign of representation of the absent object 
(see below paragraph 6). 
 
3.3. The Co-Evolution of Language, Mind, and Material Activities 
 
To Thảo, the emergence of new signs depends upon the intrinsic contradictions 
of available signs which are no longer appropriate to new material activities. So, 
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the evolution of language has been deeply influenced by the development of 
collective cooperative activities. In a certain way, one could say that language 
adapted to both, new social relations and new interactions with the physical 
environment. But we cannot deny the fact that language of real life was part of 
those objective material activities and thus it cannot be regarded as a consequence 
of events that take place outside and before it. In any case, however, the subjective 
experience of language had the role to merely record the new representations of 
the world conveyed by language and allowed by new social relations. 
The language of real life evolved through contradictions that it contained and 
that had to be transcended by more sophisticated forms of language. In this vein, 
the evolution of language does not differ from the development of other social 
material activities. The evolution of social life is indeed a dialectic process that 
constantly transcends the inadequacy of every stage under the pressure of 
biological and social needs. One could then observe a kind of immanent 
development of social attitudes – among them, language takes place too – that 
occurs outside consciousness and independently of it. 
But Thảo did not dismiss the idea that “the cognizance of the developed 
indication obviously makes for considerable progress in the organization of 
labour” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 59). In this instance, one could talk about a kind of co-
evolution between material activity and cognizance. And, consequently, the 
language of real life plays the most relevant role. It is the condition for having 
sophisticated conscious cognitive skills. For instance, “once the signs become 
conscious, it enables the subject to explicate for himself the content of his 
perceptive field.” And “this sign thereby awakens individual initiative at the same 
time that it appears as a means available to the individual to mobilize and orient 
collective labour.” This is what Thảo called the practical role of consciousness. 
Thus, Thảo did not suggest a deterministic approach to cognition. To him, in 
fact, material activity is the starting point for having human-specific cognition. 
The internalisation of language of real life allows the emergence of that specific 
cognition. On the one side, consequently, consciousness depends upon objective 
language. But once language is consciously internalised, consciousness could 
influence material activities and improve working strategies. And language is the 
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intermediary that allows the bi-directional interactions between mind and 
material activities. 
We cannot deny, however, the fact that cognition could entail a kind of progress 
that deeply differed from the progress involved in the material activity. The 
improvements of praxis – which is made possible by the consciousness of signs – 
must be considered to be a “quantitative progress”. Instead, the development of 
material behaviour involves a “qualitative leap”, i.e., the development of 
productive forces. To explain, Thảo invoked here the theory of dialectical leap 
suggested by the Marxist tradition. Some years later, in an article devoted to 
Marx’s Capital, Thảo (1984: 80-81) described the dialectical relation between 
measure and disproportion. It was a classical issue which had already been discussed 
by Hegel, Marx, and Lenin. The progressive accumulation of quantitative changes 
entails a dialectical shift (disproportion), namely the inversion of quantity in a new 
qualitative stage. Each qualitative stage can stand a certain degree of little 
quantitative changes (measure) which do not modify its nature. Let think about 
water evaporation: water withstands a quantitative warming before changing its 
nature and becoming vapour. 
In other words, there is a co-evolution between consciousness and material 
activities by way of the language of real life. However, the development of 
productive forces stimulates the transition from a less sophisticated stage of 
cognition, language, and material activity to a more sophisticated one. The 
development of material activities defines the limits in which cognition could 
influence that development through quantitative innovations. 
 
4.1. The Sign of Representation. The Material Conditions 
 
From the point of view of phylogeny, the analysis of Kafuan lithic industry (2.6 
ma), Thảo stated, suggests that our pre-human ancestors (Australanthropus) 
organized collective hunting. As we have already mentioned earlier (see above 
Chapter 7), according to Thảo, the qualitative leap that marks the emergence of the 
sign of representation from the simple indication depends upon the ability to 
transcend the limits of present perception. Such an ability arose when the group 
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broadened its field of action by dividing itself into different sub-groups. Two 
subgroups followed the same game at different distances and used the simple 
indicative sign (the pointing to the thing itself) to attract the attention of the 
others to the chased game. But at a certain point, the simple indication is not 
enough anymore. Our anchestor began to employ the sign of representation which 
alluded to the game even in the absence of the game within the perceptive field of 
one or another subgroup. On that basis, the sign of representation is the peculiar 
way our ancestors assured the coordination of their task given the absence of the 
game. In this regard, the social activity of labour is already objectively gone beyond 
the field of presence of present perception before the full emergence of the sign of 
representation. In short, material conditions of collective labour are the 
preconditions for having the emergence of the sign of representation.  
To Thảo, “we can place the level of this behaviour at about 16-17 months, or 
nearly in the middle of the prehominid age (14-20 months), which does indeed 
correspond to the time when the transition from the first to the second phase of 
prehominid development in prehistory begins” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 68). Thus, once 
again, Thảo tried to apply some observations of Piaget and Gouin-Décarie to his 
description of the origins of the sign of representation from the material collective 
activities of our prehominid ancestors. 
It is matters now to understand how the simple indicative sign became a simple 
sign of representation after having described the main differences between these 
two kinds of signs. After that, the developed sign of representation – which is 
composed of the simple indication and the developed indicative sign – will be taken 
into account. 
 
4.2. The Sign of Representation. The Perceptive Field 
 
As has been seen, to Thảo, the simple indicative sign points to things which are 
present within the perceptive field. In the most sophisticated case, the simple 
indicative gesture could also indicate an object that is recently disappeared: “the 
sensorimotor image of the object is maintained in the form of an enduring image 
which, through the mediation of the indicator, continues more or less to be part of 
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present perception” (id., p. 60). 
Instead, the representation (représentation) is the “imaginary presentation of an 
absent object.” Thus, the representation involves “something more than a simple 
enduring sensory-image of the object associated with the perception.” In effect, the 
thing is re-presented. The subject “ʻpresents it [the thing] again’ to himself outside 
of the field of presence of present perception” (id., p. 61). The representation is 
thus an active image (image active) produced by the subject that “marks the 
beginning of thought [i.e. the ability to manipulate representation of absent, 
possible, or impossible things].” 
Regarding this dynamic, Thảo wrote: 
 
Thus, the modelling of signifier [le modelage du signifiant, the modeling of reciprocal 
signification in the English text], in its reciprocal movement, on the basis of the 
material conditions of collective labour ends this time no longer in a simple 
variation inside the same structure [the six variations of the structure of the 
developed indicative sign], but in an altogether new structure, the indicative sign 
now functioning as the sign of representation or representative indication. As opposed to 
this, the indication within the limits of the field of presence of present perception 
may be called the sign of presentation or presentative indication. (id., p. 66) 
 
The sign of representation radically changes the structure of perception. 
According to Thảo: 
 
perception from now on is fitted into a new structure where it is broadened by the 
moment of representation which constantly projects beyond the limits of the field of 
presence of present perception the more or less indeterminate image of a distant space, 
but which must be made progressively more precise in terms of the real situation 
and activity. (id., p. 67) 
 
Thus, the sign of representation enriches the perceptive field by way of active 
images which broadened it and adds new absent elements. In other words, the sign 
of representation enables a relevant progress in the power of the embodied 
perceptive thought of our ancestors. 
 
4.3. The Sign of Representation. The Signifier 
 
The sign of representation is composed of a simple indication and a developed 
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indicative sign. According to Thảo, the need to exchange signs between the two 
subgroups during sophisticated collective hunting led our ancestors to use both, 
the simple and developed indicative sign in a new way. Interestingly, the simplest 
form of the sign of representation shows the same signifier of the simple indicative 
sign: “the direction of the pointed finger, in other words, the external form of the 
signifier [signifiant, signifying in the English translation], does not seem to have 
changed, but the signified [signifié, the thing signified in the English translation] has 
become altogether different” (id., p. 63). On that basis, the same gesture conveys a 
new signified. 
The cooperative collective activity enables to determine both the attentional 
frame of the group and then the field of reference (the game) – even if the thing is 
absent within the perceptive field. So the material social activity is the condition to 
determine the new (representative) meaning of the developed indicative sign. The 
representation of the absent thing and the sign that conveys that representation 
are communicable and meaningful just because they depend upon a given common 
attentional frame and a common field of reference. To Thảo, the sign of 
representation is eminently context-related, and the occasional material social 
activities are essential to determine the field of reference of the sign of 
representation. 
There is a problem because of homonymy of the simple indication. When the 
simple indication is displayed as a sign of representation, it requires the support of 
other gestures and vocalizations in order better to determine the field of reference. 
As a matter of fact, the subject has at a disposal the simple indication as well as the 
developed indicative sign. For this reason, the simple indication that accompanied 
the representation of the absent object is matched with the developed indicative 
sign that adds more information about the absent thing. In this way, the sign of 
representation could be described as composed of two signs: the simple indication 
and the second variation of the developed indicative sign (2) TFM. In effect, Thảo 
suggested that the sign (2) TFM becomes part a sign of representation because it 
could stress on the moment of the object and the moment of the form (see Thảo 
[1973] 1984: 69-70): 
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We may believe that owing to the exigencies of the new situation, it [the developed 
indicative sign] is now integrated into the structure of representation so that from 
now on it has two components, one indicating the “this here absent’” [the simple 
indication] and the other representing it in the aspect under which it is usually 
presented in the practice of collective work, in other words, as a “this here in the 
form (F) as it appears in its (presumed) motion.” 
 
In this case, too, however, the developed indicative sign involved in the sign of 
representation could be meaningful just because it is based on group past 
experience. This fact marks the most relevant limit of the sign of representation. 
 
4.4. The Sign of Representation. Some Cognitive Consequences 
 
The sign of representation allows making predictions and suggesting 
hypotheses about absent things and possible situations. After that, the real 
situation and activity confirm the likelihood of representations. From the point of 
view of the phylogeny, our ancestors began to produce instruments by way of raw 
materials that they found at a certain distance from the object of the biological 
need. They necessarily needed to manipulate representations of absent situations: 
“as the Australanthropi hunters tended to increase the distance from their 
biological object in order to find the material necessary for the preparation of 
instruments, there had to be a more detailed indication associated with simple 
gesture of the hand aiming at the biological object” (id., p. 69). 
In other words, the sign of representation allows the most elementary form of 
abstract thought. For this reason, Thảo wrote that “the appearance of the sign of 
representation at about the middle of the prehominid stage or transition stage 
between ape and man, [must be considered] as a true freeing of the brain” (id., p. 68). 
Indeed, the sign of representation is the condition to transcend the narrow limits 
of the present situation – “where animal psychism is imprisoned” – and then both, 
language and consciousness, could reach their superior function. 
From the point of view of the experience of the subject, the first cases of the 
transition from the simple indicative sign to the simple representative sign require 
what Thảo called reflection (réflexion). The reflection is a cognitive event that after 
a few seconds conditions the transition from the image of the “this here still 
 357 
present” to the image of the “this here absent”. During that period, the body 
continues to perform the simple indicative sign. And the enduring image of the 
object involved in the simple indicative sign is still at work. A representation of the 
absent object is thus produced, and the signification of the simple indicative sign 
essentially changes. 
Interestingly, Thảo defined the reflection as “the continuation, for a while, of 
the experienced return of the sign to oneself” (id., p. 67). Indeed, the main feature 
of the sign of representation is the fact that “it immediately implies, by its 
objective form, the moment of subjectivity” (id., p. 66). Simply put, the sign of 
representation is a sign that the subject eminently addresses to his/herself. As a 
matter of fact, the reflection is a subjective conscious cognitive event. “We can 
thus say that the representative indicative sign appears from the beginning as 
conscious.” But this subjective conscious experience of the sign of representation 
does not imply that it could arise outside social dimension, of course. At the same 
time, however, that conscious experience is the reason why the sign of 
representation must be context-related before becoming a meaningful expression 
addressed to the others. 
 
5.1. The Formulas of The Sign of Representation 
 
As has been seen above (Chapter 5), among Australanthropi, hunters tended to 
increase the distance from the biological object in order to find the raw material 
which was necessary for the preparation of instruments. This fact entailed the 
production of the representative indicative sign. But this sign needs the support of 
other signs because the signifier is not enough to determine the meaning of that 
sign. According to Thảo, new collective cooperative activities involved “the 
modelling of signifier [le modelage du signifiant, the modelling of reciprocal signification 
in the English text], in its reciprocal movement, on the basis of the material 
conditions of collective labour” (id., p. 66). Specifically, they associated the simple 
sign of representation – whose structure coincides with the simple indication – 
with the developed indicative sign. 
To Thảo the simple indication that evokes the enduring image of the object that 
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is absent within the perceptive field is a “provisional sign of the representation of the 
absent object” (id., p. 72). The simple indication with the function of representation 
“very much depends on the enduring image of the missing object, and as nothing 
learned about it, except that it really exists outside of the perceptive field.” Since 
the developed indicative sign accompanied the provisional sign of the 
representation of the absent object, the representation becomes firmer and more 
precise. The developed indicative sign, as a matter of fact, “adds the indication of a 
motion and a form concerning this object” (ibid.). 
Thảo stated that the most elementary semiotic base of the association of the 
provisional sign of the representation of the absent object with the developed 
indicative sign had been observed by Piaget (1945: 230-231). A little girl at about 13 
months associates the simple indicative sign with the developed indicative sign to 
indicate an object within the framework of present perception. Thảo called that 
sign sign of composite indication (signe de l’indication composée). Thus, unlike the 
developed sign of representation, the sign of composite indication still requires the 
present perception. 
The general formula of the sign of composite indication is:  
 
(7) T.TMF: this here as a this here in a motion in the form (F). 
 
One must remark that “the developed indicative sign which constitutes the 
second element of the composite indicative sign, can be presented according to any 
of its possible formulas” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 71). 
To Thảo, it is not necessary that the two signs are effectively realized: one of 
them could also be only sketched-out. In this case, the voice fulfils a specific 
function. Voice evokes the whole meaning of the sketched-out movement which is 
usually associated with that vocalization. 
The efficacy of the sign of representation exactly depends upon the assimilation 
and refunctionalization of the sign of composite indication. Our ancestors and our 
children have at a disposal the sign of composite indication to support the 
representation of the absent object. The signifier of the sign of representation 
remains the same of the sign of composite indication. But the meaning changes. 
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For this reason, Thảo introduced a particular diacritical sign (      ) since he 
described the general formula of the sign of representation of the absent object:  
 
(8) T .TMF: this here (absent) represented as a this here in a motion in the form 
(F). 
 
The sign of representation of the absent object is composed of the simple 
indication and the developed indicative sign. In this case, too, the moment of the 
developed indicative sign could be replaced by whatever variants of the general 
formula (1) TMF. The line over the general formula (8) T .TMF marks that the 
object is absent and then it is represented. This fact is the main difference with the 
sign of composite indication (7) T.TMF. 
There are three variations of the general formula of the sign of representation 
of the absent object (8) T .TMF. In both cases, “the line drawn above the letters 
designating the representative structure […] could very well affect only one of 
them.” In other words, the representation could affect both the simple indication 
and the developed indicative sign. This is the case of the general formula (8). But 
the representation could also affect only one of the two components. In this way, 
Thảo described two possibilities: 
 
The sign of the syncretic representation of the instrumental form: (9) 
T. TFM  or (10) T. TFM . (see the transcription of the errata-corrige: figures 
15 and 21) 
(11) The sign of deferred imitation: T .MTF. (see the transcription of the 
errata-corrige: figures 15 and 21) 
 
In the case of the formula (9) the representative structure affects the second 
component “TFM” alone. In effect, the sign of the syncretic representation of the 
instrumental form starts from the simple indication of something that exists 
within the perceptive field and involves the representations of both, its movement 
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and form of motion. The sign (10) is the sign of representation that emphasises the 
gestural component of the sign more than the vocal one. In this way, it differs from 
the first one (9). In the next paragraphs, the semantic formula of each one of those 
signs will be analysed in great detail.  We leave aside for a moment the explanation 
of the formula (11). 
 
5.2. Material Preconditions and Cognitive Consequences 
 
The two formulas of what Thảo called the sign of representation of the syncretic 
form are: 
 
(9) T. TFM : this here represented as a this here in the form (F) as it appears in 
its (presumed) motion; 
 
(10) T. TFM : this here represented with insistence as a this here in the form (F) 
as it appears in its (presumed) motion. 
 
(9) and (10) are composed of two elements: the simple indication (T) that points 
to the present object and the developed indicative gesture (TFM) that evokes the 
representation – for this reason, there is the line drawn above the letters (      ). 
The developed indicative sign could more or less emphasise the gestural moment. 
In this way, the formula (9) refers to the developed indicative sign that simply 
evokes the representation by way of a vocalization and a sketched-out movement. 
Instead, the formula (10) refers to the developed indicative sign which stresses 
more than the other one on the gesture. The line under the letters (        ) exactly 
shows the emphasis on the moment of the gesture. 
According to Thảo, the sign of representation (9) T. TFM supports the 
emergence of the syncretic representation of the instrumental form. Our ancestors 
pointed to the raw material and uttered some vocalizations that evoked the form 
the instrument in which the material must be transformed. This kind of 
representation was necessary “for the preparation of the instrument far from the 
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object of biological need and for the transition to the work of elaboration” (id., p. 
72). This fact depends upon some material conditions and involves some cognitive 
consequences. 
The ancient anthropoid was able to manipulate objects within the perceptive 
field. The presence of an interesting object, as a matter of fact, entailed the 
sensorimotor image of the instrumental function which the object could have. That 
image was “an image of the characteristic motion of the instrument to be 
prepared” and then it predetermined and guided the manipulation of the object. 
The image is evoked by the object itself by way of acquired cognitive associations 
of perceptions and movements. The ancient anthropoid “immediately applied” 
that image of the desired form the object must have “to the perceptive image of 
the present object of biological need.” This kind of activity took place within the 
perceptive field and the object of biological need was still present. 
The prehominid, instead, used the sign of indication during cooperative 
collective activities. Thảo said that they indicated to one another “the raw material 
to be used by stretching their hands toward it” (id., p. 73). This exchange of signs 
“was enough to bring agreement as to the choice of material.” The subject had at a 
disposal “the functional [sensorimotor] image of the instrument into which the 
material has to be transformed.” But unlike the ancient anthropoid, Thảo 
continued, that sensorimotor image was more stable in so far as it was the 
signification of the sign exchanged during collective cooperative activities. 
Simultaneously, more sophisticated activities required the sign of developed 
indication in order better to determine the form of the instrument into which the 
material had to be transformed. 
Interestingly, the developed indicative sign fulfilled two functions: it was 
employed as a simple indication that evokes the sensorimotor image of the 
instrument and it also reproduced the motion of the preparation of the 
instrument. For instance 
 
it is a question of a cutting instrument, the fundamental meaning being “this here in 
a motion in the form of cutting (C) or TMC,” we will obtain in the present case, in 
the imperative mood, according to formula (3): MCT, “the motion in the form of 
cutting concerning this here.” There occurs here a transposition, altogether normal 
at the syncretic level, from the useful motion characteristic of the instrument, to the 
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motion characteristic of its preparation for the manipulation of material, in other 
words, a confusion between the motion of manipulation which must allow the stone 
to cut, and the very motion of cutting with that stone. Consequently, the image 
projected here by the sign-as-meaning [à titre de signification] is confused in 
practice in its content with the functional image which had already guided the 
preparation of the instrument, namely the generalized sensorimotor image of the 
instrumental function, or of the motion of cutting. (id., p. 73) 
 
According to Thảo, collective cooperative activities radically changed since the 
“preparation of the instrument is done at a distance from the object of biological 
need”. In this case, our ancestors looked for raw materials that could be 
transformed into a useful instrument. On that basis, they had to choose the most 
appropriate raw material and addressed to one another simple indications which 
directed the attention of the group towards interesting raw materials. But the 
functional image of the instrument into which the raw material had to be 
transformed did not find a stable point of application within the perceptive field. 
As a matter of fact, the sensorimotor functional image of the instrument to be 
prepared became “too vague” (id., p. 74) because the choice of the raw material had 
still to be made. The simple indication “was no longer enough to bring them [our 
ancestors] to agreement on a satisfactory choice” (id., p. 73). 
Thus, the simple indicative sign “had to be completed with a developed 
indicative sign” (id., p. 74). The developed indicative sign, indeed, designated “the 
instrument in question by the usual movements belonging to it, that is, the 
movement of its use” (ibid.). But since the instrument does not yet exist and our 
ancestors were in front of confused raw material, the developed indicative signs 
had necessarily to refer to an absent object (the instrument into which the raw 
material will be transformed). Thus, the developed indicative sign accompanied by 
the simple indication in front of possible raw material involved the representation 
of the absent instrument. 
In this case, the developed indicative sign bears emphasis on the moment of the 
form, i.e. the function the instrument must have. The representation of the form 
and function of the instrument is overlaid on the perceptive image of the raw 
material the simple indication refers to. In other words, the image of the function 
is confused with the sensory-image of the motion of its preparation. 
Before concluding, it is interesting to remark that Thảo invoked the 
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observations of the American psychologist and paediatrician Arnold Gesell (1880-
1961) who described the emergence of drawing skills in the child at about 16-17 
months (see Gesell & Ilg [1943] 1949: 131). To Thảo ([1973] 1984: 75), the child who 
draws shows the ability to associate a simple indication with a developed indicative 
sign that evokes a representation:  
 
we notice that he begins with a motion of his hand that consists of leaning the pencil 
on the paper, which is a way of insisting on the movement of the hand stretched 
toward the object in the indicative sign: “this here!” The gesture is followed by a 
movement which more or less approximates the straight line. […] thus the whole 
gesture consists essentially in an association of a simple indication of the “this 
here,” viz. the paper, with a developed indication aiming at a straight line which, in 
the beginning, does not yet exist. In other words, in this second component of the 
gesture, we are dealing with a developed representative indication […]. 
 
Thảo gave the example of the drawing skills of the child to describe the 
structure of the developed representative indication (9) T. TFM . But the 
behaviour of the child is absolutely not communicative. So Thảo suggested a very 
audacious analogy between the child and our ancestors. And, at the same time, he 
implicitly assumed that the ability to produce representations of absent entities 
transcends the limit of language in a wide sense and it may also be observed in 
conducts of another kind. 
 
5.3. The Sign of the Syncretic Representation of the Instrumental Form (9) 
 
Thảo introduced the general formula of the sign of the syncretic representation 
of the instrumental form (or developed representative sign): (9) T. TFM . The first 
component of the sign is the simple indication of the present object and the second 
one is the developed indicative sign that conveys the representation of the 
instrumental form. This one is the motion of the instrument, viz. the function of 
the instrument. 
That sign of representation conveyed a representation in front of a possible 
object (the raw material) and referred to the absent object (the instrument). It 
could represent the absent object just because, usually, it was already employed in 
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front of the present object. That is to say, the developed indicative gesture TFM 
was already employed by the group of prehominids to reproduce the form and 
function of the present instrument in front or beside it. Thus, it could be also 
employed since the object is absent from the perceptive field in so far as all the 
members of the group can recognize and understand the sign. 
For the same reason, the gestural moment of the developed indicative sign is 
only sketched-out. In the case of (9) T. TFM , Thảo stated, the developed indicative 
sign probably had “the form of a syncretic word” and the corresponding gesture 
was “reduced to a simple internal outline.” The gestural component developed 
indicative was merely sketched-out and the vocalization fulfils the most important 
function. Thus, Thảo summarised: 
 
We have seen that the sign which appeared in phylogeny was very probably formed 
by the association of the gesture of the hand stretched toward possible raw material 
with the syncretic word representing the instrument to be prepared. The gesture of 
the developed representative indication which gives this word its meaning, reduces 
itself to a simple internal outline, as is the normal case for an already established 
word [mot]”. (id., p. 76) 
 
The vocalization then could convey the representation of the “this here” in the 
usual form of the instrument. We can say that the vocalization played the role of a 
word because the developed indicative sign was already established. Thus, 
according to Thảo, the developed representative sign (9) T. TFM depends on past 
experience in two ways. Firstly, it evokes a representation in so far as it is already 
and usually employed by the community. Secondly, the developed indicative sign 
could be reduced to the vocalization alone because all the members of the 
community were able to understand it and thus it was unessential to perform the 
whole sign. 
As this discussion implies, Thảo implicitly introduced a new condition that 
explained the mutual understanding among the members of the group. The 
motivated link between signifier and signified was not enough anymore. And the 
perceptive field only partially determines the reference of the sign. The sign of the 
representation of the instrumental form could be understood if, and only if all the 
members of the group shared the same semiotic code. In other words, the sign of 
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representation of the function of the instrument depended upon past collective 
experience of the group. In effect, the developed indicative sign became so much a 
stable habit that it was meaningful even when the object was absent, and the 
vocalization alone may convey the corresponding representation. 
 
5.4. The Sign of the Syncretic Representation of the Instrumental Form (10) 
 
According to Thảo, the sign of syncretic representation of the instrumental 
form (9) T. TFM does not perform the gestural moment which is, instead, simply 
outlined at the level of the nervous system of the subject. Sometimes, the pressure 
of the exigencies of the situation may involve the emergence of a developed 
representative sign which emphasised the gestural aspect more than the previous 
one (9). This structure of this sign shows the following semantic form: (10) T. TFM . 
Notably, the line under the letters (      ) exactly shows the emphasis on the 
moment of the gesture. 
Thảo called insistence (insistance) the emphasis on the gestural aspect of that 
sign. The insistence on the gestural moment begins with the simple indication and 
is continued in the second component. The whole sign is accomplished in a 
particularly insistent manner. As has been said, the need to stress on the gestural 
aspect of the sign, depended upon some practical exigencies. Thảo wrote that 
 
If we now return once again to phylogeny, at the time of the transition from the first 
to the second phase of prehominid development, we may believe that this insistent 
form of the sign had to appear in the course of the preparation of the instrument, at 
the time when the situation required a clear representation of the instrumental 
form. In fact, in the group busy with this operation, an individual can find himself in 
a perplexing situation, if, for example, while preparing the cutting stone by 
crushing, he only succeeds in chipping one of the two stones without achieving a 
useful result. The others then come to his aid. And as already possess the sign of 
syncretic representation of the instrumental form, formed at the moment the raw 
material was chosen, they repeat it, but this time in a more distinct manner, by 
emphasising the gestural aspect. (id., p. 76) 
 
On that basis, in the case of (10), the developed indicative sign that conveys the 
representation must be regarded as a more or less approximately pantomime or 
mimic representation of the instrumental form. 
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It is not necessary here to describe how the awareness of that sign arose as 
sporadic, collective, and individual over the time. What must be stressed, however, 
is the fact that the exchange of the representative sign (10) involves the awareness 
of the representative sign as such. The group addresses the sign to a subject who, 
in turn, does not perform the sign to communicate with the others. The subject 
addresses it to the ones’s own self: “the stumped tool-maker has nothing to say to 
his companion, since it is precisely up to him to shape the cutting stone that has 
been indicated to him, the sign which he automatically sends back to the other, 
return upon himself” (id., p. 77). This awareness of the developed representative sign 
corresponds to the awareness of the instrumental form which constitutes the 
representative content of that sign. Thus, by way of the representative sign, the 
subject becomes aware of the form the instrument must have. 
We can now return to a description of the more general trends of lithic industry 
among our ancestors. The Kafuan culture had produced stone tools that show the 
ability to have representations of the form of the instrument at a distance of the 
biological object. This one is the main stone (the raw material, the object of labour, 
objet de travail) that must be transformed. Our ancestors used the second stone as 
an instrument to transform the first one. The sign of representation allows the 
awareness of the form into which the first stone must be transformed. The 
representation of the form our ancestors became progressively aware of the real 
nature of labour which is the activity that implies the distinction between means 
and object of labour. 
In this regard, Thảo explained the reason why the pointing finger is the finger 
that points: “as the hand that makes this sign already holds the second stone, it is 
obviously the second finger which can most easily straighten out in order to be 
placed on the first stone. It is thus this finger which will be progressively 
specialised as the index finger” (id., p. 78). Implicitly, then, Thảo admitted that a 
simple contingent behaviour – which arises under the pressure of given exigencies 
– becomes a stable acquisition of the species. But he was not clear to describe 
whether that habit is genetically or cultural inherited. In any case, it is a habit that 
originally arose from collective cooperative activities. 
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5.5. The Differed Imitation (11) 
 
The differed imitation is the delayed repetition of a given behaviour (cf. Piaget 
1945: 64). For example, the child at about 16 months is able to imitate the 
movements of the playmate, even when he/she is not present. In this way, the 
imitation refers to an absent object (the absent playmate) and involves the 
representation of the absent object. At the same time, the performance of the 
movements (the imitation in a strict sense) determines the referent by imitating 
some aspects of the referent (the movements of the absent playmate). 
In certain cases, to Thảo, the differed imitation may fulfil the function of a sign 
during communicative exchanges. The imitation of the movements of the absent 
object could be useful, for instance, during the collective hunt. During those 
activities, the need to quickly imitate the movements of the game transformed the 
sign of representation (9) T. TFM – i.e. the sign that entails the representation of 
the absent object by way of vocalizations. “In the excitement of the impending 
hunt, the word became reinforced by externalising the developed indicative 
gesture whose internal outline it already implied” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 80). Because 
of that excitement, the developed indicative sign (TMF) was performed insistently. 
The behaviour of imitation of the absent object would be then the sign of insistent 
syncretic representation of the movement of the absent object. This sign is composed of 
the inner outline of the simple indication (T) and the performance of the developed 
indicative sign that stresses on the moment of motion (MTF). Since the object is 
absent the simple indication is only outlined while the developed indicative 
gesture is performed insistently. Thus, Thảo suggested the formula:  
 
(11) T  .MTF: “this here (absent) representing with insistence in the motion of this here 
in the form (F).” 
 
The signifier completely produces the signification, of course: the imitative 
gestures involve the signified as the image of movements of the absent object. The 
main peculiarity of this sign is the fact that the body of the subject who performs 
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the sign manifests the movements of the absent object (in the motion of this here in 
the form). For this reason, Thảo wrote that  
 
as this meaning is effectively realized in the subject’s own body, there occurs a 
syncretic transfer of the indicative meaning which now indicates the motion in 
question in the subject himself considered as object: this time it is no longer 
question of a representative indication but rather a presentative one. 
 
 On that basis, the developed indicative sign must be regarded in this case as a 
sign of presentation – i.e. a sign that refers to a present object – rather being a sign 
of representation. Indeed, the body of the subject becomes the support of the 
meaning: “the motion of this here (the subject’s own body) in the form (F), 
presented in an insistent way, or MTF.” In other words, the body presents the 
absent object and by way of the imitation of the movements of the absent object 
involves the representation of the absent object as the referent of the 
communicative act. Thus, the representation of the absent object (T) is 
syncretically matched with the perceptive image of the subject’s own body. 
Another way of saying this is that the perceptive image of the subject’s own body 
evokes the representation of the absent object and determining the reference. 
Thus, the previous knowledge of both the referent and its movements is 
necessarily required so that the observer understands the meaning of the sign. 
 
6. The Contradictions of the Sign of Representation 
 
As has been seen above, the contradictions involved in the developed indicative 
sign cause the emergence of the sign of representation. And new social activities 
(the production of the instrument at a distance from the object of biological need) 
involve the integration of the developed indicative gesture into the sign of 
representation. But the developed indicative signs included in the sign of 
representation involved more and more misunderstandings.  
The developed indicative sign could stress on the moment of the object or on 
the moment of motion. Slowly the developed indicative sign that stresses more on 
the moment of the object became a sign that represents the object alone (TMF). 
And the developed indicative sign that stresses more on the moment of the motion 
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became a sign that represents the motion alone (MTF). The simple indication (T) – 
which could be more or less performed – comes to the aid of the developed sign. 
But, as we have shown in the previous paragraphs, the problem of the reference 
still remains present. The context, the previous knowledge, the traditions, etc., 
becomes the fundamental factors to determine the reference of the sign of 
representation. 
In support of his position, Thảo stated, “the word used by the speaker to 
indicate the motion of a certain object is understood by the hearer as representing 
the same motion of another object” (id., p. 137-138) or “the word used to indicate 
an object in a certain motion is understood by the hearer as representing it in 
another motion” (id., p. 138). In other words, the sign of representation was not 
useful to simultaneously stress on both moments, the moment of motion and that 
of the object. And then Thảo reasoned that the contradictions implied by the 
developed indicative sign between the moment of the motion and the moment of 
the object had been transcended by the elementary functional sentence. Let us move to 
the next Chapter which largely described the development of the functional 
sentence. 
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Chapter Eleven 
The Development of Iconic Syntax 
 
 
 
Il est probable que le progrès apporté dans le travail collectif 
par lʼinvention de lʼinstrument élaboré a amené un nouveau 
développement dans la répartition des tâches, […].  
Le cadre de la communication sʼen trouvé considérablement élargi, 
ce qui entraînait à son tour un nouveau progrès 
dans la structure du langage.  
Cʼest là, vraisemblement, quʼil convient de chercher  
lʼorigine de la phrase fonctionnelle […] . 
(T.D. Thảo) 
 
 
 
1. Preliminary Remarks. - 2. The Functional Sentence. - 3.1. The Elementary 
Functional Sentence. - 3.2. The Gestural Connection. - 3.3. The Functional 
Sentence in the Phylogeny. - 4.1. The Developed Functional Sentence. - 4.2. 
Type I: Enumeration. - 4.3. Type II: Correlation. - 5.1. The Functional Name. - 
5.2. The Typical Name. - 5.3. The Questioning. - 6.1. The Functional Verb. - 6.2. 
The Typical Verb. - 6.3. The Sentence in Strict Sense. - 7. Concluding Remarks. 
 
 
 
1. Preliminary Remarks 
 
In his ILC, Thảo’s aim was also to explain the transition from the connection of 
two (or more) syncretic words to fully-developed sentences. To him, the function 
of real sentences is to express the connections of things by means of the 
connection between words which refer to those things: “expressing by means of 
sign relations, the relation between things” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 82). Thus, one could 
affirm that Thảo suggested a conception of iconic nature of syntax. To some today’s 
scholars (Haiman 1985; Givón 1989; Burling 1999), the syntax shows a certain 
degree of iconicity in so far as it establishes the relation between the order of 
words and morphemes within a sentence with the order of facts that the sentence 
describes. That relation is diagrammatic, i.e. the relation between parts of the 
linguistic structure reflects the relation between things or concepts which those 
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parts codify (see for instance Matthews 1991: 12). As this discussion implies, the 
syntax does not follow arbitrary rules which are independent of the state of affairs 
a sentence refers to. By contrast, the syntax makes possible an iconic order of 
words by which the things in the world are represented. The syntax is not 
independent of the semantic and pragmatic nature of linguistic expressions: both 
the meaning and reference of words play a relevant role in the construction of 
sentences. The syntax is indeed part of communicative social interactions and, for 
this reason, the use of particular grammatical forms is strongly linked, even 
deterministically linked, to the presence of particular semantic or pragmatic 
functions in discourse (Van Valin 1991; Tomlin 1990). The syntax does not depend 
upon hierarchical structures but rather upon both, the meaning of words 
considered alone and the iconic value of their connection. Unfortunately, matters 
are not quite that simple. Suffice it to say that syntactical order of words within a 
sentence depends on multiple factors which cannot be reduced to iconicity. 
Thảo refused to call the association of syncretic words “pseudo-sentence” 
because “this denomination […] does not seem to us to be a very good one, in so far 
as it suggests that these associations have nothing in common with real sentences 
except that words are juxtaposed to one another” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 81). He did not 
accept the assumption that first sentences uttered by the child would be a simple 
juxtaposition of syncretic words: “we can no longer understand how, under these 
conditions, the transition from the one [the association of words] to the other [the 
real sentence with a definite grammatical structure] could be made.” As a 
consequence, Thảo insisted that the connection between syncretic words “must 
already contain some embryonic connections which will be fully formed in the true 
sentence.” The sentence of the child, indeed, somehow shows a connection 
between words that refers to the connection between things. The sentence of the 
child does not still evidently show syntactical connections among words, but it 
already reveals a semantic connection that transcends the simple juxtaposition of 
vocalizations.  
One could pose some questions: Did Thảo really explain the transition from the 
isolated words to real sentences, all things considered? Could he really explain the 
origins of predication? Did he instead presuppose the predication since he 
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emphasised the predicative function of functional sentences? How can the 
juxtaposition of two vocalizations involve the connection of two meanings and 
then the emergence of a complex whole image which represents the real 
connections between things? Could the syntactical structures be reduced to a 
simple improvement of verbal abilities? Should the syntactical connection (liaison 
syntaxique) be simply considered to be a more sophisticated way to express an 
intended semantic connection (liaison sémantique) and nothing more? 
 
2. The Functional Sentence 
 
Thảo ([1973] 1984: 80-82) introduced the notion of “functional sentence” (phrase 
fonctionelle) to explain the transition from the isolated words to fully-developed 
sentences. In this way, he faced the question of the emergence of predication: How 
can the simple juxtaposition of words slowly become a syntactical connection? 
How does the grammatical structure of fully-developed sentences arise? What is 
the main feature of the syntactical structures? 
The functional sentence marks the transition from the use of isolated syncretic 
words to the first real sentence. According to Thảo, the functional sentence is the 
association of isolated pre-existing meaningful vocalizations (syncretic words). 
But, though the signifier of a functional sentence shows the simple juxtaposition of 
vocalizations, the meaning conveyed by that association reproduces the 
connection between the things of the state of affairs the functional sentence refers 
to. In other words, the functional sentence appears as a juxtaposition of signs but 
simultaneously fulfils the function of predication in so far as its meaning 
successfully involves the reproduction of connections between external entities. 
The functional sentence is nothing other than the association of two signs that 
pre-exist to their juxtaposition. Indeed, the connection between two signs is not 
the constitutive factor that determines the meaning of the two signs considered 
alone. In effect, the meaning of those signs depends upon pre-existing cognitive 
and symbolic operations. And the functional sentence fulfils the purpose of 
connecting those pre-existing meanings. But we wonder whether this connection 
gives rise to something more than the mere addition of two meanings. 
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The functional sentence is the association of two (or more) syncretic words. The 
syncretic word, as has been seen above, is nothing other than a vocalization whose 
signified depends upon the corresponding developed indicative gesture – which 
may be more or less outlined: “the syncretic word gets its entire meaning from the 
developed indicative gesture which subtends it, whether in an externalised or 
simply an internal outlined form” (id., p. 82). Thus, the functional sentence 
associates two vocalizations which implicitly depend upon the corresponding 
developed indicative gestures. The meaning resulting from that connection is 
nonetheless something more than the simple juxtaposition or association of two 
meanings. The two more or less outlined gestures produced two images which melt 
together and entails a new complex tendential image (for the notion of “image” see 
above Chapter 6, § 6.2). “The semantic connection [liaison sémantique] is explained 
by the real connection between the two subjacent gestures, which as they rapidly 
succeeded each other, connect themselves thereby in the same dynamic whole 
[ensemble dynamique]” (id., p. 82). 
Thảo suggested that the real sentence is the result of the quantitative 
development of the previous connection between vocalizations. As this discussion 
implies, he reduced the peculiarities of the real sentence to two properties: i) the 
connection is explicitly uttered and then ii) it is more understandable. The 
function of real fully-developed sentences is to express the connections between 
things by means of the connection between words which refer to those things. On 
that basis, the connection is the most relevant element of syntactical structures. It 
is the operation that links two pre-existing elements by way of some syntactical 
elements such as verbs, prepositions, conjunctions, etc. In short, the real sentence 
shows the syntactical connection between subject, verb, and complement while the 
functional sentence fulfils the function of connection by way of the juxtaposition 
of two syncretic words. 
As we have shown, the functional sentence shows the structure of the fully-
developed sentence in an “embryonic” form merely. The real sentence expresses 
the same semantic connection between the functional sentences by way of a more 
sophisticated syntactical connection. But, for the same reason, the functional 
sentence fulfils the function of the real sentence even if it does not show the same 
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form. “The associations of syncretic words […] do not yet imply the form [la forme] 
of a sentence, defined by the syntactical connection [liaison syntaxique], they 
nevertheless perform the fundamental function [la fonction] of the sentence, which 
consists in expressing, by means of sign relations, the relation between things” (id., 
p. 82).  
The main difference between real and functional sentences merely concerns the 
form of the sentence. In the case of real sentences, indeed, the connection between 
signs is made explicit by means of the verb. In the case of the functional sentence, 
on the other hand, the connection is simply evoked because the predication still 
lacks: “the relation between the two words is evidently not formulated” (id., p. 81) 
but “the relation between things” could nonetheless be expressed “by means of 
sign relation” (id., p. 82). In effect, the connection between two syncretic words 
conveys a “complex image” (id., p. 81) which is nothing other than the 
reproduction of the real connection between things, even if that connection is not 
explicitly uttered by vocalizations.  In the same way, the real sentence differs from 
the functional one also because the vocalizations become more stable: the 
functional sentence is a “temporary connection, spontaneously formed on the 
gestural plane, which will be stabilised later on the verbal plane in the sentence 
with subject, verb and object” (id., p. 82). 
The most relevant step between the use of isolated words and the predication is 
fulfilled by the functional sentence which already implies a complex meaning that 
makes a qualitative difference in the meaning conveyed by isolated words. But 
both, the functional and real sentences, presuppose the previous use of syncretic 
words. And, in turn, syncretic words require the support of developed indicative 
gestures to be meaningful. Thus, the signification of the developed indicative sign 
must be understood to be the fundamental key to explaining the signification of 
more sophisticated expressions. For this reason, Thảo insisted that the systems of 
arbitrary signs ultimately depend upon the systems of non-wholly arbitrary signs 
(see above Chapter 3). 
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3.1. The Elementary Functional Sentence 
 
To Thảo the functional sentence appears in the child at about 17-20 months. The 
functional sentence follows the use of isolated syncretic words (14-17 months) and 
precedes the emergence of real sentences (21 months). That transitional phase 
corresponds to the second stage of prehominid evolution (Kafuan: see fig. 16). 
As has been seen, the most elementary structure of the functional sentence is 
the connection between two syncretic words. The functional sentence implies 
three formal possible elementary cases. The first case is the connection between 
two syncretic words which mean the movement (i). The second one is the 
connection between two syncretic words which mean the object (ii). The third case 
is the connection between a syncretic word which means the movement with a 
syncretic word which means the object (iii).  
(i) Thảo considered the first possible form as too problematic: “we must exclude 
the case where they [the syncretic words] would both be taken in their actions 
sense, for their connection would then have to express a relation between two 
motions which would be too complex a content for the child at this level” (Thảo 
([1973] 1984: 82). 
(ii) The first syncretic word means the object in motion or at rest and the second 
one the object at rest (cf. id., p. 90-91 and formulas 15-16 and 151-161). Thus, Thảo 
described two tables with two possible formulas of the connection in the case of 
(ii). This kind of the functional sentence “provides an altogether new semantic 
content, since it expresses a relation between two objects, either through the 
mediation of a motion which concerns them both, or directly, both objects being at 
rest” (id., p. 92). The connection between the two meanings of the two syncretic 
words may be regarded as the form of adjunction (cf. id., p. 88) as well as the form of 
position or spatial contiguity (cf. id., p. 89). In any case, the ability to mean the 
common property of two objects (that property could be the movement or the 
being at rest) must be seen as the ability to pointing at a third element that 
mediates the passage from the first object to the second one, from the more known 
object to the less known one. 
(iii) The first syncretic word may refer to an action and be connected with 
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another syncretic word which refers to an object, and vice versa (cf. id., p. 90-91, 
formulas 12-14 and 121-141). So Thảo described the four possible formulas of the 
connection of a syncretic word that means a movement (desired or observed) with 
a syncretic word that means the object at rest. This kind of the functional sentence 
is more elementary than the case (ii). It “expresses the relation of a motion to an 
object” (id., p. 91). As Thảo insisted, the relation of a motion to an object was 
already illustrated by the syncretic word alone (see Chapter 6). In the case of the 
functional sentence (iii) the second syncretic word makes more precise the 
meaning of the first syncretic word. The connection between the two syncretic 
words, then, is a relation of attribution (id., p. 84). For this reason, Thảo wrote that 
“we can distinguish a principal word [mot principal], or the word taken in the sense 
of action, which already expresses the essence of the total meaning, and an adjunct 
word [mot ajoint], or the word taken in the sense of object whose role is only to 
make more precise the moment of the ʽthis here’ in the meaning of the first” (id., p. 
91-92). 
 
3.2. The Gestural Connection 
 
The functional sentence (ii) and (iii) are presented as connections of two uttered 
vocalizations which subtend two developed indicative gestures. The two subtended 
gestures give the vocalizations (the two syncretic words) their meaning. This is 
what Thảo called “the fundamental parallelism of the gesture and of the word [le 
parallélisme fondamental du geste et de la parole].” Thus, in so far as the specific 
meaning of the functional sentence depends upon the connection between the two 
syncretic words, then the connection occurs with the two gestures. Thảo called 
that connection gestural connection (liaison gesturelle): it is the inner gestural 
connection between the two developed indicative signs. In this way, the gestural 
connection establishes the meaningful connection between the two syncretic 
words. 
But that gestural connection is not a third sign that is added to the other two. In 
effect, to Thảo, the gestural connection depends upon the rapid succession of the 
two outlined gestures: “the semantic connection which emerges here in the 
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association of two words, is explained by the real connection between the two 
subjacent gestures, which as they rapidly succeed each other, connect themselves 
thereby in the same dynamic whole” (id., p. 82). The rapid succession of the 
subjacent gestures involves the emergence of the connection between two 
tendential images. These two images could refer to the same object – as in the case 
of the functional sentence (iii) – as well as they may refer to two different objects – 
as in the case of the functional sentence (ii). 
We must add that “the actual meaning can only be determined depending on 
the situation” (id., p. 84). This means that the same sequence of vocalizations may 
refer to several different connections and several different objects: “the same 
external form of verbal association, however, may internally comprise an 
altogether different gestural connection” (id., p. 85). Once again, we are dealing 
with the polysemy of the language of the child (see above Chapter 7). Indeed, the 
understanding of the meaning and the reference of the functional sentence 
depends upon a shared attentional frame. 
As we have shown above, the core of the functional sentence is the relation that 
must be established between two syncretic words. This connection could take the 
shape of the attribution, the adjunction, the position, etc. On that basis, the 
functional sentence evokes the real connection between two given objects. But the 
functional sentence in-itself does not make explicit that connection by way of a 
verb or by way of other elements which make clear the connection. In other words, 
there are no verbal isolated elements which allow us to individuate the function of 
connection. But the function of connection could be indeed fulfilling by other 
means, namely the gestural connection and the juxtaposition of vocalizations. 
With predication, one must mean the connection between a subject and an 
element (the predicate; comment) that conveys some information about the 
subject (topic). It is not easy to state that predication is already at work in the 
functional sentence because the functional sentence connects two syncretic words 
which cannot be reduced to the role of subject and predicate. In fact, the meaning 
of the two elements of the functional sentence must be considered to be the 
syncretic image of the object in a certain motion in a certain form. And the two 
meanings are deeply interdependent, and it is not easy to clearly differentiate 
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them. 
One cannot dismiss, however, that Thảo set out that the connection between 
two syncretic words shows the ability to define one of the two words by way the 
other in a better way. In the case of attribution, the meaning of the second word 
allows determining the topic of the functional sentence (the this here) in a better 
way. More suitable would be the choice to introduce here the distinction between 
thème/propos, topic/comment: the topic is what is being talked about and the 
comment is what is being said about the topic. In the case of the attribution, the 
topic is simply repeated two times so as to define the topic of the comment 
contained in the first word in a better way. 
In the case of adjunction, the juxtaposition of two syncretic words evokes the 
relation between two different objects. This juxtaposition could evoke several 
different forms of relation (spatial, temporal, intentional, etc.). In any case, the 
motion of the first object concerns in some way the second object. From a 
syntactical standpoint, the first word fulfils the role of both the subject and the 
verb while the second one could be reckoned to be the complement (from the Latin 
complementum, from complēre, to fill, to complete). Thảo talked about adjunction 
exactly because the second word completes the scene evoked by the first word by 
adding some elements. In this case, the complement does not help to complete the 
meaning of a predicate (as the so-called argument). It neither serves to assign a 
property to a subject or object (as the predication does). What the adjunction does 
is to evoke a certain physical or psychical relation between two objects and 
nothing more. As a matter of fact, it is a mere juxtaposition of signs that offer a 
complete representation of a given state of affairs. 
 
3.3. The Functional Sentence in the Phylogeny 
 
Thảo insisted that the functional sentence appeared at the end of the second 
phase of prehominid evolution (Kafuan). From the point of view of the ontogeny, 
this phase corresponds to the development of the child at about 17-20 months. 
More interesting is Thảo’s description of the emergence of the functional sentence 
as a response to some practical needs. We have already had occasion to explain 
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how, according to Thảo, the development of material activities determines the 
qualitative shift in language and cognition (see above Chapter 10). In short, under 
the pressure of new practical needs, the old forms of language are modified. Thảo 
stated that some contradictions arose between new social relations and the older 
means of communication during the Kafuan era. Those contradictions appeared as 
a misunderstanding, “a quid pro quo, in which is reflected the objective 
contradiction between the new relations appearing in collective work, because of 
the development of the instrumental forces and the form of language previously 
acquired” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 95; see above Chapter 7). 
 In the case of functional sentences, new needs arose during collective hunting – 
and especially the fact that our ancestors were divided into several subgroups. 
These new needs had been the condition for having the emergence of a new form 
of linguistic skills. Thus, Thảo stated that 
 
the progress brought about in collective work because of the invention of the 
elaborated instrument led to a new development in the division of tasks, and from 
this came the reinforcement of the vanguard’s role and undoubtedly, on occasion, 
the more or less temporary appearance of particular teams in the group at work. 
The framework of communication was therefore considerably broadened and this 
entailed, in its turn, new progress in the structure of language. (id., p. 92) 
 
In effect, according to Thảo, “the syncretic word used in isolation is 
comprehensible only as a function of the immediate situation” (id., p. 93). The same 
applies to developed indicative sign. In these two cases, “communication takes 
place between the subjects who work more or less at the same place, so their 
perceptive fields approximately coincide.” By contrast, the sign of representation 
better satisfied the needs of “the prehominid group as particular teams were 
formed that could function apart from each other” (ibid.). The new material 
activities entail a “more extensive field of action of the group” and “more 
complex” coordination of collective efforts. For this reason, older signs, “the 
ancient forms of language necessarily modelled themselves on the new conditions 
of collective work, and there resulted the creation of new forms more adapted to 
the total situation” (ibid.). 
Thảo recognized, of course, that before the development of functional 
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sentences, the developed representative sign or the corresponding syncretic word 
were employed to evoke the representation of the absent thing (see Chapter 10) 
but he emphasised that the simple sign of representation became equivocal. “In fact, 
the various teams no longer faced the same immediate situation, even when they 
were close enough to one another to communicate by gesture and voice” (Thảo 
[1973] 1984: 93). Crucially, the subject was forced to repeat the communication in 
another form: the first sign refers to the movement and the second one to the object. 
From the point of view of the speaker [le locuteur], “the meaning [of the two signs] 
was the same.” But “a repetition was needed to make things more precise” (ibid.) 
because “for the neighbouring team, the situation appears altogether different” (id. 
94). It follows, that “for the receiver,” the two signs had “two different meanings.” 
That is was the most elementary form of the functional sentence, namely the 
juxtaposition of two signs which make the utterance more precise. 
Thảo seems to be convinced that, from the point of view of the addresser, the 
juxtaposition of two signs was seen as a redundancy [redondance] while the 
addressee understood the two signs “not as a redundancy but as an association.” 
The juxtaposition/association of a developed representative signs underlined the 
identity of the relation between the two “things” which the two signs that 
composed that association/juxtaposition refer to: MTF-TFM. In other words, the 
association/juxtaposition involves two images that refer to the same object. The 
redundancy is thus required to make the meaning more precise and compensate 
for the absence of the object within the perceptive field. 
The semiotic structure of the functional sentence could also show different 
sequences: for instance, a developed indicative sign and a developed representative 
sign, or vice versa, or two developed indicative signs, etc. (cf. id, p. 90-91). In this 
connection, we should make special points of the fact that at least one of the signs 
employed in the functional sentence must be vocalised. According to Thảoʼs 
written conventions, in this case, the sign should be written in brackets: for 
instance, “(MTF)”. It means that at least one of the signs which compose the 
functional sentence must be a syncretic word, i.e. a vocalization. We will have to 
talk about that again. 
Thảo insisted that the role of the addressee is the most important condition for 
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having the emergence of the functional sentence. As we have shown above in 
Chapter 5, the addressee had already been invoked by Thảo to explain the 
development of consciousness: the addressee had to merely record the use of signs 
and employ them in the flow of inner language. In the case of the functional 
sentence, instead, the addressee plays an active role since she is the inventor of 
that kind of signs. 
Let imagine that our ancestors split into two teams. According to Thảo, “the 
functional sentence could thus not originate in the first team, which did not have to go 
beyond the horizon of the present perception” (id., p. 97). Instead, “it became necessary 
only for the second team which, not having observed the event with its own eyes, 
is obliged to ʻkeep itself informed of the situation’, which is possible only by the 
explicit representation of a relation clearly posited between a motion and an object or 
between two objects” (ibid.). Thus, the members of the second team indicated “to 
one another and each to himself the objective relation in question” (id., p. 98) while 
they had “nothing to communicate to the hunters who have preceded them” 
(ibid.). 
In this way, the second team is the inventor of the functional sentence: 
 
the hunters of the second team construct the functional sentence, by indicating to 
one another and each to himself the objective relation in question, which defines 
the very structure of cognizance. We are still dealing here, of course, with just a 
sporadic consciousness. But as the new form of social labour develops, the use of the 
functional sentence is generalized, so that it ends by being integrated with enduring 
image of the group that each keeps within himself. And individual cognizance results 
from this and becomes constantly available to each and every subject. (ibid.) 
 
We cannot deny the fact that – although Thảo did not highlight this point – the 
subgroups already share a common frame of reference without which the 
communication still remains equivocal or even fails. And the shared frame of 
reference is nothing but the collective activity and previous collective habits. 
To Thảo, the functional sentence entails two different kinds of experience on 
the basis of the social role of both interlocutors. If one follows Thảo’s hypothesis, 
one could be able to highlight some interesting consequences of his assumptions. 
We have already had occasion to describe the way the functional sentence was 
perceived by the addresser as a redundant repetition of the same meaning. On the 
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other hand, the addressee understood the juxtaposition of two signs “not as a 
redundancy but as an association.” In the case of the addresser, the situation the 
functional sentence refers to is clear and the reference is still present within the 
perceptive field. By contrast, the addressee did not observe the event with his/her 
own eyes and “is obliged to ʻkeep itself informed of the situation’” (id, p. 97). For 
this reason, the functional sentence must fulfil the function of making explicit the 
representation of the relation between a movement and an object or between two 
objects. 
 Before the emergence of the association/juxtaposition of two signs of 
representation, Thảo wrote, the most elementary form of the functional sentence 
must be regarded as an association/juxtaposition of a developed indicative sign 
and a developed representative vocal sign. The sign of representation is the 
indispensable core of the functional sentence since it is addressed by the first 
subgroup to another team “which finds, or found, itself, far from the field of action 
of the first” (ibid.). In other words, “from the beginning the functional sentence 
implied the representative form: it enabled the teams who find or found 
themselves distant from the field of present action, to represent to themselves the 
objective relation which escapes the field of presence of their sense perceptions” 
(id., p. 98). 
The sign of representation was accompanied by the developed indicative sign 
from the outset. In effect, the developed indicative sign was meant to reinforce the 
efficacy of the sign of representation by way of the indicative gesture of the hand. 
In this vein, the sign of representation refers to something absent and the 
developed indicative sign fulfils the function of presentative indication. The 
addresser could communicate the addressee the relation between an absent object 
and a present one in so far as the addressee did not perceive that relationship 
because he/she was at a distance from the perceptive field of the addresser. The 
developed indicative sign fulfils the function of real gestural connection which 
“projects a relation of location between the two signified images and represents 
thereby the real spatial relation between the two objects aimed at” (id., p. 97). 
At the same time, both, the sign of representation and the developed indicative 
sign, were accompanied by vocalizations. To illustrate, the addressee sees and 
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hears the addresser who utters two syncretic words and performs an indicative 
gesture which connects the meaning of the two syncretic words. In such a context, 
the addressee has nothing to communicate to the addresser which has not 
transcended the limit of actual perception yet. Instead, the addressee has to ask for 
confirmation and to inform the other members of the second team. In this way, the 
addressee “repeats both words as he has just heard them, and he himself stretches 
his hand in the same direction as that of the speaker” (id., p. 97). Again, we can 
observe that in Thảoʼs view the origin of the functional sentence may not be 
divorced from the concrete forms of social intercourse. 
Faced with this issue, Thảo claimed that “the functional sentence […] constitutes a 
decisive step in the progress of knowledge” (id., p. 95). As a matter of fact, the 
gestures are limited to the immediate perceptive field. Instead, the vocalization 
conditions the transition to abstract thinking because it is more independent of the 
actual perceptive field than the indicative gesture. Thảo said that the primacy of 
vocalizations cannot be reduced to a simple change in the signifier, but they also 
involve a change of meaning and cognition. 
Vocalizations also mark the transition towards verbal language: “the verbal 
synthesis will play an ever increasing role” (ibid.). Not for nothing reinforces the 
vocalization the gestural moment in communication. Slowly the verbal moment 
takes the place of the gestural one to establish the relation between language and 
reality. As a consequence, the voice becomes the support of inner language, i.e. the 
linguistic activity that indicates the external world to the self. To minimise 
confusion, the only point we need to note for now is that Thảo argued that the 
voice fulfils the function of mediation. In his words: “it is only by its constant 
mediation [of the voice] that the subject is able to extend and indefinitely 
complicate his gesture, in order to indicate the external world to himself in a more 
varied and precise projected image” (ibid.). 
Unfortunately, Thảo did not explicitly say how the vocalization takes 
precedence over gestures. He simply described a slow process that leads from the 
developed indicative sign through the sign of representation to the functional 
sentence: “As soon as it is a matter of connecting two developed indications, the 
gesture can operate only by being supported by a verbal association or the 
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functional sentence.” But Thảo insisted, on several occasions, that the gestural 
moment is still at work to determine the meaning of the functional sentence, even 
if it is only outlined or sketched-out. 
 
4.1. The Developed Functional Sentence 
 
Let us move on to more sophisticated forms of the functional sentence. As we 
have also made clear, the functional sentence allows the representation of the 
“objective relation” between two events (things, movements, etc.) “which escapes 
the field of presence” of the sense perceptions (cf. Thảo [1973] 1984: 98). Now we 
can go so far as to say that functional sentence cannot satisfy all the needs of our 
ancestors. In point the fact, the functional sentence does not allow representing 
the entire absent situation: “the information obtained in this way, however, still 
concerns only an invisible relation, in other words an invisible aspect of the 
present situation.” By contrast, the representation of the totally absent situation 
arose by virtue of the developed functional sentence (phrase fonctionelle développée). 
Given that Homo habilis was able to produce an instrument because of the 
representation of the totally absent biological situation, Thảo reasoned that Homo 
habilis already employed developed functional sentences. In the same way, the 
developed functional sentence appears in the child at about 19-21 months. 
The most elementary form of the developed functional sentence is the 
enumeration (énumération): “an enumeration by accumulation of associations” (id., 
p. 99). In this case, the ellipsis could play a very relevant role. A more sophisticated 
form is the correlation (corrélation): it “is able to express an absent situation since it 
contains two extremes designating two objects, one of which functions as the 
subject of the situation and the other as its object and a middle term indicating the 
reciprocal dynamic, relation between them” (id., p. 103). In the next two 
paragraphs, the two types of the developed functional sentence will be described in 
great detail. 
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4.2. Type I: Enumeration 
 
The enumeration is a sequence of vocalizations. It corresponds to the structure 
of the functional sentence, but it repeats that structure indefinitely. A distinction 
between the two kinds of vocalization is now required. The first vocalization means 
an action, while the others mean the objects. The word taken in the sense of action 
could be repeated before or after each other word of the sequence. Thảo made the 
following example: a child says Lena proua (to walk), Tossa proua, kiska (the cat) proua 
(cf. Thảo [1973] 1984: 99; the examples are illustrated by Gvosdev in his Problèmes 
dans l’études du langage cez l’enfant / Voprosy izucheniia detskoi rechi / Problems in the 
Study of Child Language, Moscow, 1961). The enumeration could also assume a more 
sophisticated form: the word taken in the sense of action might come “in the first 
place, and afterwards is in general only implicitly repeated” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 
101). The example illustrated by Thảo is Look mummy, daddy, grandma, uncle G., etc. 
(we can read the same example in Piaget 1945: 236-237). 
The second form of the enumeration is more interesting because Thảo 
introduced the notion of ellipsis, i.e. the omission of words that are nevertheless 
understood in the context of the remaining elements. The word taken in the sense 
of action “is uttered only once” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 100). What is more, the word 
taken in the sense of action “functions as just one syncretic word [...] but it is 
obviously implied” every time other words are uttered. Symptomatically, it may 
happen that “the word taken in the sense of action is completely implied from the 
beginning” (id., p. 101). The ellipsis involves a relevant fact: the meaning of the 
utterance depends upon some absent elements and thus the signifier is not enough 
to determine the signified. 
Thảo took the mechanism of ellipsis for granted and he did not explain the 
cognitive and linguistic conditions of that phenomenon. In effect, the ellipsis 
presupposes the fact that the linguistic utterance lacks some elements. So the 
utterance has a standard form whose elements could be omitted. And this omission 
does not preclude the possibility of understanding. Thảo assumed that the subject 
has already at a disposal the (more or less implicit) practical knowledge of the 
structure of the utterance and then the subject could simplify the utterance and 
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omits some elements of it. These elements are absent even if they continue to be 
implicitly at work to determine the meaning of the utterance. So the addresser and 
the addressee have to complete the utterance by way of their knowledge of the 
standard and complete structure of the utterance. That knowledge could be better 
regarded as the knowledge of the procedure that ties two elements to produce a 
simple functional sentence. That procedure could also be repeated to produce a 
sequence of functional sentences. In this way, the repetitive use of the same 
procedure entails the production of the enumerative functional sentence. 
One can then highlight three points. First, the repetition of the same procedure 
involves the emergence of a new linguistic structure. Second, the enumerative 
sentence is a sequence of parts which have been produced by way of the same 
procedure. The fact that the same procedure is used to produce each part of the 
sequence could involve the omission of some elements without compromising the 
meaning. Lastly, it should be stressed that Thảo’s theory of enumerative sentence 
did not define the sequence as recursion, namely a sequence whose elements are 
related to the previous elements in a straightforward way. More exactly, the 
enumerative sentence is a list of functional sentences and thus it is the result of the 
iteration of the same procedure. In contradistinction to the recursion, the iteration 
is the act of repeating a process which is not based on the result of previous 
operations. 
 
4.3. Type II: Correlation 
 
The correlation provides a clearer representation of the absent situation than 
the enumeration. Given a sequence of signs, the correlation is the juxtaposition of 
two small sentences which have a middle term in common: (T1F1M)–MT1F + MT2F–
(T2F2M). The middle term indicates the reciprocal dynamic relationship between 
the two objects meant by the small sentences. But caution must be paid because 
the middle term should not be understood to be a precursor of a verb. In any case, 
the formula of correlation is the result of a synthesis allowed by the middle term. 
To illustrate: 
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(T1F1M)–MT1F + MT2F–(T2F2M) →   (T1F1M)–MT1:2F–(T2F2M). 
 
The resulting formula shows two extremes which are two signs that means two 
different objects (T1F1 and T2F2). And the middle term means an action (M) that is 
common to both of those objects (T1:2): the middle term is the place where the two 
simple sentences merge. In this way, the middle term establishes a relationship or 
connection between two sentences and thus between two things in motion. 
We repeat: Attention must be paid to the fact that the middle term is not a verb. 
It is rather a sign that represents a motion which concerns both, the subject and 
the object. There is no matter of predication but rather the middle term connects 
two sentences to produce a compound sentence. The middle term is thus a logical 
connective that fulfils the function of coordinating conjunction which links together 
two or more elements. In this way, the correlative sentence could represent a 
situation by evoking the objective relation between two independent objects in 
motion. Thảo made the following example: 
 
“the object-grasshopper ( T1GM  ) in relation to the motion which concerns it and 
which concerns the object-boy (T2BM) in the form of jumping” which we can more or 
less transcribe as follows: “the grasshopper it jumps, the boy he catches it.” (Thảo 
[1973] 1984: 103) 
 
Interestingly, the correlative sentence seems also to transcend the mechanism 
of parataxis (when phrases and clauses are placed one after another 
independently). From the point of view of meaning at least, the correlative 
sentence might recall the subordinating conjunction with sequences (and, then, while, 
after, before, etc.): the conjunction joins an independent clause and a dependent 
clause. In detail, the correlative sentence could evoke a temporal and spatial 
relationship between two objects by way of the conjunction with sequences. Thus, 
the middle term of correlative sentence may fulfil, more or less, both functions, the 
coordinating and subordinating ones. Unfortunately, Thảo did not describe in great 
detail the value of the middle term. 
To Thảo, the correlation arose in the form pantomime during the phylogeny: 
“prehominids began to imitate not just the motions of the game but also those of 
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the hunters” (id., p. 104). The pantomime is, in this case, the sequence of two 
simple imitations – the first represents the escaping game and the second one the 
hunting hunters – which involves the staging of a hunting scene. The pantomime is 
“gestural representation of the characteristic situation of the most important 
moment of the hunt” (ibid.). From the point of language, the pantomime is the 
juxtaposition of two functional sentences which involves “the creation of the 
developed functional sentence of the correlative type.” Slowly, the vocal moment 
became autonomous: “the gesture is reinforced by speech, and there results by 
juxtaposition and synthesis of two elementary sentences, the correlative functional 
sentence” (ibid.). 
Thảo described in great detail the emergence of pantomimes and the way this 
behaviour began to transcend the narrow limits of the biological need so that our 
ancestors began to imitate also when the biological needs were satisfied (for 
instance during play). In this way, the pantomime depends no more upon “the 
objective conditions of the preparation for hunting expeditions” (id., p. 105) and 
thus “the group ends up by availing itself of it [the correlative functional sentence] 
independently of the condition just mentioned, namely the biological need.” Then 
Thảo described the emergence of a sporadic consciousness of the correlative 
functional sentence and its transition towards the collective and individual 
cognizance. 
 
5.1. The Functional Name 
 
Thảo suggested that the name – i.e. the word used to denote any object of 
thought not considered in a purely individual character – arose from the ability to 
have a distinct representation of the form of motion (F). And Thảo described the 
emergence of the name during both, the phylogeny and ontogeny, as a process 
composed of two stages: the phase of the functional name and that of the typical 
name. The transition between the first stage and the second one is mediated by the 
formation of the questioning. 
The first example of that ability is given by the developed representative sign 
(19) T. FTM   (see the transcription of the errata-corrige: figures 15 and 21.) In this 
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case, the developed indicative gesture (5) FTM – which stresses on the moments of 
the form of motion and the object in motion – supports the emergence of the 
developed representative sign (19) T. FTM   “where the insistence in the first place 
bears on the moment of the form” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 107). But the developed 
representative sign (19) still depends upon the simple indication that precedes it. 
Thus, Thảo stated, the sign (19) does not yet make possible to have a distinct 
representation of the form of motion of the object as such and regardless of the 
perceptive image of the object. In other words, 
 
The moment of the form here is not yet completely abstracted, since the developed 
representative indicative sign which projects it to the first place of the formula, is 
still closely associated with the simple indication of the raw material. The 
abstraction of the form is completed when the sign in question functions 
independently, when it is able to enter into new associations. (id., p. 109) 
 
Instead, the functional sentence is eminently a verbal expression. So it offers a 
more abstract support for the emergence of the name. Specifically, the developed 
correlative functional sentence is the starting point suggested by Thảo to explain 
the emergence of the name. The correlative sentence is the association of two 
developed indicative verbal signs through a middle term. For instance:  
 
(21) (T1F1M)–FT1M + FT2M–(T2F2M) → (T1F1M)–FT1:2M–(T2F2M). 
 
The resulting formula shows two extremes which are two signs that means two 
different objects (T1F1 and T2F2). And the middle term means the form of motion (F) 
that is common to both of those objects (T1:2): the middle term establishes the 
connection between two objects and is the place where the two simple sentences 
merge. 
According to Thảo, the name arose from the ability to draw an analogy between 
the forms of two objects through the association of two sentences. That analogy 
does not concern two objects in their entirety, but rather it is based on the 
common property of both of them. And more in detail, the analogy concerns the 
form, thus the correlation between the two objects is not dynamic as in the case of 
the enumerative sentence but rather a formal one (formelle): “the relation between 
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the two extreme terms is mediated by a form and not by a motion [...] we can speak 
here of a formal correlation [corrélation]” (id., p. 111). Thảo wrote that this 
analogical relation is a comparison (comparaison): “we can immediately see that a 
comparison results from it: the two indicated objects are in fact compared to each 
other by the mediation of their common […] form” (ibid.). 
To Thảo, the middle term of the formula (21) tends to be “absorbed by one of the 
two extremes” (id., p. 112). On that basis, Thảo introduced the following formula: 
 
(22) (T1F1M. FT1-2M  )–(T2F2M): “this structure contains two, not three terms, the 
mediation performed in formula (21) by the middle term which has been 
internalized in the first, which has thereby been enriched with a new meaning” 
(id., p. 113). 
 
In this way, the property to have a certain form is represented as essentially 
connected with an object. For the same reason, the form is represented “in its 
particular realization in the indicated object T1” (id., p. 114). The new term – which 
is the syncretic representation of an object with a certain property – represents the 
model (the ʻthis here in general’ or ʻTxʼ) for all the objects that show the same 
property. 
Thảo called this sign functional name (nom fonctionel): a syncretic word that is 
employed to mean a general property and to establish comparisons between 
objects which show that property. But the functional name cannot convey the 
same meaning of a real name in so far as it involves an image that Thảo described 
as the syncretic image of both the particular object that posses the given property 
and the typical image of that property: “we do not as yet have a conceptual image 
of it [of the form] but simply a typical image [image typique], since the typical is the 
general in so far as it is realized in the particular” (ibid.). And “we are dealing here 
with the representation of a determinate form as common to an indefinite number 
of possible objects […] resulting from previous comparisons.” In other words, the 
functional name still merges the image of the particular object with the image of 
the general property and, for this reason, it fulfils the function of the name without 
conveying the meaning of the real name, namely the general concept. 
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5.2. The Typical Name 
 
When the functional name is employed alone, it must be considered to be a 
typical name (nom typique). The typical name is the name of an object with certain 
properties. It could be useful to remember that the typical name has the structure 
of the juxtaposition of a developed indicative sign and a developed representative 
sign:  
 
(24) T1F1M. FTxM  . 
 
The typical name could be employed alone without the support of other signs of 
the analogical chain. And when it is employed alone, the new sign loses the 
richness and diversity of the aspects of the objects it means. Specifically, the new 
term shows a specific phenomenon: “the semantic structure of the name is 
transformed in such a manner that its syncretic content T1M gradually becomes 
recessive, while its determinate content FTXM becomes progressively dominant” 
(Thảo [1973] 1984: 115-116). Another way of saying this is that the form of motion 
of the particular object meant by the developed indicative sign (T1FM) that 
constitutes the first part of the typical name (T1F1M. FTxM  ) loses relevance and is 
pushed into the background. 
Of course, the emergence of the typical name previously required the ability to 
establish analogies and generalization. But Thảo was not clear on this subject and 
merely tried to illustrate some examples already mentioned by Piaget (1950: 258-
259). Thảo described the formation of the typical name in accordance with a 
synthetic process. First, the typical image arises from both, the associations of 
terms and comparison of some objects. Then a term absorbs the typical image and 
slowly losses its peculiarities to become the support of the typical image.  
Interestingly, the typical image remains connected with the image of the 
particular object in so far as the recessive image “though recessive, still remains” 
(Thảo [1973] 1984: 116). The typical image “does not yet appear in itself as an 
abstract character defining a class of objects, but only in so far as it is realized 
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concretely in the indicated object.” The typical name is “the indication of the 
object as exemplary type” (id., p. 117). But, for the same reason, the typical name 
begins to designate the object-in-itself with its property without implicitly 
referring to an indefinite plurality of possible objects possessing that property. 
For this reason, one could affirm that Thảo’s theory of the typical name seems to 
describe something similar to the notion of “prototype”. The prototype is a 
member of a category that represents more than the others the fact of possessing 
the property that determines the class. This notion was already suggested by the 
Neapolitan philosopher Giambattista Vico (1688-1774) to explain the origins of 
language and thought and today is extensively employed by psychologists, 
linguists, philosophers, etc. (for instance Rosch 1973, 1975; Lakoff 1987; Langacker 
1987). The notion of prototype recalls the pair type/token. This pair was introduced 
in semiotics by Peirce and is used today by linguists, philosophers, and scientists 
(see Wetzel 2014). The type is the model while tokens are concrete particulars. The 
typical name represents objects that embody or exemplify types, and, for this 
reason, it could be regarded as a token. But the fact that the general concept and 
the general name are not available yet implies that the typical name conveys a 
meaning that is the token of a type which does not exist yet. 
 
5.3. The Questioning 
 
The transition from the functional name to the typical name is marked by the 
emergence of the questioning. The child at about 20 months begins to pose 
questions of that kind: “What is it?”. According to Thảo, what the child asks is a 
name that represents the determined form as common to several objects. 
Unfortunately, Thảo did not spend enough time to explain the emergence of the 
questioning. He simply affirmed, by way of a negative argument, that the 
questioning  
 
cannot, of course, bear on the first component T1F1M since this deals only with the 
meaning of a developed indication for which an ordinary syncretic word would 
suffice. From the very beginning of the stage under investigation, the child himself 
invents words of this kind: he does not have to ask for them. The questioning which 
appears at about 20 months can thus only aim at the second component of the 
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meaning in question FTxM. (Thảo [1973] 1984: 114) 
 
In this vein, the question is a word which means the name of the typical form of 
something. The structure of the question shows a gestural moment through which 
the child points to the object, a verbal moment, and an eye-contact with the 
interlocutor. The question could be perceived as a question because the child 
“turns his eyes toward the observer with a look which tends to move alternatively 
from the observer to the indicated object, and expresses in this way his expectation 
of that object’s name” (id., p. 114). 
The eye-movement and the vocalizations produce a new semantic structure: “in 
this alternating movement of the look accompanied by the repetition of the names, 
a new meaning is constituted” (id., p. 123). The question permits to focus the 
attention of the partners to the typical form of the object and to utter the name of 
that form. In this way, the typical form of the object begins to be distinguished 
from the particular form of the present object. And the functional name, along 
with its confused typical image (image typique confuse), becomes a typical name that 
conveys a distinct typical image (forme typique distincte). 
Thảo stated that the child needs to be part of a linguistic community before 
posing the question. The name the child asks is, in fact, a fixed name. This name is 
usually employed to name the object, but the child interprets it as a typical name 
which is still merged with the image of the particular object. So Thảo wrote that 
“the fixity of the name can be obtained only by a social agreement since it 
corresponds to the experience of a multiplicity of objects” (id., p. 115). By contrast, 
our ancestors employed already existing syncretic words as typical names. Thảo 
added that the awareness of the typical distinct form of the object – in the case of 
our ancestors, it is the form that the instrument must have – would explain the 
standardization of the lithic production of the Kafuan. Thảo’s description of the 
emergence of the typical name during the phylogeny is quite imaginative and, for 
this reason, it has not been analysed in greater detail. What must be remarked is 
the fact that, in the typical name, as Thảo set out, our ancestors fixed “the 
accumulated experience of hundreds of thousands of years of adaptive labour” (id., 
p. 127). The typical name, indeed, allows fixing the practical knowledge of the 
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production of the instrument as available experience for a social group as a whole. 
In this way, the cognitive and practical skills of our ancestors increasingly 
developed. 
 
6.1 The Functional Verb 
 
To Thảo “the sentence as sentence [la phrase comme phrase proprement dite]” 
is “based on the differentiated word” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 127). The differentiated 
word is a word that means a thing, an action, or a completion. Thus, “the 
cognizance of the typical name” inaugurated the differentiation of a vocalization 
qua substantive (substantif) with a determined meaning37. The second transition 
towards the true sentence is the emergence of the syntactical connection by way of 
a functional verb which allows producing a syntactical connection. Then the 
emergence of the true verb must be considered to be the condition for having the 
syntactical connection as a grammatical form. 
The functional verb (verbe fonctionel) appears in the child at about 21 months and 
is a syncretic word which indicates the action: “the linguistic heritage of the 
prehominid stage comprises only the substantive as differentiated word, as typical 
name, so that the word which indicates action remains syncretic” (id., p. 129). The 
semantic structure of the functional verb is based on the structure of the 
developed indicative sign (6): FMT. In effect, the developed indicative sign (6) 
stresses on both, the moment of the form of motion and the moment of motion. In 
this way, the developed indicative sign (6) could accompany a typical name and 
                                                 
37 The source of the following lines is the website of the French Centre National de 
Ressources Textuelles et Lexicales: http://www.cnrtl.fr/etymologie/substantif. The 
French term substantif has been borrowed from Latin substantivus adj. “Substantialˮ 
(attested from Tertullian [ca 150 - ca 230]; see Gaffiot 2001; cf. von Wartburg 12: 357a). It 
has been borrowed from medieval Latin nomen substantivum: “unity of the lexicon which 
can be combined with various morphemes expressing modalities and which 
corresponds semantically to a substance (beings or classes of beings, things, notions)” 
(attested since the 13th century, cf. Städtler 1988: 245). In the Port-Royal Grammar (1660), 
the substantive is opposed to the adjective: the substantive means the substance, the 
thing by itself while the adjective means the way the thing is (cf. Colombat, Fournier, 
Puech 2015: 81). To Thảo, a substantive is a lexical unit (usually a word) that designates 
a thing or a notion by itself. In other words, it is a word that holds a name function in 
the sentence. 
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then indicates the action (i.e. the form of motion and motion) that concerns the 
object the typical name refers to.  
In detail, the functional verb is employed to indicate the form of the motion the 
real subject wants to give to the object. Thảo made the following example: 
 
at about 20-21 months we can observe a new behaviour in the child which consists 
of pushing a train of four blocks with the finger, imitating the observer, or himself 
laying out a train of two or three blocks in a line by pushing them. The regulation of 
such behaviour presupposes that the subject indicates to himself the form of 
alignment as the form, as of whole, of the motion to be imparted to the blocks, since 
any impulse from outside that form would only disperse them. (id., p. 129) 
 
Once again, the behaviour of the child is regarded as expression of some 
cognitive symbolic skills. From the point of view of the phylogeny 
 
we may believe that a sign of this kind had to be constituted for the task of aligning 
stones for the construction of walls for shelters. In Lower Bed I of the Olduvai gorge, 
a circle of roughly piled stones was discovered which was probably used as a shelter 
by Homo habilis whose remains were discovered at the site MKI less than a mile away, 
at the same geological level. (id., p. 130) 
 
The functional verb indicates the form of the action which must be imparted to 
the object. Slowly our ancestors began to be aware of that sign: “cognizance of this 
sign, which operates according to the dialectic of the three moments: sporadic, 
collective and individual […] implies from now on its own level within itself as 
consciousness of the form of the motion to be imparted to the object” (id., p. 133). In any 
case, it seems that Thảo asserted that the main function of the verb is to mean an 
action. Interestingly, even if in the Vietnamese language the verb remains 
invariable and is readily associated with the movement (Động từ, “motion word”). 
But Thảo probably found this definition of the verb in Western tradition directly. 
He agreed with the traditional definition of verb suggested by Plato in his Sophist 
(262a): “that which denotes action we call a verb [ῥῆμα, rhêma]” (English trans. by 
Benjamin Jowett). 
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6.2. The Typical Verb 
 
In the transition from Homo habilis to Homo faber (sapiens), the production of 
tools led Thảo to hypothesise the emergence of the sentence as a syntagmatic 
sequence of differentiated words (typical names and typical verbs). The typical 
verb (verbe typique) is the vocalization which means the action, the form of motion 
as such. He did not describe the typical verb as a means to determine the time (as 
Aristotle’s definition of the verb in his Poetics 57a). Neither he described it as a form 
of predication (as in Port-Royal Grammar where the verb is nothing other than a 
word whose main use is to signify affirmation). The typical verb is also non-
modifiable vocalization – thus it does not evolve determinations such as diathesis, 
number, person, mood, etc. And, at first, this is no question here of sequences of 
typical names and typical verbs. The typical verb, in other words, was used alone 
and it was a name employed to name the action. 
From the point of view the individualʼs consciousness, the subject became aware 
of the own productive labour by recognising him/herself in the product of labour: 
“the form realized as property of the produced object is none other than the very form 
of the motion of productive labour, in so far as this motion has been stabilized in that 
object” (id., p. 134). Thảo seems to implicitly invoke Hegel’s famous passage of his 
Phenomenology of the Spirit devoted to the master-slave dialectic (or Lordship and 
Bondage, Herrschaft und Knechtschaft). The slave is the character that represents 
the worker. He creates products and sees himself reflected in the products he 
created. The slave realises that the world around him was created by his own 
hands. And in this way, he achieves self-consciousness to be the author of the 
products of his/her own labour. 
Homo habilis began to be aware of labour as the technical activity that 
presupposes the conscious representation of both the goal and the means. But the 
transition to the real labour of production began only with Homo sapiens. With H. 
sapiens, the dialectic of language and reality seems to be achieved. As a matter of 
fact, the typical verb allows becoming conscious of the product of labour as such. 
And, Thảo stated, the human labour is nothing other than the conscious 
reproduction of the dialectic of nature as matter in motion. In effect, Thảo wrote: 
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In reality this relation [between the motion and the object] appears in the most 
general manner in nature itself, since all human productive labour is only a conscious 
reproduction of the spontaneous process by which phenomena are themselves 
produced. 
[…] in the social practice of productive labour, where man reproduces in his own way 
things of nature by consciously repeating this fundamental process, where the 
motion concerning the object objectifies itself, in a more or less transitory way, by 
being stabilized in a configuration which is maintained for a while. (id., p. 134) 
 
The source of Thảo’s insight is the following quote of Marx (1877: 114-116; MEW 
XXIII: 192-195): 
 
Labour is, in the first place, a process in which both man and Nature participate, and 
in which man of his own accord starts, regulates, and controls the material re-
actions between himself and Nature. He opposes himself to Nature as one of her own 
forces, setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the natural forces of his 
body, in order to appropriate Nature’s productions in a form adapted to his own 
wants. By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time 
changes his own nature. He develops his slumbering powers and compels them to 
act in obedience to his sway. We are not now dealing with those primitive 
instinctive forms of labour that remind us of the mere animal. An immeasurable 
interval of time separates the state of things in which a man brings his labour-power 
to market for sale as a commodity, from that state in which human labour was still 
in its first instinctive stage. We pre-suppose labour in a form that stamps it as 
exclusively human. A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, 
and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. But what 
distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect 
raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of every 
labour-process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the 
labourer at its commencement. He not only effects a change of form in the material 
on which he works, but he also realises a purpose of his own that gives the law to his 
modus operandi, and to which he must subordinate his will. And this subordination 
is no mere momentary act. Besides the exertion of the bodily organs, the process 
demands that, during the whole operation, the workman’s will be steadily in 
consonance with his purpose. This means close attention. The less he is attracted by 
the nature of the work, and the mode in which it is carried on, and the less, 
therefore, he enjoys it as something which gives play to his bodily and mental 
powers, the closer his attention is forced to be. […] In the labour-process, therefore, 
man’s activity, with the help of the instruments of labour, effects an alteration, 
designed from the commencement, in the material worked upon. The process 
disappears in the product, the latter is a use-value, Nature’s material adapted by a 
change of form to the wants of man. Labour has incorporated itself with its subject: 
the former is materialised, the latter transformed. That which in the labourer 
appeared as movement, now appears in the product as a fixed quality without 
motion. The blacksmith forges and the product is a forging. 
 
According to Thảo, Homo sapiens is able to represent “to himself in advance a 
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rather long series of well-determined movements” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 141). This 
would be clear when on analysed the Chellean industry: 
 
While the production of the Olduvian chopper only requires from 5 to 8 cutting 
strokes on both sides of the edge, the Chellean biface requires several dozen well-
ordered strokes, and for each stroke the exact striking place, the direction and the 
force of the motion to be accomplished must be determined. (ibid.) 
 
To Thảo, it means that “the subject must have in his mind a rather complex plan 
of action” and “would be to indicate to himself a series of operations of a determine 
typical form which presupposes the differentiation of the verb as typical verb [verb 
typique].” In the transition from H. habilis to H. faber (sapiens), the production of 
tools leads to assume the emergence of the sentence as a syntagmatic sequence of 
differentiated words (typical names and typical verbs). Unfortunately, Thảo 
stopped here his description of the formation of syntax38. But, interestingly, Thảo 
finished his description of the origins of language with the verb – which means an 
action – exactly at the same point where his description of the formation of human 
language among humans in PDM begins (see above Chapter 2). 
 
6.3. The Sentence in Strict Sense 
 
According to Thảo “the sentence in strict sense [phrase proprement dite]” must be 
regarded as “the relations of subject to verb, and of verb to complement” (Thảo 
[1973] 1984: 128). And he added that “the complement” is “indistinctly direct or 
circumstantial.” To Thảo, the true sentence is distinguished from functional 
sentence only in regard to the syntactical form. In fact, to him, the functional 
sentence fulfils the same function of the real sentence. The real sentence is nothing 
other than an improvement of the functional sentence: the functional sentence 
does not imply the grammatical and explicit form of the real sentence, but it 
nevertheless performs the same function. The grammatical form, which the true 
sentence shows, is the syntactical connection. This is composed of three terms at 
                                                 
38 But it could be possible – even if Thảo has not been too clear about it – to suggest that 
the sequence typical verb-typical name sketched out the first form of syntactical 
predication: the typical verb allows determining the relation of movement to the object 
and thus the object with a certain objectified property. 
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least: subject, verb, and complements. 
In this regard, a brief remark concerning the handbooks of French grammar 
could be useful to highlight the way Thảo applied to the human language in 
general some categories employed to describe the French language. Letʼs take a 
look at the history of the notion of phrase. 
The notion of phrase appeared in French grammatical handbooks in the first 
half of the 19th century. The phrase became the cornerstone of grammar until the 
mid-20th century. At the beginning, it was confused with proposition (Chevrel 2006: 
233). Until the 18th century, the proposition was the linguistic expression of a 
logical judgement and was composed of three elements: the subject (substantive), 
the attribute, and the connection (the verb to be). Thus, the proposition was 
considered to be the linguistic expression of thought just like the Port-Royal 
Grammar (originally Grammaire générale et raisonnée, 1660) had set out. Slowly, the 
proposition began to be analysed on the basis of the grammatical functions of its 
parts (for instance by the abbé Girard (1677-1748): cf. Chevrel 2006: 244). In this 
way, the logical analysis of proposition (subject, verb, and attribute) parallelled and 
was aligned with the grammatical analysis of the parts of the proposition (Chevrel 
2006: 247-252; see for instance Urbain Domergue (1745–1810): cf. Chevrel 2006: 
227). And, at the end of the 18th century, the notion of phrase, thus, coincided with 
the proposition analysed from the grammatical point of view. But the phrase 
transcended the narrow limit of logic and became a grammatical notion. 
In the second half of the 19th century, the notion of phrase became a synonym 
of the group of words between two points composed of a simple proposition, at 
least (Chervel 1977: 208). At this juncture, we donʼt care about the fact that there 
was a certain confusion between phrase and proposition (Marchello-Nizia 1979: 38-
39). A proposition is composed of a subject, a verb, and complements. The notion of 
complement (complément) was invented by César C. Dumarsais (1676–1756) and 
improved by Nicolas Beauzée (1717–1789; cf. Chevrel 2006: 231; see also Chevalier 
2006). As has been seen, Thảo’s invoked the direct complement and circumstantial 
one. The stabilization of the complément circostanciel in French grammars took place 
during the 1850s while the stabilization of the complément d’objet direct in the 1920s 
(cf. Chevrel 1977: 184). 
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The French 19th- and 20th-century grammars described the phrase as released 
from any kind of logical implication and independent of any theories of knowledge. 
Instead, to Thảo, the syntax of true sentence extensively depends upon semantic. 
All the true sentence and the syntactical connection do is nothing but to illustrate 
the semantic connection between concepts or between things in a better way. So 
the function of the parts of the true sentence is not reduced to grammatical 
appropriateness but it also implies the relation with extra-linguistic factors. 
After having described the outlines of Thảoʼs theory of the formation of syntax, 
we are now able to recapitulate the main topics of the present chapter in order to 
understand the real underlying reasons for Thảoʼs approach to language evolution. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 
It should be noted that the title of the third chapters of the first part of ILC 
devoted to the sentence formation was entitled The alveoulus of the dialectic of 
knowledge. And it could be useful to remember that the central claim of Thảoʼs 
hypothesis is the description of the emergence of the most abstract contents of 
consciousness. The description of language origins allows Thảo to describe the 
forms through which consciousness and abstract thinking arises from the simplest 
kind of knowledge to the more sophisticated ones. As a matter of fact, as we have 
already noticed in the previous chapter, the language of real life is a social 
behaviour and evolved to represent mind-independent things in a better way. In 
connection with this, the formation of syntax marks a relevant stage in the 
formation of human knowledge. 
To Thảo “knowledge of the object consists only in the knowledge of its motion” 
(id., p. 135). Natural phenomena are the results of the dialectic of nature which 
must be regarded as the spontaneous process by which every object is constituted 
by a “multitude of particles in motion” (id., p. 134). Knowing the object means 
knowing its form of “equilibrium as motion provisionally stationary” at the present 
instant, i.e. their transitory configuration. Spontaneous natural processes must 
then be regarded as the dialectic by which “the motion concerning the object 
objectifies itself, in a more or less transitory way, by being stabilized in a 
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configuration which is maintained for a while” (ibid.).  
We must add that, for Thảo, the praxis is the criterion of knowledge. To explain, 
we can read in Marxʼs first thesis on Feuerbach that “the chief defect of all hitherto 
existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that the thing, reality, 
sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not 
as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively” (MEW III: 5; Eng. trans. by W. 
Lough from Marx & Engels 1969: I, 13). After Marx, Leninʼs second chapter of the 
third part of his Materialism and Empiriocriticism was devoted to the criterion of 
practice. To him, knowing must be considered to be the ability to conscious 
reproduce natural spontaneous phenomena. It is the only way we can confirm our 
hypotheses on the laws of natural phenomena. 
In a similar way, to Thảo, human production consciously reproduces “the 
spontaneous process by which natural phenomena are themselves produced” 
(Thảo [1973] 1984: 134). Nature is nothing other than matter in motion – as we have 
already seen above in Chapters 5 and 6. Producing objects involves the fact that 
humans must reproduce the natural process in their praxis. At the level of human 
production of objects, the produced object shows properties that are stabilized 
forms of motion. Those properties have been applied to the object by the worker. 
Thus, in front of the produced object whose useful form “is nothing but the very 
form of the act of labour which is objectified in it” (ibid.), the worker could become 
aware of the transitory stabilized configuration of the motion applied to the object 
which must be seen as the property of the object as such. As a consequence, the 
worker becomes aware the product of his/her own labour. And thus productive 
labour allows the first form of knowledge of the dialectic of reality. As we have 
seen, typical verb better satisfies that purpose. In effect, the condition of being 
aware of the produced object has to be found in the language of real life. We repeat, 
the language of real life rises from the real conditions of existence and fulfils the 
role of mediation between the unconscious experience of reality and conscious 
lived experience. 
As we have already noticed, Thảoʼs aim was to show how “the development of 
social practice” creates  
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step by step new forms of language and consciousness, where the original 
semiotical structure is enriched each time with new linguistic gestures 
modelled on the material activity and the material relations of the workers, 
which, with the support of verbal symbolism, project a more and more 
encompassing and precise image of the external world. (ibid.) 
 
As a consequence, “the transition from the production of the instrument to the 
production of the tool involves the constitution of the sentence, which will be 
realized with the original dialectic of the productive forces and the realisations of 
production in the development of Homo habilis and his transition to Homo faber” (id., 
p. 141). At this juncture, Thảo claimed that the act of production, as a technical act, 
involves the fact that “consciousness does not limit itself to the representation of 
the purpose itself, but that it also specifies the mode of activity implied by it” (id., p. 
133). The formation of the sentence is thus the key to explaining the sophisticated 
forms of human knowledge of and action on reality because it enables us to 
produce the representation of a rather long series of well-determined movements. 
Interestingly Thảo described the formation of both the name and the verb as 
two independent processes which, at some point, come together into a fully-
developed sentence. But we must repeat that, unfortunately, Thảo did not add 
more details in connection with this point. And it seems quite clear that the 
chapter devoted to syntax formation is one of the weaker sections of the book. 
However, we should also add that the subtitle of the chapter devoted to syntax is 
Introduction to sentence formation. What Thảo suggested, then, are “some brief 
remarks.” As a matter of fact, he was aware that “the formation of the sentences as 
sentence, in the strict sense, […] raises an entirely new set of problems which 
demand to be treated within the framework of another analysis” (Thảo [1973] 1984: 
127). But this treatment of the formation of the sentence as sentence within the 
framework of another analysis lacks in Thảoʼs available published and unpublished 
writings. Maybe the reason for this is the fact that Thảo had already introduced 
two of the main elements of the sentence in a strict sense (the name and the verb) 
which allowed him to describe the emergence of the consciousness of the object as 
the product of human labour. That is the precondition for every theory of 
alienation and class struggle in modern societies. At the same time, the formation 
of both, verb and name, represents a kind of introduction to a theory of both 
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human knowledge and ideology. We have already yet had occasion to analyse in 
depth these two points in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter Twelve 
Towards a Philosophical Anthropology 
 
 
 
Il existe incontestablement une théorie de l’aliénation chez Marx, 
et il ne s’agit que l’interpréter et de la développer.  
Le problème de l’aliénation du langage est  
sans doute une des voies fécondes pour ce développement. 
(T.D. Thảo) 
 
 
 
1. Introduction. – 2. Noiré’s Theory and the Debate on Language Origins in the 
19th Century. – 3. The Noiré Tradition. – 4. Thảo’s Theory in the History of the 
Debate on Language Origins. - 5. Overcoming Physiological Determinism. – 6. 
The Pointing. – 7. Thảo’s Anthropology. – 8. Concluding Remarks on the 
Language of the Real Life and the Cultural Niche.  
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
After having analysed Thảo’s theory of language origins in detail in the previous 
chapters, we would now formulate a comprehensive view of the prfound meaning 
of philosophical efforts Thảo was engaged in. What we will seek to explore is the 
theoretical choices made by Thảo in the formulation of his theory of the origins of 
language and consciousness. To proceed far into the building of that framework, 
first, we must take into consideration the question of language origins from the 
standpoint of the long-term history of the issue and analyse different solutions 
proposed to solve that puzzle. In the course of our study, we have repeatedly 
compared Thảo’s theory with other hypotheses on the origin of language and 
consciousness for the purpose of highlighting its distinctiveness. In the present 
chapter, we will try to study Thảo’s theory from the wider point of view of the 
history of the question about the origin of language. For this purpose, we will put 
in relation Thảo’s theory with a particular theoretical tradition that we will call 
“Noiré Tradition”. The German philosopher Ludwig Noiré is obviously not the only 
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significant scholar of this tradition but surely, he is the one who has long been 
considered a reference point by many authors. We will also highlight how Thảo’s 
first theory proposed in PMD is particularly indebted to that tradition. After that, 
we will show how much the theory proposed by Thảo in his ILC goes away from 
that tradition. We will thus be able to appreciate the change of point of view put in 
place by Thảo during the 1960s. At the same time, our efforts will enable us to 
propose a synthesis of the path taken during the course of our present work. 
As we are interested in considering Thảo’s philosophical anthropology, we must 
wonder what are the criteria under which he regarded human nature. After 
studying the development of Thảo’s theory of language, then, the following 
chapter will show the reader what we think is the culmination of Thảo’s efforts. As 
we have seen, for Thảo the theory of the origins of language fits into a more 
general theory of consciousness. What kind of philosophical project seem to play a 
role in Thảo’s theory of consciousness? In short, Thảo wanted to describe two kinds 
of transition: the transition from animality to humanity and the transition from 
perception to ideality. Another way to say what we have already shown in Chapter 
1 is that, since the period of PDM, Thảo has reversed the Husserlian system and has 
replaced the phenomenological idealism with a materialist dialectical ontology and 
a new understanding of human being. The profound meaning of Thảo’s theory of 
consciousness and its genesis seems, therefore, to be a general anthropology. Did 
the same goal also orient Thảo’s theory set out in his ILC? 
But the question is not that simple. First, obviously, a theory of human nature 
has a teleological and speculative character. Second, Thao wants to highlight the 
link between humans and nature, but he must also admit that there are 
simultaneously continuity and discontinuity between them. If there is only 
continuity, we support a mechanistic materialism. If there is only discontinuity, we 
support a spiritualism or an existentialism. The basic implication of Thảo’s line of 
thinking was that humans are natural beings and matter is all that exists. The 
matter at the human level takes a particular form: the form of praxis (labour). And 
Thảo’s assumption revolves around the notion of praxis as the actual root of 
human consciousness. That to say, Thảo started from concrete existence and praxis 
to describe consciousness and thought. In a phrase, as consciousness is the 
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awareness of what exists and what is done, consciousness is embedded in praxis. 
Third, we have a paradox: we are discussing the general outline of Thảo’s 
anthropology, even if he just dealt with the dynamics preceding the emergence of 
Homo sapiens. In other words, Thảo’s genetic anthropology described the pre-
history of Homo sapiens in order to show the core of what we define human being. 
Assuming a fixed human nature or essence does not mean to support a kind of 
biological reductionism. As a matter of fact, transhistorical attributes of human 
beings are in turn the result of human history. For the same reason, Thảo’s 
anthropology avoids the culture-historical relativism. 
For our purposes in this study, it is worth noting that it seems that Thảo would 
suggest a general anthropology which serves him to demystify philosophical 
idealism (existentialism, structuralism, and phenomenology) and to identify the 
roots of alienation in past and modern societies. In this way, alienation seems to be 
the result of the failure to recognize two bonds: i) the unity of the individual and 
society; ii) the link between the individual and the creative power accumulated 
during both pre-human and human history. Convinced that in capitalist society – 
as well as in phenomenology – the life of the individual and the life of society, the 
life of the individual and its biological origin, are opposed, Thảo wanted to 
highlight the natural and social origins of each person. Consciousness is a 
particular type of activity directed toward the ideal appropriation of reality, while 
labour is the real activity of the actual appropriation or reality. Every time when 
someone interdicts the free appropriation of reality through labour and social 
relations, or philosophy neglects the primacy of real life, individuals deviate from 
the fulfilment of their aspirations. 
At this point, we would like to shift attention to the fact that, as language is the 
expression of historically specific forms of production and social relations, the 
contradictions of everyday life are expressed in language. For this reason, language 
must be seen as the arena of ideological and political struggles. To what extent we 
can find in Thảo’s theory of language a sketched theory of ideology will be 
discussed in the following lines. 
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2. Noiré’s Theory and the Debate on Language Origins in the 19th Century 
 
In the first part of PMD, Thảo sharply criticised Husserl and came to the 
conclusions that there was a growing need to tackle the problem of empirical, 
natural and historical development of consciousness. On that basis, Thảo regarded 
tool-making and other collective activities as the condition for having the human-
specific form of consciousness. More narrowly, human language may be better 
understood as a result of the specific cooperation involved in tool-making. 
Specifically, the structure of Thảo’s theory depends upon five assumptions: i) 
language arose from collective goal-oriented activities; ii) those activities were 
targeted at tool-making; iii) vocalizations accompanied and coordinated collective 
efforts; iv) those vocalizations were understandable by all of the primitive workers 
exactly because they shared the same practical goals; v) the first function of 
language was not the communication of thoughts. 
As we have already pointed out in Chapter 2, Thảo’s theory should be read 
against the background of the Noiré Tradition. According to Noiré (1877: 333), the 
necessary skills for creating language did not depend on rationality but rather on 
peculiar human sociability. This one has implied an unprecedented form of 
cooperation already at work in an early stage of human development. To Noiré, 
before speaking our ancestors already cooperated for achieving common ends (id., 
p. 331). Noiré consequently suggested that in the context of cooperative tasks, 
language arose. The corporeal efforts made in the context of those tasks 
involuntary produced vocal emissions. Slowly, these involuntary vocalizations 
became shared and recognisable by every member of the group (id., p. 332). 
Interestingly, sounds were performed during the same given actions: given sounds 
constantly corresponded to the same given action (id., p. 341) and they originally 
mean some aspects of that action. 
Noiré’s theory has had a wide influence in the debate on language origins for 
nearly a century (see D’Alonzo 2017a). But Noiré’s theory must be first studied in 
the context of the debates in which it arose. On the one side, the debate on 
language origins in the 19th century was mostly a reaction against the theory of 
the divine origin of language suggested by the French intellectual Louis-Gabriel-
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Ambroise de Bonald (1754–1840) in his Mélanges littéraires, politiques et philosophiques 
(Literary, Political and Philosophical Mixture, 1819). The French philologist Ernest 
Renan (1823–1892) and the German linguist Jakob Grimm (1785–1863) took 
promptly a position and thus revitalised a debate that has already inflamed the 
previous century (for an overview cf. Haßler & Neis 2009: 25-48). Most scholars 
agreed with the assumption that it is not necessary to invoke a transcendental 
principle for explaining language origins (for France see Auroux 1984 and Desmet 
1996; for England see Aarsleff 1983; for Germany see Knobloch 1988). Furthermore, 
Noiré’s theory fitted into the post-Darwinian debate on language origins. In The 
Descent of Man (1871), Charles Darwin had suggested that human language 
progressively appeared in pre-human multimodal communication systems 
constituted by gestures and vocal imitation. Thus, the first traces of language must 
not be seen only in the history of genus Homo but even before. 
Within this general picture, various options have been suggested during the 
19th century. In the case that language slowly arose from some cries or gestures, 
Jespersen (1922) listed four alternative theories at least: 
The so-called bow-wow theory: onomatopoeias or other imitative behaviours as 
original words. First words imitated external objects. Another form of 
imitation could be the pantomime: imitation through gestures and other 
body movements of the source that they mean. 
The so-called pooh-pooh theory suggests that first words were interjections which 
express the subjective state of mind. This was the option chosen by 
Geiger (1868 and 1872). Before him, in the fifth book of his De Rerum 
Natura (The Nature of Things, 1028-1090), the Roman poet and 
philosopher Lucretius (99 BC–c. 55 BC) suggested a typical interjection 
theory. His main source was the Greek philosopher Epicurus (341–270 
BC), who wrote that language was a vocal expression of the perceptive 
and corporeal experience of the world. Similarly, Lucretius suggested 
that the nature and the need were the reasons why the primitive 
humans put in relation sounds to things. See also Heymann or Hermann 
Steinthal’s (1823–1899) Der Ursprung der Sprache (1851, 1858, 1877, and 
1888). 
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The so-called ding-dong theory: language derived from instinctive expressions of 
a state of mind produced by an outer thing. See the Essay on the Origin of 
Language (1860) by the English theologian Frederic W. Farrar (1831–1903) 
and Dictionary of English Etymology (1859) by the English linguist and 
cousin of Darwin Hensleigh Wedgwood (1803–1891). That hypothesis was 
already formulated by Leibniz in the third book of Nouveaux essais sur 
l’entendement humain (New Essays on Human Understanding, 1765) and 
mentioned by de Brosses in his Traité de la formation mécanique des langues 
(Essay on the mechanical development of languages, 1765). This solution 
is the sound symbolism (phonesthesia, phonosemantics): vocal sounds 
carry meaning in themselves and could be used for meaning certain 
features of the things (see also Wallis 1653 and Humboldt 1836). 
Nowadays, sound symbolism is called phenomimes. One calls psychomimes 
sounds describing psychological states rather than external phenomena 
(Hasada 1998). 
The so-called yo-he-do theory: language arose from vocal expressions which 
follow some physical efforts. Noiré’s theory exactly supported this 
hypothesis. 
According to Noiré, humans alone have the ability for creating language. And 
human language is a new stage in the history of animal communication systems. 
Against Darwin, Noiré did not accept the essential relation between human 
language and pre-human communication systems. Interestingly, the Austrian 
philosopher Ernst Mach in his Die Principien der Wärmelehre (Principles of the 
Theory of Heat, 1896) reproched the way in which Noiré had argued for the 
essential and deep difference between humankind and other animals. In his letter 
to Mach (Grunewald, 14 February 1902) the Austrian philosopher Fritz Mauthner 
(1849–1923) – who took into account the impasse reached by the debate on 
language origin at the time in the second volume of his Beiträge zu einer Kritik der 
Sprache (Mauthner 19122) and then explained the reason by criticising the most 
influential theories of the epoch (see Bredeck 1989 for more elaborate treatment) – 
reckoned that Noiré had suggested a too deep split between humans and other 
animals. And the same criticism was also addressed to a Noiré’s close friend, the 
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German philologist Max Müller (1823–1900) and his Das Denken im Lichte der Sprache 
(The Thought in the Light of Language, 1888). Paradoxically, after nearly half a 
century, the Hungarian psychologist Géza Révesz (1878–1955) regarded Noiré’s 
theory as an example of a biological perspective. It would contrast with 
anthropological theories that consider language without assuming any kind of link 
with animal communication. Surely, Noiré refused the divine origin of language 
and argued for gradual origin. But he did not reduce human language to animal or 
pre-human communication systems. 
 
3. The Noiré Tradition 
 
For our purposes, it is important to note that Noiré’s theory played a relevant 
role in at least two traditions. Firstly, Noiré’s theory was largely employed by 
Marxist scholars. One need only look at the proposals of Plexanov in his 
Fundamental Problems of Marxism (1908), Bogdanov in his Philosophy of Living 
Experience: Popular Essays (1913) and Buxarin in Historical Materialism. System of 
Sociology (1921). We can also mention the case of Vološinov (1930: 52) and Marr 
(1928: 1) (for more details, see Thomas 1957: 113; Velmezova 2005, 2007; Smith 
1998: 87). The resemblance between Thảo’s theory set out his PDM and the 
opinions of those Soviet scholars concerning language origins is striking and 
remarkable. But it is still difficult to determine to what extent Thảo really known 
Russian literature on language origins (in this regard see Bertrand 2002, Brandist & 
Chown 2011; Tchougounnikov 2005; Sériot 2005). The French audience could have 
at disposal some information about Soviet linguistics. In addition to the 
testimonies of Marr’s linguistics (see Marcellesi 1978) and the impact of Marxism 
on linguistic sciences in the USSR as well as in France (see Alpatov 2003, Bert 2016), 
it is quite interesting to mention the French translations of Plexanov (1927, 1948) 
and Buxarin (1927). A good report of certain Soviet views concerning language 
origins – including Bogdanov’s theory – could also be found in the French 
translation of Reznikov (1949). It is however unlikely that Thảo’s knew the writings 
we have just mentioned. 
Nonetheless, it might be possible to establish a comparison between Thảo and 
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some Soviet scholars. They, indeed, shared the same theoretical horizon (Marxism) 
and especially they dealt with language origins in association with a more general 
investigation into the material origins of consciousness. They had to answer the 
question: How did language arise from social dimension of labour? The Soviet 
scholars had also to suggest a theory of language origins independently of Engels’ 
Dialektik der Natur (Dialectics of Nature, written between 1872 and 1882, according to 
Haldane 1940, and first published in 1925, see MEW XX: 305-670) and in particular 
the chapter devoted to The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man 
(firstly published in 1895) because a wider circulation of Engels’ text follows the 
Russian edition of Dialectics of Nature in 1925. In a similar way, Thảo did not follow 
Engels’ theory of language origins. Specifically, as we already noted in Chapter 2, 
Thảo did not agree with Engel’s theory of the primacy of communication function 
in language. Although they had different reasons, the Soviet scholars and Thảo 
adopted Noiré’s perspective on language origins. Indeed, Noiré’s theory shared 
some assumptions of Marxism and especially the role played by labour in language 
development. Notably, Noiré’s Das Werkzeug und seine Bedeutung für die 
Entwicklungsgeschichte der Menschheit (The Tool and its Meaning for the History of 
Human Evolution) was translated into Russian in 1925 (see Nuare [1880] 1925). 
However, there are several dissimilar assumptions between Noiré and Engels. To 
sum up, Engels believed that the first stage of linguistic development took place 
among our pre-human ancestors (“a particular highly-developed race of 
anthropoid apes”; MEW XX: 444, trans. in Engels 1934). On the contrary, Noiré 
seems to prefer isolating humankind and its linguistic skills from animal 
communication systems deeper than Engels. Derived from Engels’ approach was 
the assumption that the difference between human and animal communication 
systems is a difference of degree. What we must highlight now is the fact that 
Soviet scholars tried to conciliate Noiré’s theory with the theory set out by 
Bücher’s Arbeit und Rhythmus (see Chapter 2 for more elaborate treatment). Singing, 
collective labour, and corporeal movements are intimately linked among primitive 
peoples and their aim was to rhythmically coordinate collective efforts. The 
German philologist Karl Borinski (1861–1922) was one of the first philologists who 
linked Noiré’s theory with Bücher’s insight (cf. Borinski 1911: 15-16). The Danish 
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linguist Otto Jespersen (1860–1943) became the main supporter of that solution (cf. 
Jespersen 1922: 419-426). Later, Thảo implicitly would follow the same tradition. 
A second tradition in which Noiré’s theory played a relevant role and that Thảo 
more likely knew is the French psychology and psycholinguistics. In this case, 
Jespersen’s account has been adopted by the French psychologist Henri Delacroix 
(1873–1937). According to Delacroix (1924: 113-120), musical language (singing) 
arose during collective tasks and goal-oriented activities. Jespersen and Delacroix 
explicitly invoked Noiré’s and Bücher’s theories. Other linguists of the epoch, on 
the contrary, preferred only to mention Bücher. For instance, in his general 
introduction to linguistics Le langage: introduction linguistique à l’histoire (The 
Language: a linguistic introduction to history, writing in 1914 but published in 
1921), the French linguist and pupil of Antoine Meillet (1866–1936) Joseph 
Vendryes (1875–1960) admitted that primitive language probably took the shape of 
singing whose function was to set a tempo during collective tasks such as working 
or walking (cf. Vendryes 1921: 16-17). 
Other examples can be mentioned here. The French philosopher Maurice 
Pradines (1874–1958) supports Jespersen’s insight in his handbook in general 
psychology (cf. Pradines 1946: 508-511). Before him, the French psychologist André 
Ombredane (1898–1958) supported the view that rhythmical expressions were tools 
to coordinate collective efforts (cf. Ombredane 1933: 366). In the same years, the 
French psychologist Pierre Janet (1859–1947) – one of the most popular 
psychologist of the epoch – explicitly mentioned and followed Noiré’s theory. Janet 
(1936) affirms that language arose from involuntary cries (verbal gestures) 
performed under the pressure of efforts. Janet made the example of a woodcutter 
that shouts something like “han” during his work. Involuntary cries assumed a 
social function and became signals once they began to be employed during 
collective tasks. More specifically, their function was the coordination of collective 
efforts. 
Janet’s theory deeply influenced the French Jesuit Paul Foulquié (1893–1983) 
who explicitly invoked Janet in his exposition of language origins in his Précis de 
Philosophie (1936: 228; 1945: 227; 1950: 228). Now, it could be useful to remember 
that Foulquié’s handbook was the most common philosophical handbook adopted 
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by private French high schools in 1930s and 1940s. Remarkably, Foulquié described 
the way in which a group of workers that must do a collective and simultaneous 
efforts shout something like “ho hisse!” (but this example was not mentioned by 
Foulquié 1936). Thảo did the same example. That cry is simultaneously expression 
of the effort and a tool for coordinating actions. Before concluding, it could be 
relevant to note the fact that Piaget ([1924] 2002: 206) attributed that theory to 
Janet. Thus, we can admit that Thảo was more likely influenced by French 
psychological theories to follow Noiré-Bücher’s theory then by Marxist tradition. 
To sum up, as the Noiré tradition, in PDM, Thảo supported the idea that 
language arose from involuntary working interjections. As Bücher, he suggested 
that primitive vocalizations originally have a pragmatic function. They help our 
ancestors to coordinate their collective efforts. Interestingly, they were 
involuntary exactly because labour itself required them. Against Engels, Thảo 
admitted that the intention would come only later, and it would merely concern 
communication of ideas. Lastly, we must stress on the fact that, against Engels, in 
PMD, Thảo suggested that language did not arise before the emergence of our 
species, even if the symbolic function is largely shared by other mammals. 
 
4. Thảo’s Theory in the History of the Debate on Language Origins 
 
After having dealt with the Noiré tradition, it would be interesting to shed light 
on the theoretical value of Thảo’s theory. What are the alternative options Thảo’s 
theory was in contrast to? What kinds of assumptions did Thảo implicitly or 
explicitly argue for? To answer these questions, it could be useful to analyse the 
theoretical choices made by Thảo in his PDM against the background of the age-old 
debate on language origins. Before proceding far into the building of the 
framework, attention must be paid to the fact that this paragraph serves the 
description of Thảo’s theory. Consequently, its aim is eminently explicative of 
Thảo’s theory, and it cannot be used indifferently to describe whatever hypothesis 
on language origins. In this case, Auroux (1989) gives a good description of some 
possible ways to tackle the issue from a more general point of view (for more detail 
see Gessinger & von Rahden 1989 and Borst 1957-1963). The history of the debate 
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on language origins is indeed full of examples of scholars whose theories are 
incompatible with the dichotomies we are suggesting in this paragraph. 
Language could have human or divine origins. One of the points of departure of 
the theory of the divine origins of language(s) is the Bible (see Albertz 1989). 
However, the storyteller of the Old Testament does not explicitly address the issue 
and merely said that after the creation of the first man God talks with him (Gen. 2, 
16-17). For centuries, commentators had disagreed about the language used by God 
to talk with Adam. The same problem occurs in the passage when Adam names 
things (Gen 2, 19-23). Is it the same language of God’s? What does it remain of the 
first language ever spoken? Does that language reveal the real nature of things? 
The Old Testament also described two different and incompatible linguistic events 
concerning that language. On the one side, after the deluge, the descendant of 
Noah spoke their own languages (Gen 10, 5, 20, 31). On the other side, the 
storyteller tells that different languages arose only after the Tower of Babel (Gen. 
11, 1). In any case, the question concerns language faculty as well as human 
languages. For instance, Dante (1265–1321) suggested that God gave Adam language 
faculty (cf. De Vulgari Eloquentia I, IV, 4) but languages are human products (cf. 
Divine Comedy, Paradise XXVI, 124-138). Many centuries later, Thomas Hobbes 
(1588–1679) would argue that God taught Adam how naming things; after that, 
Adam goes ahead on his own (cf. Hobbes 1651: I, 4). 
After Johann Peter Süßmilch (1707–1767), the followers of the theory of the 
divine origins of language usually offered a more rational explanation to support 
their theory (see Süßmilch 1756). They affirmed that it is impossible that primitive 
humans made a pact regarding words-meaning because they needed to already 
have a shared language. On the other hand, so as to have a language, it is necessary 
to already have the rational ability to produce it. On that basis, reasoning 
presupposes language and language presupposes reason. As we have seen in 
Chapters 3-6, in ILC, Thảo dealt with the same conundrum and admitted the 
primacy of language over consciousness. In PDM, he had suggested that higher 
mental functions largely depend upon the internalisation of the meaning of 
practical activities by way of sounds and the inhibition of actions. Thus, Thảo’s 
investigation of consciousness sought to provide insights into the nature of 
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language, given the primacy of social life. In a similar way, Noiré (1877: 333) 
admitted that the required feature for creating language did not depend on 
rationality but rather on the peculiar human sociability. This one has implied an 
unprecedented form of cooperation already at a primitive stage of human 
development. Before speaking, our ancestors already cooperated for achieving 
shared goals (id., p. 331). 
The main point of the conundrum we have just mentioned regards the 
opportunity to admit a stage in human history which precedes the emergence of 
language. For instance, Renan (1848), Humboldt (1820) and Müller (1861) sharply 
reproched the theory of language origins but simultaneously disagreed with the 
possibility that language arose gradually. In their mind, in fact, humankind and 
language faculty are inseparable. If humankind is a rational species and language is 
the instrument of reasoning, it is possible to admit neither that language preceded 
rational thought nor that rational thought preceded language. Against that, from 
an evolutionary point of view, human language is regarded as rooted in animal 
communication systems. To mention the most significant example, Darwin (1871) 
suggests the continuity between animal communication systems and human 
language. In a similar way, in PDM, Thảo suggested that the symbolic function is 
largely shared by other mammals than humans. But language did not arise before 
the emergence of our species. His opinion radically changed in ILC when he 
admitted that our pre-human ancestors already had at their disposal a kind of 
language of real life. 
One of the most important problems that arise in the debate on the origins of 
language concerns the human predisposition to language. As we have seen, in PDM, 
Thảo suggested that cooperation is the main factor that determines the emergence 
of human language. In ILC, however, he argued that some bodily predispositions, 
and especially bipedalism, along with the cooperation, of course, facilitated the 
emergence of language. In any case, Thảo did not suppose the existence of the 
human soul – as a metaphysical entity which is ontologically different from the 
body – for explaining human language. Against that, René Descartes (1596–1650) 
believed that humans are not only made up of matter (rex extensa). They also have a 
mind (res cogitans) that enables them to think and speak (see Descartes 1637). Not 
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only the rationalist tradition but also empiricism and sensualism suggested a form 
of dualism. Although John Locke (1632–1704) assumed that our knowledge arises 
from the corporeal experience, he did not dismiss the role of the mind as the active 
faculty which is ontologically different from the body and enables us to associate 
experiences (one cannot forget that the circulation of Locke’s philosophy outside 
Great Britain was marked by the materialistic interpretation of Coste; see Poggi 
2007 and Thomson 2007). Even if he admitted a certain similarity between humans 
and animals (cf. Condillac 1798: § 107), Étienne Bonnot de Condillac (1715–1780) – 
probably for just a formal religious adhesion to the official doctrine – admits the 
existence of human soul (cf. id., § 6, p. 21 and § 8, p. 23). Thảo’s materialist 
anthropology set out in his ILC seems to be closer to Johann Gottfried Herder’s 
(1744–1803) materialistic account. That is, Herder (1772, 1778, 1786, and 1799) 
esteemed that language arose from some peculiar anatomical and physiological 
features of humankind (see Tani 2000 and D’Alonzo 2015). 
One of the main puzzles a theory of language origins must resolve concerns how 
fundamental signs could be shared by a given linguistic group. How can 
fundamental signs be understandable for everybody if the speakers have never 
spoken before? To this question, one may reply in two ways. One the one hand, our 
ancestors shared some cognitive or bodily predispositions before sharing 
fundamental signs. Those predispositions could be inborn or acquired. For 
instance, Epicurus wrote that climatic conditions influence how a given ethnic 
group perceive and have emotions. Consequently, every given ethnic group 
performed sounds in a peculiar way. At the same time, he admitted the existence of 
some corporeal predispositions that everybody necessary share with the others 
(Letter to Herodotus, Diogenes Laërtius. Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, X, 
75). More radically, Herder (1786, 269) acknowledged two principles: i) a universal 
inborn instinct to imitate that humans share with other animals, ii) and the 
human-specific com-passion (Mitgefühl). Based on human anatomy, com-passion 
and imitation are two non-language-specific abilities that enable us to understand 
the others. Similarly, Condillac (1798: 262-263) admitted the existence of a mimetic 
and empathic mechanism that supported the emergence of some fundamental 
signs. Noiré (1877: 333) introduced the notion of Gemeingefühl (a common and pre-
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linguistic sentiment of shared goals and intentions). Gemeingefühl should pave the 
way for understanding the intentions of the others. Consequently, Noiré 
highlighted how Gemeingefühl is a specific biological feature of Homo sapiens. 
Generally, to Thảo the primacy of social activities seems to be the principle that 
explains the mutual understanding, along with the objective meaning of 
fundamental signs. But we cannot forget that in PDM he suggested that mutual 
understanding in its most fundamental form also depends upon the understanding 
of the own reactions as a response to the behaviour of the others (see Chapter 2). In 
any case, he seems not to assume the existence of an inborn ability. 
Sometimes natural prerequisites are not enough to explain the mutual 
understanding of fundamental signs. Thus, some scholars introduced the role of 
the context as the key condition for describing that phenomenon. For instance, 
Lucretius wrote that the needs arising in contingent situations led our ancestors to 
name things and to understand each other (cf. De rerum natura, V, 1028-1029). As we 
have already seen, Noiré argued for the priority of Collectivwesen (social being) 
respect to individuals (cf. 1877: 334). And no wonder, then, if Noiré (1877: 323) 
mentioned Feuerbach’s Philosophie der Zukunft (cf. Feuerbach 1843: 152). For this 
reason, he suggested that social relationships are the essential condition for having 
language. Along this line, according to Engels, explained the origin of language 
from and in the process of labour. In this way, labour and social life brought out the 
necessity to communicate with others. Quite different in the form but along the 
same line, Bücher (1899) affirmed that, among primitive communities, rhythmical 
corporeal movements, singing, and other vocalizations are performed to 
coordinate collective activities. Thảo too acknowledged the role played by labour 
in the evolution of human language. However, according to PDM, the initial roots 
of words were sounds that spontaneously burst out, connected with human 
activities and automatically resulted from activities that were carried out together, 
collectively. No communicative intention precedes the emergence of language. 
However, practical needs pave the way for the emergence of language and the 
social milieu must be regarded as the necessary environment in which language 
arose. 
The last remark concerning Thảo’s theory is about polygenism: human 
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languages cannot stem from a common mother tongue. As a matter of fact, in PDM, 
Thảo did not merely consider original linguistic material as a natural product that 
could be the same for all. Vocalizations changes in time and space. Remarkably, in 
ILC, he radically changed his own views and suggested the existence of some 
fundamental signs which are naturally shared by humans because they are rooted 
in human evolution and history, and in our corporeal predispositions as well. 
 
5. Overcoming Physiological Determinism 
 
In the previous paragraph, we have briefly mentioned the question of the 
interactions between the organism and environment against the background of 
language evolution. And we have seen that for Thảo the interactions between 
organism and environment in the human world are mediated by social relations. 
This has consequences on the way Thảo thought of human language and the 
human condition. In this regard, some remarks concerning Thảo’s theory set out in 
his PDM are needed. 
Thảoʼs theory of consciousness must be regarded against the background of a 
large debate involving some French Marxist scholars of the time (see for instance 
Prenant 1935: Ch. 12). In that context, Pierre Naville played a relevant role in that, 
he argued for an objective psychology largely based on John B. Watson’s 
behaviourism. For him, behaviourism considers that the real domain of psychology 
consists only of observable movements (cf. Naville [1942] 1963: 23). As a 
consequence, for Naville, the behaviour – that is, the structure of what the body 
does and says, its reaction patterns interpreted at all levels of activity and in all the 
relationships of the organism to its environment – can explain everything that we 
are accustomed to relating to the so-called “psyche” (cf. Naville [1946] 1948: 254). 
The main element in the approach Naville suggested to the problem of 
consciousness is the fact that he denied the existence of consciousness and 
conceived of human behaviour as the result of physiological mechanisms of action 
and reaction (cf. Naville [1946] 1948: 254). “Man is a biological machine, placed 
under certain conditions [L’homme est une machine biologique, placée dans des 
conditions déterminées.]” (Naville [1942] 1963: 316). Navilleʼs psychology was a 
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kind of physicalism largely affected by the mechanicism of the 18th century. To put 
it another way, Naville seems to suggest a kind of non-dialectic materialism. 
Against that, Thảo tried to suggest a synthesis between the phenomenological 
approach to consciousness and natural sciences through the dialectical 
materialism. In detail, he suggested a dialectic of behaviour in order to explain the 
formation of consciousness in animals. So conceived, Thảo consequently explained, 
the main aim of PDM was “to provide Marxism with an analytical instrument to 
investigate the interiority of lived-experience [le vécu]” (Thảo [1974: 37] 2009: 297). 
For this reason, he had to overcome the Naville’s behaviouristic mechanicism. On 
that basis, he introduced the notion of inhibition. That notion enabled him to 
translate the Hegelian notion of “negation” in a more suitable concept to be 
accepted by scientists. This option was a kind of naturalisation of Hegelian 
dialectic. But we can wonder whether he achieved his aim. 
In PDM, consciousness arises from the physiological mechanism of inhibition. 
But inhibition is still a physiological mechanism. For this reason, Thảo admitted 
that animals have a form of consciousness. As humans share certain aspects of 
their existence with the animal condition, the physiological mechanism of 
inhibition still plays an important role in the formation of human consciousness. 
For example, the symbolic function still shares a physical and physiological origin 
with the animal dimension. Animal consciousness and signification are the results 
of the inhibition of an action; they are the products of the suspension of an actual 
relationship with the world. We can thus wonder what then is peculiar to the 
human dimension. 
About the origin of language, according to Thảo, language arises when the 
action is not carried out. We have seen that the signification arises from the 
collective action interrupted for some reason. As long as vocalizations (working 
interjections) function as pragmatic tools for coordinating collective actions, we 
are not dealing with language because those vocalizations are still meaningless. Of 
course, those vocalizations already had a social value. In this regard, it could be 
useful to distinguish working interactions from emotion interjections. Remarkably, 
some years before Thảo, Bogdanov (2015) already stressed on the deep difference 
between working interjections (social) and emotional interjections (natural). 
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The question we face at this juncture concerns the extent to which interjections 
are the result of the mechanical interactions between the language and the 
physical world (body included). Traditionally, Julien Offray de La Mettrie 
elucidated a rigorous mechanistic theory of language learning (see La Mettrie 
1748). La Mettrie’s deterministic and mechanic insight exercises an influence on 
philosophy of language during the 18th century, and especially on de Brosses 
(1765) who described the primitive language as the result of mechanical influence 
of the environment over the organism (Gossiaux 1981, Auroux 1981, Droixhe 1981, 
Nobile 2005; more sceptical are Porset 1980, Coulaud 1981, Dardano-Basso 1998). 
What Jespersen (1922) called pooh-pooh theory suggested that fundamental signs 
were interjections: they instinctively express speaker’s feelings, emotions, 
sensations. Corporeal alteration involved by an object or the surrounding 
environment produces some emotions (pain, joy, etc.) that could be accompanied 
by cries and involuntary vocal responses. In this regard, from Sanctius (1523–1601; 
cf. id., 1587: 110) to the English politician and grammarian James Harris (1709–1780; 
cf. id. 17945: 289), interjections were regarded as universal natural signs. On the 
contrary, Condillac (1775: 356) affirmed that interjections (accents) are meaningless 
without the support other gestures and the context in which they are performed. 
Thảo, working interjections are not the expression of feelings and emotions, but 
rather the tool to coordinate collective efforts. Since the beginning, they have a 
social value. 
However, those vocalizations were still meaningless. When they began to mean 
the action and then the product of that action, they cease to be tools for working 
and become instruments of knowledge and communication. “The human ancestor 
did not say what he thought because he thought it, but thought it because he said 
it, and he said it because he stopped doing it” (Thảo [1951] 1986: 169-170). Language 
is entirely the product of an interreptued action rather than being an essential part 
of it. In this passage, we can observe the distance that separates the theory 
proposed in PDM from Engels’ theory. For Engels, language is above all an 
instrument of communication because it responds to practical needs. 
In ILC, Thảo’s theory dramatically changed. In ILC, the mechanism of inhibition 
is no longer at work. And therefore, consciousness is not its product. For this 
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reason, Thảo denied any form of consciousness to animals. Consciousness arises 
from the language of real life. Furthermore, signification is neither something that 
arises from the inhibition of the action nor the product of the separation of inner 
life from actions. In so far as the inhibition doesn’t play any role in the genesis of 
consciousness, Thảo dismissed any dialectics of nature. The dialectics of inhibition 
cannot be seen as the inner structure of living beings anymore. Thảo adopted the 
point of view of historic materialism to describe the dialectical emergence of 
consciousness from language and labour among pre-human societies. Thảo 
confirmed, however, that consciousness always follows linguistic behaviour and 
must grasp significations arising independently of its will. But in ILC linguistic 
behaviour is fully formed already on a practical level. Signification is not the result 
of individual experience but already exists as a collective product outside the 
individual communicator. We have seen that consciousness arises from the 
internalization of the signification of the language of real life. And for this reason, 
the language of real life can be the mediation between the life of consciousness and 
social practice. For the same reasons, language is no longer the negation of the real 
relationship with the object. The gestural indication and its signification thus 
become the keystone that connects practical consciousness to the real world. On 
the contrary, working interactions referred only to actions and their products, but 
not to the object as it existed before and independently of the individual 
communicator. It follows the universal value of the pointing – while working 
interactions largely depend upon contingent habits. 
 
6. The Pointing 
 
We do not know exactly when Thảo began to study the gesture of indication. 
And we do not have access to the writings of Thảo that precede the publication of 
the first article published in La Pensée (1966) dedicated to the topic. Nevertheless, 
we have two testimonies. The first one is that of North Vietnamese poet and 
responsible for Vietnamese writers on behalf of the Communist Party Nguyen Dinh 
Thi (1924–2003). He dates Thảo’s growing interest in the gesture of indication in 
the mid-1960s, along with the growing criticism towards psychoanalysis and 
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structuralism. What Nguyen Dinh Thi remembers of that time is the sound of sirens 
of alert in Hanoi. Nguyen Dinh Thi is probably referring to the first phase of the 
Operation Rolling Thunder. From 2 March 1965 until 2 November 1968, the U.S. 2nd 
Air Division conducted an aerial bombardment campaign against the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam. 
Nguyen Dinh Thi’s testimony is long but deserves to be reported here: 
 
During the 1960s [...]. In our usual exchanges dealing with philosophical schools in 
vogue then in the West, he strongly opposed structuralism and companies aiming at 
inflating importance and radicalizing the Freudian theses. [...] And then one day, in 
the middle of the sirens of alert, he came to me and gave me a manuscript in French, 
proposing to me to meet again to exchange our ideas. I was reading these 
typescripts [...]. Thảo dedicated these pages to the gestures of indication in the child 
to arrive at the statement according to which when the child pointed the finger, he 
began to distinguish himself and the outside world [Durant les années soixante [...]. 
Dans nos échanges habituels, traitant des écoles philosophiques en vogue alors en 
Occident, il s’est fermement opposé au structuralisme et aux entreprises visant à 
gonfler d’importance et à radicaliser les thèses freudiennes. [...] Et puis un jour, au 
milieu des sirènes d’alerte, il vint me trouver pour me donner un manuscrit en 
français, me proposa de nous revoir pour échanger nos idées. Je lisais ces feuilles 
dactylographiées [...]. Thảo consacrait ces pages aux gestes d’indication de l’enfant 
pour arriver au constat selon lequel lorsque l’enfant montrait du doigt, il 
commençait à distinguer son moi et le monde extérieur.] (from Thao 2004: 167) 
 
The second testimony is the one Thảo’s himself we gave in 1975. In his words, 
 
I was able to overcome that obstacle in the beginning of the sixties, thanks to 
Spirkin’s analyses of this experiences with indicative gesturing in monkeys [he 
referred to The origin of consciousness, in Russian, Moscow 1960: 65-68]. This sign – the 
indicative gesture – is the simplest element of a basic semiotics, and thus marks the 
first step that opens the passage from mere sensory-motor skills to consciousness. 
(Thảo [1975: 25] 2009: 313) 
 
By this, we can say that, as he confirmed, Thảo “developed the analysis of 
indicative movement as sign by using results of the critical study of Saussurian 
semiotic concepts” (ibid.) in the early 1960s. At the same time, he read Spirkin’s 
writing and was interested in the language development in the child. As we have 
seen, the study of the language behaviour in the child served Thảo to better 
understand the formation of consciousness. And the gestural indication seems him 
to be “one and the same with the intentional orientation of the consciousness to 
the object” (ibid.). But he realized that there is a material movement that subtends 
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the pointing before every kind of conscious intentionality. Then, the notions of the 
language of real and fundamental significations enabled him to understand how 
the “material signifier […] serves as the mediation between material social practice 
and the interior of consciousness” (Thảo [1975: 26] 2009: 315). 
Thảo was not the first theorist to highlight the role of the indicative gesture in 
the phylogeny of language. About the “myth” of the deictic origin of language, 
Bühler wrote that  
 
Nowadays a modern myth about the origin of language is occasionally encountered, 
one that is explicitly or implicitly based on Brugmann’s [cf. Brugmann 1904] and 
other’s way of thinking and which picks up and elaborates the topic of deictic words 
as if they were the primal words of human language. Mute deixis, indicating with the 
outstretched arm and index finger and similar indicating gestures with the head and 
eyes are said to have preceded them. It is claimed that acoustic signs that also serve to 
demonstrate were at first used only to underscore this pointing to objects and 
events in the realm of perception, which was done mutely or accompanied by shouts 
and calls (animals, too, shout and call, but do not yet point), but that later these 
acoustic signs increasingly served as elaborations and extensions of the gestures. 
(Bühler [1934] 1990: 100-101; see also Bühler 1933: 136 ff. and 180 ff.) 
 
Thảo claimed something similar. Nonetheless, Bühler highlighted a problem 
that the theory of the deictic origin of language does not solve. How do we go from 
the deixis to the nomination? According to Bühler, in fact, the deictic terms that 
indicate the object and the denominative terms that mean properties must be 
distinguished. How does the symbolic function of sounds arise? We have seen that 
the theory that Thảo suggested in ILC argued that the symbolic function of sounds 
ultimately depends on an underlying and unconscious gestural system. As we saw 
in Chapter 10, the problem of the passage from presentation to representation, 
from the indication in context to the usable symbol in the absence of the object 
was not resolved yet. 
What was highlighted by Bühler is an age-old philosophical problem. According 
to Agamben (2006: 16), “the problem of indication […] constitutes the original 
theme of philosophy.” Accordingly, Aristotle had already separated the first essence 
(Gr. πρώτη οὺσία, Lat. substantia prima) from the second essences (Gr. δευτέραι 
οὐσίαι, Lat. substantiae secundae). The first one corresponds to both proper names 
and demonstrative pronouns, while the second ones to common nouns (cf. 
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Aristotle, Cat. 2a, 11). According to Agamben (id., p. 19-20), however, the Stoics 
were the first to recognize the autonomy of the pronoun and linked it to the 
indication (Gr. ἄρθρα δεικτικά, Lat. demonstratio, indicative articulations). Then 
Apollonius Dyscolus (fl. 2nd century AD) and Priscian (fl. AD 500) connected the 
pronoun to the sphere of the first substance. As a result, the pronoun means the 
substance without qualities (substantiam sine qualitate), while the noun means the 
substance with qualities (substantiam cum qualitate). Both indication and pronoun 
thus refer to what language must suppose, the object in itself. Remarkably, for 
Agamben (id., p. 22) “the substantia indeterminata that it [the pronoun] signifies and 
that, as such, is not in itself signifiable or definable, becomes signifiable and 
determinable through an act of ‘indication’.” And he added that “that which is 
always already demonstrated in every act of speaking […], that which is always 
already indicated in speech without being named, is, for philosophy, being” (id., p. 
25). In other words, the act of indication enables the transition from perception to 
language and opens the dimension of the transcendence (i.e., the being, the mind-
independent world). 
As pointed out by Benveniste (1966: 252-253) and Jakobson (1971: 132), the 
deictic expressions and therefore also the gesture of indication are empty signs 
because they have a variable reference. In other words, they are meaningful signs 
only if performed in a specific context. However, the gesture of indication is 
different from the verbal deixis. In fact, pointing does not depend on the linguistic 
conventions but on its physical execution (as opposed to the deictic theory 
proposed by Kaplan, Stalnaker and Perry: see Bianchi 2003: 33). Peirce himself had 
admitted the existence of some signs whose material properties were “to suggest 
and point to the mind what the signs stand for” (cf. Peirce 1909: MS 637, p. 35; from 
Parmentier 2016: 44). In other words, the gesture of indication embodies the 
“directing intention” mentioned by Kaplan (1989), that is, the speaker’s intent to 
refer to something. However, for Thảo, the gesture of indication is not a mere 
support external to the directional intention of the speaking subject since the same 
intention of the speaking subject would not exist in the absence of the gesture of 
indication. Furthermore, we are also dealing here with the same problem we had in 
Chapter 10. Does the gesture of indication presuppose or not presuppose an already 
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formed shared frame of reference? According to Thảo, pointing is already and from 
the beginning inscribed in a pragmatic context of collective actions aimed at a 
physical world. 
 
7. Thảo’s Anthropology 
 
An aspect that the theories exposed in PDM and ILC have in common is the fact 
that Thảo based its observations on the hypothesis of the recapitulation. We should 
ask to what extent the recapitulation theory retains some elements of 
mechanicism. The problems related to the “biogenetic fundamental law” are 
widely known (Gould 1977): i) the theory of recapitulation presupposes the 
inheritance of acquired characters; ii) most of the evolutionary changes are added 
at the end of the ontogeny; iii) ontogeny remains unaltered and only the adult 
stage is exposed to the influence of the surrounding environment which stimulate 
the emergence of acquired characters. In addition, ontogeny would become 
remarkably long if each phase was a simple addition to the existing ones. 
Therefore, we need a phylogenetic process which enables the length of each phase 
to be progressively shortened, removing or accelerating some stages in their 
development. As a consequence, ontogeny is a sequence of stages under the control 
of phylogeny. On that basis, phylogeny is the mechanical cause of ontogenesis and 
ontogeny does not have an independent status. 
Although the recapitulation already dominated the paleontological studies until 
the 1930s, the theory was already obsolete in the 1960s. However, there was still 
someone who was still fascinated. For example, Piaget, who had studied 
palaeontology during the highly successful period of Haeckel’s theory, argued for 
parallelism between ontogeny and phylogeny. One of the most striking aspects in 
Thao’s theory is the biological determinism. Thảo’s nativism can recall the model 
of the Leibnizian monad. The development of human language and cognition 
depends on the unfolding of an innate genetic program. Every member of the 
human species is identical regarding the faculty of language – it is therefore in the 
individual that language must be studied (cf. Lecercle 2006: 19, 21). And we can 
wonder what language has in common with life in society. We are dealing with the 
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embodiment of an ancient social linguistic relationship into an innate structure. 
Thus, we cannot exclude a certain form of fetishism as a social relationship is 
reduced to the state of a natural thing (in this case genetic and/or neuronal 
structure of the brain; cf. Lecercle 2006: 31). But attention must be paid to the fact 
that Thảo did not argued for an abstract idea of human nature which implies that 
social relationships would be its actual manifestation. By contrast, in the inborn 
structure we find the fixation of the previous material behaviour. 
Probably, biological determinism serves Thảo to defend the inevitability of some 
aspects of human behaviour. In this sense, Thảo defended and justified a general 
theory of human nature. We cannot rule out that such an anthropology could also 
have political consequences. To the extent that Thảo admits that the history of 
humanity is inherited by everybody, individuals carry within themselves the same 
human essence which cannot be entirely shaped by circumstances. Human essence 
must thus be developed and expressed freely in the course of ontogeny. Adulthood 
is instead free from biological conditioning and open to the influence of the social 
surrounding environment. When society hinders the normal development of the 
human essence, we are dealing with an authoritorian regime that makes the 
individual alienated. The individual will be alienated from his human nature, from 
the society of which they are a part – and which should not dominate them – and 
from the products of their work – which should not be a party or state property. 
Against that, the communist society will not be the one that re-educates the 
individual, but the one that conserves and develops the human essence in every 
individual. Communist society is that society in which the consciousness of the 
nature of the human species, of its history and its evolution, is realized both on the 
theoretical level and on the practical-existential level.  
If we accept this point of vierw, the question of the recapitulation is linked with 
the one of the communist society, which was at the hearth of the Marxism-
Leninism. Marxʼs Third Thesis on Feuerbach explicitly stated that 
 
The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and upbringing 
forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that it is essential to educate the 
educator himself. This doctrine must, therefore, divide society into two parts, one of 
which is superior to society. The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and 
of human activity or self-changing can be conceived and rationally understood only 
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as revolutionary practice. (MEW III: 553; trans. from Marx & Engels 1969: 13-15) 
 
Against materialist mechanicism of the 18th century, Marx believed that the 
psychic dimension cannot be seen as the passive result of external circumstances. 
This debate had already marked the Second International (1889–1916). Over the 
course of the period in question, Rosa Luxemburg (1871–1919), for instance, 
provided the basis for the idea that we must have confidence in the mass initiative 
and the democratic organization of the revolutionary process. After the WW1, Karl 
Korsch and György Lukács became the main representatives of the humanist 
Marxism. Against that, the Third International or Comintern (1919–1943) was 
dominated by Leninist views, along with the Stalinian policy. Lenin conceived the 
Communist party as the conscious vanguard of the proletariat. The Communist 
party must be directed by professionals of class-struggle. In France during the 
1960s, anti-humanism takes the form of Althusserʼs structuralist Marxist 
philosophy. According to him, there is a shift between ideology and science, 
between the unconscious representation of reality and the conscious one. Thus, 
there is a shift between political theorists and leaders and the mass. 
More interestingly, we cannot forget that the Leninist theory of conscious 
vanguard was the state ideology in Vietnam. In the 1960s, Ho Chi Minhʼs health 
declined, along with his leadership within the party. On that basis, the Party was 
dominated by the General Secretary of the Central Committee Le Duan (1907–1986). 
Le Duanʼs centralised and managerial policy was directed to improve the planned 
economy by way of the First-Five-Year Plan (1961–1965). In early 1965, US air 
strikes against North Vietnam began, along with interruptions of electric power, 
destruction of petroleum storage, manufacturing, and industrial facilities, 
disruptions of transportations routes, and so forth. As a result, North Vietnam was 
even more dependent on foreign donator countries, i.e. the Soviet Union and the 
Peopleʼs Republic of China. These factors determined the strengthening of the 
Vietnamese political elite. We cannot forget that the Vietnamese regime adopted 
the system of administrative detention already employed in the People’s Republic 
of China and called the re-education through labour (in China, the system was active 
from 1957 to 2013). Basically, this system was dominated by the idea that the 
 428 
individual could be completely re-educated through a forced labour and self-
critique under the control of the Party. 
Since the 1950s, Thảo took position against the violence of Stalinism and 
Maoism. Suffice it to remember the charges against Thảo during the process of 
March–April 1958 (see Papin 2013 for more details). The historical premise is the 
fact that, in 1956, the report of the XX Congress of the Communist Party of Soviet 
Union recognizes the errors of Stalin. This enabled a wave of reformism in 
Communist countries. In the same year, two Vietnamese journals published a series 
of articles calling for freedom and democracy. Thảo published two articles in those 
reviews. He asserted that the real freedom is the freedom that people has to 
criticise leaders. He added that the true freedom is the freedom of the individual. 
The individual is submitted to the community, but the community is built by 
individuals. This idea of freedom is destroyed by authoritarianism, bureaucracy, 
dogmatism, and the cult of personality. The discipline of the organization and the 
leading role of the Party, the vanguard of the working class is thus called into 
question. As a result, Thảo was removed from his position at the University, he is 
interrogated by the police and subjected to public sessions of self-criticism. He was 
condemned in June 1958. In the 1970s, Thảo had not changed his mind. Neglecting 
and oppressing inborn human nature conduce to alienation. Only later, in the 
1980s, Thảo resumed his political engagement against Stalinism, bureaucracy and 
authoritarianism – but this time, his engagement was merely theoretical (see Thao 
2013 for more details). 
Alienation could also influence other aspects of human existence. As the 
language of real life unconsciously reflects the contradictions of the real life, we 
can talk about alienated language. As a means of suggesting the value of Thảoʼs view 
on alienation, we should cite the following letter to Rossi-Landi: 
 
I think that the attacks that have been directed in recent years against the problem 
of alienation, particularly by Althusser and his friends, are totally unfair. [...] I 
suppose that in your books – I am waiting for the translation of them, you give the 
reply to Althusser. [Je pense que les attaques qui ont été dirigées les dernières 
années contre le problème de l’aliénation, notamment par Althusser et ses amis, 
sont tout à fait injustes. […] Je suppose que dans vos livres, dont j’attends la 
traduction, vous donnez la réplique à Althusser.] 
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I was also happy to read your pamphlet on alienated language. [...] There is 
definitely a theory of alienation in Marx, and it is only a question of interpreting it 
and developing it. The problem of alienation of language is without doubt one of the 
fertile paths for this development. [J’ai été également heureux de lire votre brochure 
sur le langage aliéné. […] Il existe incontestablement une théorie de l’aliénation chez 
Marx, et il ne s’agit que l’interpréter et de la développer. Le problème de l’aliénation 
du langage est sans doute une des voies fécondes pour ce développement.] 
(Letter to Rossi-Landi, Hanoi, 25 June 1971; see fig. 22) 
 
Exactly opposed to Thảoʼs theory, the philosophical anthropology of Arnold 
Gehlen (1904–1976) argued that the human being is a being to be disciplined. On 
that basis, at this point it may be convenient to focus on Gehlenʼs Der Mensch seine 
Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt (The Man, His Nature and Place in the World, 
1940). In the first place, we need to consider the fact that Gehlen embarked on an 
extremely ambitious project to describe the human nature, along with the 
comparison of our species with other animal species. In this vein, we can admit 
that Gehlen addressed the question of what constitutes the human nature in a way 
that is too close to Thaoʼs one, especially in PDM. In order to understand Gehlen's 
analysis, it is necessary first to see some of the assumptions on which it was based 
and then proceed to the comparison with Thảo’s insight. 
The comparison is possible because, even if there is no evidence that Thảo had 
ever read Gehlen, for both, the collective human life has played a fundamental role 
for the stabilization of the relationship with the environment. The artificially 
produced elements such as language, tools, technical knowledge, traditions, 
institutions, etc., are the tools human being employ to modify the conditions of 
existence for their own benefit. Like Thảo, to Gehlen, who cites the American 
philosopher and psychologist George Herbert Mead’s (1863–1931) Mind, Self, and 
Society (1934), the starting point of the experience we made of ourselves is the 
relationship with the other. That standpoint, which is shared by Thảo and Gehlen, 
depended upon the long tradition of the German thought. In tradition, Noiré 
played a very relevant role, and it is not surprising that Gehlen largely mentioned 
the German philosopher, along with Herder. Interestingly, Gehlen also suggested a 
theory of language origins that explicitly recall some elements of Noiré’s one (see 
Marino 2008). As Thảo’s PDM ten years after him, for Gehlen, the thinking is the 
particular human intentionality, that is, the intentionality that directs itself toward 
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the thing through sounds. Interestingly, if we compare Thảo’s theory with Gehlen’s 
one, we must admit that Thảo’s one reduced the origin of language to a single root. 
For Gehlen, instead, along with i) the “sound gestures”, that is, the working 
interactions of the Noiré tradition, language also arises ii) from emitted and self-
perceived vocal ejaculations, ii) from sounds used as symbols that the mind 
employs to recognize and group objects, iii) from the call and iv) from a kind of 
lallations. Nonetheless, as has been shown, the indicative gesture is a more 
powerful notion to explain the origin of human intentionality than any theory that 
establishes an association between sound and sensations (as was the case with 
Spirkin: see Chapter 7). 
The main element in the approach Gehlen suggested to the problem of human 
nature is the thesis that the human being cannot be considered divided in terms of 
body and soul. For our purposes in this study, it worth noting that like Thảo, 
Gehlen had considered, in terms of feedback circuits, the relations between the 
various organic, linguistic and technical components of human behaviour. Gehlen 
connected the various components of the human being in such a way that one 
cannot isolate a component element (the mind, language, the hand, abstract 
thought, etc.) and place it as the individuating and constituting principle for the 
human being, thus creating an ontological hierarchy among the components. But 
while Thảo continued to consider the labour and conceptual thinking that is its 
consequence as a distinctive feature of the human being, Gehlen defined the 
human being as an acting being (ein handelndes Wesen): unlike other animals that 
are guided by the instinct, the human being does not have a species-specific 
behavior and lacks a specific environment (Umwelt). This postulate, Gehlen argued 
that the human being is properly a historical animal, as their worldly 
determinations appear dictated by its historically established activities. As the 
reader recall, Thảo made the same deduction. In a phrase, for both, culture is the 
second nature of the human being. But they did not share the same starting point. 
According to Gehlen, the human is an unfinished and deficient animal 
(Mängelwesen), as they are indeterminate beings in relation to their environment. 
By this, Gehlen admitted that the human beings must drive their activity towards a 
not instinctually fixed and not genetically encoded end. As was pointed out by 
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Gehlen, almost every human behaviour is always learned and never immediately 
available at birth. By contrast, we have seen to what extent Thảo acknowledged the 
existence of genetically encoded behaviour in the language and cognitive 
development of the child. Gehlen traced a clear-cut transition from animals to 
humans based on the notion of Mängelwesen and thence he reasoned that human 
beings must necessarily direct their behaviour towards a stabilization of their 
environment. The passions and instincts of the human being have not a specific 
goal and therefore they must be guided. To avoid the risk of the destruction of any 
human society, the institutions are therefore necessary for the social life and the 
very survival of the human being. For this reason, Gehlen reasoned that the human 
being is a being to be disciplined (Wesen der Zucht). Unfortunately, an exhaustive 
account of the subject in all its ramifications is not possible. We have prefered to 
focus our attention on the fact that Gehlenʼs approach interfaces in multiple ways 
with Thaoʼs one, especially in PDM. But the presupposition underlying Gehlenʼs 
insight of the human being as a Wesen der Zucht is dramatically different from 
Thaoʼs emphasis on human dignity, as we have just seen in the previous paragraph. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks on the Language of the Real Life and the Cultural 
Niche 
 
Although the role of genetic inheritance is very important in Thảo’s theory, one 
of the most interesting Thảoʼs theses on language origins concerned the 
emergence of language as a social fact. And even if human essence is the 
crystallization of past social relationships, biology is partly the result of society. 
Furthermore, not all language is genetically inherited. Only the fundamental layer 
of language is inherited by the child who develops it in the course of ontogeny. The 
language of real life remains a collective product. Thảo did not tell us that our 
ancestors had previously some specific linguistic skills at their disposal, except for 
vocalizations and gestures they shared with other animals. That means that our 
ancestors had no genetic predisposition to language. Additionally, language is first 
and foremost a cultural phenomenon. In other words, the genetic mutation does 
not precede the social invention of language. Rather, the social invention of 
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language behaviour exerts a selective pressure on individuals so that a given 
character is fixed in the genetic code. 
The culturally-driven co-evolution of gene and culture seems to be the key to 
understand one of the most relevant hypotheses set out by Thảo in his ILC. Against 
the background of the mid-20-century climate of opinion, Thảoʼs view was not 
widely shared as it would be today (see Dor & Jablonka 2000, 2001, 2004, 2010). In 
the second half of the 20th century, the modern synthesis was the paradigm that 
dominated the theory of evolution. The label synthetic theory was given to that 
theory by Julian Huxley in 1942, but this theory is also called neo-Darwinian 
synthesis, the neo-Darwinian theory of evolution or simply neo-Darwinism to 
emphasize the fact that it constitutes an extension of the original theory of Darwin, 
who still did not know the mechanisms of heredity discovered by Mendel. 
According to the modern synthesis, the genetic variation of natural populations is 
randomly produced by mutations and recombinations. As we have already seen in 
Chapter 1, excluding the possibility of transmission of acquired characters, modern 
synthesis regarded Lamarckism, and its most recent form, Lysenkoism, as a real 
danger in scientific biology. 
Of course, the picture is much more complex. Suffice it to say that, within the 
modern synthesis, for instance, Lloyd Morgan, James Mark Baldwin (1861–1934) 
and Fairfield Osborne (1887–1969) have suggested that many individuals in dealing 
with a new critical situation adapt themselves to learning. Adapting through 
learning allows members of the population to survive until the moment when new 
mutations enable the emergence of an innate response process. Such a process is 
called Baldwin effect by the name of the American researcher who proposed this 
theory in the late 19th century. An explanation of the inheritance of acquired 
learning responses was proposed by Conrad Waddington (1905–1975) in the United 
Kingdom, and by Ivan Schmalhausen (1884–1963) in the Soviet Union. Waddington 
and Schmalhausen proposed an evolutionary process as a Darwinian mechanism 
that allows certain acquired characters to become inheritable. But as we have said 
the picture is not that clear. In fact, Waddingtonʼs theories had been criticised by 
Ernst Mayr and Theodosius Dobzhansky, who accused him of Lamarkism. Instead, 
on 23 August 1948, Schmalhausen became a victim of the Order 1208, one of a series 
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signed by Minister of Higher Education in the USSR, which led to the mass 
dismissals of many university professors. Due to accusations of promoting 
Darwinian evolutionary theory, at the time when Lysenkoism played a major role 
in Stalinʼs policy, he was removed from the heading positions in Moscow 
institutions. 
For many years, evolutionists have dismissed epigenetic mechanisms. Most 
Western biologists considered evolutionary phenomena in terms of random 
genetic variants that could produce useful effects and were therefore selected. The 
role of the environment was overlooked. Only recently the evo-devo approach has 
highlighted the link between ontogenesis and phylogeny (see West-Eberhard 2003). 
Nowadays, some scholars suggest that an initial phenotypic-behavioural 
adjustment, not generated by a casual mutation but by phenotypic plasticity, 
would spread a practice that would change the social and ecological niche by 
altering the selective pressure and generating a selective regime for those genetic 
variants that implement the transmission skills of the material culture (cf. Pievani 
& Suman 2016: 68-69). That would be the case of language. Such a practice would be 
a communicative form which has been functional to the transmission of survival-
related behaviour. Neodarwinian extended synthesis sets out a model of biological 
causality (the so-called reciprocal causation: see Laland et al., 2010) which focuses 
on the plurality of causal factors and their multilevel interactions involved in a 
coevolutionary process. In this case, the genes would appear later when the 
modified selective pressures allow their diffusion and fixation within the biological 
population. In this regard, some scholars are introducing the notion of “inclusive 
inheritance” (see Danchin et al. 2011). It seems that Thảo’s theory of human 
evolution and language development fits well in that framework.  
To move forward, we should remind the reader what, for Thảo, the language of 
real life is not. It is not the observable language behaviour as it is in behaviourism. 
In this case, Thảo’s theory would be limited to physiology. The language of real life 
is not the ordinary language of the philosophical school of Oxford. In this case, 
Thảo would ignore the link between social conditions and language behaviour. The 
language of real life is not the Saussureʼs langue. In this case, it would be a psychic 
entity – and, for the same reason, it is neither the Chomskyʼs competence nor the 
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performance. The language of real life is not a worldview of post-Humboldtian 
tradition because, in this case, there would not be bidirectional relationships 
between language and reality. And it is not a product of consciousness. Rather, the 
language of real life precedes consciousness and will. As Thảo put it, the language 
of real life emerges from a given specific goal-oriented need to communicate. This 
need is not a general one but depends upon a specific form of the organization of 
societies. For this reason, the study of the language of real life reveals the real 
social relations within a given society. 
The language of real life reflects the production relations. Thus, it conveys 
contradictory meanings in so far as the society is marked by contradictions. And 
consciousness is seriously affected by social relations by way of the language of real 
life. By this, consciousness can be oriented by social conditions. Thảo did not 
explain to what extent the speaker passively adapts to the linguistic codes decided 
by the socio-economic system. The reason of this could be Thảoʼs caution in facing 
political issues, of course. Likely, for this reason, he deeply analysed the structure 
of those signs which are not ideologically-oriented. Specifically, those signs – such 
as the gestural indication – whose function is eminently epistemic. We can only 
add that, according to Thảoʼs standpoint, the ideology is nothing other than a 
rational discursive conscious organization of meanings conveyed by the language 
of real life. 
Before concluding, we must pay special attention to Thảoʼs firm reaction against 
the Husserlian theory of consciousness (see above Ch. 4). Thảo questioned the 
validity of Husserlʼs theory of consciousness exactly because higher mental 
activities are activities of humans considered in their whole existence. We should 
not reduce our analysis of consciousness to the inner life of consciousness itself, 
neglecting the real relationships between the individual and both the social milieu 
and the surrounding environment. In a similar way, we should not dismiss the role 
of both language and body in the study of consciousness. For this reason, 
phenomenology is an abstraction, an idealisation that separates consciousness and 
concrete existence. In Thảoʼs view, it is important to emphasise that consciousness 
is anchored in collective activities. The lived experience is, indeed, the product of 
social relations among individuals during the process of production and 
 435 
reproduction of their means of existence. Higher mental activities are the 
extension of real material behaviour. And the language of real life is at the heart of 
the internalisation of material behaviour. Assuming that the language of real life 
seriously affects all the aspects of our existence, then perception and theoretical 
and philosophical elaborations are more or less linked to social practice. The 
material behaviour (the language of real life, the social relations, and the modes of 
production) is the cultural niche that constitutes the environment of 
consciousness. In a phrase to sum up the meaning of Thảo’s anthropological 
project, the dimension of rational thought must be reconciled with the real life. 
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Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
At this point is useful to make a few brief points about Thảo’s overall view of 
language evolution, and what aspects of it are relevant to the history of the puzzle 
of language origins. As we have seen, several thinkers and scientists throughout 
the philosophical and scientific tradition took up the relationship between 
cooperation, language, and social cognition. Among them, Thảo seems us to 
deserves a special mention. His account threw into sharp relief the social nature of 
both language and cognition, so that language evolution is linked inextricably to 
social relations. Such a view depended upon the assumption that labour is an 
exclusively human characteristic which sets humans apart from animals. And the 
genesis of language is in human labour. In this way of thinking, language develops 
among both our pre-human ancestors and present humans in response to 
problems posed by the material life. Bearing in mind that language arises from the 
social demands and needs of the material world, language is transformed itself as 
human society changes. Given the social roots of thought and language, 
consciousness evolves continuously over time. 
In our research, we have tried to suggest and overview of Thảo’s reflection on 
human language from the 1940s to 1975. In the following lines, we will sum up the 
main contents of our research. What will stand out is the fact that our efforts 
tended to place Thảo’s theory (or theories) in its historical context and to study its 
inner development over the period in question. And we must also highlight the fact 
that our understanding of Thảo’s theory largely depended on still unpublished 
texts. 
In the first chapter, we saw how the phenomenological analysis of lived 
experience leads Thảo to radicalize the phenomenological reduction: since 
everything is the result of the movement of the constitution, consciousness must 
also be considered as the result of the constitution. But this time, the constitution 
is realized by the matter itself. More precisely, the consciousness described by 
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phenomenology must be considered as the result of biological evolution as well as 
of social history. For this reason, Thảo has argued that it is necessary to consider 
dialectical materialism as the only coherent solution to safeguard the positive 
results of phenomenology. A digression devoted to the history of the “dialectical 
materialism” served to better understand Thảo’s philosophical choice in the 
context of France at that time. In fact, that period was marked by the influence of 
the Stalinist dialmat. In this respect, it should be noted that Thao refused to think 
dialectical materialism as a political position. For him, dialectical materialism is the 
philosophical solution that can solve the main conundrum of phenomenology. In 
this way, we compared Thảo’s theory with the hypothesis of French existentialism 
(which implies a reduction of the world to the structures of subjectivity) and, 
among other things, with the approach of Merleau-Ponty who, in the same period, 
suggested a philosophical project very similar to Thảo’s one. But we added that, 
that on the one hand, we have a phenomenologization of naturalism with Merleau-
Ponty, and on the other hand a naturalization of phenomenology with Thao. Thảo 
argued that dialectical materialism allowed him not to reduce consciousness to 
matter without neglecting the material origins of consciousness. It seems quite 
relevant that he emphasized the way in which matter is a philosophical concept 
that serves to describe reality as a dialectical movement that leads to increasingly 
sophisticated levels of organization. In this sense, Thao followed and developed 
Engels’ project of a dialectic of nature. Interestingly, for Thao the 
phenomenological analyses are valid only within the animal world. On that basis, 
we can observe a primordial form of consciousness already in the simplest 
organisms. Specifically, Thảo added that consciousness is only the result of the 
inhibition of a given behaviour and the symbolic function can be considered as an 
important step in the evolution of animal consciousness. In this case, the lived 
inner experience of the organism is no longer known in the interiority of 
consciousness, but rather is communicated to others through behaviour. 
The main point of Chapter 2 was the analysis of Thảo’s hypothesis on the origins 
of human language in his PDM. Human language is the result of two conditions. 
First, it is the most sophisticated form of a symbolic function that already exists in 
animals, and especially among mammals. Second, human language deeply depends 
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on the specific way of organizing society among our ancestors. After briefly 
describing how the symbolic function derives from the mechanism of inhibition, 
we described the semiotic structure of symbols: the repressed sketched act 
becomes the expression of all uncompleted behaviour that has been inhibited at 
the level of the nervous system (meaning). Now, we must only mention that Thảo’s 
theory is the apex of a long tradition that begins with the German philosopher 
Ludwig Noiré and arrives at Thảo through the works of philosophers, 
psychologists, linguists, and textbooks! According to this tradition, language arose 
among our ancestors during the collective work in the form of involuntary 
vocalizations produced as a result of the muscle efforts (ho ... hisse!) which later 
would become the first verbs. Thảo also believed that metaphorical processes are 
at work in the development of the symbolic function. At the end of the chapter, we 
wondered how to explain the passage, the mediation, between the practical life 
and the life of the consciousness. To point the fact, prelinguistic expressions are 
part of practical life but they are meaningless, while language only refers to mental 
content withouth being part of practical life. In a phrase, the manipulation of 
concepts substitues the manipulation of objects. Thảo seems to support a form of 
linguistic theory for which the speaker is cut off from the subject of practical life. 
In other words, language is nothing other than the abstract moment and the 
negation of the real life. 
In the 1960s, Thao changed his mind. Thao shared with other Marxists such as 
Lucien Sève and Henri Lefebvre the critique of (Saussurean) structural semiological 
model which was centred on language as a system composed of negative and 
differential elements. The autonomy of structures leads to think of structures as 
metaphysical entities and to confuse the ideal with the real, the products of science 
with actual reality. But Thao had a very different objective compared to other 
Marxists. They criticised the extension of the Saussurian semiological model to 
other human and social sciences, while Thảo had to outline the fundamental lines 
of a general semiology that would have allowed him to describe the phylogenetic 
development of language and consciousness. This was the subject of Chapter 3. 
There, we also suggested a comparison between Thảo and Italian semiologist Rossi-
Landi. In the same years, they proposed two semiotic models based on the Marxian 
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philosophy. However, Rossi-Landi’s aim was to develop his theory of the homology 
between the market and the language, largely accepting the notion of linguistic 
value and arbitrariness, while Thảo wanted to think of social conditions of 
language production by removing the primacy of arbitrary signs and the 
correlative notion of value. 
In chapter 4, we approached the old philosophical question of realism. More 
precisely, we described how Thảo has tried to link consciousness and material 
reality. After a short presentation of the ontological and epistemological 
assumptions we can observe in Thảo’s theory of consciousness, we briefly 
described the position of Engels and that of Lenin’s in his Materialism and Empirio-
Criticism Thảo seems to refer to. In this way, Thảo’s criticism of Husserlian 
phenomenology became more and more clear. Husserl’s philosophy was for Thảo a 
kind of subjective idealism because phenomenology has simply described the lived 
experience of the subject and neglected the real relation between the subject and 
the external material reality. In fact, according to Thảo the semiotic act of the 
indication implies the most fundamental relationship between humans and the 
physical environment. It goes without saying that the gesture of indication 
(pointing) must be considered as the origin of the consciousness as well as the 
support of the actual and embodied intentionality because it implies not only the 
relation subject-object but also the belief in the outside world as such and 
independent of the subject. As such, pointing is the condition of possibility of the 
objective and shared world, because the thing becomes the underlying layer of 
several possible perspectives on it. 
In chapter 5, we focused on that it is not by chance that Thảo’s definition of 
consciousness as “inner language” in his ILC. To him, consciousness is the 
internalisation of the language of real life. The flow of the inner speech must not be 
considered as disembodied; it is rather supported by a sketched nerve stimulation. 
In a similar way, in the flow of the inner language, the subject is not alone but 
addresses the discourses proper to the inner image of the others. Then, a brief 
analysis of the Soviet debate on the nature of consciousness in the 1950s and 1960s 
would be conducted to better understand a possible context in which Thảo 
developed his own theory. Then, some remarks on the debate on the mind-body 
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problem taking place in the English-speaking world in the same period would show 
how, in the 1950s and 1960s, after the crisis Behaviourism, researchers largely dealt 
with the problem of consciousness and its relationship with the body on both sides 
of the Iron Curtain. As far as this debate is concerned, the peculiarity of Thảo’s 
approach lies in the role he assigned to language and society in the formation of 
consciousness. The attempt to balance materialism and anti-reductionism lead 
Thảo towards a sort of emergentism. We cannot exclude, however, that Thao seems 
also to suggest a form of epiphenomenalism and one can, therefore, ask to what 
extent consciousness can influence the actual behaviour. One answer seems to be 
that consciousness is only a behaviour that the subject addresses to himself. 
Chapter 6 examined the extent to which the language of real life is to be 
considered as the mediation between social practice and consciousness. To address 
this point, we began by sketching a comparison between the theory of Thảo 
consciousness and that of Vološinov/Baxtin. To summarize, we can enumerate the 
common hypothesis shared by our authors in the following list: 
 
a. Language is a human practice involved in social interactions; 
b. Conscious contents depend on the internalization of language; 
c. Language is not the translation of ideas that pre-exist in consciousness; 
d. Language is the internalisation of public dialogue; 
e. Subjectivity is the result of intersubjectivity; 
f. The social origin of language conditions the forms of thought; 
g. Consciousness cannot be reduced to physio-neurological mechanisms. 
 
The similarities between the two authors depend both on dialectical 
materialism and the critique of abstract objectivism in linguistic thought, that is, 
on the tendency of language as a closed, abstract and stable system. Both argue 
that they wanted to return to a conception of the social production of signs. 
However, the difference is that Vološinov/Baxtin wanted to propose a philosophy 
of language as a philosophy of ideological signs, while Thảo wanted to show how 
the Marxist approach to language can solve problems related to the phylogenetic 
origin of language and consciousness. After this analysis, we highlighted the main 
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hypotheses of the sociogenesis of consciousness according to Thảo’s theory. The 
main element of Thảo’s approach to the question of consciousness is his theory of 
the internalization of the language of real life. The language of real life seems to be 
the key to explaining how conscious contents arise. To better explain this point, we 
compared Thảo’s theory with Vygotsky’s. They believed that consciousness seems 
to be an internalisation of the social behaviour. Nonetheless, while Thao paralleled 
Vygotsky in describing the phylogeny of language, he preferred to follow Piaget 
when he described the ontogenetic formation of linguistic behaviour. It should also 
be noted that for Thảo language and thought have the same origin, whereas for 
Vygotsky language and thought had two different sources. 
Chapter 7 sketched out a survey of Thảo’s hypothesis on the development of 
practical skills such as the use and production of instruments or tools. As we have 
largely seen, Thảo’s hypothesis on the origins of language largely depended on 
Engels’ theory of the role of labour in the development of language skills. In detail, 
Thảo tried to justify Engels’ proposals with the most recent results in several 
academically distinct fields of research such as biology, archaeology, 
paleoanthropology, etc. According to Thảo, all the stages of technological 
development allow us to propose hypotheses about the social relations needed to 
produce certain types of tools and therefore the corresponding linguistic skills 
belonging to our ancestors. In order to identify what was and was not distinctive of 
Thảo’s theory, we offered a systematic, exhaustive and comparative overview of 
the studies carried out in different fields such as archaeology, paleoanthropology, 
biology, etc., in the middle of the 20th century. In this way, we understood what 
criteria Thảo employed to date the most important advances in technology and 
lithic industry during the evolution of our ancestors (Chelllean, Olduwan, 
Acheulean and Musterian). After that, our analysis also showed to what extent he 
made special efforts to situate his work in a context of a wider international 
discussion of the problems related to the origin of our species. Thus, we examined 
to what extent the mastery of available knowledge has been an important factor in 
Thảo’s theory of human evolution as well as human cultural development. In 
addition to this, Thảo had not only accepted the available hypotheses on human 
biological and cultural evolution. He was also caustic in his opposition to certain 
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ways of interpreting the empirical evidence. But we can not forget that Thảo also 
seems to be largely influenced by contemporary researchers whose thinking 
betrays certain elements of anthropocentrism and teleology. 
In Chapter 8, we compared Thảo’s theory of language with certain assumptions 
of the classics of dialectical materialism, the main trends of Soviet anthropology 
(Spirkin, Bunak) and Soviet linguistics (Abaeb) of the 1960s and 1970s. We also took 
into account the debates on language origins that took place in Western countries 
in the middle of the 20th century. We discussed the positions taken by scholars 
such as Jakobson, Mead, Oakley, Leroi-Gourhan, Bronowski, Kainz, Goodall, 
Reynolds, and many others. Given this scenario, Thảo seems to be one of the most 
radical researchers in that he has assigned gestures and multi-modality a key role 
in explaining the formation of language and thought. That point could explain the 
reason why he was largely interested in Birdwhistell’s kinesics (see fig. 7a). 
Chapter 9 was composed of six groups of paragraphs. In the first, we discussed 
the method used by Thảo. Archeology and psychology offered results that Thảo 
took as empirical starting points to suggest his hypothesis and to which he also 
returned to confirm his own hypothesis. In the second group of paragraphs, Thảo’s 
approach to innate language abilities in children is analysed in detail. We 
illustrated how the hypothesis of the recapitulation of phylogeny by ontogenesis 
and the analogy between the development of language in children and the 
symbolic skills of our ancestors are necessarily based on the assumption of the 
innateness of some modern-human symbolic skills in the child. After that, we 
addressed some questions about the deductive method that seems to work in 
Thảo’s reasoning. He established a finite set of formulas (six) that can generate all 
the infinite occurrences of signs that occur during phylogeny as well as ontogeny. 
In the third group of paragraphs, we tried to analyse Thảo’s theory in the context 
of the debates between psycholinguists during the 1960s. Then, again on the 
subject of the language of the child, we evaluated whether Thảo’s hypothesis 
lacked a solid base of experimental data or if Thảo’s understanding of experimental 
data was inappropriate. At this point, remarks about Thảo’s alleged scientism and 
its relation to the phenomenological method and the practice of phenomenological 
reduction were introduced. Finally, we tackled the issue of the representation of 
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the language that Thảo seemed us to accept. According to Thảo, the linguistic study 
of language as a closed system of arbitrary signs which depends on the differential 
relations between them is too reductive. The essence of language transcends the 
narrow limits of linguistics. The human language is essentially a substance, an 
empirical phenomenon. As an empirical fact, language must also be considered a 
biological fact. In this way, anatomy, biology, physiology and psychology offered 
clues to investigate the nature of language. But language is also a social fact. As 
such, language largely depends on the development of the forces of production. In 
this way, it also fulfils the function of a means of communication. But this does not 
mean that the subject freely decides to communicate his own pre-linguistic 
thoughts to others through language. As we saw, in fact, the language of real life is 
an objective social entity that determines the emergence of individual 
consciousness. 
In Chapter 10, we focused on the way Thảo described the oldest forms of 
language – circular-arc movements and straight-line gestures – and analysed the 
development of the corresponding cognitive skills (as the language of real life is 
the key to explain the genesis of abstract thought). The emergence of new signs 
depends on the intrinsic contradictions of available signs that are no longer 
adapted to new material activities. Thus, the language of real life has evolved to 
better represent the things independent of the mind. In fact, each sign reveals 
inadequacies, and, for this reason, it must be overtaken by another more 
sophisticated sign. Specifically, the six forms of the developed sign of indication 
reflect in a more sophisticated way the material movement of things. For Thao, the 
qualitative leap that conditions the emergence of the sign of representation from 
the simple indication depends on the ability to transcend the limits of the current 
perception. Representation is an active image produced by the subject that marks 
the beginning of thought, that is, the ability to manipulate the representation of 
things that are absent, possible, or impossible. Nevertheless, the representation of 
the absent thing and the sign that conveys this representation are communicable 
and meaningful simply because they depend on a shared field of reference. This 
conundrum shows the most relevant limit of the sign of representation. 
Thảo’s goal was also to explain the transition leading from the connection 
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between two (or more) syncretic words to fully formed sentences. For him, the 
function of fully formed and developed sentences is to express the links of things 
through the connection of words that refer to these things. Thus, in Chapter 11, we 
argued that Thảo had suggested a theory of the iconic nature of syntax. For some of 
today’s scholars, the syntax shows some iconicity in that it establishes the 
relationship between the order of words and morphemes in a sentence with the 
order of the facts described by the sentence. This relationship is diagrammatic, 
that is, the relationship between the parts of the linguistic structure reflects the 
relationship between the things or concepts that these parts codify (see, for 
example, Haiman 1985, Givón 1989, Burling 1999; also cf. Matthews 1991: 12). In this 
way, the syntax does not correspond to arbitrary rules independent of the state of 
things. The use of particular grammatical forms is strongly linked, if not 
determined, by the presence of particular semantic or pragmatic functions in the 
discourse (see Van Valin 1991 and Tomlin 1990). 
Our comments focused on the functional sentence. According to Thảo, the 
functional sentence is the association of isolated meaningful pre-existing 
vocalizations (syncretic words). It marks the dialectical transition from the use of 
isolated syncretic words to the first real sentence. But to get a clearer idea of what 
was and what was not distinctive of Thảo’s iconic theory of syntax, we described 
his theory of the formation of both the name and the and verb in greater detail. In 
this regard, one asked some questions. Does Thảo’s theory really explain the 
transition between isolated words and real sentences? Did Thảo’s actually explain 
the origins of predication? Did he rather assume the existence of predication, since 
he emphasized the predicative function of functional sentences? How does the 
juxtaposition of two vocalizations imply the connection of two meanings, then the 
emergence of a complex whole image that represents the real links between 
things? Could syntactic structures be reduced to a simple improvement of verbal 
abilities? Should the syntactic connection simply be considered as a more 
sophisticated means of expressing a planned semantic connection and nothing 
more? 
Chapter 14 tried to sum up the main lines of our study. In this way, we focused 
on what we consider the culmination of Thảo’s philosophical project, i.e., a 
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philosophical theory of human nature. To gain a clearer understanding of Thảo’s 
anthropology we had to begin with a comparison of his theory of language origins 
with the history of the topic. In this way, we showed how the main theoretical 
problem arisen in PDM was the relationship between the life of consciousness and 
the practical life. The notions of the language of real life and the gesture of 
indication introduced in ILC solved that problem. Consciousness evolves 
continuously over time because the transformation of language parallels the 
development of human society itself. It means that consciousness cannot be 
reduced to the corporeal activity but needs to be explained against the background 
of social relations and labour. 
From a philosophical standpoint, Husserlian phenomenology had failed to 
recognize three essential links: i) the one between the life of consciousness and 
practical life; ii) the link between the life of the individual and the net of social 
relations; iii) the link between modern humans and the history of human lineage. 
We have already taken the link of the first two kinds into account. We may now 
focus on the last point. This may have stimulated Thảo to suggest that human 
ontogeny reactivates the previous stages of human evolution. But another way to 
say the same thing is that there is a universal human nature. Thảo’s philosophical 
conception of human nature serves to judge current and future societies avoiding 
the reference to particular historical conditions of the formation of consciousness. 
Obviously, the theory of alienation and its overcoming has a teleological and 
speculative character. Nonetheless, Thảo’s aim was to set out a theory which 
dismiss every kind of radical nurturism. As the comparison with Gehlen’s 
anthropology showed very well, according to Thảo, humans do not need to be 
disciplined.  By contrast, the fulfilment of human-specific aspirations depends 
upon the acknowledgement of the human nature in each person and the shared 
organization of the entire process of production and reproduction of the existence. 
Our efforts, which have been devoted to a detailed analysis of the RLC and 
provided a historical perspective on how Thảo addressed the problems of language, 
could take the form of a commented edition of that book (ongoing project in 
collaboration with Andrea D’Urso). The researchers could finally have at their 
disposal an improved text thanks to the errata corrige signed by the hand of Thảo 
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himself. As a result, a historical analysis devoted to the development of Thảo’s 
theory and essentially based on the results of this study – which largely depends on 
unpublished manuscripts – will also enable scholars to appreciate the philosophical 
value of the ILC. This will be the most immediate and concrete result of this study. 
Since our research provides a better understanding of the relationship between 
Thảo’s theories of language origins in his PDM and RLC, one will also examine the 
extent to which his theory changed in the 1980s. To achieve this aim, scholars have 
to previously study the unpublished and totally neglected Anthropological 
Investigations which reflect Thảos’ point of view on the issuein the 1980s. In those 
investigations, he suggested several fascinating, unexpected and suggestive 
hypotheses that were profoundly and essentially different from what he had 
proposed in his previous writings. Once we have completed the reconstruction of 
Thảo’s theory of the language origins at the end of the 1980s, we will be able to 
draw up a complete account of Thảo’s research into language from the 1940s to the 
1980s, along with a description of the internal evolution of Thảo’s thought 
throughout his career.  
What must also be emphasized is that Thảo’s thought may still be useful in 
assessing and appreciating some assumptions about the origins of human language 
that have been proposed for recent decades. For instance, the study of language 
origins has tended towards the relationship between language and cooperation, as 
exemplified in the works of Tomasello et al. (2005: 690). How exactly are these 
relationships to be understood? Could Thảo’s theory help us to better understand 
the commonly-held view of language origins? According to Tomasello, the 
evolution of language lies in the evolution of the ability for shared intentionality 
that enables us to develop a shared point of view as well as shared goals, plans, and 
intentions in cooperative activities within a joint attentional frame and a shared 
frame of reference. To Thảo, however, shared intentionality is the prerequisite of 
individual intentionality rather than being its development. Additionally, the 
evolution of that ability depends upon the need to cooperate rather than being the 
condition for having cooperation. 
Thảo’s emphasis on labour (collective hunting, tool-making, etc.) makes his 
theory close to those of many recent scholars such as Lieberman (1984), Burling 
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(1999), Arbib (2005), Stout (2008), and Bickerton (2009). According to Thảo, tool-
making must fulfil a dual task. Archaeological evidence serves to deduce the 
cognitive skills of our ancestors and understand the evolution of social habits. On 
the one hand archaeological discoveries reveal the way the cognition of our 
ancestors worked, and, on the other hand, the evolution of practical skills involved 
in tool-making is the point of departure to suggest hypotheses on the evolution of 
language. In other words, Thảo argued that cooperative hunting, social learning, 
tool-making, and faculty of language share the same cognitive background. From 
this point of view, he suggested something similar to what has been set out by 
some recent scholars such as Gärdenfors (2003), Osvath and Gärdenfors (2005), and 
Spelke (1990 and 2000). 
Thảo’s theory may recall some assumptions of externalism (Parent 2013) and the 
token-reflexive approach (Reichenbach 1947). Language and other communicative 
acts, indeed, must be studied against the background of real communication and in 
relation to the pragmatic and physical frame of reference. To Thảo, cognitive and 
linguistic processes are rooted in physical interactions of the body with the 
physical and social environment. By contrast, recent theories of embodied 
cognition seem to neglect the role of social environment (see Borghi and Cimatti 
2015 for more elaborate treatment). 
Thảo’s theory meets the need of an interdisciplinary approach in the field of the 
research on the evolution of language. So Thảo acknowledged that a research on 
that topic must be intimately related to the findings of biology, too, as today it is 
widely accepted by the scientific community (cf. Fitch, Hauser and Chomsky 2005: 
180). Interestingly, he had, however, a peculiar idea of biology which was 
extensively informed by Lysenko’s epigenetic model (see Levins and Lewontin 1985 
for more details). On that basis, not only did Thảo suggest that the development of 
the brain could entail the evolution of language, he also set out that language, in 
turn, may change the brain and the corresponding cognitive skills. Nowadays, this 
dynamic is called co-evolution of both brain and language (cf. Deacon 1998: 113). 
But nobody should forget that to Thảo the social praxis mediates the mutual 
influence of language and brain. 
Nowadays scholars are suggesting that cognitive processes are the result of the 
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interactions of the nervous system with the body (embodiment), through 
interaction with the surrounding environment (enactive cognition), and in 
association with the action (situated cognition). Someone is arguing that our 
ancestors have gone from instrument-assisted ecology to a tool-dependent one 
(see Bruner et al. 2016). Material culture was no longer an addition, but an 
ecological and evolutionary necessity. This is the case of Baldwin’s effect: an 
external factor, such as material culture, affects a behavioural modification that 
subsequently orients genetic variations (see Chapter 12 for more elaborate 
treatment). In other words, cultural changes have shaped the human ecological 
niches, which then they have retroactive on our biology and our physiology (see 
Laland et al., 2010; Pievani & Suman 2016). From the point of view of our concerns, 
it could be useful to highlight that some cognitive abilities induced or allowed the 
behaviour but, at the same time, environmental-induced behaviour can induce a 
development of cognitive capacity. Scholars such as Morgan and colleagues (2015) 
have recently concluded that the diffusion of material culture (lithic industries) 
has been accompanied by a development of more sophisticated information 
transmission mechanisms: observation, imitation, teaching, and articulated 
language. In other words, the hypothesis is that there has been a long and gradual 
evolution of material culture and language, beginning at least from the onset of the 
Oldowan industry. This approach is surprisingly similar to Thảoʼs one even if he did 
not take care to develop this point in great detail. 
The question facing Thảo in his ILC was how full-formed language evolved from 
what, nowadays, Bickerton (1998: 341) calls protolanguage. But, in contrast to 
many today’s scholars, Thảo previously provided a general semiotic theory to 
support his hypothesis. This approach avoids the danger of the highly variable 
terminology. And in so far as Thảo refused to merely condemn the non-wholly 
arbitrary signs, he preserved the term sign so as to explicitly deprive it of all the 
privileges accorded it by scholars who regard full-formed language as a model of 
any semiotic system. Thảo, thus, seems to advocate a form of continuity approach 
(Pinker and Bloom 1990; Pinker and Jackendoff 2005). Accordingly, Thảo described 
the evolution of linguistic skills among all symbol-using species in the Homo 
lineage (cf. Deacon 1998: 340). Furthermore, Thảo’s semiotics offers some tools to 
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assess some assumptions which are extensively employed by recent scholars. For 
instance, Clark and Brennan (1991) mean with “joint attentional frame” or 
“common ground” what gives a pointing gesture its meaning. Thảo would not have 
agreed with this definition. As Thảo put it, the joint attentional frame does not 
really work as something brought in from the outside. The pointing gestures are 
already meaningful. In fact, Thảo’s genetic semiotics is based on the revaluation of 
motivated signs. And for this reason, motivated signs involve joint-attention rather 
than being determined by it. 
Thảo’s emphasis on the peculiar semantic and syntactical features of gestural 
communication systems – which could be at best punctuated with grunts and other 
vocalizations – may recall Corballis’ theory (2003). To Thảo, the development of 
full-formed language follows a slow process that has led the original holistic 
communication system to the analytical structure of modern languages. Mithen 
(2005) has recently suggested something similar but he does not set out that 
holistic communication of our ancestors could be regarded as the only precursor of 
full-formed language. This fact reveals one of the main conundrums of Thảo’s 
theory: How the development of the linear analytical order of words could explain 
the recursive procedures of full-formed languages? Indeed, Thảo was interested in 
the interactions between semantic and syntax rather than the evolution of 
syntactical structures as such. For this reason, it seems that he suggested a theory 
of the iconic nature of syntax (Burling 1999), as we saw in Chapter 11. For the same 
reason, one may ask if the processes of internalisation and abstraction described by 
Thảo could explain the transition from motivated referential syncretic words to 
arbitrary signs. Thảo’s answer was that this process did not end in a prehistoric 
phase but rather continues in everyday life. Motivated signs constantly support the 
conventional construction of systems of arbitrary signs. To Thảo, the most 
elementary understanding of a given speech act is enabled by the motivated 
features of communication (gestures, mimic, syntax, intonation, etc.), the frame of 
reference, and shared practical purposes. 
The previous briefly comparison between Thảo’s theory and the current 
research trends in the evolution of language should not be taken as an attempt to 
legitimate the Vietnamese philosopher. Against that, we should regard Thảo 
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neither as a naïve forerunner nor as a brilliant visionary. A given theory set out in 
the past must be seen as a historical phenomenon. But it does not mean that such a 
theory cannot offer valuable insights on how it is best to proceed with tackling 
current issues. The evolution of language is a field of research that cannot neglect 
the problematic nature and weakness of its methods, paradigms, and assumptions. 
Today, for instance, the main trend of that field of research is the 
interdisciplinarity. A cross-disciplinary research must suggest principles to 
connect data from different disciplines and those principles need to be discussed 
because they have not yet been established a common framework. Consequently, 
nobody can reject ancient theories in advance in so far as they may enable the 
debate to focus on the plausibility and potentialities of currently available 
assumptions. 
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La théorie des origines du langage de Trần Đức Thảo 
Depuis des siècles, plusieurs penseurs et scientifiques ont abordé la relation entre la 
coopération, le langage et la cognition sociale. Parmi eux, Trần Đức Thảo (1917-1993) 
mérite une mention spéciale. Le but de la recherche qui suit est de présenter au lecteur la 
réflexion philosophique de Thảo sur le langage humain et son évolution. Nous essaierons de 
tracer les grandes lignes de la théorie de Thảo sur les origines du langage dans ses 
Recherches sur l'origine du langage et de la conscience (1973) dans lesquelles il a essayé de 
truver une synthèse entre philosophie, linguistique, psychologie et anthropologie physique. 
La découverte du marxisme-léninisme a conduit Thảo à proposer une approche matérialiste 
et dialectique au problème de la relation entre corps esprit. De cette façon, Thảo a proposé 
une sorte de tournant matérialiste et historique de la philosophie de la conscience de Husserl 
qui était au cœur de ses premiers intérêts philosophiques. La théorie de Thảo met en relief la 
nature sociale du langage et de la cognition, de sorte que l’évolution du langage est 
inextricablement liée aux relations sociales. Une telle conclusion reposait sur l’hypothèse 
que le travail est une caractéristique exclusivement humaine qui distingue les humains des 
animaux. Pour lui, la genèse du langage est dans le travail humain et donc le langage se 
développe parmi nos ancêtres pré-humains ainsi que chez les humains en réponse aux 
problèmes posés par la vie matérielle. En gardant à l’esprit que le langage découle des 
exigences sociales et des besoins du monde matériel, selon Thảo le langage se transforme 
lui-même au fur et à mesure que la société humaine change. Et compte tenu des racines 
sociales de la pensée et du langage, la conscience évolue continuellement avec le temps. 
Dans ce cadre, Thảo a voulu déterminer la nature du langage et son rôle dans les sociétés 
préhistoriques et son évolution à travers les relations sociales. 
Mots clés : Tran-Duc-Thao, Evolution du langage, Cognition sociale, Marxisme-léninisme, 
Phénoménologie, Conscience 
 
Trần Đức Thảo’s Theory of Language Origins 
Several thinkers and scientists throughout the philosophical and scientific tradition took up 
the relationship between cooperation, language, and social cognition. Among them, Trần 
Đức Thảoʼs (1917–1993) deserves a special mention. The purpose of the following research 
is to introduce the reader to Thảoʼs philosophical reflection on human language and its 
evolution. We shall attempt to map out the main lines of Thảoʼs theory of language origins 
set out in his Recherches sur l’origine du langage et de la conscience (1973) that combines 
philosophy, linguistics, psychology, and anthropology. The discovery of Marxism-Leninism 
led Thảo to suggest a materialistic and dialectic approach to the mind-body problem. In this 
way, Thảo tried to suggest a materialist and historical turn of Husserl’s philosophy of 
consciousness which was at the very heart of his own first philosophical interests. Thảo’s 
account threw into sharp relief the social nature of both language and cognition, so that 
language evolution is linked inextricably to social relations. Such a view depended upon the 
assumption that labour is an exclusively human characteristic which sets humans apart from 
animals. And the genesis of language is in human labour. In this way of thinking, language 
develops among both our pre-human ancestors and present humans in response to problems 
posed by the material life. Bearing in mind that language arises from the social demands and 
needs of the material world, language is transformed itself as human society changes. And 
given the social roots of thought and language, consciousness evolves continuously over 
time. Within this framework, Thảo wanted to determine the nature of language and its role in 
pre-historical societies and its making through social relations. 
Key Words: Tran-Duc-Thao, Language Evolution, Social Cognition, Marxism-Leninism, 
Phenomenology, Consciousness 
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